• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00205 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10771 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00205 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10771 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00205 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10771 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00205 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10771 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00205 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10771 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00205 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10771 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00205 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10771 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00205 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10771 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0.28%

Our People > Dr. Robert M. Cutler

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Dr. Robert M. Cutler

Senior Editor and Contributor

Robert M. Cutler has written and consulted on Central Asian affairs for over 30 years at all levels. He was a founding member of the Central Eurasian Studies Society’s executive board and founding editor of its Perspectives publication. He has written for Asia Times, Foreign Policy Magazine, The National Interest, Euractiv, Radio Free Europe, National Post (Toronto), FSU Oil & Gas Monitor, and many other outlets.

He directs the NATO Association of Canada’s Energy Security Program, where he is also senior fellow, and is a practitioner member at the University of Waterloo’s Institute for Complexity and Innovation. Educated at MIT, the Graduate Institute of International Studies (Geneva), and the University of Michigan, he was for many years a senior researcher at Carleton University’s Institute of European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies, and is past chairman of the Montreal Press Club’s Board of Directors.

Articles

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan’s High-Stakes Race for Pakistan

In recent years, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have embarked on distinct yet complementary paths to enhance their connectivity with Pakistan. Kazakhstan has embedded itself within such institutionalized frameworks as the Middle Corridor (also known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, or TITR). In this context, it has also sought to align with trans-Eurasian logistics designed to integrate South Asian trade routes into established infrastructural regimes. Uzbekistan, by contrast, marginalized from World Bank-backed corridors, has adopted a more adaptive and tactical approach by advancing alternative linkages such as the Termez–Karachi transport corridor and the Trans-Afghan Railway. Both strategies reflect the imperative to reduce dependence on Russian-controlled northern routes while leveraging Pakistan’s maritime infrastructure to reposition Central Asia within the matrix of regional and global trade. Thus, a few days ago, at a meeting with Uzbekistan’s Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Pakistan, the prospect of developing the Termez–Karachi transport corridor was discussed. Termez is on Uzbekistan's border with Afghanistan; the goods would travel via Kabul and Kandahar to Quetta, then to the Karachi port. The possibility of establishing an advanced logistics terminus in Termez with the assistance of Pakistan's National Logistics Corporation was explored. The two sides noted the need to create a permanent platform for business communications between them, such as an Entrepreneurs' Council coordinated by their respective Chambers of Commerce. This road route should not be confused with the Trans-Afghan Corridor (TAC, also called the Trans-Afghan Railway Project or the Uzbekistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan Railway Project), a $4.8 billion project to connect the three countries via 573 kilometers of rail. This rail route would run from Termez through Mazar-e-Sharif and Logar in Afghanistan, reaching Pakistan at the Kharlachi border crossing and extending to Kohat District, where a rail link southward already exists. In August 2024, the governments of Kazakhstan and Pakistan agreed to extend the TAC's route into northeast Kazakhstan to create the Trans-Afghan Multimodal Transport Corridor: multimodal because goods would arrive from Kazakhstan at Uzbekistan's Termez terminus by truck, for transshipment by rail to Pakistani ports. From there, they can reach a broad range of countries from Southeast Asia to South Asia to the Middle East. Kazakhstan, pursuing its goal to diversify its export pathways and reduce dependence on traditional northern routes, has explored several connectivity projects that have either direct or indirect implications for trade routes to Pakistan. Of these, the three most significant are the Trans-Afghan Multimodal Transport Corridor (TMTC), the Middle Corridor, and the Quadrilateral Traffic in Transit Agreement (QTTA). The Middle Corridor is the best-known of the three. Seeking to connect China to Europe via the Caspian region, it is not directly pertinent for Pakistan, but it would offer the potential to integrate with Pakistani trade routes, offering an alternative pathway for goods. The QTTA includes China, Kyrgyzstan, and Pakistan along with Kazakhstan. This transit deal aims to facilitate Kazakhstan's foreign trade by providing it with access to Pakistani ports via the Karakoram Highway, which connects Pakistan and China, thereby bypassing Afghanistan. It was agreed in 2017 and...

1 year ago

Kazakhstan and the UAE Are Building a Geoeconomic Powerhouse Spanning Asia and the Gulf

Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s recent mid-January visit to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), to attend the Abu Dhabi Sustainability Week (ADSW) Summit, underscores the strategic importance both nations place on their bilateral ties. ADSW is a prominent global platform dedicated to accelerating sustainable development and promoting international cooperation on the global environmental agenda. The 2025 summit — with the theme, “Nexus of Next: Supercharging Sustainable Progress” — was designed specifically to explore advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence, renewable energy, and innovative sustainability solutions. As leader of the most dynamic of the Central Asian economies, President Tokayev’s presence signaled his country’s ambition to play a more prominent role in addressing environmental challenges at an international level. In his keynote speech, Tokayev addressed environmental issues that are particularly critical for Kazakhstan, including desertification, biodiversity loss, water scarcity, and food security. He emphasized his country’s multifaceted approach to these challenges, which includes digital technologies, large-scale infrastructure projects, and the development of nuclear energy as a low-carbon solution. Kazakhstan has recently launched initiatives, such as expanding solar and wind farms and implementing advanced irrigation systems to combat desertification. Tokayev also highlighted Kazakhstan’s commitment to meeting its renewable energy targets, aiming to generate 15% of its electricity from renewables by 2030, in partnership with global leaders in green technology. Overall, the ADSW Summit provided a platform for Kazakhstan to engage with international partners, share its vision for sustainable development, and explore collaborative opportunities to address global environmental challenges. Kazakhstan’s efforts include the development of the Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum Solar Park, which will have a capacity of 5,000 megawatts (MW) by 2030, and participation in the Space-D programme, which enhances operational performance through nano-satellites. In particular, President Tokayev met with UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan to discuss bilateral relations. The two leaders agreed to focus on a specific economic agenda — focused on trade, investment, and sustainable development — to create positive bilateral trade dynamics. Their Joint Declaration on Strategic Investment Projects in these fields was also highlighted. Kazakhstan and the UAE have developed a dynamic and multifaceted partnership over the past three decades. Since establishing diplomatic relations in 1993, the UAE has become Kazakhstan’s leading strategic partner in the Arab world. Early cooperation focused on trade and investment but has since expanded to include sectors such as petrochemicals, energy, transport, logistics, agriculture, and aerospace. Key milestones include the establishment of direct flight routes between the two countries and the signing of long-term investment agreements in the mid-2000s. Tokayev noted that direct investment from the UAE into Kazakhstan more than doubled from 2023 to 2024, placing the country among the top ten largest foreign investors in Kazakhstan. A focal point of their discussion was the goal of increasing bilateral trade turnover to $1 billion. In this context, the Dubai International Chamber has established a representative office in Kazakhstan to boost trade and investment opportunities further still. For several years, the UAE has been expanding its cooperation with the Greater Caspian...

1 year ago

Kazakhstan’s Nuclear Power Move and Implications for the West

Kazakhstan’s recent referendum approving the construction of its first nuclear power plant (NPP) is a watershed moment. More than a domestic policy decision, this move puts into relief Kazakhstan's strategy for positioning itself as a linchpin in the diversification of global energy supply chains, with the world's largest uranium reserves accounting for nearly 40% of the global supply and a key geographic location. The country's ambitions align with the broader resurgence of nuclear power as an indispensable component of a sustainable energy future, countering decades of stagnation in the West and challenging the dominance of Russia and China. The renewed attention on nuclear energy arises from a convergence of systemic and technological factors. Environmental pressures to reduce reliance on fossil fuels such as gas and coal have left energy producers searching for scalable, reliable alternatives. Renewable energy sources like wind and solar, while important, remain limited by intermittency and storage challenges. At the same time, safety concerns rooted in historical disasters — Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, and Fukushima — have been mitigated by advances in reactor technology. A growing public recognition of nuclear power's viability has resulted. In this context, Kazakhstan's entry into the nuclear power arena is logical. Enhancing its ability to integrate uranium extraction with downstream nuclear fuel production would underscore its potential to play a central role in addressing global energy needs. By fostering international partnerships, Kazakhstan can leverage its resource wealth to become a critical supplier for advanced economies looking to diversify their energy mix. Kazakhstan's move comes at a time of shifting geoeconomic dynamics in the nuclear energy sector. Over the past three decades, Russia and China have consolidated their dominance, exploiting the West’s inertia. Russia has used NPP construction as a geoeconomic tool, creating dependence in such countries as Turkey and Uzbekistan. China, meanwhile, has aggressively developed its domestic nuclear infrastructure while securing global uranium supplies, particularly through investments in Africa and Central Asia. By contrast, Western nations have lagged behind, plagued by fragmented project management, skilled labor shortages, and political resistance. Anti-nuclear movements, many of which gained momentum during the Cold War with Soviet backing, have continued to stymie development in Europe and North America. The resulting industrial inertia has left Western economies vulnerable, with insufficient capacity to meet rising energy demands or counterbalance Russian and Chinese influence. Kazakhstan's emergence offers the West a rare opportunity to reverse this trend. The country’s multi-vector diplomatic strategy, emphasizing balanced relations with global powers, makes it an ideal partner for rebalancing energy supply chains. Kazakhstan’s role in global energy extends beyond uranium. The country’s geological resources overlap with deposits of rare-earth elements (REEs), which are vital for advanced defense technologies, renewable energy systems, and high-tech manufacturing. The shared extraction technologies and logistical infrastructure for uranium and REEs present opportunities for integrated resource development. NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program could play a pivotal role in this regard. By incorporating rare-earth mining and supply chain security into NATO’s Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection (CEIP) framework, member states could...

1 year ago

Kazakhstan Could Save America’s Energy Future

The energy crisis gripping Europe has made clear for all to see the limits of solar and wind power. Years of investment and unbridled ambition have not created renewable sources that can deliver the consistent, large-scale energy that modern economies need. Nuclear power has emerged as the only viable solution for achieving zero-emissions energy while maintaining reliability. Europe’s urgent need to reduce its dependency on Russian gas has made all that even clearer. Meanwhile, the United States faces its own energy challenges. Its nuclear industry urgently requires a secure and stable uranium supply; yet U.S. foreign policy has largely overlooked Kazakhstan, the world’s largest uranium producer. It gets worse. No sitting U.S. president has ever visited Kazakhstan, which produces over 40% of the world’s natural uranium. Russia and China have filled this diplomatic vacuum, embedding themselves deeply in Kazakhstan’s energy sector. The United States and Europe must act decisively to build stronger ties with Kazakhstan and Central Asia, if they are to achieve energy independence by securing their nuclear futures. Europe’s dependence on Russian natural gas has been its geopolitical Achilles’ heel for decades. Russia's illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, driving home the need to diversify energy sources, has further increased that vulnerability. Nuclear power offers Europe a path to energy independence. This hinges, however, on access to uranium, of which Europe imports 97% of its supply. Moreover, much of that uranium is enriched in Russia, creating a dependency analogous to that on Russian gas. That problem can be solved by deepening cooperation with Kazakhstan, the world’s largest uranium producer. Unfortunately, Europe’s engagement with Kazakhstan has been half-hearted at best; yet the country's reserves are essential for powering Europe’s nuclear plants. Strategic investments and partnerships are needed to unlock Kazakhstan’s role as a reliable uranium supplier to Europe, but logistical hurdles and a lack of political focus have so far stymied efforts to make that happen. Kazakhstan, the world's leading uranium producer, offers the United States a critical opportunity to secure its energy and national-security needs, yet Washington has ignored this and made little effort to deepen its ties with Kazakhstan. By contrast, China sources 60% of its uranium imports from Kazakhstan, supported by investments in mining and nuclear fuel facilities. Likewise, Russia has, through Rosatom, forged strong partnerships with Kazatomprom. These efforts give Beijing and Moscow significant leverage over global uranium markets. The U.S., however, has failed to foster the political and economic relationships necessary for long-term nuclear-energy security. Kazakhstan is a particularly glaring case in point. Over the past two decades, Kazakhstan has come to account for nearly half of global uranium production, giving it a key position in the global uranium supply chain. Neighboring Uzbekistan, the fifth-largest producer, adds another 6%, and Mongolia also has significant undeveloped reserves of future potential. Yet Kazakhstan remains heavily dependent on Russian infrastructure for uranium transport and enrichment. Until the late 2024 signature of an agreement to supply nearly half of its annual uranium ore production to China through the...

1 year ago

Kazakhstan’s High-Stakes Balancing Act in the Aktau Crash Investigation

The Aktau crash of the Azerbaijan Airlines Embraer 190 aircraft, which killed 38 people on 25 December, was a tragic event with significant international repercussions. This devastating accident not only claimed lives but also raised critical questions about aviation safety and the handling of sensitive investigations. As investigators sought to determine its cause, Kazakhstan faced an important decision regarding the handling of the flight recorder. Ultimately, the country chose to transfer the recorder to Brazil, the manufacturer of the aircraft, rather than to the Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC) of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), as Russia had proposed. This decision reflected both technical and diplomatic considerations, marking a crucial moment in the unfolding investigation. By taking this decision, Kazakhstan adhered to established industry procedures for aviation safety investigations. Such a step highlights the country's commitment to transparency and global norms in aviation. The move is typical of the country's foreign policy under President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, whose long diplomatic experience leads him to emphasize a rules-based approach over political considerations and to act in accord with established procedural norms. This choice ensured that the investigation would follow established international practices, thereby lending credibility to the process and reassuring global aviation stakeholders. This behavior is also in line with Kazakhstan's broader commitment to international law and a rules-based global order. Another notable example of this approach was its endorsement of the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity through its refusal to recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea or the independence of the Donbas regions. These decisions were not necessarily easy ones, given Kazakhstan’s economic and security ties with Russia, but they reinforced its commitment to global standards. While some observers might frame decisions like the Aktau recorder transfer as a “snub” to Russia, such characterizations would miss the point. Like Kazakhstan’s refusal to recognize Donbas as independent and its efforts to prevent the flow of military components in violation of Western sanctions, its actions are not meant to be about rejecting one partner in favor of another. Rather, acting in its own autonomous interests, Kazakhstan seeks to "do the right thing," because this maintains a consistent international profile with a steady foreign-policy course grounded in international law and practice. Kazakhstan’s mediation efforts extend beyond formal multilateral forums, showcasing its active engagement in regional and global diplomacy. The country provided a neutral platform for discussions between opposing factions in the conflict over Syria; and it has also worked to ease tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan, hosting purely bilateral consultations and thus demonstrating its capacity to engage constructively in regional conflicts without taking sides. These efforts are in line with Kazakhstan’s larger foreign-policy strategy to act as a principled and impartial intermediary on the global stage, fostering dialogue and reducing hostilities. Similarly, Kazakhstan’s leadership in the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) reflects its dedication to multilateralism and peaceful conflict resolution. Kazakhstan exemplifies the rising middle-power archetype also through its significant contributions to global nuclear non-proliferation. Its foreign policy operates on...

1 year ago

How the Azerbaijan Airlines Crash Could Shake Relations with Russia

The crash of an Azerbaijan Airlines (AZAL) airplane in Aktau, Kazakhstan, has the potential to significantly effect Azerbaijan's relations with Russia if Moscow mishandles the situation. To date, there has been a lack of transparency and responsiveness on the part of the Kremlin. The implications could include accelerating the deterioration of Moscow's influence in the region. These implications, therefore, concern not only the local countries, but any international actor having strategic interests in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, or otherwise concerned with their future role and place in the evolving post–Cold War international system.   The Facts of the Disaster Given the rapid dissemination of information in the 2020s by electronic means, whereby authentic real-time videos made by first responders to the fuselage on the ground were uploaded to social media and available worldwide within minutes, the overall outline and some details of the incident are by now generally well known. The airplane was en route from Baku to Grozny, the capital of Chechnya, when explosions in the air damaged the cabin. Very soon after, but not as a result of these explosions, the pilots completely lost all electronic orientation and navigation capabilities. According to one source close to Azerbaijan's investigation into the crash, preliminary results showed the plane was struck by a Russian Pantsir-S air defense system and its communications were then paralyzed by electronic warfare systems on the approach into Grozny. Ukrainian military drones have repeatedly targeted Russia’s southern regions, triggering Russian air defenses. “No one claims that it was done on purpose,” the source said; but “taking into account the established facts, Baku expects the Russian side to confess to the shooting down of the Azerbaijani aircraft.” After being hit, the plane was refused emergency landing permission at Grozny (2.5 kilometers from where the incident occurred) and at least two other Russian airports in the North Caucasus (Makhachkala, 155 kilometers away, and Mineral’nye Vody, 225 kilometers), before being directed by local air control out over the Caspian Sea. Once there, the pilots made the decision to try to land in Aktau (435 kilometers away). Against all odds, they succeeded in avoiding the need to ditch the aircraft into the sea, which would have undoubtedly killed all on board and also destroyed the craft, making any investigation into what had happened impossible. In the event, according to the Kazakhstani authorities, out of 62 passengers and five crew, 32 survivors were initially rescued. Captain Igor Kshnyakin, Co-pilot (First Officer) Alexander Kalyaninov, and Purser Hokuma Aliyeva died when the front wheel touched down ahead of the back wheels, as a result of which the cockpit was thrown violently away from the ongoing wreck. However, this is what created the conditions for at least some of the passengers to survive, as it split the fuselage in two. The event has garnered international attention, including for the professionalism of the crew.   What Has Happened Since At first, Kazakhstan declared its own unilateral competence to investigate the crash, which occurred on...

1 year ago

How Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan Anchor a Strategic Middle-Power Hub in Central Asia

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are driving Central Asia’s global significance. Together, they are turning Central Asia into a strategic middle-power hub. The two countries increasingly act as central nodes in a region key to global supply chains and, inevitably, geopolitical competition. However, they are not merely reactive to changes around them, but are highly dynamic. What does it mean to say that the region is emerging as a strategic middle-power "hub"? The notion of a hub extends beyond the national profiles of the two principals, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, to include the aggregation of collective influence. Central Asia is recognized as a cohesive entity in global forums. Kazakhstan’s energy wealth combines with Uzbekistan’s demographic strength, creating an influential synergy beneficial to the entire region. The interplay between their respective strengths allows them to amplify Central Asia’s voice in international institutions and negotiations collectively. By integrating their regional strategies within global frameworks — such as the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) — Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan enhance the region’s geopolitical relevance. Kazakhstan, for example, has successfully advocated for the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR, also called the "Middle Corridor"). This transcontinental trade route is emerging as a lynchpin in Eurasian logistics, connecting China to Europe via the Caspian Sea. Uzbekistan, for its part, has emphasized the integration of transport and energy infrastructure. These initiatives align with the broader vision of a unified Central Asia. The leadership of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan has reinforced the region's collective identity as the "C5" group, also including Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. This regional bloc has become a diplomatic focal point for major powers like the United States, China, Germany, and Japan. All of them engage with Central Asia through structured consultations within the C5 framework. These meetings have given the region traction in international diplomacy. The elevation of the C5 group reflects the region's new prominence. The United States engages with the C5 on issues ranging from regional security to sustainable development, emphasizing its commitment to a secure and prosperous Central Asia. China’s cooperation under the C5+1 mechanism complements its transcontinental infrastructure initiatives. Germany focuses on sustainable energy and governance, while Japan prioritizes infrastructure and technology transfers. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan together have over two-thirds of the region's gross domestic product and two-thirds of its population. Kazakhstan's vast natural resources undergird its economic influence, while its geographic expanse (as the ninth-largest country in the world) makes it central to major connectivity initiatives. Through President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev's nuanced foreign policy, Kazakhstan has adeptly balanced relationships with major powers, ensuring that it remains a key partner for Russia, China, and the European Union. Uzbekistan has surged to prominence through its ambitious domestic reforms and proactive engagement for regional cooperation under the leadership of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, who has implemented market liberalization measures attracting foreign investment and reinvigorating its economy. As the most populous country in Central Asia, Uzbekistan is an indispensable actor in regional affairs....

2 years ago

Russia’s Strategic Posturing and Putin’s November Visit to Kazakhstan

On November 27, 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s state visit to Kazakhstan underscored the complex geopolitical and security challenges facing the region. Hosted by Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in Astana, the visit took place amidst heightened tensions following Russia’s deployment of its Oreshnik hypersonic missile in Ukraine on November 21. This escalation has reshaped the regional security environment, compelling Kazakhstan to confront potential spillover effects of the Ukraine conflict. Energy remained a central focus during the visit. Kazakhstan remains heavily reliant on oil exports through the pipeline of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), which passes through southern Russia. This cooperation benefits Kazakhstan economically but, by tying Kazakhstan further into Russian energy networks, it further complicates Astana's efforts to balance relations with Moscow and Western powers. Following periodic closures of the CPC route on various pretexts, Kazakhstan has resolved to diversify its energy export strategy. It has increased shipments by barge across the Caspian Sea to enter the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, which terminates on Turkey's coast in the eastern Mediterranean. One should not be surprised if ideas about the old Trans-Caspian Oil Pipeline (TCOP) project are taken out of deep storage for reanimation. The TCOP is an undersea link first discussed in the late 2000s between then-Presidents Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan and Nicolas Sarkozy of France. It was shelved at the time because it did not seem geoeconomically necessary. Since then, relations between Russia and Kazakhstan have been complicated by the periodic CPC closures that, although they are given technical justification, appear politically motivated by Moscow to squeeze Astana. Kazakhstan's short-term solution, to increase oil shipments by barge across the Caspian Sea to Baku for insertion into the BTC pipeline, simply cannot attain the volumes necessary to provide a strategic alternative to the CPC. The BTC, at present, would be able to accommodate whatever volumes Kazakhstan would be able to transit to Azerbaijan including via a prospective TCOP, for export to world markets from Ceyhan. One would suppose that bilateral discussions also covered the possible participation of Rosatom in the construction and operation of Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant (NPP). However, no mention of this topic was made in public statements. Kazakhstan would prefer to escape the vise-like pressure between Russia and China on this matter. That is why Tokayev has discussed participation by the French firms Orano and EDF with France's President Emmanuel Macron. It has recently been suggested that it would be technically feasible for Kazakhstan to find a group of Western companies capable of executing the project. A Western consortium would have no reason to hesitate to include Kazatomprom in an appropriate role, not excluding capacity-building. The Russia-only and China-only options for the NPP's construction would be less welcoming to such a possibility. Kazakhstan's leadership has become properly sensitive to how energy partnerships are not just economic decisions, but strategic calculations in Central Asia's volatile geopolitical landscape. Indeed, Russia’s use of the Oreshnik missile against Ukraine has created an entirely new security situation. It has raised concerns that...

2 years ago

Who Will Build Kazakhstan’s Nuclear Power Plant?

There are three generally discussed possibilities for construction of Kazakhstan’s newly approved nuclear power plant (NPP). One is that Russia is sole contractor. Another is that China is sole contractor. Each of these choices has its own rationale yet also geo-economic and geopolitical drawbacks for Kazakhstan. Third, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has publicly stated that he favors an international consortium with participation by companies from China, France, Russia, and South Korea. This option, however, faces logistical challenges, particularly in dividing responsibilities among consortium members and determining the sourcing of critical components. Tokayev has already discussed with France’s President Emmanuel Macron the possible participation of the French companies Orano and EDF in particular. Orano focuses on various aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, including uranium mining, enrichment, and waste management. EDF specializes in design, construction, and operational management. This opens the door to a fourth possibility. Orano, EDF and the British-German firm Urenco together can provide all the NPP construction and management services necessary to realize the project. But Kazatomprom, which focuses on mainly on mining and processing, has not been mentioned in any of these schemes. Such an alternative approach, involving Western companies like Orano, EDF, and Urenco, could ensure comprehensive services with strong Western involvement, possibly including Kazatomprom, thus boosting local capacity and creating a "demonstration project" for broader natural resource collaboration within NATO frameworks. This kind of partnership could help Kazakhstan reduce its dependency on single external actors, thereby enhancing its strategic autonomy. Moreover, by involving Kazatomprom, the project could focus on knowledge transfer and capacity building, fostering local expertise and reducing external dependencies over time. It is reasonable that an offer to take Kazatomprom into a Western consortium and to make capacity building in Kazakhstan, at Kazatomprom and elsewhere, an explicit goal of the project, would be welcome in Astana. Cooperation via NATO platforms could likewise offer Kazakhstan access not only to technical specialists from NATO countries but also to more joint training exercises and workshops, to complement an exchange of knowledge on best practices in nuclear safety and energy resilience. And that would be only a “demonstration project” for the constructive expansion of the energy component of NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) into broader natural-resource and rare-earth domains. Indeed, there is no reason even to wait for the NPP project. Central Asia, especially Kazakhstan, is a periodic table of the elements, especially rare-earth elements, and their exploration and development has been under way for some time. Building upon the energy-security successes through NATO's PfP, this proposal suggests expanding cooperation with Caspian region Partner countries into the mining sector, specifically for rare-earth elements critical to defense. Extending PfP to include these resources aligns with NATO's and Partners' core security goals, offering broader opportunities to secure the supply chain and enhance collective defense capabilities. This extension also presents a strategic avenue to mitigate risks associated with supply disruptions and geopolitical tensions. Leveraging the extensive experience of partnership in energy security, NATO and its Partner countries could begin with...

2 years ago

Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan Stand Out at COP29

The 29th United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP29), held in Baku from November 11–22, 2024, has underscored the critical role of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in advancing Caspian Sea regional energy transitions. Both countries leveraged their positions along the Middle Corridor to present ambitious renewable and nuclear energy strategies.   Azerbaijan: Renewables and the Middle Corridor Azerbaijan, the host and chair of COP29, has positioned itself as a renewable energy connector between Central Asia and Europe. Its energy strategy reflects a pragmatic approach to transitioning from hydrocarbons, which accounted for 88% of government revenues in 2023, to a diversified portfolio incorporating solar, wind, and hydropower. Azerbaijan has prioritized key renewable energy projects to align with its goal of achieving a 30% renewable share in its electricity mix by 2030. Among these is the operational Garadagh Solar Power Plant, a 230-megawatt (MW) facility developed by the UAE's Masdar, which generates 500 million kilowatt-hours (kWh) annually. Complementing this is the planned Alat Solar Project, a 400-MW solar installation expected to be operational by 2027. These projects aim to bolster domestic electricity supply and expand Azerbaijan’s capacity to export renewable energy. The Caspian Offshore Wind Initiative, backed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), seeks to harness the Caspian Sea’s favorable wind conditions. A 1-gigawatt (GW) wind farm is under preliminary study, with construction anticipated to begin by 2026. This project could transform Azerbaijan into a renewable energy hub for the Middle Corridor, particularly as Europe reduces its dependency on Russian energy.   Kazakhstan: Nuclear Ambitions and Renewable Diversification Kazakhstan’s energy strategy focuses on nuclear power and renewables, driven by the need to reduce coal dependency, which still accounts for two thirds of its electricity generation. The government’s approval of its first nuclear power plant, following a nationwide referendum in October 2024, is central to this strategy. The planned nuclear reactor, located near Lake Balkhash, will generate 1.2-GW of electricity, replacing approximately 20% of coal-fired generation. This initiative complements Kazakhstan’s status as the world’s largest uranium producer, supplying over 40% of global demand and generating $3.6 billion in export revenues in 2023. Potential consortium members for the project include South Korea’s KEPCO, France’s Orano and EDF, China’s CNNC, and Russia's Rosatom, although economic-sanctions issues complicate Russia’s involvement in the nuclear sector. Kazakhstan is simultaneously scaling up renewable energy projects, with several key initiatives underway. The Zhanatas Wind Farm, operational since 2022, produces 100-MW of power, and the Shelek Solar Park, a 200-MW solar facility near Almaty, is expected to come online in late 2025. Together, these projects aim to increase renewables to 15% of Kazakhstan’s electricity mix by 2030, quintupling the level from 2023.   The Trans-Caspian Electricity Cable Project At the COP29 conference, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, along with Uzbekistan, announced an ambitious trans-Caspian electricity cable project through an underwater transmission system. This infrastructure initiative, estimated to cost $2.5 billion, seeks to establish an electricity corridor linking Central Asia with European markets, representing a significant step in regional energy integration. The project...

2 years ago