Our People > Dr. Robert M. Cutler

Dr. Robert M. Cutler

Senior Editor and Contributor

Robert M. Cutler has written and consulted on Central Asian affairs for over 30 years at all levels. He was a founding member of the Central Eurasian Studies Society’s executive board and founding editor of its Perspectives publication. He has written for Asia Times, Foreign Policy Magazine, The National Interest, Euractiv, Radio Free Europe, National Post (Toronto), FSU Oil & Gas Monitor, and many other outlets.

He directs the NATO Association of Canada’s Energy Security Program, where he is also senior fellow, and is a practitioner member at the University of Waterloo’s Institute for Complexity and Innovation. Educated at MIT, the Graduate Institute of International Studies (Geneva), and the University of Michigan, he was for many years a senior researcher at Carleton University’s Institute of European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies, and is past chairman of the Montreal Press Club’s Board of Directors.

Articles

Oil

What Will Kazakhstan Make of the Novorossiysk Constraint?

Russia’s July decree requiring FSB approval for foreign vessels entering Novorossiysk introduces a new procedural constraint into the regional export environment. Modest in scope, the measure nevertheless grants Moscow a latent mechanism for influencing Kazakhstan’s primary oil export route via the CPC pipeline, and by extension, its westward orientation. The CPC terminus, long treated as infrastructurally neutral, has been “recoded” as a site of discretionary oversight. This development coincides with the gradual erosion of the energy governance model inaugurated by foreign concessions at Tengiz, Karachaganak, and Kashagan, where Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) created juridical islands largely external to domestic legal and fiscal regimes. It is possible that a new phase is emerging whereby infrastructural flows are re-anchored in sovereign discretion, as an accumulation of procedural instruments favors regional currencies and reduces Western intermediation. Kazakhstan’s energy model was built on upstream Western capital and downstream Russian transit. The fragility of that erstwhile equilibrium has now been revealed, even though the disrupter is not a single actor but a convergence of pressures. This dual-dependency now appears more vulnerable, unsettled by converging geopolitical and institutional pressures. The superficial continuity of physical infrastructure masks deeper shifts in logistical autonomy, fiscal sovereignty, and international alignment. Structural Exposure and Strategic Compression The fiscal layer exposes the shifts. Revenues from Western-operated concessions are routed into the National Fund, which reinvests them into foreign debt instruments, often issued by the same economies that operate Kazakhstan’s extractive infrastructure. Kazakhstan’s export of physical assets and reinvestment into external liabilities constitutes a structural contradiction. The state’s constitutional control over subsoil resources is not matched by operational authority. The CPC pipeline, though formally multinational, is routed entirely through Russian territory. The new decree does not immediately alter its function, but it inserts a potential instrument of political leverage. The bargaining terrain has consequently already shifted: what was previously a matter of contractual detail is now entangled with external discretion. For the present, the decree’s practical impact is limited, but it reveals the current system’s embedded asymmetry. Moscow’s move signals a readiness to formalize political leverage. It lays the groundwork for a possible reconfiguration of Eurasian energy flows under post-conflict conditions. In this vision, transactions would be conducted through sovereign institutions, denominated in rubles, tenge, or other regional currencies. The intent is clear: to reduce reliance on Western frameworks and to re-anchor Russia’s “peripheries” within its institutional orbit. The maneuver unfolds within a broader context of strategic adjustment. Europe is searching for non-Russian energy inputs. Turkey is expanding corridor-based integration. China’s Belt and Road Initiative continues to institutionalize long-term infrastructural absorption. Kazakhstan has become a contested node within overlapping geopolitical networks that pull it in different vectorial directions. Against this backdrop, the once legal-technical re-negotiations over Tengiz, Karachaganak, and Kashagan are situated within a tectonically shifting geopolitical matrix. Trans-Caspian connectors, digital corridors, and regulatory frameworks are coalescing into a new infrastructural logic. The decree has little practical effect for now, but it points to a deeper condition where sovereignty is declared but not...

1 year ago

Kazakhstan-Turkey Partnership

Kazakhstan and Turkey Reshape Their Eurasian Partnership

President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s visit to Ankara consolidated bilateral ties, but it also marked a deeper strategic inflection. The visit marks a broader regional convergence between two major Eurasian actors as they coordinate a strategic regional architecture. Thus, Tokayev’s language emphasized an “expanded strategic partnership,” signaling a move beyond traditional trade or cultural diplomacy. Ankara, for its part, went well beyond symbolic gestures in its response, with binding institutional agreements and substantive infrastructural commitments. The timing of the visit underscores its significance against the current geopolitical backdrop, where Central Asia is once again the object of keen attention from external actors vying for footholds and influence. In this context, the Kazakhstan–Turkey axis appears not as a knee-jerk reaction to outside machinations but as a deliberate autonomous regional vector that enhances the agency of both countries. Strategic Depth of the Tokayev Visit Tokayev’s trip to Turkey represents an assertion of multidimensional regional agency: Kazakhstan’s long-standing multi-vector foreign policy was once a balancing act among great powers, but it has now entered a phase of selective consolidation. This bilateral intensification indexes a shift in the configuration of Eurasian geoeconomics, as strategic weight disperses across an increasingly differentiated agentic field. The Astana–Ankara alignment means that both countries can act with diminished external dependence, even as global architectures become more unstable and contested. Tokayev’s diplomacy suggests the emergence of an equilibrium strategy anchored in regional connectivity rather than bloc affiliation. Ankara’s perspective is equally structural. The shared vocabulary — “coordination,” “deepening,” “integration” — signals a logic of long-horizon strategic cooperation. Complementarities Across the Bilateral Core The current Kazakhstan–Turkey relationship exhibits a structurally complementary relationship rarely sustained at this depth between two regional powers so geographically distant from one another. On one side, Kazakhstan brings economic scale, resource depth, and transit centrality to the Middle Corridor. On the other, Turkey brings not only industrial experience and defense sector credibility but maritime access, NATO membership, and a flexible political reach into Europe, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean basin. The evolution of mutual strategic trust based on converging structural interests binds these capacities of the two sides together. For Kazakhstan, Turkey provides logistical continuity and downstream industrial expansion; Ankara also diversifies Astana's international geoeconomic network. For Turkey, Kazakhstan provides resource access, eastward corridors, and meta-regional relevance beyond the Black Sea. These structural interests converge across multiple material economic sectors: energy, defense-industrial cooperation, agrotechnology, education, and digital logistics. Nor is this convergence driven solely by state policy: both countries’ private sectors increasingly perceive each other as entry points into economic systems adjacent to one another. The Organization of Turkic States (OTS) as an Institutional Amplifier The Organization of Turkic States (OTS), now maturing into an institutionalized platform for regional legitimacy with a shared symbolic and infrastructural vocabulary, enables Kazakhstan–Turkey cooperation to transcend the limits of bilateralism while maintaining its coherence. Joint positions on transport, trade, education, and foreign policy are advanced and discussed within a common multilateral setting where proposals are negotiated horizontally with other Turkic states. Through...

1 year ago

Export of Natural Gas

Turkmenistan’s Strategic Reentry into Gas Diplomacy

Turkmenistan holds the world’s fourth-largest proven gas reserves. And yet, its energy diplomacy has until quite recently remained inert. The paradox is systemic: it possesses more gas than infrastructural escape routes; yet as demand for non-Russian energy rises across Eurasia’s westward axis, Ashgabat’s relevance grows, not so much because it radically evolves but because the system around it does. Historically, 80–90% of Turkmen gas has flowed east through the Central Asia–China pipeline, sometimes called the Turkmenistan–China corridor. The dependency is acute, and the pricing asymmetrical. Previous efforts to increase flows in other directions — across Iran, via Azerbaijan, southward to South Asia, or across the Caspian Sea — have been dashed on the rocks of logistics and geopolitics. The early 2000s were especially pivotal, when Turkmenistan's delay in engaging with the EU’s Southern Gas Corridor initiative shaped a decade of missed leverage. What we are seeing now is not a late start but a late modulation of the country's energy vectors across weakly emerging paths. Geoeconomic Constraints as Strategic Catalysts Dependency on China as a monopsonist (sole purchaser) implies not just limited diversification but two deeper vulnerabilities. First, price-setting mechanisms remain inscrutably opaque. Second, the lack of alternative outlets structurally reinforces the asymmetry. Attempts to broaden options through Iran or Azerbaijan, though nominally ongoing, rely more on swaps than corridors, and even these are uneven. The Dauletabad–Sarakhs–Khangiran pipeline, completed in 2010, should have represented a minor second axis. However, it operates at a trickle, if at all, due to Iran's past failure to pay contracted sums in a timely fashion, requiring international arbitration. Another example is the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) pipeline, discussed since the 1990s, and in which India lost interest two decades ago. TAPI remains on hold, hampered by Afghanistan’s security volatility and a practical lack of commercial prospects that produce financing shortfalls. The Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP) was long stalled by legal uncertainties over Caspian Sea seabed rights and opposition from Russia and Iran. Even since the sea’s status under international law was settled by the Caspian Convention, signed in 2018, planning for this pipeline remains somnolent, despite its removal of many legal barriers to TCGP construction. Swap agreements are usually regarded as workaround tools, but for Turkmenistan, they have become more permanent structural mechanisms, allowing Ashgabat to insert itself into third‑party supply chains without transit risk. Iran’s infrastructure is unreliable but offers compression and metering; Azerbaijan’s network enables reverse flows and flexibility. A modest but symbolically important addition is the Dostluk field, a previously disputed offshore deposit between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan in the Caspian Sea. A 2021 Memorandum of Understanding resolved maritime delimitation and designated the field for joint development. Even when summed all together, these vectors remain mainly null. Once seen as “backup” export routes, they have failed structurally. Turkmenistan, infrastructurally entangled yet geopolitically uncommitted, still lacks true backup and instead manages redundancy, maintaining multiple provisional export channels simultaneously. It must still respond adaptively to shifting constraints while balancing fragile options. Turkmenistan's Attempts to Rewire Its Client...

1 year ago

U.S. Tariffs

Kazakhstan–U.S. Tariff Question Indexes a Broader Geopolitical Pattern

When the United States announced a 25% tariff on selected imports from Kazakhstan, effective August 1, it offered little explanation beyond a vague appeal to restoring the trade balance. At first glance, this seemed routine, indeed almost perfunctory. However, the timing, context, and symbolic weight of the move suggest otherwise. Kazakhstan’s exports to the U.S. are modest, and key commodities are unaffected, yet the signal was received clearly in Astana. What the Tariff Means in the Broader Picture In the current phase of the international system's evolution, tariffs no longer function solely as instruments of commercial redress. They have become vectors of strategic pressure, deployed to influence positions in a broader geopolitical context. From this perspective, Kazakhstan appears less as a trade partner than as a node within a larger and shifting strategic-connectivity network. To interpret the tariff imposed by the United States on Kazakhstan as a bilateral irritant would be to miss its deeper significance. The target may be marginal in economic scale, but the symbolism is central. What is at stake is not merely the movement of goods, but the movement of expectations. What is at issue is how middle powers such as Kazakhstan read global cues and signal their response. The tariff is a point of entry into an evolving geoeconomic pattern. Kazakhstan's answer to the American move thus becomes an exercise in managing uncertainty under shifting rules. Astana has moved quickly by dispatching a delegation, issuing public reassurances, and subtly shifting its narrative. This is not a crisis for Kazakhstan, but it is not something that can be ignored either. What seems to have triggered the tariff is not the trade volume, but the context. Kazakhstan’s longstanding ties with both Russia and China have complicated its attempts to preserve its autonomous balance in a tightening global field. The U.S. move may be part of a wider American effort to pressure states seen as too hesitant or too exposed. Kazakhstan's early response is thus less a tactical correction than a move to preempt misunderstanding. Background: A Cascade of Tariff Announcements The tariff targeting Kazakhstan came at the end of a months-long sequence of trade announcements that began to accelerate in early 2025; it was not an isolated action. On April 2, under the now-familiar slogan of restoring reciprocity, the Trump administration unveiled a broad tariff package affecting more than 180 countries at a base level of 10%. Russia and Belarus were notably untouched, but Kazakhstan was singled out for a rate of 27%. No one could quite justify why, and Washington did not seem interested in explaining the move. On July 7, Astana received a second notice: a revised tariff, now fixed at 25%, would take effect on August 1. This replaced the earlier measure and applied to a more specific set of goods. Without mentioning Kazakhstan by name, President Trump followed with a comment on social media about restoring “balanced flows” and correcting “distortions.” More than twenty other countries — an eclectic list including Brazil,...

1 year ago

Organization of Turkic States

The Turkic States Are Quietly Building a Geoeconomic Power Base

The Organization of Turkic States (OTS) has spent the past years assembling itself not through declarations or summit communiqués, but through shared transport and logistics, harmonized customs procedures, and coordinated capital flows. What began in 2009 as the Turkic Council, a lightly institutional and rhetorically cohesive forum for shared identity, has evolved, following its 2021 transformation into the OTS, into a logistical and regulatory organism. Its under-the-radar evolution has been systematized through agreed documents, deployed capital, and materialized infrastructure. The OTS has entered a phase of procedural coordination and structural intent. Its cooperation is now practical, strategic, and functionally embedded. This evolution has not followed a single arc, nor has it merely responded to outside pressures. Instead, it has progressed through an uneven sequence of internal adjustments, sometimes slow and technical, sometimes accelerated by external jolts such as the recent disruption in Azerbaijani–Russian relations. But such jolts only intensified a trajectory already underway. Member states had been converging long before this most recent bilateral crisis by aligning their policies, testing instruments, and developing the practical grammar of multilateral coordination. The current phase of renewed cooperation is not a reactive surge but a prepared transition that expresses an underlying structural shift in Eurasian geoeconomics at large. Digital Infrastructure and Networked Cooperation If there is a single domain where institutional convergence becomes immediately visible, this would be digital logistics. Once-fractured national processes — disjointed customs systems, mismatched permits, bureaucratic duplication — have begun to fold into a shared administrative architecture (including eTIR, eCMR, and ePermit) structured by international conventions that have been adapted to fit the particular alignments now emerging in the Turkic sphere. These procedures are no longer pilot projects but live systems. They digitize paperwork, synchronize border procedures, and build the kind of operational rhythms that trade corridors need in order to function. Negotiations continue, meanwhile, on a Free Trade in Services Agreement, targeted not at deregulation but at harmonization, viz., the alignment of technical and professional standards across a disparate set of economies. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, for example, are already piloting a Simplified Customs Corridor. Its eventual integration with the multimodal Uzbekistan–Türkiye axis is not a matter of if, but of how soon. Official observer states to the OTS are also beginning to move, with Hungary being the clearest case. Its $100 million injection into the Turkic Investment Fund made headlines, but the real story is downstream: Hungarian infrastructure now receives Azerbaijani gas via Türkiye. That is not diplomacy; that is energy dependence, structurally routed. Turkmenistan, long the holdout, has started to engage, first through planning meetings and now through signed agreements. Its ports, once idle in regional plans, are being fitted into the wider Caspian logistics network. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), formally recognized only by Türkiye, is also a functional participant through educational exchanges, shared language, and soft institutions. Reciprocal Trade and Development The shift underway is as much geographic as it is institutional. Central Asia is no longer on the margins of the OTS...

1 year ago

Bilateral Relations

Uzbekistan and China Deepen Ties Across Strategic, Economic, and Soft-Power Fronts

Uzbekistan and China have significantly expanded their bilateral relationship in the last month. The meeting between Presidents Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Xi Jinping on June 17, 2025, in Astana, during the second China–Central Asia Summit, formally endorsed what both states termed a “multi-dimensional strategic partnership.” The occasion marked the conclusion of bilateral negotiations on Uzbekistan's accession to the World Trade Organization. This membership is both procedural and symbolic, as it signals Uzbekistan's intensifying participation in global economic architecture. In particular, it serves to legitimize the country's market-opening reforms in the eyes of international partners. Strategic Dialogue and the Evolution of Political Ties The June 2025 summit meeting built upon groundwork laid during Mirziyoyev's January 2024 state visit to China, when a suite of agreements were reached that catalyzed the creation of a Strategic Dialogue between the two countries' foreign ministries. A year later, in January 2025, this was formally upgraded to an “all-weather comprehensive strategic partnership”. This phrase signifies that the dialogue was acquiring operational substance in the form of diversified sectoral initiatives spanning infrastructure, innovation, security, and energy. For Uzbekistan, this initiative marks a sustained effort to define itself not only as a recipient of foreign capital but as a co-architect of regionally significant configurations. Trade and investment data point to a structurally intensifying relationship. Bilateral trade stood at $14 billion in 2024, up from $13 billion the previous year, with both sides aiming for $20 billion in the near term. As of February 2025, 3,467 Chinese firms were active in Uzbekistan, an increase of over 1,000 from the prior year. However, the $9.8 billion trade deficit in China's favor remains politically sensitive, highlighting asymmetries even as cooperation deepens. Sectoral Investment and Institutional Coordination A joint investment portfolio exceeding $60 billion undergirds this integration. Key projects include special economic zones, technoparks, and localized production of BYD electric vehicles. The sectoral spread extends to renewable energy, mining, logistics, metallurgy, pharmaceuticals, and smart agriculture. Financial institutions such as the Silk Road Fund and China Eximbank are underwriting emblematic initiatives, including the Olympic Village in Tashkent. On June 28, 2025, Uzbekistan's Deputy Minister of Investments, Industry and Trade met with Chinese leather industry representatives to coordinate manufacturing projects in Andijan and Ohangaron. These dynamics were further institutionalized at the Uzbekistan–China Interregional Forum held June 1–2, 2025, in Samarkand, where Uzbekistan's Deputy Prime Minister Jamshid Khodjaev emphasized that Chinese investment has increased fivefold since 2017. Although this was technically a regional event, it reinforced — as a public-facing moment of alignment between central planning and international economic engagement — a national-level policy architecture receptive to external capital, particularly from China. Infrastructure and Energy At the infrastructural core of bilateral cooperation stands the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan (CKU) railway. Both presidents re-emphasized the project's strategic relevance, identifying it as essential to transcontinental logistical continuity from East Asia to Europe. The project has not only economic but also geopolitical significance, situating Uzbekistan as a connective node rather than a peripheral conduit. If completed on time, it may also reduce...

1 year ago

Regional Influence

Iran–Israel War Highlights Central Asia as Zone of Strategic Stability

The explosive conflict between Iran and Israel, including coordinated U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear infrastructure, has drawn global attention to the Persian Gulf and Levant. The escalatory spectacle, however, has blinded most observers to a quieter structural shift. This is the rising indispensability of Central Asia, including its linkages with the South Caucasus. Unaligned in rhetoric and untouched by spillover, Central Asia's very stability quietly threw into relief its increasing centrality to Eurasian energy and logistics calculations. As maritime chokepoints came into question and ideological rhetoric became more inflamed, Central Asia offers a reminder that the most valuable nodes in a network are the ones that continue operating silently and without disruption. Neither Israel nor Iran has real operational depth in Central Asia, and this has made a difference. Unlike Lebanon, Iraq, or Yemen — where proxy networks or ideological leverage allowed Tehran to externalize confrontation — no such mechanisms exist east of the Caspian Sea. Iran’s efforts in Tajikistan, grounded in shared linguistic heritage and periodic religious diplomacy, today remain cultural and informational rather than sectarian and clientelist. The influence of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Central Asia is minimal; Israeli presence, while diplomatically steady in places like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, is neither controversial nor militarized. There are no significant arms flows or dual-use infrastructure for either side to use. As a result, Central Asia has remained untouched by the conflict. Although the Iran–Israel conflict is relatively geographically localized, it has shed light on global systems far beyond the immediate zone of combat. Although not so far from the missile trajectories and nuclear facilities, Central Asia and the South Caucasus are remarkably insulated from their effects. Rather than becoming another theater of contestation, they have demonstrated their value as stabilizing elements at a time of heightened geostrategic volatility. It is no longer optional to take into account the Central Asian space, which geoeconomically includes Azerbaijan, now a permanent fixture at the region's summits. As the war now produces a phase of reactive adaptation in international geoeconomics and diplomacy, the region has become a control parameter of the international system rather than a fluctuating variable dependent upon it. The Iran–Israel conflict has drawn new attention to the vulnerability of maritime energy corridors, especially the Strait of Hormuz, through which a fifth of the world’s oil passes. While contingency planning has focused on naval logistics and airpower deterrents in the Gulf, the Eurasian interior has remained materially unaffected, reflecting its structural indispensability. Central Asia and the South Caucasus, particularly Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, offer existing and potential overland alternatives that bypass maritime chokepoints entirely. Kazakhstan’s oil continues to flow via the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) pipeline to the Black Sea, while Azerbaijan’s infrastructure, anchored by the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) corridor, links Caspian energy to Mediterranean terminals. These routes are not replacements for Persian Gulf volumes, but, as redundancies, they acquire significance as stabilizing arteries as well as increased relevance in moments of system stress. The war has thus sharpened a fact...

1 year ago

United States

Kazakhstan Reshapes Its U.S. Partnership

On June 12, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio met with Kazakhstan's Deputy Prime Minister–Foreign Minister Murat Nurtleu in Washington. According to the State Department readout, the American side reiterated its commitment to Kazakhstan’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity while the two diplomats discussed the expansion of “opportunities for bilateral trade and investment” and the importance of “trusted infrastructure and a favorable regulatory landscape for U.S. companies in Kazakhstan.” Other policy issue-areas targeted for cooperation included the expansion of security cooperation, promotion of regional integration (through the C5+1 diplomatic platform), and exploration of commercial opportunities “particularly in the technology and critical minerals sectors.” The bilateral meeting is an expression of deeper structural adaptation within a rapidly transforming international system. While U.S.-Kazakhstan relations were once characterized by only episodic contact and simple tactical cooperation, they have recently been reconstituted into a stable and operationally integrated bilateral relationship with system-wide relevance. Trade between the United States and Kazakhstan reached $4.1 billion in 2023, a 30 percent increase from the year prior, with projections for 2025 surpassing $4.5 billion by mid-year. Long anchored in oil exports and machinery imports, the bilateral trade structure is now undergoing strategic deepening. Kazakhstan’s 12 percent share of global uranium reserves, alongside its emerging lithium sector and other rare earth elements, makes one of the most alluring partners in U.S. efforts to restructure supply chains and reduce overdependence on China, owing to its export reliability, geographic position between major powers, and regulatory openness to Western investment. Kazakhstan, for its part, is demonstrating a granular grasp of what structural integration into global supply networks requires. Domestic reforms have included the modernization of investment regimes and coordinated institutional adjustments across ministries and frameworks such as the Astana International Financial Centre. Nonetheless, uneven rail capacity, limited downstream processing, and gaps in customs harmonization still pose material constraints to full Western alignment. The C5+1 framework, launched in 2015 and revitalized since 2021, has matured into a semi-institutionalized platform for intra-regional coordination. Thanks partly to Kazakhstan's initiatives, it now offers both practical counterweights to Russian influence and Chinese economic presence, including infrastructure collaboration and trade diversification, as well as symbolic ones like diplomatic visibility and regional leadership signaling. More than a diplomatic forum, it reflects a broader regional strategy in which Central Asian states, led by Astana, seek to institutionalize a distinct strategic space through multilateral formats. This architecture enables selective cooperation on infrastructure, trade, and regulatory standards while preserving flexibility amid the competing pressures of a multipolar order. Foreign Minister Murat Nurtleu has been instrumental in this conceptual and operational shift. After serving as Chief of Staff to the President from 2022 to 2023, he was appointed Deputy Prime Minister–Minister of Foreign Affairs in April 2023. His career trajectory—including postings at Kazakhstan’s UN Mission in Geneva (overlapping with Tokayev's tenure as Director General of the UN Office in Geneva) and his leadership in Asia-Africa diplomatic affairs—reflects an evolving strategic mindset. Nurtleu has emerged not merely as a representative of state policy but...

1 year ago

President Tokayev

President Tokayev: Kazakhstan Charts Its Own Course

In a rare, candid interview with Al Jazeera, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev of Kazakhstan projected a steady, pragmatic vision for his country’s future, portraying it as a stabilizing force amid turbulent global currents. Tokayev explained how his government is navigating complex pressures at home and abroad, from economic modernization and digital transformation to balancing ties with Russia, China, Europe, and the United States. The message was one of controlled ambition: Kazakhstan will not be rushed, but rather steer a measured course of reform and integration, balancing domestic stability with global engagement. Tokayev opened the interview by acknowledging the obstacles facing Kazakhstan’s domestic reforms, notably the global pandemic and the war in Ukraine. These external shocks, he explained, have tested the country’s resilience and delayed the delivery of the “New Kazakhstan” that he promised three years ago. Yet he remained firm in his commitment to a gradual but determined path forward. “We must be frank, we must be pragmatic, but at the same time we need to be very much bold,” he said. Domestically, Tokayev defended his record on political reform, including the legalization of opposition parties and the introduction of a one-term presidency of seven years. “I have already announced that I will step down” in 2029, he said, adding that this was “a demand of my people.” This latter move is unprecedented in the region. Tokayev characterized Kazakhstan’s laws as “quite democratic,” dismissing criticisms from organizations like the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe and Human Rights Watch as biased and detached from the country’s political and historical context. "I don't believe that we should follow recommendations of human rights organizations nowadays," he said, also mentioning foreign funders behind certain NGOs, which he left unnamed. Acknowledging the need for further reforms, particularly in media freedom and civil liberties, Tokayev made clear that stability remains the overriding priority. “Without stability, there will be no reforms, no modernization, no transformation of our society,” he said. Tokayev emphasized Kazakhstan's commitment to a “law and order” strategy to promote greater stability, where the laws fully comply with international standards. Tokayev's remarks on measured progress typify his leadership style, which admits the complexity of transformation while setting pragmatic goals. His program of a “fair and just Kazakhstan” reflects his awareness of domestic discontent with wealth disparities that simmer beneath the surface of economic expansion. The country's economy remains dominated by hydrocarbon fuels, which account for over half of exports. Tokayev’s vision of transforming Kazakhstan into a “non-hydrocarbon country” by 2060 strikes a pragmatic note. “Coal in our domestic energy balance accounts for 73%. We cannot give up coal just overnight,” he said, signaling both realism and the limits of immediate energy transition. The diversification of transport routes — including the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (the Middle Corridor) and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline — aligns with his goal of mitigating overdependence on Russia and ensuring economic security amid global uncertainty. Tokayev’s foreign policy strikes a careful balance between continuity and adaptation. While acknowledging Kazakhstan’s reliance on...

1 year ago

Historical Repressions

Tokayev Honors Victims While Putin Rewrites Stalin’s Past

On May 31, 2025, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev of Kazakhstan stood at the Museum and Memorial Complex “ALZhIR,” which Stalin had established in 1937 as a camp in the Soviet Gulag. Akmola was the name of Astana at the time, and “ALZhIR” is a Russian acronym for “Akmola Camp of Wives of Traitors to the Motherland.” The former Gulag camp, as its name indicates, was for women (a total of roughly 8,000, not to mention over 1,500 children born in the camp) who were detained solely for their familial associations with accused intellectuals or political dissidents. The full name of the Complex, which opened in 2007, is the Museum and Memorial Complex in Memory of Victims of Political Repression and Totalitarianism. In a solemn wreath-laying ceremony, declaring the imperative to preserve memory and confront the Soviet past directly, Tokayev provided a stark contrast to simultaneous developments in Russia, where orchestrated celebrations and symbolic gestures have contributed to the resurrection and sanitization of Stalin’s legacy. [caption id="attachment_32500" align="aligncenter" width="1200"] The Museum and Memorial Complex “ALZhIR”; image: TCA [/caption] This year, Russia’s state apparatus has initiated a broad and deliberate campaign to reinsert Stalin into the country’s national consciousness. Major new monuments have been erected, existing public spaces have been renamed, and state-controlled media have popularized new narratives of Stalin’s leadership. The unveiling of a statue of Stalin in mid-May at the Taganskaya metro, one of Moscow’s busiest stations, received a significant degree of international attention. It was a meticulous restoration of the bas-relief sculpture, “The People’s Gratitude to the Commander-in-Chief,” a work that had been destroyed during the Khrushchev-era de-Stalinization. Cities like Vologda, where Stalin was exiled from 1911 to 1914, have joined this revival, with local leaders organizing public lectures praising his wartime “strategic genius.” Volgograd’s airport was renamed as Stalingrad International Airport by presidential decree. The 80th anniversary of the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany provided a ready pretext for these efforts. The resurrection of Stalin’s image in Russia serves more than a commemorative function. It represents a strategic deployment of a historical narrative to justify present-day authoritarian practices. President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly drawn explicit parallels between the sacrifices of the Battle of Stalingrad and contemporary military operations in Ukraine, framing the use of force as a historical imperative. State-controlled media in Russia reinforce this framing, while educational curricula have been revised to highlight Stalin’s leadership while marginalizing the atrocities of his regime. This selective memory is an active construction of ideological hegemony, consolidating state power through the manipulation of historical truth. Yet while Russia is reconstructing a mythic narrative that merges nostalgia with political expediency, Kazakhstan is confronting the traumas of its past. Over the past five years, the State Commission on the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression has reviewed thousands of cases, exonerating over 300,000 individuals. Public debates, academic conferences, and community initiatives have reinforced this commitment, along with the publication of survivor testimonies and the release of new archival materials. These materials cover not just...

1 year ago

Previous 1 … 4 5 6 7 8 … 10 Next