Our People > Dr. Robert M. Cutler

Dr. Robert M. Cutler

Senior Editor and Contributor

Robert M. Cutler has written and consulted on Central Asian affairs for over 30 years at all levels. He was a founding member of the Central Eurasian Studies Society’s executive board and founding editor of its Perspectives publication. He has written for Asia Times, Foreign Policy Magazine, The National Interest, Euractiv, Radio Free Europe, National Post (Toronto), FSU Oil & Gas Monitor, and many other outlets.

He directs the NATO Association of Canada’s Energy Security Program, where he is also senior fellow, and is a practitioner member at the University of Waterloo’s Institute for Complexity and Innovation. Educated at MIT, the Graduate Institute of International Studies (Geneva), and the University of Michigan, he was for many years a senior researcher at Carleton University’s Institute of European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies, and is past chairman of the Montreal Press Club’s Board of Directors.

Articles

Nuclear Diplomacy

Kazakhstan Offers the IAEA a Practical Option on Iran

On May 26, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev received IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi in Astana. The meeting pointed beyond bilateral nuclear cooperation toward Kazakhstan’s possible role in wider nuclear-security problems. Tokayev welcomed a roadmap for deepening Kazakhstan’s cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency through 2036, alongside documents on nuclear medicine and science. Grossi’s visit also followed Kazakhstan’s referendum on its first post-independence nuclear power plant, which has widened the civilian side of the country’s nuclear profile. Iran was not the subject around which the meeting was organized, but it is the issue that gives the meeting strategic weight. In particular, Kazakhstan’s established IAEA relationship could help give nuclear diplomacy a practical form if political agreement first creates a need for technical implementation. The potential is real, but it is narrow. Any political resolution of the Iran nuclear issue turns on decisions by Tehran, Washington, Israel, regional states, and the IAEA. The parties must first agree politically on an IAEA-led arrangement for Kazakhstan to enter the scene. Tokayev’s own formulation was appropriately limited: Kazakhstan’s assistance would be a gesture of good faith, and only if appropriate international agreements exist. Its involvement would come after the political bargain, not before it. Kazakhstan’s nuclear profile begins with the Soviet nuclear testing site at Semipalatinsk, which made nuclear policy a shared public memory before it became a diplomatic profile. Between 1949 and 1989, this site became one of the central locations of the Soviet nuclear-weapons program. The Nevada–Semipalatinsk movement, founded in 1989 by Olzhas Suleimenov, turned public opposition to testing into a political force before the site was closed in August 1991. Kazakhstan’s nuclear policy still expresses a public memory of Soviet testing and its public-health consequences. That memory does not make Kazakhstani society simply anti-nuclear, but it means that the country's nuclear policy carries a sensitive history. From the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan inherited on its territory one of the world’s largest nuclear arsenals. That arsenal included strategic nuclear warheads associated with intercontinental missiles and long-range bombers. Kazakhstan did not merely surrender an arsenal; it made renunciation part of its international profile. The country chose non-nuclear status, transferred the weapons to Russia, and joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear-weapon state. This renunciation gave political restraint an institutional form and gave Kazakhstan a special status in nuclear affairs. That standing has also appeared in earlier Iran-related diplomacy. Kazakhstan hosted two rounds of P5+1 nuclear talks with Iran in Almaty in 2013, and in 2015 Kazatomprom supplied Iran with 60 metric tons of natural uranium as part of the internationally coordinated implementation of the JCPOA. That standing now operates most clearly through Kazakhstan’s long cooperation with the IAEA. The Tokayev-Grossi meeting and the 2026–2036 cooperation roadmap make Kazakhstan’s nuclear development part of a continuing institutional relationship. Grossi’s visit also included agreements on nuclear science, healthcare delivery, and agricultural applications under IAEA programs. Tokayev and Grossi are not improvising a political solution to Iran; they are strengthening an institutional channel through...

2 hours ago

National Identity

Kazakhstan Reclaims the Golden Horde

Kazakhstan’s symposium on the Golden Horde opens, in formal institutional terms, the question of where the country locates its statehood. Held in Astana on May 19–20 under UNESCO patronage, it brought together more than 300 scholars and experts, including 120 foreign researchers from more than 20 countries. Its title was “The Golden Horde as a Model of Steppe Civilization,” with history, archaeology, culture, and identity named as focal points of inquiry. The initiative places Kazakhstan’s history outside the narrow frame of post-Soviet chronology, treating the medieval past as a problem in the formation of Central Eurasia. Kazakhstan’s turn to the Golden Horde is not a decorative appeal to the medieval past, but a claim about statehood. It seeks to place Kazakhstan’s sovereignty within older Eurasian traditions of exchange, law, political authority, and movement across the steppe. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has put the claim in explicit form. In 2024, he described Kazakhstan as a successor to the nomadic civilization of the Great Steppe and called the Ulus of Jochi, known internationally as the Golden Horde, a pinnacle of state-building in Central Eurasia. At the Astana symposium, he returned to the same line, presenting the Golden Horde as an empire connecting East and West and influencing the development of civilizations and states. The point is not identitarian but genealogical: the recovery of a statehood tradition, not the retroactive conversion of a medieval formation into the present-day republic. The Golden Horde’s significance is as a political form whose relevance lies in rule, exchange, law, and mobility: this is where steppe history becomes state history. The symposium’s official framing emphasized the political, economic, cultural, and spiritual heritage of the Ulus of Jochi. Its final resolution was more specific, identifying the Golden Horde’s role in political traditions, international trade and diplomacy, legal institutions, numismatics, craft production, and the interaction of nomadic and urban societies. The Golden Horde thereby moves out of the narrow category of conquest and into the practical grammar of political and social order: administration, circulation, law, and exchange. The inherited Russian imperial and Soviet frame did not simply neglect the Golden Horde; it organized the question from outside Kazakhstan’s own statehood. A recent study in Nationalities Papers identifies a Soviet paradigm in which the Golden Horde was treated as foreign, destructive, and external to the emergence of the Kazakh Khanate, while the Ak Orda was favored as the more acceptable predecessor. This view did not disappear with independence. Under Nursultan Nazarbayev, the Golden Horde remained comparatively marginal in official historical narrative, even as Kazakhstan celebrated the Kazakh Khanate and the broader nomadic past. Ideological categories narrowed the possible interpretations of the past. The issue today is not reinvention but reordering. Presidential declarations provide the catalyst, not the machinery. The machinery is supplied by historians, institutes, universities, and conferences. The Nationalities Papers study describes historians as memory actors helping to move the Golden Horde from contested or marginal status toward official endorsement. It also identifies a dispute between older and newer schools of...

4 days ago

GDP

Why Kazakhstan Is Moving Ahead in GDP Per Capita

The International Monetary Fund has projected Kazakhstan to reach roughly $23,170 in nominal GDP per capita by 2031. On the same current-dollar measure, it is projected to pass China around 2026 and Russia by 2031. The comparison is a milestone, but it requires perspective. It is neither a purchasing-power verdict nor a comprehensive measure of household welfare. It nevertheless marks Kazakhstan’s entry into a higher income band. The question is how a state that began independence amid post-Soviet economic disruption reached this stage. How Kazakhstan Reached This Point Kazakhstan’s present position rests on a three-decade progression of state capacity, resource development, and institutional learning. When the Soviet Union collapsed, the country did not inherit a working growth model. It inherited broken production chains, institutional rupture, and inflation. It therefore faced the task of building a market economy out of an administrative-command system. In current U.S. dollars, GDP per capita stood near $1,400 in 1991, and exceeded $14,000 by 2024; in constant-dollar terms, the gain was smaller but still substantial. Hydrocarbons supplied the base, but political institutions and leadership acumen determined how much of that base could survive volatility. The path since 1991 has not been smooth. The 1990s brought collapse and stabilization. The 2000s brought hydrocarbon acceleration, foreign direct investment, and a rise in nominal GDP per capita climbing from a little more than $1,000 in 2000 to more than $8,000 in 2008. The global financial crisis interrupted the rise without destroying the model. The early 2010s brought recovery. The 2014–2016 oil-price and exchange-rate shock then tested the foundations already built, as the current-dollar figure fell sharply while real output per person proved more stable. COVID imposed another interruption. The post-2020 rebound belongs to that sequence. The Tokayev agenda belongs to this third stage of institutional learning. It did not create the GDP per capita trajectory over three decades, but today the issue has shifted from accumulation to stewardship. The inherited growth model had to be made more competitive, more rules-based, more socially visible, and more sustainable. Since 2022, the government has treated de-monopolization, asset recovery, social investment, and private-sector development as connected elements of the same governing effort. The IMF’s latest assessment shows the pressure inside that effort: growth remains strong, supported by oil output and non-oil activity, while fiscal, inflationary, and quasi-state-sector pressures still require correction. The Reform Program and Its Results Decree No. 542, signed in May 2024, set out measures to liberalize the economy, limit expansion of the quasi-state sector, revise privatization criteria, strengthen competition, and improve conditions for entrepreneurship. Its operative terms are competition, privatization, reduced state participation, and lower business costs. The decree temporarily halts the creation of new quasi-state entities and provides for an audit of state and quasi-state assets, partly to identify candidates for privatization. It also incorporates reforms affecting procurement and business regulation. The decree seeks to bend Kazakhstan’s accumulated macroeconomic trajectory toward commercial governance. The challenge is not to remove state capacity but to prevent it from crowding out private...

1 week ago

Critical Minerals

Central Asia Enters the Minerals Race

Central Asia is entering the critical minerals race at a time when deposits alone no longer confer strategic advantage. The Astana Mining & Metallurgy Congress, scheduled for June 11–12 at Hilton Astana, gives the issue operational form: supply chains, investment, and commercial projects. U.S. Under Secretary Jacob Helberg will participate there and in the preceding C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue on June 10–11. The Astana agenda also puts Central Asia’s role in global supply chains directly into view. The test is how quickly governments, investors, and industrial buyers can finance, process, move, and purchase minerals before they are locked into industrial supply chains. The G7 is moving in the same direction, but through institutional design rather than industrial action. The group is discussing a permanent critical minerals secretariat to maintain continuity across changing G7 presidencies, possibly at either the International Energy Agency or the OECD. The proposal acknowledges a real deficiency in Western coordination, but it also reveals the larger problem: continuity is useful only if it becomes execution. At the same time, reports have circulated about disagreements over stockpiling and leadership, including European resistance to both a single shared stockpile and a U.S.-led structure. For Central Asia, the practical question is not institutional architecture alone, but whether such coordination produces finance, processing capacity, and long-term offtake. The June dialogue in Astana is part of a wider C5+1 movement from diplomacy toward operational cooperation. Its participants are trying to convert the platform from a talk shop into a vehicle for business transactions. As TCA has reported, U.S. engagement in the region is increasingly tied to business mechanisms, export-credit support, and project finance. Kazakhstan has already moved into this framework track. Kazakhstan and the United States signed a memorandum of understanding on critical minerals cooperation during Tokayev’s November 2025 visit to Washington, and the agreement took immediate shape through the Tau-Ken Samruk–Cove Capital tungsten project. Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry later described the MOU as the first agreement of its kind in Central Asia, providing for processing capacity in Kazakhstan, technology transfer, and expanded access for Kazakh products to the U.S. market. In February 2026, Uzbekistan followed with its own U.S. critical minerals track: TCA reported that Tashkent signed a critical minerals MOU on February 4, and that DFC heads of terms for a Joint Investment Framework followed on February 19. Central Asian governments are not passive terrain for outside competition. Kazakhstan, with Central Asia’s most developed mining and metallurgical base, and Uzbekistan, with a rapidly expanding minerals program, are using minerals competition to attract capital and build processing capacity. They are seeking to diversify partners and move beyond dependence on raw material exports. The regional objective is industrial upgrading while preserving room for maneuver between China, Russia, the United States, Europe, and other partners. The minerals question cannot be separated from the larger Eurasian setting. Central Asia is trying to widen its own field of choice before its options are narrowed by what Hudson Institute senior fellow Ken Moriyasu called, in comments to...

2 weeks ago

Nuclear Energy

Kazakhstan Recasts Its Nuclear Past

At the United Nations in late April, Robert Floyd, executive secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, warned that any renewed nuclear test by Russia, the United States, or another state could draw other nuclear powers back into testing. His remarks followed the re-emergence of nuclear testing as an issue in international political debate. Kazakhstan enters this debate from the opposite side of nuclear history. It is a former Soviet nuclear test ground that now defines its nuclear policy through civilian power, peaceful use, and non-proliferation. Kazakhstan’s nuclear future is shaped by its nuclear past. The country was a Soviet nuclear test ground at Semipalatinsk, now Semey, where late-Soviet public-health concerns helped force nuclear testing into public politics before the site’s closure. After independence, Kazakhstan renounced the Soviet-era nuclear weapons it inherited on its territory. Its present nuclear-energy policy begins from that record. It is not a search for nuclear status, but a civilian program formed by restraint, public memory, and national development. Semipalatinsk is the source of Kazakhstan’s authority on nuclear testing. Between 1949 and 1989, the Soviet Union used the site as one of its principal nuclear testing grounds. In total, 456 nuclear tests were conducted there, including 340 underground and 116 atmospheric tests. Kazakhstan closed the site in 1991. These facts remove the subject from arms-control abstraction. For Kazakhstan, nuclear testing is a territorial, social, public-health, and political inheritance, bound to the eastern steppe and the communities around the former test range. Atomic Lake gives that history a single, physical form. In January 1965, the Soviet Union carried out the Chagan underground nuclear explosion at the Semipalatinsk Test Site. The blast, with a yield of 140 kilotons, was part of a Soviet program for using underground nuclear explosions in civil engineering, including reservoirs and channels in water-scarce regions. It created the crater later known as Atomic Lake. The site remains a physical residue of the Soviet claim that nuclear explosions could serve economic and social development. This is why nuclear technology in Kazakhstan cannot be politically neutral. Independence gave Kazakhstan agency in that history. Kazakhstan transferred Soviet-era nuclear weapons to Russia by April 1995 and took part in cooperative threat reduction, including the sealing of test-site boreholes and tunnels. More recently, it became host to the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Low Enriched Uranium Bank at Ulba, in Oskemen. The bank is an IAEA-owned fuel-assurance reserve for peaceful nuclear power, designed to support access to nuclear fuel without encouraging additional enrichment programs. Kazakhstan’s civilian nuclear claim, therefore, rests on practice: disarmament, threat reduction, and non-proliferation infrastructure. The policy now turns on a practical paradox. Kazakhstan has been the world’s leading uranium producer since 2009 and produced about 40% of the world’s uranium in 2025. Yet it has no operating nuclear power plant. Its Soviet-era BN-350 reactor, near Aktau on the Caspian Sea, was decommissioned in 1999 after decades of electricity generation and desalination. Kazakhstan is central to the global nuclear fuel cycle but has...

3 weeks ago