Afghanistan - The Times Of Central Asia

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Qosh Tepa canal

Afghanistan’s Qosh Tepa Canal Raises Water Security Fears

Water has long been one of Central Asia’s most contested resources, shaping agriculture, energy policy, and diplomacy across the region. Recently, Afghanistan’s Qosh Tepa Canal project has emerged as a central point in this debate. Promoted by the Taliban as a vital step toward achieving food security and economic growth, the canal also raises alarm bells among downstream neighbors who heavily depend on the Amu Darya River. Now, according to Islamic Emirate spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid, the second phase of the project is expected to be completed within five months, raising further concerns among downstream countries about its potential impact on regional water security. Progress on the Ground In August, the Afghan authorities stated that 93% of the second phase had been completed. Videos show the canal lined with concrete and stone in some sections, alongside the construction of large and medium-sized bridges to link surrounding settlements. The project spans 128 kilometers from Dawlatabad district in Balkh province to Andkhoy district in Faryab province and involves over 60 contractors, making it one of Afghanistan’s largest infrastructure projects. Origins and International Support The canal’s roots trace back to earlier international efforts. While some sources attribute its conceptual origins to Soviet or British engineers in the 1960s, significant development began in 2018 under President Ashraf Ghani. The project was supported by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and Indian engineering firms. According to the Scientific-Information Center of the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (SIC ICWC), a $3.6 million feasibility study was launched in Kabul in December 2018, funded by USAID and conducted by AACS Consulting and BETS Consulting Services Ltd. The study was coordinated with several Afghan ministries, but has not been published. Following the Taliban’s takeover, the Islamic Emirate held an official inauguration ceremony on March 30, 2022. The full canal is designed to stretch 285 kilometers, measuring 100 meters wide and 8.5 meters deep, and is expected to divert an estimated six to ten cubic kilometers of water annually from the Amu Darya. Afghan media have quoted water management expert Najibullah Sadid, who projected the canal could generate between $470 million and $550 million in annual revenue. Regional Concerns and Environmental Risks The project has raised alarm in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan, countries that depend heavily on the Amu Darya for irrigation. Experts at SIC ICWC point out that no environmental impact assessment was conducted for downstream states, nor were they formally notified of the construction, as required by international water conventions. In December 2022, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev called for practical dialogue with Afghanistan and the international community to strengthen regional water security. Adroit Associates estimates that the canal could eventually divert up to 13 billion cubic meters annually, nearly one-quarter of the Amu Darya’s average flow. Environmental risks are also mounting. Analysts warn that Uzbekistan, which relies heavily on the river for agriculture, could face soil degradation and declining crop yields. Turkmenistan, where agriculture accounts for 12% of GDP, may also suffer severe disruptions. Some studies suggest Uzbekistan and...

UN General Assembly

Afghanistan Absent, Not Forgotten – Central Asia’s UNGA Strategy

From September 23–29, 2025, the UN General Assembly’s general debate unfolded without an Afghan delegation addressing those assembled amid the unresolved UN seat issue. Yet Afghanistan was hardly absent. Central Asian presidents used their platform to project a collective stance that stopped short of recognition while rejecting isolation. Their message reflected a regional doctrine of managed engagement: keep the neighbor connected enough to limit collapse, through corridors, energy grids, and humanitarian channels. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev of Uzbekistan offered the clearest blueprint, urging the international community to “prevent [Afghanistan’s] isolation,” and calling for support to develop transport and energy corridors across Afghan territory. That language aligns with initiatives already underway: a multilateral framework signed in Kabul on July 17 to move the Trans-Afghan railway toward feasibility, and fresh agreements on the 500 kV Surkhan–Pul-i-Khumri line designed to stabilize Afghanistan’s power supply while linking it to a regional grid. Mirziyoyev’s message was a bid to convert geography into risk management. Kazakhstan struck a technocratic note. Kassym-Jomart Tokayev told the Assembly that “inclusive development in Afghanistan” is the basis for long-term regional peace and stability. This phrasing matches Almaty’s UN-backed hub for the Sustainable Development Goals and Astana’s self-image as the region’s administrative center. The goal is to stabilize the weakest link so trade and transit do not fracture. Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov used part of his brief UN address to demand that roughly $9 billion in Afghan central-bank assets frozen in Western jurisdictions be returned to “the Afghan people,” and called isolation “unacceptable.” In a remittance-dependent economy like Kyrgyzstan’s, collapse next door risks hunger, displacement, and crime. His remarks were both moral and practical, and marked the sharpest public challenge to Western policy voiced by any Central Asian leader this week. Traditionally, Tajikistan has taken the hardest line on the Taliban. This time, Emomali Rahmon emphasized humanitarian assistance, citing drought-hit regions and areas devastated by the August 31 eastern Afghanistan earthquake, and said Dushanbe supports peace, stability, and socio-economic development next door. The quake killed more than 2,000 people and destroyed thousands of homes across Kunar, Nangarhar, and Laghman just as aid budgets were shrinking. Turkmenistan took a different approach. President Serdar Berdimuhamedov did not mention Afghanistan, instead promoting Ashgabat’s permanent neutrality as a proposed UN agenda item, “Neutrality for Peace and Security,” along with broad transport and energy initiatives. This approach preserved flexibility on projects like TAPI without committing to specifics in New York. What makes these speeches consequential is how closely they mirror work on the ground. The Trans-Afghan railway, long dismissed as only a plan, now has a political framework and a declared security pledge from Kabul. Whether it moves forward depends on both capital and security, but for Tashkent, a southern outlet to Pakistani ports is the difference between landlocked and land-linked. The Surkhan–Pul-i-Khumri line is more conventional and urgent: a 200-kilometer fix to keep the lights on and the revenues flowing. The long-troubled CASA-1000 power corridor is also inching back into view after being paused post-2021, with...

Transport and Logistics

Opinion: Bridging Histories, Building Futures – Central Asia, Pakistan, and the Dream of a Railway

On 5 September 2025, the Times of Central Asia published an article titled “Trans-Afghan Railway: Can Uzbekistan Build a Railway Through Afghanistan to Reach the Sea?” Reading it stirred something deep within me. The piece was not just about steel tracks or trade corridors - it was about dreams, history, and the future of a region I have long been passionate about: Central Asia. I am not a political analyst; I am an engineer by training and a student of history by passion. Having worked in Afghanistan and witnessed the landscape of its geography and politics up close, I feel a personal connection to the idea of connectivity between Pakistan and Central Asia by rail. This is not just a policy debate for me - it is a lifelong vision tied to my family history, my professional journey, and my fascination with the region’s rich past. When the Soviet Union withdrew its last troops from Afghanistan on 15 February 1989, ending its long and bloody war, the region entered a new and uncertain chapter. That very moment coincided with the beginning of my own career. Just two months earlier, I had started my first job as a Junior Engineer. For me, the Soviet withdrawal was not only a historical milestone; it was also a symbolic reminder of how deeply Afghanistan and its neighbors were tied to global currents of power, conflict, and change. Standing at the threshold of my professional life, I wondered how this region - so often defined by wars - might instead be remembered for bridges, trade, and railways. My fascination with Central Asia is also deeply personal. From my mother’s side, my family traces its lineage back to Bukhara. This explains why many families in Pakistan carry the name Bukhari, as their ancestors once migrated southward from that historic Central Asian city. History was not abstract for me - it lived in the stories of my elders and in the books I devoured as a student. In my school years, I read the Baburnama twice. These memoirs of Zahīr ud-Dīn Muhammad Bābur, the founder of the Mughal Empire, fascinated me. Born in Andijan in the Ferghana Valley (modern-day Uzbekistan), Babur’s life was a reminder of how Central Asia and South Asia have always been linked - through migration, culture, politics, and ambition. In 1992, I made my first trip to Tashkent. The journey was more than a visit; it was a pilgrimage to the heart of a region I had admired from afar. That first encounter left an indelible mark on me, and more than three decades later, my passion for Central Asia remains unending. Long before modern projects and international agreements, history itself carved the routes of connectivity. The Khyber Pass, lying between present-day Pakistan and Afghanistan, has for centuries served as a gateway between Central and South Asia. Caravans laden with silk, spices, and stories once passed through its rugged cliffs. Empires - from the Mughals to the British - understood its importance. And...

Afghanistan

Rail, Water, and Helicopters – Uzbekistan’s “Limited Recognition” of the Taliban

Uzbekistan has spent the middle of September embroiled in an increasingly tetchy press battle over an unusual topic: helicopters. The Taliban, who run the de facto government in Kabul, have long claimed that several dozen military aircraft and helicopters currently residing in Uzbekistan are rightfully theirs. On September 11, a Taliban official announced publicly that Uzbekistan had agreed to hand them back. This was reported widely in the regional media, with the Uzbek foreign ministry slow off the mark in denying these claims. The dispute goes back to the fall of Kabul in August 2021, when a total of 57 aircraft were flown from Afghanistan to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan as Ashraf Ghani’s government collapsed. “The helicopters came from the Afghan territory to Uzbek territory illegally, so actually we had the right to confiscate them,” Islomkhon Gafarov, an Afghanistan expert at the Center for Progressive Reform, a Tashkent think tank, told the Times of Central Asia. However, Gafarov adds that the aircraft were the property of the U.S. military loaned to the previous government of Afghanistan, and therefore, Washington will have a say in their return. This has not stopped the Taliban from continuing to demand the helicopters back for use in “humanitarian operations,” in the words of Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi. Such wrangling is part of the daily diplomatic in-tray for Tashkent when dealing with a neighbor whose government has not been recognized by almost the entire world. “Afghanistan is our neighbor,” said Gafarov. “According to the geopolitical situation, we have to conduct a dialogue with this government. It’s true, Uzbekistan hasn’t recognized the Taliban government, but de facto, we work with them; we’ve had diplomatic relations with them since 2018.” Tashkent certainly has reasons to work with the Taliban. Helicopters are a mere sideshow compared to two far larger issues that will define their relations for years to come: rail and water. Railway On the positive side of the ledger, the Taliban have brought to Afghanistan a reasonable degree of stability - enough to start contemplating large-scale infrastructure projects. In July, an agreement was struck between Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Uzbekistan to conduct a feasibility study for a trans-Afghanistan railway, with 647 kilometers of new track being laid to link Uzbekistan with Pakistan’s Indian Ocean ports. This railway could bring significant benefits to Uzbekistan, one of only two double-landlocked countries in the world. Currently, sea-bound exports must travel via Turkmenistan to Iran. Other routes almost all rely on going via Kazakhstan. The China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, currently being constructed, should remove some of the need for sea-bound routes, but the Pakistan route would be faster. “The trans-Afghan route is the shortest way to the seaports of Karachi and Gwadar,” Gafarov told TCA. With a line from Termez, Uzbekistan, to Mazar-i-Sharif in Northern Afghanistan already operational, this only leaves two sections unbuilt - from Mazar to Kabul, and then from Kabul to Peshawar in Pakistan. The teams are still only at the feasibility stage right now, and have, with some chutzpah, predicted...

Afghanistan

Afghanistan Launches Toti-Maidan Gas Project with Uzbek Support

Uzbekistan has reaffirmed its support for Afghanistan’s economic recovery by backing a long-term gas development initiative in Jawzjan province. According to ToloNews, work has officially begun on the exploration and extraction of the Toti-Maidan gas fields under a 25-year contract signed by Afghanistan’s Ministry of Mines and Petroleum with KAM Group and Uzbek firm Railcom. Speaking at the launch ceremony, Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar said the project would help reduce Afghanistan’s dependence on imported gas and electricity, stem the outflow of foreign currency, and lay the groundwork for future gas exports. “This project sends a message to regional countries that Afghanistan is ready for investment,” he stated. Afghan Minister of Mines and Petroleum Hedayatullah Badri described the initiative as a new model of cooperation with Uzbekistan, elevating bilateral ties from historical proximity to a “new phase of modern economic cooperation.” The ministry noted that the Toti-Maidan fields cover 7,500 square kilometers and already contain around 30 wells. Uzbekistan’s Deputy Minister of Energy, Bakhtiyar Mohammad Karimov, emphasized the strategic significance of the agreement, highlighting the application of advanced technologies and adherence to environmental standards. He called the initiative the start of major bilateral energy cooperation. The Toti-Maidan project follows a series of energy agreements signed in August between Afghanistan’s state-owned utility company, Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS), and Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Energy. Those $243 million contracts, signed with Nego Energy and Uz Energy, include the extension of the 500-kilovolt Surkhan-Dasht Alwan transmission line, substation expansions in Arghandeh and Nangarhar, and upgrades to the Kabul-Nangarhar power corridor. Officials from both countries say these initiatives underscore a shared commitment to deepening energy and economic ties, even as Afghanistan continues to face serious political and humanitarian challenges.

Afghanistan

Taliban Again Urges Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to Return Military Helicopters

Afghanistan’s acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi has once again called on Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to return military helicopters flown out of the country by Afghan pilots during the collapse of the previous government in August 2021. The appeal was reported by Afghan news outlet Tolonews, following Muttaqi’s meeting with diplomats and representatives of international organizations in Kabul. “We ask those countries that, four years ago following political developments, took part of our helicopters and transferred them to neighboring countries, to return these helicopters to the Afghan people so they can be used in humanitarian operations,” Muttaqi said. He also criticized ongoing sanctions on Afghanistan, particularly banking restrictions that he claimed have prevented Afghans abroad from sending money to families affected by natural disasters. “Unfortunately, due to the unjust and unlawful restrictions imposed on Afghanistan, our compatriots have been unable to send aid to those affected by the earthquake,” he added. An earthquake that struck eastern Afghanistan on August 31 killed around 2,200 people and destroyed more than 5,000 homes, according to Al Jazeera. Both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have since sent humanitarian aid, including food, medical supplies, and tents, to assist survivors. Muttaqi emphasized that providing sustained assistance to those affected remains a top priority for the Taliban government. Earlier this month, The Kabul Times quoted Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid as saying that Uzbekistan had agreed to return 57 helicopters. However, Ahror Burkhanov, spokesman for Uzbekistan’s Foreign Ministry, dismissed the claim as “fake news,” stressing that Tashkent’s position on the matter has not changed.