Water Security - The Times Of Central Asia

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COP31

Opinion: What is on the agenda for Central Asia at COP31?

The 2026 United Nations Climate Change Conference, better known as COP31, is taking place in Antalya, Türkiye, from November 9 to 20. Delegations from almost 200 countries will participate in the event, including all the Central Asian republics, but Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan will play an outsize role in coordinating their messaging and ensuring the regional environmental agenda gets the time it needs in the spotlight. The buzzword for the C5 in Türkiye is “cooperation.” Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources will host a meeting for Central Asia’s five environmental ministers at its national pavilion to discuss regional cooperation and joint climate initiatives. Uzbekistan is committed to contributing to common positions on glacier retreat, water security, adaptation needs, and equitable access to climate finance through the multilateral Mountain Group and the Group of Landlocked Developing Countries (LLDCs). Turkmenistan will continue pushing for the formation of the Ashgabat Climate Dialogue as a new multilateral platform for promoting climate change initiatives. In line with its Mountain Agenda, the Kyrgyz Republic will be lobbying for support to establish the Global Mountain Resilience Center in Bishkek. Mobilizing affordable climate finance is critical for all the republics. According to the Climate Policy Initiative, global climate finance reached $2 trillion in 2024, against estimated annual mitigation finance needs of $7.8 trillion through 2030. In an interview with The Times of Central Asia, Aziz Abdukhakimov, Presidential Adviser on Environmental Issues and Chair of the National Committee on Ecology and Climate Change of the Republic of Uzbekistan, stated: “Access to adequate, predictable and affordable climate finance remains essential for developing countries to achieve their climate goals. For Uzbekistan, the implementation of our national climate commitments is estimated to require approximately $33.7 billion for mitigation and $15.7 billion for adaptation by 2030.” Closing, or at least narrowing, that gap requires building support among international financial institutions, multilateral development banks, development partners, and private investors. The GEF Council, meeting in Samarkand ahead of the Eighth GEF Assembly, endorsed a $3.9 billion replenishment package (GEF-9), demonstrating donor interest and tangible commitment to climate projects, including for a restoration project in the Chu and Talas river basins shared by Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and for a risk mitigation facility to attract private investment into Uzbekistan’s renewable energy sector. But there is hope that commitments at COP31 will go further. In September 2026, during Climate Week NYC, President-Designate Murat Kurum announced that Uzbekistan would be one of the first five pilot countries to receive support under the Climate Implementation Bridge (BRIDGE), the flagship initiative of COP31. This represents an important opportunity to translate national climate priorities into investment-ready projects and facilitate access to international financing. In his interview, Abdukhakimov stated that Uzbekistan’s focus will be “mobilizing investment in renewable energy, energy efficiency, climate-resilient infrastructure, sustainable water management, agriculture and ecosystem restoration.” At the same time, Kazakhstan will be presenting its plans to establish a national climate investment platform, plus a framework partnership program for developing the circular economy across Central Asia. Tajikistan will be...

Cotton harvest

Uzbekistan Cotton Harvest Reaches 4.63 Million Tons as Water Losses Persist

Uzbekistan's Ministry of Agriculture says the country had harvested 4.63 million metric tons of raw cotton as of October 22, exceeding its target by 3%. About 76% of the cotton harvested so far was harvested mechanically, reflecting the industry's shift away from manual labor. A new study, however, highlights another challenge: extensive water losses in the country's irrigation system. According to the Ministry of Agriculture, nearly 3,000 harvesting machines collected 3.52 million metric tons of cotton. Mechanized harvesting accounted for 98.5% of the crop in the Jizzakh region, 94.2% in the Syrdarya region, and 81.2% in the Tashkent region. In other regions, the figure was as low as 61%. Although the national target has been exceeded, the first picking is continuing on more than 49,000 hectares. Machines have reduced the need for seasonal workers in an industry that depended on large-scale manual labor for decades. Nevertheless, approximately 1.1 million metric tons of cotton was still picked by hand. At an international seminar on October 19–20, the government-linked Center for Economic Research and Reforms presented a study reporting that cotton yields had increased by 71% and grain yields by 48% between 2017 and 2025, while water withdrawals had declined by 22%. Water-saving technologies now cover 2.6 million hectares of agricultural land, according to the study. The same study, however, estimates that approximately 37% of irrigation water is lost during transportation through canals, while nearly half of irrigated farmland is affected by soil salinization. A 2021 World Bank report estimated that agriculture accounts for nearly 90% of the country's freshwater withdrawals, with cotton the largest user of irrigation water. These losses are particularly significant for Uzbekistan, whose agricultural sector depends on water from the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers. Decades of river water diversion for irrigation have been among the main causes of the Aral Sea's decline. The study also assesses the climate impact of agricultural production, finding that agriculture accounts for 17.5% of the country's greenhouse gas emissions. Methane, primarily associated with livestock farming, makes up nearly two-thirds of the sector's emissions. Proposed measures include reducing water losses, restoring pastures, and improving fertilizer efficiency. The pressure on Uzbekistan's water resources is also expected to increase. In July, the OECD warned that shrinking glaciers, rising temperatures, and growing demand threaten to reduce the country's water availability in the coming decades.

CICA Summit

Central Asian Leaders Link Trade and Security at Baku Summit

Central Asian leaders called for better transport links and joint action on water shortages at the Baku summit in Azerbaijan on October 15, arguing that practical cooperation could prevent political disputes from turning into conflict. The seventh summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) adopted the Baku Declaration, admitted Laos as a new member, and approved Azerbaijan’s continued chairmanship through 2028. Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev called for an “infrastructure of trust” based on transparent government actions and the fulfillment of commitments. His proposed concept would connect conflict prevention with joint transport and energy projects, trade, and digital links. He pointed to the damage that conflicts in Asia were causing to economies and security far from the fighting. Mirziyoyev warned, “When dialogue weakens, the risk of misguided decisions increases.” He urged governments to prevent political disagreements from becoming armed confrontations. Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev proposed a preventive diplomacy mechanism within CICA, enabling members to contribute before a crisis develops. He told the summit, “Peace is best built before crises emerge.” According to the Azerbaijani state news agency AZERTAC’s account, the Baku Declaration includes provisions on economic ties, transport and digital connections, and energy security. It addresses the opportunities and risks of artificial intelligence. Trade Routes Across the Caspian Sea The meeting came one week after the Avaza summit, where Central Asian presidents and Azerbaijan’s Ilham Aliyev discussed east-west and north-south trade routes. In Baku, those regional priorities entered a wider Asian forum, alongside calls to make commercial relationships more dependable. Tokayev proposed a CICA Transport Connectivity Strategy covering major routes, including the Middle Corridor across the Caspian Sea. He linked Azerbaijan’s rapprochement with Armenia to new opportunities for east-west transport. Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon called in his summit address for simpler customs and logistics procedures and better connections between different forms of transport. He presented economic cooperation as a foundation for lasting peace, alongside continued action against terrorism and its financing. On the summit’s sidelines, the foreign ministers of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan discussed transport and transit cooperation. Their talks covered improvements to logistics infrastructure and international routes connecting Central Asia with the Caucasus, according to Turkmenistan’s government account. During a separate bilateral meeting, Tokayev and Aliyev inaugurated the Trans-Caspian Fiber-Optic Cable Line remotely, opening an approximately 380-kilometer connection between Aktau in Kazakhstan and Sumgayit in Azerbaijan. The project forms part of the Digital Silk Way initiative, with onward connections intended to carry data between China, Central Asia, and Europe. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Artificial Intelligence and Digital Development gives the cable a design capacity exceeding 400 terabits per second. The ministry says the additional route will provide backup for existing international connections and allow operators to distribute traffic across more channels. It expects the connection to attract investment in data centers and cloud services as Kazakhstan seeks a larger role in carrying international data. Kyrgyzstan’s President Sadyr Japarov similarly called for fiber-optic routes linking Asia and Europe. He invited technology companies to build data centers...

Water Security

Central Asia Agrees New Water Limits, but National Quotas Remain Unclear

Water has repeatedly caused friction between Central Asian governments. Uncoordinated releases have flooded communities downstream, while disputes over access have contributed to deadly fighting along contested borders. On October 7, the region's countries agreed on water withdrawals from the Amu Darya and Syr Darya for fall and winter 2026–2027, though published results do not reveal how much water each country will receive. The agreements were reached at the 95th meeting of the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC) in Avaza, on Turkmenistan's Caspian coast near Turkmenbashi. Participants agreed on national water withdrawal limits and projected reservoir operating schedules, but the figures remain in unpublished annexes to the meeting protocol. Regional cooperation has grown in recent years. In June, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan agreed on water releases and electricity supplies for the 2026 irrigation season, continuing efforts to coordinate reservoir operations across borders. Despite this progress, longstanding tensions remain. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan need water in the winter to generate electricity, while Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan need it in the summer for irrigation. Bishkek has revived proposals for its neighbors to share the costs of maintaining reservoirs, while Afghanistan's Qosh Tepa Canal could put further pressure on the Amu Darya. Countries are also trying to resolve discrepancies in river-flow measurements. [caption id="attachment_58085" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Officials from Central Asian countries attend talks on cross-border cooperation and sustainable development in the Amu Darya basin in Turkmenistan. Image: State News Agency of Turkmenistan[/caption] From Flooded Villages to Border Clashes The competing demands of electricity generation and agriculture are particularly evident in the Syr Darya basin. Kyrgyzstan's Toktogul Reservoir sits on the Naryn River, the Syr Darya's main tributary. In winter, Kyrgyzstan releases water to generate electricity, months before downstream farmers need it for irrigation. When these releases exceed the capacity of reservoirs and canals, the excess water can cause flooding. In February 2004, residents of Kazakhstan's Kyzylorda region experienced the consequences of uncoordinated water releases. The Syr Darya overflowed its banks, forcing the evacuation of at least 200 families. Ice had already restricted the river's flow, worsening the flooding. According to NASA, Kyrgyzstan was releasing more water from its hydropower system than the agreements allowed, with the excess flow entering the Shardara Reservoir. Uzbekistan agreed to divert some of the water into the Arnasay lake system, but it was not possible to divert the entire volume needed. As a result, the river flooded areas farther downstream. In the Amu Darya basin, disagreements developed differently. In 2012, then-Uzbek President Islam Karimov warned that disputes over water resources could lead to war. The source of tension was the construction of the Rogun Hydropower Plant in Tajikistan. Tashkent feared that a large dam on the Vakhsh River, a tributary of the Amu Darya, would allow Dushanbe to influence the volume of water reaching Uzbekistan's agricultural regions. The confrontation was accompanied by interruptions in gas supplies to Tajikistan, transport restrictions, and mutual accusations. Dushanbe linked Tashkent's actions to pressure over the Rogun project, although the Uzbek side disputed that...

Water Security

Opinion: Central Asia’s Old Water Bargain Was Built for Cotton

Central Asia inherited a water bargain built for another economy. In the Soviet system, upstream republics stored water and released it for summer irrigation. Downstream republics used that flow for cotton and other crops. The cost of the exchange stayed inside one plan. Water releases, electricity, fuel, and crop quotas were part of the same political economy. After 1991, the dependence survived, but the plan that balanced it did not. The 1998 Syr Darya agreement already tied reservoir operation to irrigation releases and set compensation for the winter power Kyrgyzstan gave up. The 2000 Chu-Talas agreement went on to share the cost of operating and maintaining shared water infrastructure between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Those agreements were important, and they show why today’s dispute is not new. Central Asia has long known that water regulation carries a cost. What it has not built is a wider settlement that prices storage and seasonal regulation under today’s climate, energy, and market conditions. That question is now open again. In January 2026, Kyrgyzstan’s new Water Code came into force. It recognizes water as a commodity and introduces fees for domestic and external users. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have rejected payment for transboundary river water, saying existing agreements do not provide for it. Downstream governments fear an open-ended bill and a precedent that could turn every dry season into a financial dispute. The old model rested on cotton and central planning. Several conditions have changed. The climate is less stable, energy demand keeps rising, and national economies now want more from water than a cotton plan once did. Uzbekistan’s own reform language has turned against the old cotton model. At the UN General Assembly in 2023, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev said “millions of people were forced to pick cotton” in Uzbekistan over a century. In August 2026, he called the old system one that left Uzbeks “slaves to cotton.” That history shapes the water argument. Uzbekistan is not abolishing cotton. It still grows the crop and continues to reform the sector. But as Tashkent moves away from the old cotton-centered model, the regional water logic built around that model also needs revising. The same pressure runs through the Amu Darya, where agricultural adaptation has become an economic and political issue rather than a purely hydrological one. Less predictable river flows make seasonal storage more valuable. Water is also becoming scarcer in parts of the region. Kyrgyzstan sits at the center of that question. It is the only country in Central Asia whose water resources are almost entirely formed within its own territory, and Kyrgyz officials argue that it carries the upkeep for infrastructure that serves its neighbors. They say the country spent about $80 million on the water sector last year and around $259 million over five years. That spending covers the water sector as a whole, including infrastructure whose benefits reach beyond Kyrgyzstan’s borders. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan reject paying for river water, saying existing agreements do not require it. But storing that water and releasing it...

Water Security

Opinion: Chinese Firms Expand Their Role in Kyrgyzstan’s Water Infrastructure

Kyrgyzstan plays a central role in Central Asia’s water system and is of growing interest to China. According to figures cited by President Sadyr Japarov in April 2026, approximately 50 billion cubic meters of surface runoff are generated annually within the country. About 12 billion cubic meters are used domestically, while around 7 billion, or 14% of the total, flow to China. Kyrgyzstan has five main water-management basins. The Issyk-Kul–Tarim management area includes both the closed Issyk-Kul basin and rivers flowing toward China, making its transboundary component a distinct area of bilateral cooperation. The Aksu River, which originates in Kyrgyzstan and feeds the Tarim River in China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, is particularly important. Estimates put its contribution at 70–80% of the Tarim’s flow. Given Xinjiang’s importance to China’s domestic stability and the Belt and Road Initiative, these shared waters have economic and long-term geopolitical significance for Beijing. Legal and Regional Context Kyrgyzstan and China established a strategic partnership in 2013, but no publicly available bilateral agreement specifically governs the allocation and management of their shared waters. Neither country is a party to the 1992 UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes or the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses. The significant asymmetry in the countries’ economic and negotiating capacities makes the absence of a dedicated water-sharing framework a potential source of vulnerability for Kyrgyzstan. Its importance could grow as water stress intensifies and economic activity in the shared basins expands. For Central Asia, China’s involvement has broader implications. Kyrgyzstan is an upstream country whose rivers supply its downstream neighbors. Chinese participation in water infrastructure adds another external actor to a sector that has historically been one of the most sensitive areas in regional relations. The Changing Nature of China’s Presence China’s involvement in Kyrgyzstan’s water sector includes bilateral assistance for irrigation as well as construction contracts financed by multilateral institutions. These channels coexist, making it important to distinguish Chinese funding from work undertaken by Chinese companies. Kyrgyzstan’s chronic electricity shortage and need to modernize its water and energy infrastructure have created opportunities for greater Chinese involvement. The upgrading of bilateral relations to a comprehensive strategic partnership in the new era in 2023 provided an additional political framework, with hydropower identified as a priority for practical cooperation. Agreements totaling more than $1 billion were signed at the Kyrgyz-Chinese business forum in Urumqi in August 2023, underscoring the broader expansion of economic ties. Chinese companies are also winning contracts funded by international financial institutions. In September 2025, a Sinohydro Bureau 16–Sinohydro joint venture signed a contract for water-conveyance structures and the powerhouse for the second generating unit at Kambarata-2, financed by the Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and Development. The tender had been launched in 2024. The Asian Development Bank lists a $12.8 million contract dated July 2025 for an Issyk-Kul wastewater treatment plant, awarded to a joint venture involving China Road and Bridge Corporation. That contract includes three years...