Connectivity - The Times Of Central Asia

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EU-Turkmenistan Relations

Turkmenistan Opens the Door a Little Wider to Europe

Turkmenistan has historically been a difficult partner to deal with. The Turkmen government’s isolationist policies run counter to deep cooperation with any foreign party, but the Turkmen authorities seem to now perceive that these policies are costing them opportunities and revenue. In one of the latest shifts in foreign policy, Turkmenistan appears to be warming up relations with the European Union, though currently, the EU has its own reasons to boost interaction with Turkmenistan. Let’s Meet For decades, the EU and many other countries and international organizations have gone through frustrating efforts to establish a reliable relationship with Turkmenistan. Ashgabat’s form of governance is based on a cult of personality, a supposedly infallible leader capable of protecting the country from the evils of the outside world. The UN recognition in December 1995 of Turkmenistan’s neutrality was used by its government to seal off the country. It would normally be easy for the rest of the world to ignore Turkmenistan. However, Turkmenistan possesses the planet’s fourth-largest proven natural gas reserves, and it is located on what is developing into a key global trade route. On March 20, the European Investment Bank’s (EIB) regional representative for Central Asia, Olivier Kueny, complimented Turkmenistan for its “ambitions in transport and… projects that reduce greenhouse gases.“ Kueny noted that, “with direct access to the Caspian Sea, [Turkmenistan] is a key node” of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Corridor (TITR). He hinted the EIB could be interested in investing in Turkmenistan’s “rail, road, rolling stock and port infrastructure [that] could help reduce the cost and time needed to move goods between continents.“ On March 26, Charlotte Adriaen, the head of the EU division for Central Asia and Afghanistan, met in Ashgabat with Turkmenistan’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Myahri Byashimova, to discuss energy cooperation. The two also reviewed EU programs for sustainable energy, trade, and digital connectivity. On the same day, there was also a “New Horizons for Connectivity, Investment and Sustainable Growth” Turkmenistan-EU business forum in Ashgabat. Turkmenistan’s Minister of Finance and Economy, Mammetguly Astanagulov, addressed more than 200 delegates attending the forum, telling them his country is ready to expand trade, transport, and energy cooperation with the EU. Astanagulov noted EU-Turkmenistan trade increased from $1.1 billion in 2024 to $2.1 billion in 2025. EU Ambassador to Turkmenistan Beata Peksa also spoke at the forum. She noted Turkmenistan’s growing role in global transport corridors between Europe and Asia and said the EU is seeking to work more closely with Turkmenistan on improving investment conditions in the country. Peksa also mentioned helping Turkmenistan improve regulatory frameworks and investment in modern technologies to increase efficiency in moving cargo. On April 1, Adriaen met with representatives from Turkmenistan’s State Service of Maritime and River Transportation at the Turkmenbashi International Seaport on the Caspian coast to discuss the port’s role in the TITR and projects at the Balkan shipbuilding yard. And on April 7, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) co-sponsored an “Export Experience Exchange” conference in Ashgabat, the aim...

Afghanistan

Opinion: Afghanistan and Central Asia – Security Without Illusions

Over the past year, Afghanistan has become neither markedly more stable nor dramatically more dangerous, despite how it is often portrayed in public discourse. There has been neither the collapse that many feared, nor the breakthrough that some had hoped for. Instead, a relatively unchanged but fragile status quo has persisted, one that Central Asian countries confront daily. For the C5 countries, Afghanistan is increasingly less a topic of speculative discussion and more a persistent factor in their immediate reality. It is no longer just an object of foreign policy, but a constant variable impacting security, trade, humanitarian issues, and regional stability. As such, many of last year’s forecasts have become outdated, based as they were on assumptions of dramatic change, whereas the reality has proven far more inertial. Illusion #1: Afghanistan Can Be Ignored The belief that Afghanistan can be temporarily “put on the back burner” is rooted in the assumption that a lack of public dialogue or political statements equates to a lack of interaction. But the actions of Central Asian states show that ignoring Afghanistan is not a viable option, even when countries intentionally avoid politicizing relations. Turkmenistan offers a clear example. Ashgabat has maintained stable trade, economic, and infrastructure ties with Afghanistan for years, all with minimal foreign policy rhetoric. Energy supplies, cross-border trade, and logistical cooperation have continued despite political and financial constraints, and regardless of international debates over the legitimacy of the Afghan authorities. This quiet pragmatism stands in contrast to both isolationist strategies and symbolic or ideological engagement. Turkmenistan may avoid making public declarations about its relationship with Afghanistan, but it nonetheless maintains robust cooperation. This calculated calmness reduces risks without signaling disengagement. Importantly, this approach does not eliminate structural asymmetries or deeper vulnerabilities. But it dispels the illusion that distancing reduces risk. On the contrary, sustained economic and logistical ties foster predictability, without which attempts to “ignore” a neighboring country become a form of strategic blindness. In this sense, Turkmenistan’s experience affirms a broader regional truth: Afghanistan cannot be removed from Central Asia’s geopolitical equation by simply looking away. It must be engaged pragmatically or dealt with later, in potentially more destabilizing forms. Illusion #2: Security Is Achieved Through Isolation Closely related to the first is the illusion that security can be ensured by building walls. Security in Afghanistan, and in the broader Afghan-Pakistani zone, is often seen as an external issue, something that can be kept out by sealing borders or minimizing engagement. Yet in practice, security is determined less by geography and more by the nature of involvement. This is reflected in the recent decision by Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to participate in U.S. President Donald Trump's “Board of Peace” initiative. While the initiative focuses on resolving crises outside Central Asia, both countries have framed their participation as essential to their own national and regional security interests. As Abdulaziz Kamilov, advisor to the President of Uzbekistan, explained, Tashkent’s involvement stems from three factors: its own security needs, its foreign policy principles,...

Pakistan

Opinion: The New Silk Road to the Sea – Connecting Central Asia to Karachi and Gwadar

A historic shift is quietly but decisively reshaping the economic geography of Eurasia. On 5 February 2026, Pakistan and Kazakhstan agreed to elevate their bilateral relationship to a Strategic Partnership during the state visit of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to Pakistan— the first such visit by a Kazakh head of state in 23 years. This moment marked far more than a diplomatic renewal; it signaled a potential turning point in regional connectivity, one that could unlock long-suppressed economic potential across Central Asia and South Asia by overcoming longstanding geographical and logistical barriers. For decades, Central Asia’s landlocked status has imposed structural constraints on its economic growth. High transit costs, dependence on distant or politically sensitive routes, and extended distances to global markets have eroded competitiveness and limited diversification. These challenges were not the result of a lack of resources or ambition, but of geography itself. However, geography need no longer be destiny. Through strategic foresight—particularly under President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev—Kazakhstan and the wider Central Asian region have begun to convert constraint into opportunity by redefining connectivity. President Tokayev has consistently emphasized connectivity as the cornerstone of Kazakhstan’s long-term economic and strategic vision. During his engagements with Pakistan’s leadership, he demonstrated a clear understanding that sustainable prosperity for Central Asia depends on reliable, cost-effective access to warm-water ports. This conviction underpinned the decision to elevate Pakistan–Kazakhstan relations to a Strategic Partnership, recognizing Pakistan not merely as a bilateral partner, but as a gateway to global markets via the Arabian Sea. From a financial and logistical perspective, the implications are profound. Karachi and Gwadar are among the closest seaports to much of Central Asia, significantly closer than many traditional routes to global markets. Every additional kilometer of overland transit results in higher freight costs, longer delivery times, and reduced margins. By connecting Central Asia to Pakistani ports, Kazakhstan and its neighbors stand to substantially lower transportation costs, enhance export competitiveness, and attract greater foreign investment into manufacturing, mining, agriculture, and value-added industries. The most immediate and strategically sound connectivity model emerging from this partnership bypasses the troubled terrain of Afghanistan, long viewed as a chokepoint for regional trade. Under this framework, goods could move seamlessly from Karachi through Pakistan’s railway network to Haripur, then onward via the Karakoram Highway into China. From there, the cargo would seamlessly integrate with the China–Kazakhstan railway system through the established Dostyk–Alashankou corridor. This route is not theoretical; it builds on existing infrastructure, proven logistics, and political stability across all participating states. Financially, this corridor offers predictability—an essential ingredient for trade and investment. Reduced insurance premiums, fewer delays, and stable regulatory environments translate into lower transaction costs. For Central Asian exporters, particularly Kazakhstan, this means improved access to South Asian, Middle Eastern, and African markets. For Pakistan, it positions Karachi and Gwadar as indispensable nodes in Eurasian supply chains, generating port revenues, transit earnings, employment, and industrial growth. At the same time, Kazakhstan’s leadership has demonstrated pragmatic flexibility by supporting additional connectivity options. Regional discussions have included the possibility...

Pakistan

Kazakhstan Bets on Pakistan for Central Asian Connectivity

In early February, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev made a historic visit to Pakistan. The last such visit was a two-day trip in 2003 by then-President Nursultan Nazarbayev, during which he met with the Pakistani president at the time, General Pervez Musharraf. Kazakhstan’s outreach to Pakistan reflects a broader recalibration of its connectivity strategy, as Astana looks to secure more reliable southbound trade routes amid shifting geopolitical and logistical constraints across Eurasia. The topic of connectivity was already on the table in 2003, and it was also one of the most important issues during the latest visit, with Tokayev discussing the issue with Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif. The trip culminated in the signing of 37 agreements in various fields, including strategic sectors such as mining and, more generally, trade, with the aim of increasing trade from the current $250 million to $1 billion. Official statements indicate that both sides are aiming to reach that target within approximately the next two years. From a political point of view, the bilateral relationship has been elevated to the rank of Strategic Partnership. In an official statement released following the visit, great importance was placed upon the issue of connectivity and logistics between South and Central Asia. From this point of view, the Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan railway took center stage. If completed, the project would connect Kazakhstan to the ports of Karachi and Gwadar and allow Pakistan to be included in the North–South International Transport Corridor and Trans-Caspian Middle Corridor logistics routes. Speaking to the Pakistani media in the days leading up to Tokayev's trip, the Kazakh ambassador to Pakistan, Yerzhan Kistafin, stated Astana's willingness to fully finance the construction of the infrastructure, at a total cost of around $7 billion. Kazakhstan's move represents an acceleration of a logistical competition in this arena involving various players, with some at the forefront, such as Pakistan and Iran, and others further behind, such as China and India. It has been talked about for some time, but the backbone of the Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan railway has only recently begun to take shape, as confirmed to The Times of Central Asia by Dr. Nargiza Umarova, Head of the Center for Strategic Connectivity at the Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS), Uzbekistan: “In 2024, Kazakhstan joined the project to construct a railway through Afghanistan, also known as the western trans-Afghan route. The Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP) railway corridor is designed to integrate the transport systems of Central and South Asia, which will stimulate trade and economic ties between the two regions. The TAP railway, which runs through western Afghanistan to the border with Pakistan, could be extended to Pakistani ports on the Indian Ocean. This would provide Central Asian countries with an alternative route to the open seas in addition to the southern ports of Iran.” Pakistan's importance as the destination for Kazakhstan's logistics ambitions was confirmed by Dr. Marriyam Siddique, Assistant Professor at the Pakistan Navy War College in Lahore: “Pakistan serves as the primary maritime gateway for Kazakhstan’s 'land-linked' strategy, offering the shortest...

Azerbaijan

Central Asia Can Depend on Azerbaijan for Path to West, Aliyev Says

Azerbaijan is the only “reliable country” that can geographically link Central Asia to the West because alternative routes face geopolitical turbulence, according to Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev. Aliyev spoke about Azerbaijan’s prospects as a key conduit for commerce across borders as well as its deepening relationship with Central Asia during a wide-ranging interview with local television channels in Baku on Monday. He acknowledged that there is still work to be done before Azerbaijan can approach its full potential as what he called a “living bridge” for international trade. The remarks followed a summit in Uzbekistan in November in which Central Asian leaders supported Azerbaijan’s accession to the region’s Consultative Meeting format as a full participant, even though Azerbaijan is in the South Caucasus. The Consultative Meeting format is a vehicle for high-level collaboration on trade, security, and other issues among Central Asian countries, which have taken steps to resolve border disputes and other sources of tension over the years. “So many projects have been implemented in recent years that these countries have unanimously elected us as a full member. We can also consider this a great political and diplomatic success,” Aliyev said during the interview. His remarks were published by the state Azerbaijani Press Agency, or APA. Referring to international connectivity, transport, and logistics, the president said, “Azerbaijan is the only reliable country that can geographically connect Central Asia with the West today,” and, without going into specifics, he alluded to the difficulties that some other trade channels face. Paths through Russia and Iran to the West, for example, are affected by sanctions and long-running political tensions. “Of course, from a geographical point of view, other routes can also be used. However, taking into account the current geopolitical situation, we can say with complete certainty that alternative routes for the West cannot be considered acceptable,” Aliyev said. He mentioned developing projects such as a November 2024 agreement involving Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan to lay a fiber-optic cable along the Caspian seabed, as well as China’s large-scale funding for the construction of another railway to the Caspian Sea via Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. “Freight traffic to the Caspian Sea, and therefore to Azerbaijan, will increase,” the Azerbaijani president said. “Along with Central Asian countries, additional freight from China will naturally increase the demand for the East–West route, the Middle Corridor.” A September analysis by the Washington-based Jamestown research group suggested that prospects are bright for Azerbaijan, which has actively positioned itself as a trade hub since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. “Amid disruptions in both the northern and southern corridors, Azerbaijan has emerged as a critical logistics hub, offering a sanction-free, resilient, and stable environment to facilitate overland trade between the PRC (China) and Europe through the Middle Corridor,” analyst Yunis Sharifli wrote. In addition, Azerbaijan expects cargo from China and Central Asia to travel along a proposed route that would link the main part of Azerbaijan to the separate Azerbaijani area of Nakhchivan, passing through Armenia and then...

Geopolitics

2025: The Year Central Asia Stepped Onto the Global Stage

For much of the post-Soviet era, Central Asia occupied a peripheral place in global affairs. It mattered to its immediate neighbors, but rarely shaped wider debates. In 2025, that changed in visible ways. The region became harder to ignore, largely not because of ideology or alignments, but because of assets that the world increasingly needs: energy, minerals, transit routes, and political access across Eurasia. One of the clearest signs came in April, when the European Union and the leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan met in Samarkand for their first summit at the head-of-state level. The meeting concluded with a joint declaration upgrading relations to a strategic partnership, with a focus on transport connectivity, energy security, and critical raw materials. The document marked a shift in how Brussels views Central Asia, moving beyond development assistance toward geopolitical cooperation, as outlined in the official EU–Central Asia summit joint declaration. European interest is rooted in necessity. Russia’s war in Ukraine has forced EU governments to rethink energy imports, supply chains, and overland trade routes. Central Asia sits astride the most viable alternatives that bypass Russian territory. It also holds resources essential to Europe’s green transition, including uranium and a range of industrial metals. The region’s leaders spent much of the year framing their diplomacy around these tangible advantages, rather than abstract political alignments. The United States followed a similar track. Through the C5+1 format, Washington deepened engagement with all five Central Asian states, with particular emphasis on economic cooperation and supply-chain resilience. A key element has been the Critical Minerals Dialogue, launched to connect Central Asian producers with Western markets. This initiative formed part of a broader U.S. effort to diversify access to strategic materials and reduce dependence on Russia and China. Russia remained a central but changing presence in Central Asia throughout 2025. Economic ties, labor migration, and shared infrastructure ensured that Moscow continued to matter across the region. At the same time, however, Russia’s war in Ukraine constrained its ability to act as the dominant external power it once was. Central Asian governments maintained pragmatic relations with Moscow, but they increasingly treated Russia as one partner among several rather than the default reference point. Trade continued, security cooperation persisted, and political dialogue remained active, yet the balance shifted toward hedging rather than dependence. Uranium sits at the center of this shift, with the United States having banned imports of certain Russian uranium products under federal law, with waivers set to expire no earlier than January 1, 2028. As Washington restructures its nuclear fuel supply chain, Central Asia’s role has grown sharply. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s 2024 Uranium Marketing Annual Report, Kazakhstan supplied 24% of uranium delivered to U.S. reactor operators, while Uzbekistan accounted for about 9%. Canada and Australia remain major suppliers, but the Central Asian share is now strategic rather than marginal. That economic weight translated into political visibility. In December, U.S. President Donald Trump said he would invite Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to attend...