• KZT/USD = 0.00221
  • TJS/USD = 0.10830
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00221
  • TJS/USD = 0.10830
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00221
  • TJS/USD = 0.10830
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00221
  • TJS/USD = 0.10830
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00221
  • TJS/USD = 0.10830
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00221
  • TJS/USD = 0.10830
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00221
  • TJS/USD = 0.10830
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00221
  • TJS/USD = 0.10830
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
18 October 2026

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 21

Turkmenistan’s Digital Push Gains Ground Despite Tight Internet Controls

Turkmenistan remains one of the world's most tightly controlled online environments. Yet its state services portal now advertises more than 500 services, the country has more than 100,000 registered mobile-banking users, and the flagship city of Arkadag has launched a 5G network. The figures are official or state-linked and difficult to verify, and the scale remains modest by regional standards. Taken together, however, they point to a shift: digitalization is beginning to move beyond government rhetoric and into everyday administrative and financial life. A Shift That Is Hard to Measure Turkmenistan's digital transition is difficult to quantify. Official statistics are incomplete and independent checks are rare. That makes smaller, observable indicators - portal use, mobile-banking registrations, network launches, and infrastructure projects - especially useful. According to DataReportal, Turkmenistan had 3.53 million internet users in October 2025, equivalent to 46.1% of the population. Using the same source, internet access stood at 93.4% in Kazakhstan and 89.0% in Uzbekistan. Other estimates put Turkmenistan's rate lower, underscoring the uncertainty around even basic connectivity data. DataReportal also counted 5.24 million active cellular connections, representing 68.5% of the population, although a connection does not necessarily include mobile internet access. Social media use remains far more limited: the same report estimated 388,000 social media user identities in October 2025, or 5.1% of the population. Those figures coexist with severe controls. Human Rights Watch said in its World Report 2026 that internet access remains tightly controlled. The authorities have also seized and dismantled Starlink equipment and intensified internet blocking. However, targeted infrastructure projects are moving ahead. The 5G network launched in Arkadag in 2025 was implemented with Huawei and the Ministry of Communications and, according to official accounts, is intended mainly to support smart-city systems. The ministry says it is also developing a fiber-optic route toward Herat and a submarine cable with Azerbaijan to add international links and transit capacity. E-Government Moves Beyond the Legal Framework Turkmenistan launched its unified public services portal, e.gov.tm, in 2019. The Law 'On Electronic Government' came into force in July 2022, formally setting out how public bodies could provide services through information and communication technologies and exchange data electronically. The portal is available through a website and Android and iOS apps. It allows users to pay utility, communications, and education fees, book tickets, join the electronic queue for migration services, and submit applications to government agencies. Published service counts vary sharply. In April 2025, Orient referred to 46 services; in March 2026, the same publication said the portal offered more than 500. The reports do not explain the rise, but the larger figure appears to use a broader definition that includes informational pages and other functions, not only fully interactive services. In October 2025, President Serdar Berdimuhamedov approved the Concept for the Development of the Digital Economy for 2026-2028. A state program and implementation plan followed in January 2026. The documents call for wider use of digital systems across government and the economy, while separate work with the United Nations Development...

Opinion: Indian Ambassador Says Shared Spiritual Legacy Reflects Indo-Uzbek Solidarity

TASHKENT, June 10, 2026 - Indian Ambassador to Uzbekistan Smita Pant used her official remarks at the Termez Dialogue 2026 to argue that connectivity between Central and South Asia cannot be judged by infrastructure alone. Roads, railways, ports, energy links, financial channels, and digital systems are essential. But durable cooperation also depends on confidence, cultural memory, and a willingness to treat sovereignty as a condition for partnership rather than an obstacle to it. The second meeting of the Termez Dialogue was held under the theme “Peace, Connectivity, and Resilience: Shaping the Foundation for Shared Prosperity.” It was organized by the Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies under the President of Uzbekistan and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan, in partnership with CICA. The forum fits into a wider Uzbek diplomatic push to reconnect Central and South Asia through political dialogue, trade, transport, climate cooperation, and cultural exchange. Pant’s address stood out because it placed the human dimension of connectivity at the center of the discussion. The broader idea associated with the Termez platform was captured in the phrase: “Eurasia needs not lines of division, but spaces of trust.” For India and Uzbekistan, that argument has particular force. Their relationship is not only diplomatic. It rests on older movements of people, ideas, language, food, faith, scholarship, and trade. That history gives modern policy a deeper base. Central and South Asia are often discussed today through the language of corridors, transit costs, sanctions risk, and access to ports. Those questions are real. The International North-South Transport Corridor, Chabahar, air freight links, customs procedures, and digital payment systems all matter to India’s practical engagement with Central Asia. But the old routes that connected India, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and the wider Eurasian space carried more than goods. They also carried habits of coexistence. “Connectivity is not just material. It is not just about roads and rail. It is also cultural, spiritual, financial, and digital,” she said, reminding delegates that human relationships and shared values constitute the most resilient infrastructure of all. [caption id="attachment_50469" align="aligncenter" width="2508"] Indian Ambassador to Uzbekistan, Smita Pant. Photo: Embassy of India, Tashkent [/caption] This is not a decorative point. Central Asia’s geography makes connectivity a strategic necessity, but its history shows that routes endure only when they are trusted. The UN General Assembly resolution on strengthening connectivity between Central and South Asia gave international backing to this agenda in 2022. The harder question now is how to make that connectivity commercially viable, politically acceptable, and socially useful. Pant’s answer was to frame India’s approach around sustainability and sovereignty. “India's approach on connectivity is guided by a very simple mantra – it must be built on the bedrock of financial sustainability and local priorities and should not bypass ideas connected to national sovereignty and independence. India’s approach to connectivity dictates that relations must be transparent, fair and benefit the person on the ground,” she said. That line is important because connectivity projects can easily become abstract. Maps look clean from a...

Turkmenistan Opens the Door a Little Wider to Europe

Turkmenistan has historically been a difficult partner to deal with. The Turkmen government’s isolationist policies run counter to deep cooperation with any foreign party, but the Turkmen authorities seem to now perceive that these policies are costing them opportunities and revenue. In one of the latest shifts in foreign policy, Turkmenistan appears to be warming up relations with the European Union, though currently, the EU has its own reasons to boost interaction with Turkmenistan. Let’s Meet For decades, the EU and many other countries and international organizations have gone through frustrating efforts to establish a reliable relationship with Turkmenistan. Ashgabat’s form of governance is based on a cult of personality, a supposedly infallible leader capable of protecting the country from the evils of the outside world. The UN recognition in December 1995 of Turkmenistan’s neutrality was used by its government to seal off the country. It would normally be easy for the rest of the world to ignore Turkmenistan. However, Turkmenistan possesses the planet’s fourth-largest proven natural gas reserves, and it is located on what is developing into a key global trade route. On March 20, the European Investment Bank’s (EIB) regional representative for Central Asia, Olivier Kueny, complimented Turkmenistan for its “ambitions in transport and… projects that reduce greenhouse gases.“ Kueny noted that, “with direct access to the Caspian Sea, [Turkmenistan] is a key node” of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Corridor (TITR). He hinted the EIB could be interested in investing in Turkmenistan’s “rail, road, rolling stock and port infrastructure [that] could help reduce the cost and time needed to move goods between continents.“ On March 26, Charlotte Adriaen, the head of the EU division for Central Asia and Afghanistan, met in Ashgabat with Turkmenistan’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Myahri Byashimova, to discuss energy cooperation. The two also reviewed EU programs for sustainable energy, trade, and digital connectivity. On the same day, there was also a “New Horizons for Connectivity, Investment and Sustainable Growth” Turkmenistan-EU business forum in Ashgabat. Turkmenistan’s Minister of Finance and Economy, Mammetguly Astanagulov, addressed more than 200 delegates attending the forum, telling them his country is ready to expand trade, transport, and energy cooperation with the EU. Astanagulov noted EU-Turkmenistan trade increased from $1.1 billion in 2024 to $2.1 billion in 2025. EU Ambassador to Turkmenistan Beata Peksa also spoke at the forum. She noted Turkmenistan’s growing role in global transport corridors between Europe and Asia and said the EU is seeking to work more closely with Turkmenistan on improving investment conditions in the country. Peksa also mentioned helping Turkmenistan improve regulatory frameworks and investment in modern technologies to increase efficiency in moving cargo. On April 1, Adriaen met with representatives from Turkmenistan’s State Service of Maritime and River Transportation at the Turkmenbashi International Seaport on the Caspian coast to discuss the port’s role in the TITR and projects at the Balkan shipbuilding yard. And on April 7, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) co-sponsored an “Export Experience Exchange” conference in Ashgabat, the aim...

Opinion: Afghanistan and Central Asia – Security Without Illusions

Over the past year, Afghanistan has become neither markedly more stable nor dramatically more dangerous, despite how it is often portrayed in public discourse. There has been neither the collapse that many feared, nor the breakthrough that some had hoped for. Instead, a relatively unchanged but fragile status quo has persisted, one that Central Asian countries confront daily. For the C5 countries, Afghanistan is increasingly less a topic of speculative discussion and more a persistent factor in their immediate reality. It is no longer just an object of foreign policy, but a constant variable impacting security, trade, humanitarian issues, and regional stability. As such, many of last year’s forecasts have become outdated, based as they were on assumptions of dramatic change, whereas the reality has proven far more inertial. Illusion #1: Afghanistan Can Be Ignored The belief that Afghanistan can be temporarily “put on the back burner” is rooted in the assumption that a lack of public dialogue or political statements equates to a lack of interaction. But the actions of Central Asian states show that ignoring Afghanistan is not a viable option, even when countries intentionally avoid politicizing relations. Turkmenistan offers a clear example. Ashgabat has maintained stable trade, economic, and infrastructure ties with Afghanistan for years, all with minimal foreign policy rhetoric. Energy supplies, cross-border trade, and logistical cooperation have continued despite political and financial constraints, and regardless of international debates over the legitimacy of the Afghan authorities. This quiet pragmatism stands in contrast to both isolationist strategies and symbolic or ideological engagement. Turkmenistan may avoid making public declarations about its relationship with Afghanistan, but it nonetheless maintains robust cooperation. This calculated calmness reduces risks without signaling disengagement. Importantly, this approach does not eliminate structural asymmetries or deeper vulnerabilities. But it dispels the illusion that distancing reduces risk. On the contrary, sustained economic and logistical ties foster predictability, without which attempts to “ignore” a neighboring country become a form of strategic blindness. In this sense, Turkmenistan’s experience affirms a broader regional truth: Afghanistan cannot be removed from Central Asia’s geopolitical equation by simply looking away. It must be engaged pragmatically or dealt with later, in potentially more destabilizing forms. Illusion #2: Security Is Achieved Through Isolation Closely related to the first is the illusion that security can be ensured by building walls. Security in Afghanistan, and in the broader Afghan-Pakistani zone, is often seen as an external issue, something that can be kept out by sealing borders or minimizing engagement. Yet in practice, security is determined less by geography and more by the nature of involvement. This is reflected in the recent decision by Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to participate in U.S. President Donald Trump's “Board of Peace” initiative. While the initiative focuses on resolving crises outside Central Asia, both countries have framed their participation as essential to their own national and regional security interests. As Abdulaziz Kamilov, advisor to the President of Uzbekistan, explained, Tashkent’s involvement stems from three factors: its own security needs, its foreign policy principles,...

Opinion: The New Silk Road to the Sea – Connecting Central Asia to Karachi and Gwadar

A historic shift is quietly but decisively reshaping the economic geography of Eurasia. On 5 February 2026, Pakistan and Kazakhstan agreed to elevate their bilateral relationship to a Strategic Partnership during the state visit of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to Pakistan— the first such visit by a Kazakh head of state in 23 years. This moment marked far more than a diplomatic renewal; it signaled a potential turning point in regional connectivity, one that could unlock long-suppressed economic potential across Central Asia and South Asia by overcoming longstanding geographical and logistical barriers. For decades, Central Asia’s landlocked status has imposed structural constraints on its economic growth. High transit costs, dependence on distant or politically sensitive routes, and extended distances to global markets have eroded competitiveness and limited diversification. These challenges were not the result of a lack of resources or ambition, but of geography itself. However, geography need no longer be destiny. Through strategic foresight—particularly under President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev—Kazakhstan and the wider Central Asian region have begun to convert constraint into opportunity by redefining connectivity. President Tokayev has consistently emphasized connectivity as the cornerstone of Kazakhstan’s long-term economic and strategic vision. During his engagements with Pakistan’s leadership, he demonstrated a clear understanding that sustainable prosperity for Central Asia depends on reliable, cost-effective access to warm-water ports. This conviction underpinned the decision to elevate Pakistan–Kazakhstan relations to a Strategic Partnership, recognizing Pakistan not merely as a bilateral partner, but as a gateway to global markets via the Arabian Sea. From a financial and logistical perspective, the implications are profound. Karachi and Gwadar are among the closest seaports to much of Central Asia, significantly closer than many traditional routes to global markets. Every additional kilometer of overland transit results in higher freight costs, longer delivery times, and reduced margins. By connecting Central Asia to Pakistani ports, Kazakhstan and its neighbors stand to substantially lower transportation costs, enhance export competitiveness, and attract greater foreign investment into manufacturing, mining, agriculture, and value-added industries. The most immediate and strategically sound connectivity model emerging from this partnership bypasses the troubled terrain of Afghanistan, long viewed as a chokepoint for regional trade. Under this framework, goods could move seamlessly from Karachi through Pakistan’s railway network to Haripur, then onward via the Karakoram Highway into China. From there, the cargo would seamlessly integrate with the China–Kazakhstan railway system through the established Dostyk–Alashankou corridor. This route is not theoretical; it builds on existing infrastructure, proven logistics, and political stability across all participating states. Financially, this corridor offers predictability—an essential ingredient for trade and investment. Reduced insurance premiums, fewer delays, and stable regulatory environments translate into lower transaction costs. For Central Asian exporters, particularly Kazakhstan, this means improved access to South Asian, Middle Eastern, and African markets. For Pakistan, it positions Karachi and Gwadar as indispensable nodes in Eurasian supply chains, generating port revenues, transit earnings, employment, and industrial growth. At the same time, Kazakhstan’s leadership has demonstrated pragmatic flexibility by supporting additional connectivity options. Regional discussions have included the possibility...

Kazakhstan Bets on Pakistan for Central Asian Connectivity

In early February, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev made a historic visit to Pakistan. The last such visit was a two-day trip in 2003 by then-President Nursultan Nazarbayev, during which he met with the Pakistani president at the time, General Pervez Musharraf. Kazakhstan’s outreach to Pakistan reflects a broader recalibration of its connectivity strategy, as Astana looks to secure more reliable southbound trade routes amid shifting geopolitical and logistical constraints across Eurasia. The topic of connectivity was already on the table in 2003, and it was also one of the most important issues during the latest visit, with Tokayev discussing the issue with Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif. The trip culminated in the signing of 37 agreements in various fields, including strategic sectors such as mining and, more generally, trade, with the aim of increasing trade from the current $250 million to $1 billion. Official statements indicate that both sides are aiming to reach that target within approximately the next two years. From a political point of view, the bilateral relationship has been elevated to the rank of Strategic Partnership. In an official statement released following the visit, great importance was placed upon the issue of connectivity and logistics between South and Central Asia. From this point of view, the Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan railway took center stage. If completed, the project would connect Kazakhstan to the ports of Karachi and Gwadar and allow Pakistan to be included in the North–South International Transport Corridor and Trans-Caspian Middle Corridor logistics routes. Speaking to the Pakistani media in the days leading up to Tokayev's trip, the Kazakh ambassador to Pakistan, Yerzhan Kistafin, stated Astana's willingness to fully finance the construction of the infrastructure, at a total cost of around $7 billion. Kazakhstan's move represents an acceleration of a logistical competition in this arena involving various players, with some at the forefront, such as Pakistan and Iran, and others further behind, such as China and India. It has been talked about for some time, but the backbone of the Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan railway has only recently begun to take shape, as confirmed to The Times of Central Asia by Dr. Nargiza Umarova, Head of the Center for Strategic Connectivity at the Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS), Uzbekistan: “In 2024, Kazakhstan joined the project to construct a railway through Afghanistan, also known as the western trans-Afghan route. The Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP) railway corridor is designed to integrate the transport systems of Central and South Asia, which will stimulate trade and economic ties between the two regions. The TAP railway, which runs through western Afghanistan to the border with Pakistan, could be extended to Pakistani ports on the Indian Ocean. This would provide Central Asian countries with an alternative route to the open seas in addition to the southern ports of Iran.” Pakistan's importance as the destination for Kazakhstan's logistics ambitions was confirmed by Dr. Marriyam Siddique, Assistant Professor at the Pakistan Navy War College in Lahore: “Pakistan serves as the primary maritime gateway for Kazakhstan’s 'land-linked' strategy, offering the shortest...