• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00207 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10407 -0.29%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00207 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10407 -0.29%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00207 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10407 -0.29%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00207 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10407 -0.29%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00207 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10407 -0.29%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00207 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10407 -0.29%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00207 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10407 -0.29%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00207 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10407 -0.29%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 130

Hormuz Crisis: Transit Routes Through Afghanistan, Pakistan Would Be an Opportunity for Central Asia

The Strait of Hormuz has long been regarded as a central artery of global energy trade. A substantial share of oil and gas exports moves through this corridor, and regional crises are often framed in terms of energy security. For Central Asia, however, current tensions carry broader implications. They may increase demand for alternative food supply chains and transit routes linking the region to the Arabian Sea and Gulf markets. Recent tensions involving Iran also point to the strait’s growing role in food logistics. For Gulf states, Hormuz remains an energy chokepoint and a vital route for essential goods. For Central Asian policymakers, this shift matters. Any prolonged disruption could raise the region’s importance as both a supplier of agricultural commodities and a transit hub. Member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are among the world’s most import-dependent food markets. According to Reuters, between 80% and 90% of food consumed in GCC countries is imported. This reliance creates external demand that could increasingly draw Central Asia into Gulf food security planning. At the same time, the geography of these supplies remains relatively concentrated. Analysts estimate that more than 70% of the region’s food imports transit the Strait of Hormuz. This pattern could heighten interest in Central Asia as a source of food exports and a transit route. Amid ongoing regional tensions, this dependence has attracted growing attention from experts. Reuters described recent developments as “the greatest test of the Gulf countries’ food strategy since the 2008 global food crisis.” In recent years, regional governments have sought to diversify suppliers and build strategic reserves. Analysts nevertheless warn that stockpiles and diversification measures may provide only limited protection. If disruptions persist, logistical constraints could drive up prices and extend delivery times. This would create both a market shock and new commercial opportunities in Central Asia. Under such conditions, GCC food security depends on access to global markets as well as the resilience of transport routes. This is where Gulf vulnerabilities begin to intersect more directly with Central Asia’s economic geography. The infrastructure of major regional ports plays a central role in this system. One of the key logistics hubs is Jebel Ali Port in Dubai, the largest container port in the Middle East and a major re-export center. A substantial share of food shipments destined for GCC states and neighboring markets passes through this facility. Estimates suggest that disruptions at major logistics hubs such as Jebel Ali could affect supply chains on which tens of millions of people depend. This concentration of logistics flows increases the region’s strategic exposure to maritime instability. For Central Asian economies, this raises the strategic value of diversified overland and multimodal routes. Food security concerns are also linked to agricultural inputs. Industry analyses suggest that roughly 25–30% of global nitrogen fertilizer exports transit the Strait of Hormuz, including about 31% of global urea trade. During the initial weeks of heightened tensions, urea prices in Middle Eastern markets reportedly rose by about $70–80 per ton, from roughly...

Central Asia Faces an Arc of Instability to the South

Until a few weeks ago, looking south from Central Asia, observers of the region saw nothing but opportunities for connectivity. Admittedly, Iran on one side and the area between Afghanistan and Pakistan on the other have never been known for their stability. However, the current situation sees two serious conflicts on the southern border of Central Asia, which risk representing an arc of instability that will be difficult to overcome. While the global energy implications of the ongoing war in the Middle East, which began following the joint attack by the United States and Israel on Iran, are likely to be felt for months to come, the greatest risk for the Central Asian region is related to connectivity. This could also compromise significant efforts made in this regard by regional governments. Consider, for example, the recent trip to Pakistan by Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, which focused on the possibility of building a railway from Pakistani ports to Kazakh territory via Afghanistan and Turkmenistan. For much of the past decade, Central Asian governments have invested heavily in opening southern trade routes to global markets. Railways through Afghanistan, port access through Iran, and new logistics corridors to Pakistan were meant to reduce dependence on northern routes and expand the region’s economic options. The sudden emergence of conflicts along the southern frontier now raises questions about how secure those connections will be. The Times of Central Asia spoke with Peter Frankopan, author and Professor of Global History at Oxford University, about the potential implications of the two wars on Central Asia’s southern border. According to him, the main risk is not related to connectivity, but to contagion: “The key issue is about the safety of civilians and the protection of infrastructure in Central Asia,” he told TCA. “In times like these, nothing can be ruled out. With Iran lashing out at neighbors and realizing that attacks on oil, gas and more give it leverage, it is not hard to see what might come next. Second, of course, are threats to national economies. Wars create winners and losers. One can see a boom for some people in Central Asian states, but plenty of pressures, especially on inflation.” Indeed, the economic repercussions of the Middle East conflict are already being felt in the region, particularly in Turkmenistan, which maintains some of the closest trade ties with Iran and shares a long border with the country. Frankopan does not see any particular differences in terms of the danger to Central Asia posed by what is happening in Iran and between Pakistan and Afghanistan: “Clearly, instability in Afghanistan is an immediate concern, but it is not related to Iran and will have its own velocity and rhythms. But the risks of expanding violence and terrorism, of refugees, of narcotics and other illicit trafficking are real - and may well get worse.” Regarding connectivity, one of the topics that Central Asian governments pay the most attention to, according to Frankopan, the current situation should not be considered an...

Opinion: Islamic State Khorasan Province and the Strategic Risks for Central Asia

In modern Eurasia, threats are increasingly becoming part of the strategic environment. At times, they even turn into political instruments. When discussing terrorism, analysis usually focuses on the level of danger it poses. Far less attention is given to whether such threats are assumed to be manageable. The problem lies not only in the existence of radical groups, but also in the illusion that they can be controlled or used to serve someone’s strategic interests. Iranian analyst Nozar Shafiee, writing for the Tehran-based Institute for East Strategic Studies, describes ISKP as a decentralized and transnational network that can continue operating even after losing territorial control. This perspective is rarely discussed in public analysis of the region, which is precisely why it deserves attention. Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), the Afghan branch of the Islamic State group operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan, with demonstrated intent for external operations, has long ceased to depend on localized footholds. Even after losing territorial control, the organization did not disappear. Instead, it transformed. Today, it functions as a flexible network of small cells. It no longer needs to control a city or province to remain dangerous. It relies on the internet for recruitment and propaganda, operates through autonomous groups, and conducts high-profile attacks designed to attract attention and create an atmosphere of instability. However, there is another aspect that receives far less attention. In the context of regional competition, there is sometimes a temptation to view such structures as potential proxy forces, instruments of pressure that could theoretically be restrained or directed in a desired direction. The logic is simple: as long as the threat is not directed at us, it can be treated as part of a broader geopolitical game. History, however, demonstrates that this is a dangerous illusion. Radical networks do not function as controllable instruments. They operate according to their own logic and eventually move beyond the limits within which they were meant to be contained. There are numerous historical examples in which support for radical groups as a temporary strategic tool has “backfired.” Organizations created or supported for tactical purposes eventually began acting autonomously and turned their weapons against their former patrons. As Western analysts often note, supporting proxies who do not share your ideological legitimacy inevitably carries the risk that they will eventually turn against you. This represents a key risk for neighboring regions. Unlike traditional conflicts, networked extremist structures are not confined to a single territory. Their influence spreads through digital platforms, ideological narratives, and transnational connections. Even if attempts to instrumentalize such groups occur far from the region’s borders, the consequences can still affect it directly. This discussion is particularly relevant for Central Asia. First, modern terrorism no longer depends on physically crossing borders. In the mid-2010s, several thousand individuals from Central Asian countries became involved in conflicts in Syria and Iraq. Recruitment did not take place primarily through physical training camps but through online networks. Geographic distance offered little protection. Second, ISKP propaganda materials are distributed in Central...

Pakistan Declares “Open War” with Afghanistan’s Taliban as Cross-Border Attacks Escalate

Pakistan launched airstrikes inside Afghanistan on Friday following a Taliban-announced offensive against Pakistani military posts along the shared border, marking a sharp escalation in tensions between the two long-hostile neighbors. The Taliban has said it is open to talks. Pakistan’s Defense Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif said on social media that “our patience has now run out. Now it is open war between us,” framing Islamabad’s actions as a response to cross-border attacks. According to Reuters, the Afghan authorities said operations began across several eastern provinces bordering Pakistan, while Islamabad confirmed retaliatory strikes targeting what it described as militant positions. Both sides have released sharply conflicting casualty figures, none independently verified. Pakistani officials said more than 200 Taliban fighters were wounded and over 130 killed in retaliatory operations, while reporting Pakistani military casualties. The Taliban authorities rejected those figures and claimed dozens of Pakistani troops were killed. The clashes threaten a fragile ceasefire reached in October 2025 after earlier border fighting. Pakistan has repeatedly accused the Taliban of allowing Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants to operate from Afghan territory, an allegation Kabul denies. The Durand Line border has long been a flashpoint, but analysts say the scale of recent airstrikes — including reported strikes near Kabul — marks a significant escalation beyond previous localized clashes. For Central Asian states, renewed instability between Pakistan and Afghanistan carries direct strategic and economic implications. Uzbekistan has invested heavily in the proposed Termez–Mazar-i-Sharif–Kabul–Peshawar railway, a flagship trans-Afghan corridor intended to link Central Asia to Pakistani ports and expand southbound trade. The CASA-1000 electricity transmission project, designed to export surplus hydropower from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to Afghanistan and Pakistan, also depends on security conditions in Afghan territory. Turkmenistan’s TAPI gas pipeline project faces similar vulnerabilities. Escalating violence risks delaying these connectivity initiatives and raising concerns about militant spillover into northern Afghanistan, an area closely watched by Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Central Asian governments have pursued pragmatic engagement with the Taliban authorities to stabilize their southern frontier; sustained confrontation between Kabul and Islamabad could complicate that strategy and undermine regional integration plans. The United Nations and regional actors have called for restraint. While both governments describe their actions as defensive, the rhetoric surrounding the latest exchange suggests a dangerous deterioration in bilateral relations. Independent verification of battlefield claims remains limited as diplomatic efforts to contain the escalation continue.

Uzbekistan Approves Feasibility Study for Trans-Afghan Railway

President Shavkat Mirziyoyev has approved an intergovernmental agreement on the joint development of a feasibility study for the construction of the Trans-Afghan railway, which will link Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. According to the presidential resolution, the agreement between Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Transport, Afghanistan’s Ministry of Public Works, and Pakistan’s Ministry of Railways provides for the preparation of technical and economic documentation for a new railway line from Naibabad to Kharlachi. The document formalizes cooperation on the next stage of the long-discussed regional transport corridor. Under the resolution, Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been instructed to notify the Afghan and Pakistani sides that all necessary domestic procedures required for the agreement’s entry into force have been completed. The Trans-Afghan railway project was first proposed by Tashkent in December 2018 as a strategic initiative to provide Central Asia with direct access to Pakistani seaports. The original concept envisaged extending Afghanistan’s rail network from Mazar-i-Sharif through Kabul and Logar province before crossing into Pakistan. An earlier proposed route was expected to pass through Nangarhar province and the Torkham border crossing into Peshawar. In July 2023, however, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, and Afghanistan agreed on a revised alignment. The updated route will run from Termez to Naibabad, then through Maidan Shahr and Logar to Kharlachi, excluding the previously discussed Torkham crossing. Once connected to Pakistan’s railway network, cargo will be able to reach the Pakistani ports of Karachi, Gwadar, and Qasim. The railway is expected to stretch approximately 647 kilometers. According to recent statements by Uzbek officials, the estimated construction cost is $6.9 billion, although earlier projections ranged from $4.6 billion to $7 billion. The project is regarded by the participating countries as a key component of efforts to strengthen regional connectivity and expand trade routes between Central and South Asia.

Opinion: The New Silk Road to the Sea – Connecting Central Asia to Karachi and Gwadar

A historic shift is quietly but decisively reshaping the economic geography of Eurasia. On 5 February 2026, Pakistan and Kazakhstan agreed to elevate their bilateral relationship to a Strategic Partnership during the state visit of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to Pakistan— the first such visit by a Kazakh head of state in 23 years. This moment marked far more than a diplomatic renewal; it signaled a potential turning point in regional connectivity, one that could unlock long-suppressed economic potential across Central Asia and South Asia by overcoming longstanding geographical and logistical barriers. For decades, Central Asia’s landlocked status has imposed structural constraints on its economic growth. High transit costs, dependence on distant or politically sensitive routes, and extended distances to global markets have eroded competitiveness and limited diversification. These challenges were not the result of a lack of resources or ambition, but of geography itself. However, geography need no longer be destiny. Through strategic foresight—particularly under President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev—Kazakhstan and the wider Central Asian region have begun to convert constraint into opportunity by redefining connectivity. President Tokayev has consistently emphasized connectivity as the cornerstone of Kazakhstan’s long-term economic and strategic vision. During his engagements with Pakistan’s leadership, he demonstrated a clear understanding that sustainable prosperity for Central Asia depends on reliable, cost-effective access to warm-water ports. This conviction underpinned the decision to elevate Pakistan–Kazakhstan relations to a Strategic Partnership, recognizing Pakistan not merely as a bilateral partner, but as a gateway to global markets via the Arabian Sea. From a financial and logistical perspective, the implications are profound. Karachi and Gwadar are among the closest seaports to much of Central Asia, significantly closer than many traditional routes to global markets. Every additional kilometer of overland transit results in higher freight costs, longer delivery times, and reduced margins. By connecting Central Asia to Pakistani ports, Kazakhstan and its neighbors stand to substantially lower transportation costs, enhance export competitiveness, and attract greater foreign investment into manufacturing, mining, agriculture, and value-added industries. The most immediate and strategically sound connectivity model emerging from this partnership bypasses the troubled terrain of Afghanistan, long viewed as a chokepoint for regional trade. Under this framework, goods could move seamlessly from Karachi through Pakistan’s railway network to Haripur, then onward via the Karakoram Highway into China. From there, the cargo would seamlessly integrate with the China–Kazakhstan railway system through the established Dostyk–Alashankou corridor. This route is not theoretical; it builds on existing infrastructure, proven logistics, and political stability across all participating states. Financially, this corridor offers predictability—an essential ingredient for trade and investment. Reduced insurance premiums, fewer delays, and stable regulatory environments translate into lower transaction costs. For Central Asian exporters, particularly Kazakhstan, this means improved access to South Asian, Middle Eastern, and African markets. For Pakistan, it positions Karachi and Gwadar as indispensable nodes in Eurasian supply chains, generating port revenues, transit earnings, employment, and industrial growth. At the same time, Kazakhstan’s leadership has demonstrated pragmatic flexibility by supporting additional connectivity options. Regional discussions have included the possibility...