• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00206 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10844 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00206 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10844 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00206 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10844 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00206 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10844 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00206 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10844 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00206 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10844 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00206 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10844 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00206 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10844 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 56

Turkmen Cotton Farmers Frustrated by Mechanized Harvesting Delays and Losses

In Turkmenistan’s Lebap region, tenant farmers are expressing growing frustration over delayed payments and crop losses linked to the government’s push for mechanized cotton harvesting. While the use of combine harvesters is intended to boost efficiency, many farmers say the reality on the ground is causing financial hardship and lower yields. Delayed Payments Compound Financial Pressure In the Chokhbetde village council of Halach district, farmers were told they would not be paid for cotton harvested by combine machines until the entire campaign is complete. All revenues first go to the State Association for Agricultural Technical Services, Turkmenobakhyzmat, which owns the harvesters. Because accounting is based on the season overall rather than by individual field or tenant, farmers are expected to wait for payment. This delay is particularly painful for rural communities that rely on regular cash flow. A tenant farmer from Mashpaya village noted that pickers brought in from urban areas must be paid every ten days, and the payment postponement makes this increasingly difficult. The core complaint, however, is with the quality of mechanized harvesting itself. “Because the combines are poorly adjusted, 10-15% of the cotton ends up on the ground and must be collected by hand,” the Mashpaya farmer said. “Government employees are brought in for this, and they also need to be paid on time.” Beyond the immediate spillage, poorly calibrated machinery damages the plants: drums crush unopened cotton bolls, preventing them from maturing and leading to permanent yield losses. “Two Shifts” and Self-Funded Repairs Concerns about machinery use and maintenance are longstanding. During preparations for the summer grain harvest in Lebap, each combine at local Obahyzmat units was assigned two operators to run in alternating shifts. However, operators were required to fund maintenance and repairs themselves, even for foreign-made equipment such as John Deere and Case combines. The association only supplied tires, promising that repair costs would be reimbursed after the harvest as part of output-based wages and bonuses. In practice, combine crews absorbed heavy expenses. A machine operator from Bayramaly district described frequent technical failures: broken cutter bars, damaged threshing drum pulleys, faulty bearings, and worn connecting rods. “My colleague and I have already borrowed and spent 15,000 manats each, $4,300 at the official exchange rate, or $769 on the black market, just on spare parts,” he said. While some parts are now being produced locally, a repair facility in Turkmenabat has reportedly exceeded production targets for farm machinery components, these improvements have yet to reach most farmers. For now, the burden of keeping equipment running falls largely on the operators and tenant farmers themselves, with financial relief promised only at the end of the harvest season.

Central Asia’s Cotton Harvest: Between Reform, Coercion, and Economic Strain

The 2025 cotton harvest is underway across Central Asia, revealing the region’s ongoing struggle to reconcile long-promised reforms with persistent coercion and deepening economic pressure. Once the crown jewel of Soviet central planning, cotton, long dubbed “white gold”, remains a politically sensitive and economically vital crop from Turkmenistan to Tajikistan. Turkmenistan: Forced Mobilization Persists In Turkmenistan, mass mobilization for the cotton harvest continues largely unchanged. Chronicles of Turkmenistan reported that during a September cabinet meeting, President Serdar Berdimuhamedov ordered all regions to begin picking on September 10. Just two days earlier, the Ministry of Health had instructed medical institutions to send doctors, nurses, orderlies, and even technical staff to the fields, each assigned a daily quota of 45 kilograms. In the town of Turkmenabat, hospital workers said doctors were expected to go to the fields immediately after overnight shifts. Those who refuse must hire substitutes at their own expense, paying about 50 manats ($14) per day. As a result, up to two-thirds of monthly salaries are spent covering these unofficial harvest duties. While younger staff are dispatched to the fields, older employees are left to maintain hospital operations with minimal support. Uzbekistan: Reform, but Lingering Coercion Uzbekistan, by contrast, has officially ended Soviet-style forced labor. The government abolished child and public-sector mobilization, scrapped state cotton quotas in 2020, and partnered with the International Labour Organization (ILO) to monitor the transition. In March 2022, the Cotton Campaign, a global coalition of rights groups, unions, and apparel brands, lifted its boycott of Uzbek cotton, citing the end of systemic forced labor. The campaign, which began in 2011, had gained the support of more than 330 global brands, including H&M and Zara. Yet coercion has not entirely disappeared. In a recent video published by Kun.uz, Dilfuza Tashmatova, deputy hokim (governor) for family and women’s affairs in the Surkhandarya region's Sariosiyo district, was seen berating mahalla (local governance body) employees for failing to recruit enough pickers. She demanded that each “women’s activist” find five to ten additional laborers, totaling 150 people, and threatened dismissal for non-compliance. “Are you even a woman? Shameless! Unscrupulous! If you don’t want to work, then leave!” she shouted from a cotton field. According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, approximately 70% of Uzbekistan’s cotton is still harvested by hand, despite recent gains in mechanization. Labor shortages have plagued the past two harvests as fewer people are willing to take on the physically demanding work for low wages. Mahalla councils are often pressured to mobilize unemployed or low-income residents. Following public backlash, Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Poverty Reduction and Employment fined Tashmatova 20.6 million UZS (about $1,660) under Article 51 of the Administrative Code, which prohibits forced labor. From Soviet Monoculture to Market Reforms Uzbekistan’s long history of forced cotton labor dates back to its designation as the Soviet Union’s cotton monoculture. For decades, students, teachers, and medical staff were sent into the fields to meet state quotas. After independence, the system endured until international scrutiny spurred reforms. The ILO hailed...

Cotton Deadlock: Why Tajikistan’s Farmers Are Working at a Loss

Tajikistan’s cotton farmers are facing a growing crisis: while global cotton prices remain high, local producers are forced to sell at rates below production cost, threatening the viability of an entire sector that once served as a strategic pillar of the national economy. Farmers say they are currently paid just 6-6.5 TJS ($0.66-0.72) per kilogram for raw cotton, while the cost of production stands at 7-8 TJS ($0.77-0.88). Many now warn that without government intervention, the cotton industry is unsustainable. Selling Below Cost “If we don’t sell for at least 10 TJS ($1.10) per kilogram, we will go bankrupt. The production cost is simply too high,” said a farmer from Khamadoni district. He estimates that it takes between 10,000 and 12,000 TJS ($1,100-1,320) to cultivate one hectare of cotton. Yet this season, even the most optimistic buyers offer well below that value. In Khamadoni, the crisis is compounded by non-operational cotton ginning factories. Farmers were instructed in the spring to plant cotton, but come harvest time, they discovered there was no local processing infrastructure in place. Many are now searching for buyers in other districts, where prices remain equally unprofitable. Despite official claims of "freedom of crop choice," farmers say that in practice they face unspoken pressure from local authorities. Refusing to grow cotton can complicate land lease renewals or access to loans. Intermediaries Reap the Profits On the international market, cotton prices hover around $1.50-1.60 per kilogram. But Tajik producers remain disconnected from global buyers. Instead, they rely on a procurement system that disproportionately benefits intermediaries. “Without subsidies and higher purchase prices, cotton farming will collapse. The current procurement system works in favor of intermediaries, not the farmers,” said economist Farrukh Saidov. Labor costs add to the burden. Pickers are paid just 1.5 TJS ($0.16) per kilogram while many can earn up to 200 TJS ($22) a day in construction. This pay disparity is driving workers away from agriculture. Uzbekistan Supports, Tajikistan Promises In neighboring Uzbekistan, cotton production has become more viable thanks to government subsidies of 2.1 TJS ($0.23) per kilogram. Tajikistan offers no such support, leaving local farmers to operate at a loss. On paper, however, the government has ambitious plans. The national strategy for the development of the cotton and textile industry through 2040 includes proposals for preferential loans, grants, tax breaks, and greater participation of farmers in setting factory prices. Plans also call for establishing a national cotton and textile association, retraining agricultural specialists, and bringing in foreign experts. But on the ground, farmers say these promises remain unfulfilled. Video appeals shared widely on social media reflect growing desperation among rural communities. “We are forced to sell cotton below cost. Without state support, this is a path to ruin,” one farmer said. Experts agree that systemic reforms are urgently needed. These would include introducing subsidies, creating direct access to export markets, and eliminating unofficial crop mandates. For now, cotton, once a key strategic industry, is fast becoming a symbol of Tajikistan’s broader agricultural dysfunction.

Tajik Cotton Farming in Crisis: Why Production Is Falling and What the Government Is Doing About It

Tajikistan’s cotton industry is facing a deepening crisis. Production has plummeted, costs have outstripped prices, and a lack of qualified specialists is further straining the sector’s viability. Once a cornerstone of the national economy, cotton is becoming increasingly unprofitable for farmers, prompting government efforts to reverse the decline. Harvest and Export Decline Over the past two years, cotton production has dropped dramatically. The 2022 harvest totaled 404,700 tons, but by 2024 this figure had fallen nearly 40% to 253,200 tons. Cotton fiber processing also decreased, from 127,100 tons in 2022 to 106,900 tons in 2024. This contraction has impacted exports. In 2024, Tajikistan exported 100,500 tons of fiber worth $170.1 million, $28.5 million less than the previous year. The average export price fell to $1,692 per ton. Iran remains the primary buyer, accounting for 68% of Tajik cotton exports. Other destinations include Turkey (15%), China (8.4%), Russia (4.4%), Pakistan (3%), Georgia (1%), Bangladesh (0.2%), and Latvia (0.1%). Strategic Resource Under Pressure On August 26, the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade hosted a meeting of the Interdepartmental Headquarters for Macroeconomic Policy. First Deputy Minister Ashurboy Solehzoda reaffirmed that cotton cultivation and processing remain “strategic directions” for the country. He emphasized the crop's importance not only for economic stability but also for maintaining Tajikistan’s export potential. However, authorities acknowledge that without modernization and deeper processing, the country risks losing its position in the global cotton market. What’s Behind the Decline? Multiple factors have contributed to the sector’s downturn in 2025. Abnormal spring rainfall delayed sowing by 65 days, shifting ripening schedules and reducing overall crop quality. Summer heatwaves and premature irrigation by farmers led to widespread root rot, compounding losses. Economic factors have also played a key role. The average purchase price for cotton remains at 6-7 somoni per kilogram, while production costs range from 7-8 somoni, making cultivation unprofitable and discouraging continued investment by farmers. A severe shortage of qualified personnel is another critical issue. Approximately 200,000 farms lack agronomists, and many textile enterprises struggle to find staff trained to operate modern machinery. The cost of electricity further burdens the sector, accounting for up to 15% of cotton yarn production costs. Processors receive no seasonal discounts to mitigate expenses. Additionally, limited access to affordable credit has prevented enterprises from upgrading equipment or expanding capacity. Government Response The government has introduced a set of tariff and non-tariff incentives aimed at stimulating processing and expanding textile production. However, experts argue that these measures are underutilized and have yet to make a meaningful impact on domestic supply or budget revenues.

Uzbekistan Targets Premium Global Brands with U.S. Cotton Imports

Uzbekistan, one of the world’s largest cotton producers, may begin importing cotton from the United States, a move that has prompted public debate. Inomjon Abdurakhmonov, Head of the Foreign Trade Department at the Ministry of Investment, Industry and Trade, explained that the decision is aimed at helping Uzbekistan secure a foothold in premium global markets and boost the reputation of its textile exports. A rapidly growing textile sector Over the past seven years, Uzbekistan’s textile industry has expanded dramatically. Since 2017, cotton yarn output has more than doubled from 412,000 to 970,000 tons, knitted fabric production has risen from 68,000 to 312,000 tons, and ready-made garment output has jumped from 960 million to 3.1 billion pieces. Exports have grown from about $1.1 billion in 2016 to $2.8 billion in 2024. This growth stems from a deliberate policy shift away from exporting raw cotton in favor of domestic processing. Today, 100% of the national harvest is used locally, feeding factories that now export finished goods to more than 50 countries. Why import cotton? Abdurakhmonov emphasized that imports would supplement, not replace, domestic supply. “Uzbek cotton is fully consumed domestically, but our factories still operate at about 75% capacity,” he said. “Premium-grade imports allow us to expand production and meet the strict quality standards of top global brands.” Similar strategies are used by other textile leaders such as Turkey, India, Vietnam, and China, all of which import high-grade cotton to meet market requirements. The U.S. advantage The plan focuses on importing Strict Middling, a high-grade U.S. fiber recognized for its consistency, strength, and sustainability credentials under the U.S. Cotton Trust Protocol. “For major brands like Levi’s, Ralph Lauren, Puma, and Gap, ‘Made with U.S. Cotton’ is not optional, it’s a prerequisite,” Abdurakhmonov explained. Such quality cannot easily be replicated in Uzbekistan’s climate, and producing comparable fiber locally would take at least five years. Financing the imports Purchases will be supported by the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s GSM-102 program, which offers credit guarantees and deferred repayment terms of 12-18 months. This allows Uzbek manufacturers to sell finished goods before paying for the raw cotton, covering up to 98% of the deal value. Long-term benefits While U.S. cotton costs 15-20% more than domestic fiber, it will be used selectively for contracts where premium quality is mandatory, with higher margins offsetting the expense. Beyond immediate production gains, Uzbekistan aims to enhance its global textile reputation and strengthen its position in supply chains. Preferential access under the EU’s GSP+ system has already nearly doubled exports to Europe, from $74 million to $140 million and similar results are expected from U.S. partnerships. “Importing U.S. cotton is not about shortages, it’s about credibility,” Abdurakhmonov said. “This strategy will secure our place in premium markets and create long-term opportunities for our economy.”

State Workers in Turkmenistan Once Again Forced to Fund Cotton Harvest

As the cotton harvest begins in Turkmenistan, reports from the independent outlet turkmen.news indicates that the annual season is once again marred by forced labor practices. Pay or Work the Fields In Lebap and Mary provinces, state employees, including teachers, doctors, and workers from the Turkmenabat silk production association and a local knitwear factory, are being compelled to contribute financially toward the harvest. The daily levy stands at 30 manats (approximately $1.50). Since August 3, similar demands have reportedly extended to medical and educational staff in Mary province. As in previous years, state workers are frequently presented with a coercive “choice”: pay for a replacement harvester or work in the fields themselves. Some avoid field labor by sending their children in their place. Reform Promises Fall Short In 2024, the Turkmen government, in cooperation with the International Labour Organization, unveiled a roadmap for eradicating forced labor in the cotton industry. The plan outlined key measures to safeguard workers’ rights and address systemic abuses. Despite this, rights groups, including the Turkmen Initiative for Human Rights, the Progres Foundation, and the Cotton Campaign, warn that little can change while the state maintains total control over the cotton supply chain, from seed distribution to raw cotton procurement. These organizations argue that genuine reform requires guarantees of free speech and the right to organize, allowing citizens to report abuses and form independent trade unions. In reality, however, workplace union leaders are reportedly tasked with collecting money from employees and organizing labor schedules. Experts note that this top-down mobilization underscores the state-driven nature of the system, perpetuating a cycle of coercion rather than addressing its root causes.