Critical Minerals - The Times Of Central Asia

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Jackson-Vanik Amendment

Jackson-Vanik Repeal Gains Momentum as U.S. Courts Central Asia

For many years, U.S. relations with Central Asia were primarily political in nature, while economic ties developed slowly. However, in the past year, engagement has intensified significantly, with recent agreements suggesting the U.S. is poised to strengthen its economic presence in the region. A recent statement by U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio reinforces this outlook. Calls to repeal the outdated Jackson-Vanik trade restrictions have been framed by U.S. officials as a way to facilitate trade with Central Asia and strengthen U.S. energy security. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment The Jackson-Vanik Amendment, enacted in 1974, restricts trade with countries that limit their citizens’ right to emigrate. At the time of its passage, Central Asia was still part of the Soviet Union. The amendment prohibits granting most-favored-nation (MFN) status, government loans, and credit guarantees to countries that violate their citizens’ right to emigrate, and allows for discriminatory tariffs and fees on imports from non-market economies. The amendment was repealed for Ukraine in 2006, and for Russia and Moldova in 2012. However, it remains in effect for several countries, including Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, which continue to receive only temporary normal trade relations. In May 2023, a bill proposing the establishment of permanent trade relations with Kazakhstan, which included repealing the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, was introduced in the U.S. Congress. A follow-up bill with similar provisions was submitted in February 2025. Then-nominee and now Secretary of State Marco Rubio previously noted that some policymakers viewed the amendment as a tool to extract concessions on human rights or to push Central Asian states toward the U.S. and away from Russia. However, he characterized such thinking as outdated, stating that, “In some cases, it is an absurd relic of the past.” Rubio has consistently supported expanding U.S. ties with Central Asia. Expanding Cooperation In 2025, relations between the U.S. and Central Asia deepened significantly, particularly with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which are seen by analysts as the primary beneficiaries of this cooperation. In late October 2025, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau and U.S. Special Representative for South and Central Asia Sergio Gor visited Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. One of the year’s major events was the Central Asia-U.S. (C5+1) summit held in Washington on November 6. Leaders of the five Central Asian states met with President Donald Trump and members of the U.S. business community. Uzbekistani President Shavkat Mirziyoyev also met with U.S. Senator Steve Daines, co-chair of the Senate Central Asia Caucus, with both sides focusing heavily on economic cooperation. At the summit, Uzbekistan finalized major commercial agreements with U.S. companies, including aircraft orders by Uzbekistan Airways and deals spanning aviation, energy, and industrial cooperation. Kazakhstan signed agreements worth $17 billion with U.S. companies in sectors including aviation, mineral resources, and digital technologies. This included a deal granting American company Cove Kaz Capital Group a 70% stake in a joint venture to develop one of Kazakhstan’s largest tungsten deposits, an agreement valued at $1.1 billion. Further agreements were signed on critical minerals exploration. Kazakhstan and the...

Central Asia-U.S. Relations

Astana and Tashkent Engage Washington’s Central Asia Vector

On January 22 at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev signed President Donald Trump’s new Board of Peace charter. The document matters less than what their participation signifies: recognized access to the White House and a willingness to be publicly associated with a U.S.-led initiative. This is all the more significant as Washington’s relations with several long-standing partners have recently become more fraught and publicly contested. The Central Asian response is part of that story. Their participation indicates that the Trump White House regards them as interlocutors of consequence, and that both Central Asian capitals are embracing that status. On December 1, Washington assumed the G20 presidency for 2026 and set three priorities: limiting regulatory burdens, strengthening affordable and secure energy supply chains, and advancing technology and innovation. It has also scheduled the leaders’ summit for December 14–15, 2026, in the Miami area. On December 23, Trump said that he was inviting Tokayev and Mirziyoyev to attend as guests. That invitation places Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan inside a host-defined agenda whose working tracks overlap with their strongest external bargaining assets, including energy, critical minerals potential, and transport connectivity. Trump publicly tied the invitations to discussions of peace, trade, and cooperation, which is in line with his subsequent Board of Peace invitations. Diplomatic Logic and Multi-Vectorism It is worthwhile situating these developments in the context of Central Asian cooperation, which Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have driven as the regional core. At the August 2024 Consultative Meeting in Astana, all five leaders signed a Roadmap for the development of regional cooperation for 2025–2027, and adopted a “Central Asia 2040” conceptual framework. Tokayev and Mirziyoyev referenced their 2022 allied-relations agreement and announced plans to adopt a strategic partnership program through 2034, including large-scale joint economic and energy projects. Moscow’s preoccupation with the war in Ukraine has widened the room for maneuver by other external actors, and Central Asian capitals have pursued these opportunities selectively. For example, the EU’s then foreign-policy chief Josep Borrell visited Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in early August 2024, Japan has pursued its “Central Asia plus Japan” line as a counterweight to China’s influence, and Azerbaijan has been building an energy bridge between Central Asia and Europe via the South Caucasus with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Washington’s main channel into this complex is the C5+1, and the current U.S. emphasis is to create routines that survive individual summits. The U.S. Special Envoy for South and Central Asian Affairs Sergio Gor and Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau travelled to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in October 2025 ahead of the Washington summit that Trump hosted the following month for the five leaders. Such formats can concentrate attention on the implementation of standardized procurement procedures and regularized dispute resolution that new supply-chain corridors require for interoperable paperwork and predictable customs treatment. Kyrgyzstan is scheduled to host the second B5+1 forum (the business counterpart to C5+1) on February 4–5, 2026. This has already been prepared by a joint briefing...

U.S. Ambassador

New U.S. Ambassador to Kazakhstan to Build “Momentum” on Trade, Diplomacy

Julie Stufft, the new U.S. ambassador to Kazakhstan, is a career diplomat who has said her goal is to ensure that U.S. companies in the Central Asian country have not just an “even playing field” but are also “the partners of choice” in a region where Russia and China are the dominant trading partners. Stufft, who made those remarks during her confirmation hearing in the U.S. Congress in July, presented her credentials to President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev of Kazakhstan in Astana on Friday. She has previously worked on COVID-19 travel policies and U.S. visa processing worldwide and was most recently deputy assistant to the president and executive secretary of the National Security Council. Stufft has served as deputy chief of mission in the U.S. Embassies in Moldova and Djibouti, and was also a diplomat in Russia, Ethiopia, and Poland. One of Stufft’s daughters, Nora, is a student at the U.S. Air Force Academy in Colorado. After the credentials ceremony in Astana, Stufft said Tokayev and U.S. President Donald Trump have a “very close relationship” and that there was impetus for further collaboration between Kazakhstan and the United States. “We have so much momentum from President Tokayev´s recent visit to Washington that we have to build on this,” Stufft said in reference to a November summit hosted by Trump and attended by the leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The meeting focused on securing big trade deals as well as U.S access to minerals in Central Asia that are critical to energy and other industries. Another U.S. goal is to counter the longstanding influence of Russia and China in Central Asian countries, whose leaders seek to balance their relationships with the big powers. Last month, in another round of diplomatic outreach, Trump invited Tokayev and President Shavkat Mirziyoyev of Uzbekistan to attend the G20 summit in Miami later this year. In addition to holding large reserves of critical minerals, Kazakhstan is a top uranium producer and a major oil exporter. China and Russia are its biggest overall trading partners. While U.S. trade with Kazakhstan is relatively small in comparison, the relationship is growing. “My goal as ambassador, if confirmed, would be to make sure that U.S. companies have an even playing field so that they can do investment in Kazakhstan, and also that U.S. companies are the partners of choice in Kazakhstan, instead of Chinese or other companies,” Stufft said in her confirmation hearing last year. The previous U.S. ambassador to Kazakhstan, Daniel Rosenblum, resigned from the post in January 2025.

Geopolitics

2025: The Year Central Asia Stepped Onto the Global Stage

For much of the post-Soviet era, Central Asia occupied a peripheral place in global affairs. It mattered to its immediate neighbors, but rarely shaped wider debates. In 2025, that changed in visible ways. The region became harder to ignore, largely not because of ideology or alignments, but because of assets that the world increasingly needs: energy, minerals, transit routes, and political access across Eurasia. One of the clearest signs came in April, when the European Union and the leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan met in Samarkand for their first summit at the head-of-state level. The meeting concluded with a joint declaration upgrading relations to a strategic partnership, with a focus on transport connectivity, energy security, and critical raw materials. The document marked a shift in how Brussels views Central Asia, moving beyond development assistance toward geopolitical cooperation, as outlined in the official EU–Central Asia summit joint declaration. European interest is rooted in necessity. Russia’s war in Ukraine has forced EU governments to rethink energy imports, supply chains, and overland trade routes. Central Asia sits astride the most viable alternatives that bypass Russian territory. It also holds resources essential to Europe’s green transition, including uranium and a range of industrial metals. The region’s leaders spent much of the year framing their diplomacy around these tangible advantages, rather than abstract political alignments. The United States followed a similar track. Through the C5+1 format, Washington deepened engagement with all five Central Asian states, with particular emphasis on economic cooperation and supply-chain resilience. A key element has been the Critical Minerals Dialogue, launched to connect Central Asian producers with Western markets. This initiative formed part of a broader U.S. effort to diversify access to strategic materials and reduce dependence on Russia and China. Russia remained a central but changing presence in Central Asia throughout 2025. Economic ties, labor migration, and shared infrastructure ensured that Moscow continued to matter across the region. At the same time, however, Russia’s war in Ukraine constrained its ability to act as the dominant external power it once was. Central Asian governments maintained pragmatic relations with Moscow, but they increasingly treated Russia as one partner among several rather than the default reference point. Trade continued, security cooperation persisted, and political dialogue remained active, yet the balance shifted toward hedging rather than dependence. Uranium sits at the center of this shift, with the United States having banned imports of certain Russian uranium products under federal law, with waivers set to expire no earlier than January 1, 2028. As Washington restructures its nuclear fuel supply chain, Central Asia’s role has grown sharply. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s 2024 Uranium Marketing Annual Report, Kazakhstan supplied 24% of uranium delivered to U.S. reactor operators, while Uzbekistan accounted for about 9%. Canada and Australia remain major suppliers, but the Central Asian share is now strategic rather than marginal. That economic weight translated into political visibility. In December, U.S. President Donald Trump said he would invite Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to attend...

G20 Summit

Trump’s G20 Invitations: Why Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan Matter

On December 23, President Donald Trump said he would invite Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to attend the United States–hosted 2026 G20 summit in Miami. The meeting is planned at Trump National Doral. The announcement followed separate telephone calls with Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, which Trump described as focused on peace and expanded trade, and cooperation. The G20 is a group of major economies, with membership based mainly on large nominal GDP and global economic importance, collectively representing about 85% of global GDP. Kazakhstan is ranked roughly 50th in the world by nominal GDP, at approximately $300 billion, while Uzbekistan is ranked around 62nd, with a nominal GDP of about $137–140 billion. According to Polish radio, the president of Poland stated that his country would also be on the guest list. Poland is the world’s 21st-largest economy. The G20 is a forum, not a treaty body. Leaders’ summits include member governments and a limited number of host-selected guest countries. Invitations to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan would place their leaders physically at the table with G20 heads of state, allowing them to be seen, heard, and recognized by other leaders, without conferring membership or a formal role in shaping the summit agenda. On average, the host invites six to seven guests. One official host-country explainer notes that guest invitations allow non-members to bring their own perspectives. For them, the significance of attending is access, not membership. What Washington Wants and What Can Be Transacted The host typically uses the guest invitations to signal which countries and regions they regard as priorities. U.S. interest in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan rests on an immediate material basis. The United States is rebuilding its nuclear-fuel supply chain away from Russian-origin material. Federal law now bans imports of certain Russian uranium products, with waivers terminating no later than January 1, 2028. U.S. agencies have been explicit that supply diversification is a policy objective. In 2024, Kazakhstan-origin material accounted for 24% of uranium delivered to U.S. owners and operators, while Uzbekistan-origin material accounted for about 9%. Kazakhstan’s structural advantage is scale and reliability. It remains the world’s leading uranium producer, with 2024 output around 23,270 metric tons of uranium and the largest share of global mine production. Astana has also signaled an interest in moving beyond extraction toward higher value-added fuel-cycle activity. Uzbekistan’s advantage is growth potential and its fit with Western joint-venture structures. Its uranium sector has attracted major external entrants, including Orano’s South Djengeldi joint venture Nurlikum Mining with the state partner Navoiyuran to develop a new mine alongside an Itochu (Japan) minority stake. The second instrument is the resource-focused diplomacy under the C5+1 umbrella. The State Department frames the C5+1 as organized around economy, energy, and security, within which framework it has elevated critical minerals to a dedicated track. The United States launched a C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue in early 2024, and subsequent U.S. statements have described it as a vehicle for geological exploration, mining, processing, and investment opportunities across the region. This...

Critical Minerals

Kazakhstan Deepens Its Critical Minerals Push

Kazakhstan is pushing a new phase of geological exploration, and the early results suggest that the country’s critical minerals profile is deepening. The Ministry of Industry and Construction says the area of mapped and studied subsoil will rise from about 2.1 to 2.2 million square kilometers by 2026. Exploration work completed in 2024 across eleven sites has produced new resource forecasts in Abai, East Kazakhstan, Karaganda, and Kostanay. The distribution matters as much as the tonnages: rare earths and other strategic metals appear across multiple regions, while gold prospects stand out in Kostanay. Five deposits have been added to the national register, alongside newly booked reserves of gold, copper, manganese, and phosphorites. Kazakhstan’s mineral importance was already widely recognized; this round of findings measurably strengthens that judgment. Four Regions Drive a Wider Metal Mix The most recent round of results from the national survey program is notable for the geographic spread and metals mix. The 2024 work across eleven sites also produced new forecasts of precious, rare, and strategic metals in Abai, East Kazakhstan, Karaganda, and Kostanay, according to the Ministry of Industry and Construction. In the Abai Region, geologists have outlined forecast resources of about 3,200 tonnes of beryllium, 1,100 tonnes of yttrium, and 200 tonnes of niobium. The mix points to advanced-manufacturing relevance, not a single-commodity profile. East Kazakhstan adds a second, larger beryllium signal, with newly identified deposits estimated at roughly 20,600 tonnes of beryllium and 600 tonnes of tungsten. That pairing reinforces an emerging pattern in which the northeast and east of the country are presenting not just rare-earth potential but a broader suite of strategic inputs. The largest rare-earth figures in this announcement sit in the Karaganda Region. Early estimates there indicate roughly 935,400 tonnes of lanthanoids, alongside prospective resources of copper, yttrium, gallium, and molybdenum. This is consistent with the earlier 2025 reporting that has repeatedly placed central Kazakhstan at the center of the country’s renewed rare-earth narrative. Kostanay Region stands out on the precious metals side. Forecast gold resources there are reported at about 17,500 tonnes, with prospective copper resources also identified. The December update also marks formal follow-through: five new deposits have been added to the national register, with newly booked reserves that include 98 tonnes of gold, 36,000 tonnes of copper, 11 million tons of manganese, and more than 1.3 million tonnes of phosphorites. Taken together, these regionally distributed findings give added empirical weight to a view already present in earlier coverage: Kazakhstan’s mineral importance was established; the survey now suggests a widening and deepening strategic profile rather than a single episodic discovery. Kazakhstan Treats Geological Knowledge as Policy The December 8 update also fits a pattern visible through 2025: the state is treating geological knowledge as a policy tool. Earlier this year, the Geology Committee described plans to expand subsurface study coverage by early 2026, while late-2025 government reporting reiterated the 2.2 million square kilometer objective as a presidential instruction tied to industrial priorities. What separates the current cycle from...