Central Asia’s Road to the Southern Seas: A Search for Stability
India has confirmed that it received a six-month sanctions waiver from the United States for its involvement in developing Iran’s Chabahar port. According to The Times of India, the decision followed intensive diplomacy by New Delhi, which convinced Washington that Chabahar provides India’s only practical overland access to Central Asia that avoids Pakistan. Through Chabahar, India is building a land-based counterpart to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, creating an alternative axis linking the Indian Ocean with Eurasia while bypassing Islamabad and Beijing. The exemption, valid until April 2026, gives India room to negotiate with Washington. For Central Asia, the episode reflects a broader challenge: choosing viable routes to the southern seas. Current debates about “Afghan transit” focus largely on the Trans-Afghan Railway and the so-called Kabul corridor connecting northern Afghanistan with Pakistan’s ports. Yet Afghanistan’s transport network is forming along multiple lines. Alongside the eastern route, a western corridor from Herat to Kandahar and Spin Boldak is also developing, offering access both to Pakistan and to Chabahar. The integration of western Afghanistan’s infrastructure with Iran’s transport network makes this corridor more reliable under today’s political and security conditions. It aligns with projects pursued by Iran, Turkmenistan, and Afghanistan and positions Herat as a major hub. It is also close to the North–South Transport Corridor, the Lapis Lazuli and Middle Corridors, and the Caspian and Persian Gulf regions. The planned Mazar-i-Sharif–Herat line fits the logic of the Five Nations Railway Corridor, potentially giving Tajikistan and Uzbekistan access to Chabahar and, if stability improves, to Pakistan’s ports as well. By contrast, the eastern route will remain constrained by the unstable Afghan–Pakistani border and the volatile relationship between Kabul and Islamabad. Afghanistan’s own priorities also differ from outside assumptions: the Herat–Kandahar–Spin Boldak line primarily serves as an internal transport spine linking the west and south. For Kabul, the route to Gwadar is more a political gesture than a practical goal. Some analysts note that developing the western corridor also helps rebalance the country’s economic geography toward its more diverse western regions. These dynamics strengthen the western route’s appeal. The Taliban leadership has even urged Afghan businesses to reduce reliance on Pakistani ports, signaling a structural shift in trade orientation. Both Chabahar and Gwadar face political risks. Pakistan’s transit routes pass through areas affected by insurgency, including Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, as well as the broader narcotics routes of the Golden Crescent. The greatest uncertainty remains the fluctuating relationship between Kabul and Islamabad. Gwadar, while technologically superior, is undermined by chronic instability. Chabahar’s capacity is more modest, but its integration with Iran’s road and rail network provides reliability. The United States adds another layer of complexity. The waiver suggests Washington is balancing its Iran sanctions regime with its strategic partnership with India. The United States is not directly involved in regional infrastructure but retains enough influence to shift the balance between the western and eastern routes. Under certain conditions, Gwadar may appear less problematic for Washington than Chabahar. At the same time, selective sanctions exemptions...
