Geopolitics - The Times Of Central Asia

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Black Sea Tanker Attacks

Kazakhstan Oil Output Falls 21% as CPC Halt More Than Halves Tengiz Production

Kazakhstan's oil and gas condensate output fell by about 21% on July 22 after the Caspian Pipeline Consortium stopped receiving Kazakh crude and suspended loadings at its Black Sea terminal. Output dropped to 1.63 million barrels per day from a July average of 2.07 million, Reuters said, citing an industry source. The sharpest reduction came at Tengiz, Kazakhstan's largest oilfield. Production fell by 56%, from an average 925,000 barrels per day in July to about 406,000 on Wednesday, reflecting how quickly a halt at Novorossiysk can force cuts at a field more than 1,500 kilometres away. Kazakhstan's Energy Ministry confirmed the reduction, stating that producers had cut output because CPC had restricted intake and their storage tanks were nearing capacity. "The adjustment was a technical measure intended to keep production operations stable," the ministry said. It added that CPC’s production facilities remained operational and could resume shipments when conditions allowed. Consultations were continuing with the consortium, producers, shipowners, and state agencies. No timetable was given. Tengiz Bears the Brunt Chevron began production from the $48 billion Future Growth Project in January 2025. The expansion was designed to add 260,000 barrels of crude per day and raise total Tengiz output to about one million barrels of oil equivalent per day at full capacity. Chevron owns 50% of Tengizchevroil, while ExxonMobil holds 25%, KazMunayGas 20%, and Lukoil 5%. The field provides a large share of Kazakhstan's oil production and export income. After the tanker ASIA was struck on July 19, Chevron told The Times of Central Asia that the crew was safe and the vessel was stable. "There has been no impact to TCO operations or exports," the company said. However, by July 22, the export halt had forced cuts at Tengiz. Chevron did not immediately comment on the new production figures cited by Reuters. The cut compounds a difficult year for the sector. Kazakhstan produced 45.7 million tonnes of oil in the first half of 2026, down 8.4% from a year earlier. The Energy Ministry still expects 98 million tonnes for the full year, after lowering its previous target because of Tengiz outages and earlier CPC disruption. Kazakhstan's OPEC+ crude quota rose to 1.608 million barrels per day for July. The national output figure includes gas condensate and cannot be compared directly with the crude allocation. The latest reduction removes barrels Kazakhstan intended to export. The timing adds to the revenue loss. Brent rose above $100 on July 23 after attacks on Saudi tankers in the Red Sea added to disruption around the Strait of Hormuz. Tanker Attacks Halt CPC Loadings The production cuts followed a series of attacks on tankers near CPC's marine terminal. The Chevron-chartered Yasa Polaris was hit on July 7 while empty and waiting offshore. Its crew was safe, and no pollution or major hull damage was reported. Nordic Zenith was struck on July 17 while empty and approaching the terminal. ASIA and NISSOS IOS were hit on July 19 while loading Kazakhstan-produced crude. Loading briefly resumed...

Caspian Pipeline Consortium

When the War Reaches Kazakh Oil

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine unleashed the war now expanding across the Black Sea, but it did not erase the distinction between Russian military logistics and the lawful commerce of other states. Kazakhstan is not a party to the war, yet its principal oil export route passes through an expanding maritime target zone. The attacks near the Caspian Pipeline Consortium terminal therefore raise a larger question: can civilian trade carrying Kazakh crude be treated as part of Russia’s war economy simply because geography places its outlet on the Russian coast? Four vessels were attacked near CPC’s Black Sea terminal on July 17, 19, and 20. Nordic Zenith, chartered by ExxonMobil according to Reuters, was empty and approaching the terminal when it was hit on July 17. Two days later, ASIA and NISSOS IOS were struck at single-point moorings off Novorossiysk while loading Kazakhstan-produced oil. ASIA was taking Tengizchevroil (TCO) crude; NISSOS IOS was loading oil from Kashagan B.V. and Maten. A fire on ASIA was extinguished; no one was injured, both vessels remained afloat, and no oil entered the sea. Chevron told The Times of Central Asia that the crew was safe, the vessel was stable, and there had been “no impact to TCO operations or exports.” Loading briefly resumed that evening, but on July 20 a drone struck NELSA while it was loading at SPM-1. The impact on the tanker’s starboard side caused a fire on deck and in several compartments. Its 22-member international crew was evacuated except for the captain and chief officer; the vessel remained afloat, the fire was extinguished, and no oil spill occurred. CPC suspended loadings again. Ukraine’s General Staff said separately that its forces had struck two tankers used to transport Russian oil, petroleum products, and fuel for the Russian military in the Black Sea. It did not identify the vessels or connect the claim to the attacks at the CPC terminal. Russia’s Foreign Ministry blamed Kyiv, while CPC itself did not publicly attribute the attacks. Astana’s response to the attacks has remained measured and legalistic. The Foreign Ministry called the attacks an infringement on Kazakhstan’s economic interests and a threat to lawful international trade. It said an agreed mechanism for sharing information on civilian vessels entering the Black Sea to load CPC oil had been disregarded, endangering crews. It reserved Kazakhstan’s right to seek compensation under international law. Following the strike on NELSA, the Energy Ministry said it remained in constant contact with CPC while the tanker’s technical condition and the consequences of the attack were assessed. The statements focused on Kazakhstan’s rights. That is the distinction Astana is asserting: Kazakh cargoes, revenues, crews, and commercial partners should not be treated as extensions of Russia’s war economy merely because they use a terminal on Russian territory. Kazakh Crude and the Western Stake Russia’s invasion created the maritime battlefield in which these incidents occurred, and Ukraine has a legitimate interest in weakening the military logistics that sustain Russia’s campaign. But Kazakhstan is not Russia,...

Energy Security

Kazakhstan’s Main Oil Route Remains Vulnerable. It Is Expanding Alternatives

Kazakhstan’s prosperity has been built largely on oil, much of which still reaches world markets through infrastructure crossing Russian territory. That would be a strategic exposure for any country; for a landlocked state bordering Russia during the largest war in Europe since 1945, it is impossible to ignore. The Caspian Pipeline Consortium route to the Black Sea remains Kazakhstan’s most important oil artery, carrying about 80% of its crude exports. Three tankers were struck near the terminal on July 17 and 19, two while loading Kazakh oil. Loadings briefly resumed before a fourth tanker, NELSA, was hit on July 20, forcing another suspension. No casualties or oil spill were reported, but the attacks repeatedly interrupted Kazakhstan’s main export route. Kazakhstan treated the attacks as a direct threat to its own economic interests, not as an incident confined to Russia. Its Foreign Ministry condemned the July 17 and 19 strikes as unacceptable, said an agreed mechanism for sharing information about civilian vessels entering the Black Sea to load CPC oil had been disregarded, and demanded an immediate halt. Ukraine’s General Staff said it had struck two tankers overnight on July 19 as part of its campaign against Russian oil and military-fuel logistics, but did not identify them. CPC said the vessels at its terminal were loading Kazakh crude. The episode exposed Kazakhstan’s dependence on infrastructure beyond its control. That exposure reflects geography and inherited infrastructure, not Kazakhstan’s foreign policy alignment. It is a serious strategic vulnerability that Astana is trying to reduce. Kazakhstan did not choose its geography, and its export system was not designed for the rupture that followed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It is the world’s largest landlocked country, bordered by Russia and China, and sits on the Middle Corridor linking China and Central Asia with the South Caucasus and Europe. No government in Astana can alter those facts. The relevant question is how it has responded to them. Under President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Kazakhstan remains highly exposed to oil, but it is not an oil economy standing still. KAZENERGY’s 2023 National Energy Report put the hydrocarbon sector at about 23% of GDP in 2019 and about 20% in 2022. Kazakhstan’s Bureau of National Statistics put the oil and gas sector at 16.3% of GDP in 2024. The series are not directly comparable, but both indicate that hydrocarbons remain central even as non-oil sectors expand. Oil dependence has not disappeared. UNCTAD notes that oil exports still account for more than half of total exports and remain central to foreign exchange earnings and public finances. Kazakhstan has made more progress in reducing oil’s share of GDP than its weight in exports and state revenue. Any serious assessment has to account for both. Kazakhstan’s position on Ukraine also needs to be judged in context. Binary judgments obscure the constraints facing a country that shares a long border, trade channels, energy infrastructure and significant security exposure with Russia. Kazakhstan has not recognized Russia’s attempted annexations. In 2022, its Foreign Ministry said it would...

Energy Security

Russian Fuel Shortages Revive Tajikistan’s Search for Oil and Gas

On July 10, Tajikistan’s Energy Minister Daler Juma said the country had enough fuel to last two more months. This situation is due to Tajikistan’s dependence on Russian petroleum products, which are in short supply in Russia itself because of Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian oil refineries. Located in the southeast corner of Central Asia and ringed by mountains on three sides, Tajikistan has few options to replace those Russian supplies, so the Tajik authorities are preparing to try again to find domestic hydrocarbon supplies. Looking to Strike Oil at Home Estimates of the share of Tajikistan’s petroleum imports supplied by Russia range from 70% to 80%. Tajikistan’s head of civil aviation, Habibullo Nazarzoda, said on July 9 that his country is facing shortages of airplane fuel and is in talks with Turkmenistan. Russia has a prohibition on exporting aviation kerosene that runs from June 1 to November 30. Tajikistan does have hydropower and coal, but neither one of those helps with shortages at petrol stations, and much of the internal transport of people and goods in mountainous Tajikistan is done via the road network. So, Tajikistan is again looking at the potential to develop domestic hydrocarbon fields, this time with the help solely of the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). On July 7, the head of the Tajik government’s Geological Department, Ilhom Oymuhammadzoda, said CNPC was already carrying out exploration at several potential hydrocarbon deposits in Tajikistan. “I think [CNPC] will present a progress report on the seismic survey operations by the end of the year,” Oymuhammadzoda told a press conference in Dushanbe. He named the Tajik Depression, in southwestern Tajikistan, and the Ferghana Basin, in northwestern Tajikistan, as two of the more promising sites. However, Oymuhammadzoda indicated that work in northern Tajikistan could require drilling down to a depth of 7,000 meters. Tajikistan’s Search for Oil and Gas Past studies of Tajikistan’s potential oil and gas fields point especially to the southwest of the country as a logical place to seek these hydrocarbons. Southwest Tajikistan is adjacent to gas and oil fields in southern Uzbekistan that have been producing for decades, to fields in northern Afghanistan, where exploration has confirmed commercial flows, and not too far east from the giant gas fields in Turkmenistan. Looking at a map, it seems logical that southwest Tajikistan is part of this same hydrocarbon structure. In 2008, Canadian company Tethys started exploring the Bokhtar area about 100 kilometers south of Dushanbe. Tethys found both oil and gas in the area. In 2012, the Canadian company estimated the area’s gross prospective resources at 8.5 billion barrels of oil and condensate and 3.22 trillion cubic metres of gas. For a small country like Tajikistan, it was potentially enormous, although these resources remained unconfirmed and commercially unproven. However, getting to that oil and gas required drilling wells that were 3,500 meters or deeper, which greatly added to production costs. In 2013, Gazprom International drilled a well at the Sarykamysh field in southwest Tajikistan that was...

Middle East Crisis

Kazakhstan’s Persian Gulf Port Plan Faces New Iran Risk

Kazakhstan has moved a long-planned southern trade project from talks to contract. The move gives Astana a possible foothold on the Persian Gulf, but it comes as a second night of U.S. strikes on Iran and Iranian retaliation around the Gulf states have raised the cost of using that route. On June 28, Kazakhstan and Iran signed a 27-year BOT agreement to build a Kazakh transport and logistics terminal at Iran’s Shahid Rajaee Port in Bandar Abbas. The contract gives the project two years for construction and 25 years for operation, with commercial activity expected in the third year. Aman Malgazhdarov of QazExportPromotion signed for Kazakhstan, and Hossein Abbas Nejad of Hormozgan’s Ports and Maritime Organization signed for Iran. The project is designed to plug Kazakhstan into the International North-South Transport Corridor and widen export access to the Persian Gulf, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and East Africa. The $25 million investment covers a 15-hectare logistics center that could handle 1.5 million tons of goods a year. Mohammad Shakibi-Nasab, the head of Iran’s Ports and Maritime Organization, said it would “create jobs… increase the operational capacity” of Shahid Rajaee and “boost ports along the North-South corridor.” Malgazhdarov called it the “core of a future Kazakh port” within Shahid Rajaee. That ambition now sits beside a worsening security picture. On July 8, U.S. President Donald Trump declared the interim agreement to end the Iran war “over” after attacks on three cargo ships in the Strait of Hormuz. Asked about the deal, Trump said: “It’s over. I don’t want to deal with them.” The U.S. then launched a new round of strikes, and Iran fired on U.S. sites in Bahrain and Kuwait. U.S. Central Command said the attacks were meant to “further degrade” Iran’s ability to threaten navigation in the strait, with Trump warning, “If it happens again, it will get much worse!” By July 9, the U.S. military said it had struck 170 Iranian targets in 48 hours. Iran had fired at U.S. bases in Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar, and Iran’s health ministry said U.S. strikes on July 7 and 8 killed 14 people and wounded 78. The attacks hit Bandar Abbas, where Shahid Rajaee is located, and other southern coastal areas. Crude oil prices rose by 5% as the risk widened. For Kazakhstan, the timing is uncomfortable. Shahid Rajaee sits near the Strait of Hormuz, the waterway that connects the Persian Gulf to the open sea. The port offers one of Central Asia’s shortest southern outlets, but the approach depends on a zone where security, insurance premiums, and naval risk can change quickly. A terminal can lower handling costs and improve control over cargo, but it cannot remove war risk at the maritime end of the corridor. The risk may not be limited to the Gulf. The Financial Times reported that a railway bridge near Aqqala in Golestan Province was hit with cruise missiles, citing Iran’s Revolutionary Guards. The bridge lies on the Gorgan-Incheh Borun line, which carries passengers and cargo...

South Caucasus

As Azerbaijan Pushes Back Against Moscow, Central Asia Watches

The recent diplomatic escalation between Azerbaijan and Russia appeared to have run its course in April, after Moscow agreed to pay compensation over the Azerbaijan Airlines crash in Kazakhstan. Instead, the dispute has entered a new phase, and its implications now reach beyond the South Caucasus. On July 6, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned Russian Ambassador Mikhail Yevdokimov and handed him a formal note of protest over what Baku described as a Russian drone strike on a fuel station owned by Azerbaijan’s state energy company SOCAR in Ukraine’s Mykolaiv region on the evening of July 5. The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry said the attack on SOCAR facilities in Ukraine was not an isolated incident. It cited previous strikes on the company’s gas distribution compressor station and oil depot in Odesa, which caused material damage and injured employees. Baku also pointed to earlier damage to the Azerbaijani embassy building in Kyiv and the honorary consulate in Kharkiv, calling on Moscow to investigate and comply with its obligations to protect civilian infrastructure and diplomatic missions. At the same time, Shusha — known to Armenians as Shushi, retaken by Azerbaijan during the 2020 Karabakh war, and still regarded by many Armenians as occupied — hosted an international conference devoted to what participants described as Russia’s “colonial policy,” the “Circassian genocide,” and the situation of non-Russian peoples within the Russian Federation. The conference declaration called on Moscow to “recognize its historical crimes, abandon its chauvinistic policies, and end the forced recruitment of ethnic minorities into the war against Ukraine.” Experts from Azerbaijan, the United States, France, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Germany, Israel, Türkiye, and Georgia attended the conference. None of the Central Asian republics was represented. That absence was telling. Central Asian governments may be distancing themselves from Moscow in certain areas, but they remain reluctant to participate in openly anti-Russian political initiatives. For Astana, Tashkent, Bishkek, Dushanbe, and Ashgabat, the question is not whether Russia’s position has weakened, but how far they can move without provoking pressure from Moscow. For Central Asia, the dispute is not a distant quarrel in the South Caucasus. Azerbaijan is now a central link in the westward routes that Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan are trying to strengthen as alternatives to Russian territory. The Middle Corridor runs from China through Central Asia, across the Caspian Sea, and onward through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye to Europe. Any deterioration in Azerbaijan-Russia relations therefore has practical implications for Central Asian transit, energy, and diplomatic room for maneuver. The first major rupture in relations between Baku and Moscow came after Azerbaijan Airlines Flight J2-8243, traveling from Baku to Grozny, was damaged by Russian air-defense fire over Russian territory on December 25, 2024. The aircraft later crashed while attempting an emergency landing near Aktau, Kazakhstan, killing 38 people. Azerbaijan blamed Russia and demanded an apology, accountability, and compensation. Relations deteriorated further in June 2025 following the detention of ethnic Azerbaijanis in Yekaterinburg and reports of torture. The most prominent victims were the...