Iran - The Times Of Central Asia

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Food Security

Iran Conflict Drives Food Price Pressures Across Central Asia

The war around Iran is beginning to push up food price risks in Central Asia as disruptions to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz raise fertilizer and fuel costs, while Tehran’s halt to some food exports adds pressure in regional markets. The impact is not manifesting as shortages, but as rising costs across the systems that produce, move, and sell food. The United Nations has warned that the crisis is disrupting one of the world’s most important trade corridors for energy and agricultural supplies. A large share of global fertilizer trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz, and reduced shipping traffic is tightening supply and pushing up prices. Higher fuel costs are adding a second layer of pressure on farmers and transport networks. Fertilizer and fuel are among agriculture’s highest costs. Even modest increases can compress margins quickly, forcing farmers to cut usage or pass costs on, with pressure moving through to retail prices. Central Asia is particularly exposed to this shift in costs. The region relies on imported fuel and fertilizers, and depends on long, multi-stage transport routes. When costs increase at any point in that chain, they accumulate before goods reach markets. The second layer of pressure comes from Iran itself. On March 3, Tehran imposed a ban on exports of food products as part of wartime economic measures. Reporting in Tajikistan indicates that the move could affect the availability and pricing of goods such as dairy, sugar, fruit, and spices, particularly in wholesale and lower-cost retail markets. Iran is not a dominant supplier, but plays a role in specific markets. Tajikistan is the clearest example. Tajikistan has also expanded its economic relationship with Iran in recent years, supported by cooperation in industry and transport. Iranian goods are widely present in retail supply chains, and trade between the two countries has grown steadily in recent years. That growth is part of a broader trend. Iran’s economic ties with Central Asia have expanded under new trade arrangements and bilateral initiatives. Kazakhstan and Iran have discussed increasing trade turnover to $3 billion, reflecting the rising use of Caspian routes and port infrastructure, which are now under threat. [caption id="attachment_46480" align="aligncenter" width="1600"] Aralsk Bazaar. Rising transport and fertilizer costs are beginning to push up food prices across the region. Image: Michael J. Bland[/caption] Transport adds a third layer of pressure. As risks rise across the Middle East, airlines and freight operators are avoiding large swathes of Iranian airspace and surrounding routes, forcing rerouting and raising costs across supply chains. European aviation safety authorities have issued conflict-zone bulletins warning of heightened risks in the region, and carriers have adjusted accordingly. Rerouting increases fuel use, extends journey times, and raises insurance costs. Those increases affect cargo as well as passengers, and over time, higher logistics costs feed into the price of imported goods, including food. On land, the same pattern is visible. As southern routes become less predictable, more freight is shifting toward the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route - the Middle Corridor -...

Aviation Industry

Iran War Redraws Air Routes, Boosting Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan

Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan are emerging as potential beneficiaries of disruptions in the global aviation fuel market as tensions around Iran force airlines to reroute flights and rethink transit hubs. The escalation of tensions in the Middle East, including heightened risks to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, has led to sharp increases in energy prices and supply disruptions. Gas prices in the EU have risen by 70%, and oil by 60%, with additional costs reaching €14 billion. Roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz, making any disruption critically significant for global markets. The aviation industry has been among the hardest hit sectors. According to industry sources cited by Bloomberg, Europe is expected to have sufficient jet fuel supplies in the short term, but stocks are under pressure, and supply risks could emerge if the conflict continues. The cost of jet fuel has risen from about $742 to more than $1,700 per ton in recent weeks in some markets. This increase is outpacing the rise in oil prices, intensifying pressure on airlines. As reported by The Telegraph, citing data from Cirium, around 7% of scheduled flights were canceled at the peak of recent disruptions, equivalent to more than 7,000 departures, compared with about 4.7% a year earlier. Airlines are responding by cutting flight schedules and revising their business models. Lufthansa, for example, is considering temporarily grounding part of its fleet. According to CEO Carsten Spohr, fuel shortages are likely to be felt first outside Europe, where supply chains are more vulnerable. At the same time, airfares have already risen by 15-20%, beginning to dampen demand. As passenger demand softens and costs rise, carriers are balancing route cuts with the need to maintain key markets. Fuel Costs Drive Route Shifts According to Sergey Agibalov, consulting director at Argus in the CIS, significant changes are also occurring in the geography of international air travel. Major Middle Eastern hubs, such as Dubai, Doha, and Abu Dhabi, have seen a decline in transit traffic amid safety concerns and are operating below normal capacity on key routes. Agibalov argues that this creates a window of opportunity for alternative routes between Europe and Asia, including Istanbul, Addis Ababa, and hubs in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. “Airports in Central Asia and the South Caucasus are now attractive not only to passengers, but also to airlines. Disruptions to Middle Eastern jet fuel exports linked to instability around the Strait of Hormuz have led to a sharp rise in fuel prices globally. This increase is outpacing the rise in oil prices, intensifying pressure on airlines. Recent industry data shows prices reaching as high as $1,600–1,800 per ton in some markets. Under these conditions, many airlines have begun optimizing their flight schedules; even if fuel is available, flying has become very expensive,” he noted. Against this backdrop, airports in Almaty, Astana, and Baku are seeing increased traffic and stronger airline interest. Argus estimates suggest volumes are already rising in Baku, as routes across Central...

India

India–Central Asia: Connectivity, Security, and Sustainable Partnerships in a Multipolar World

A widening conflict in West Asia is forcing India and Central Asia to reassess trade routes, diplomacy, and regional security, with key projects such as Iran’s Chabahar port now facing growing uncertainty. These risks framed discussions in New Delhi on March 25–26, where experts gathered under the banner of “India–Central Asia: Connectivity, Security, and Sustainable Partnerships in a Multipolar World,” with The Times of Central Asia in attendance. The conference unfolded against the backdrop of two active Eurasian wars—the Russo-Ukrainian and the Israel/U.S.-Iran conflict. Central Asian and Indian participants agreed that the West Asian crisis is widening, putting not only ports and logistics routes but also economies across the globe under serious threat. India's Chabahar link to Afghanistan and Central Asia is now a high-risk, uncertain investment, weakening overall continental strategic thinking across Eurasia, including efforts to consolidate new trans-Caspian trade corridors. If the conflict cripples or destroys Chabahar, years of progress, hard-won partnerships, and millions in strategic investment would be erased. On the sidelines, some participants suggested that India could help cool what's becoming a dangerously global conflict. Unbeknownst to them, India had already held an all-party meeting on March 25 on the West Asia crisis. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar's message: India will not mediate. The revelation surprised some participants—others, not at all. In any event, Central Asian states, in principle, have backed any diplomatic push for peace. With West Asia in turmoil and platitudes in abundance, conference participants emphasized the need to rethink geopolitics, trade, security, and cultural ties beyond stale frameworks at a time of conflict. Four themes defined the Central and South Asian moment: the dangers of bloc politics, even as regional organizations continue to evolve and expand their influence, the ascendancy of national interests over external pressure, and the emergence of a firm refusal to pick sides in the midst of frictions between competing global pressures. Dr. Raj Kumar Sharma, a member of the India Central Asia Foundation, stated: “The conference provided an important platform to move beyond theoretical discussion and toward practical engagement. With Central Asia’s ambassadors to India present, we focused on exploring concrete mechanisms to promote peace through sustained diplomatic efforts. Despite the proximity of the conflict in West Asia to both Central Asia and India, participants expressed confidence that dialogue and restraint – buttressed by trade and investment – will ultimately guide outcomes, with particular concern for civilians and those enduring hardship. Notably, the crisis did not overshadow the conference’s primary agenda or its scholarly contributions. Overall, the gathering can be seen as a constructive step in reinforcing diplomatic initiatives dedicated to peace and stability in a conflict-affected region.” The conference witnessed the release of three significant publications on India–Central Asia relations: India – Kazakhstan Partnership in a Changing Geopolitical Order (eds. Ramakant Dwivedi, Lalit Aggarwal, Kuralay Baizakova), Manas: Kirgiz Vir Gatha Kavya by Ramakant Dwivedi & Hemchandra Pandey and India and Central, East and Southeast Asia: Enhancing the Partnership (eds. Ramakant Dwivedi & Lalit Aggarwal). [caption id="attachment_46364" align="aligncenter" width="1379"]...

Fuel prices

Central Asia Avoids Fuel Shock as Global Pressures Build

Central Asia has so far avoided the immediate fuel shocks spreading across much of the world following the U.S. and Israel’s war with Iran. There are no lines at gas stations, no visible shortages, and no signs of panic buying. But that stability sits within a rapidly tightening global market, where disruptions in Asia and policy responses in Europe are reshaping fuel flows in ways the region will struggle to avoid. Across Southeast Asia, governments are already taking precautionary steps. Some state agencies and private firms are shifting parts of their workforce to remote work to reduce fuel consumption and prepare for potential price spikes and logistics disruptions, while Thailand is preparing contingency measures, including possible fuel rationing. China, one of Asia’s largest suppliers of refined fuels, has moved to restrict exports of gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel in an effort to prevent domestic shortages linked to the war. The move is expected to tighten supplies across Asia, especially for countries that rely on Chinese fuel imports. China supplied about one-third of Australia’s jet fuel last year, highlighting the wider regional impact, and roughly half of the Philippines’ and Bangladesh’s in 2024. Vietnam has already warned airlines to prepare for flight reductions in April due to the risk of shortages caused by these export restrictions. Indonesia is also imposing limits on fuel sales. Fuel-related pressures have begun to emerge in Europe as well. Poland has introduced tax measures aimed at reducing fuel prices, with the government saying this will lower prices for consumers. Slovenia, meanwhile, has introduced significant restrictions on fuel consumption. Under new rules, private motorists are limited to purchasing a maximum of 50 liters per day, while businesses and farmers may purchase up to 200 liters daily. The combined effect of war-driven energy shocks and renewed tariff barriers is raising global costs and adding pressure across trade, transport, and inflation. Against this backdrop, Central Asia’s apparent stability is misleading. It is highly unlikely that import-dependent states such as Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan will be as well protected as Kazakhstan, which may benefit in the short term from higher crude prices. Starting April 1, Russia is banning gasoline exports in an effort to stabilize its own domestic market. Russia is a key fuel supplier to Central Asia. However, according to assurances from the Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation, the temporary export ban will not affect supplies to Uzbekistan. Deliveries under intergovernmental agreements are expected to continue, ensuring that at least part of the region’s supply remains uninterrupted. In Kyrgyzstan, despite recent developments, fuel prices and supplies remain relatively stable. The government is considering lowering taxes or temporarily waiving excise duties for fuel importers should the crisis continue. Information from Turkmenistan is difficult to verify independently. Despite reports of fuel shortages at gas stations last year, official media are now indicating a significant increase in domestic gasoline production. The production plan for January-February 2026 was reportedly fulfilled at 122.7%, according to Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers Guvancha...

Southern Corridor

The Iran Conflict Is Stress-Testing Central Asia’s Southern Corridors

Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s proposal of Turkestan city as a venue for Iran-war negotiations shows how directly the conflict had already begun to affect Central Asia itself. The region is no longer simply observing events in Iran. By the time Tokayev made the offer, Central Asian governments were already dealing with evacuations, route disruption, emergency diplomatic coordination, and growing concern over the war’s economic effects. The Iran war has thus become a real test of Central Asia’s southern diversification strategy. Governments across the region have, in recent years, sought to widen access to world markets through Iran, the South Caucasus, and, in some cases, Afghanistan and Pakistan. These channels reduce dependence on northern routes by opening access to Türkiye, Europe, Gulf markets, and the Indian Ocean. The present crisis subjects that strategy to wartime conditions. The strain of war makes it easier to distinguish durable links, conditional ones, and routes that remain more aspirational than real. The C6 and Crisis Coordination The first effects have been practical. Turkmenistan has opened four additional checkpoints along its frontier with Iran, supplementing the Serakhs crossing, while Azerbaijan’s overland route through Astara became another critical outlet, evacuating 312 people from 17 countries between February 28 and March 2. Turkmenistan, according to official reporting, transited more than 200 foreign citizens from 16 countries during the same period. Uzbekistan used the Turkmen route to repatriate its citizens, while Kazakhstan directed its nationals toward overland exits through Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Türkiye. The war is already affecting borders, consular work, and the regional diplomatic agenda. This immediate response gives sharper political meaning to the widening of the Central Asian C5 into a C6 with Azerbaijan. The March 2 call among the five Central Asian foreign ministers and Azerbaijan showed that the format was already there to be used under pressure. What had until now appeared mainly as a corridor framework shaped by summit diplomacy and expert work appeared instead as a working format for crisis coordination linking Central Asia to the South Caucasus. The C6 idea is becoming more practical and more overtly diplomatic. The Organization of Turkic States adds a second, broader layer. Its foreign ministers met in Istanbul on March 7 and issued a joint statement expressing concern over the escalation in the Middle East, condemning actions that endanger civilians, warning against further regional destabilization, and affirming that threats to the security and interests of member states concern the organization as a whole. The statement was cautious, and the OTS is not turning into a military instrument. Even so, the war is testing whether a Turkic political space extending from Turkey through the South Caucasus to Central Asia can do more than express concern as regional security deteriorates. The C6 is becoming a working format for immediate coordination, while the OTS remains the broader political frame within which that coordination takes on institutional meaning. Corridor Stress and Resilience The trans-Iran transit option offers Central Asia a continuous land arc from regional railheads and road networks...

Caspian

Caspian Escalation Raises Stakes for Central Asia

Central Asia, which has increasingly sought to present itself as a coordinated actor on the global political stage, has until recently maintained a cautious, non-aligned stance regarding the escalation in the Middle East. However, attacks affecting infrastructure in the Caspian region have altered the diplomatic balance. The Caspian Sea is a critical transit zone for Central Asia, linking Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan and onward to European and Middle Eastern markets. It forms part of key east–west and north–south trade corridors that have gained importance since Russia’s war in Ukraine disrupted traditional transit routes. In recent years, regional dynamics have also been shaped by Azerbaijan’s growing engagement with Central Asian states, including its formal inclusion in the expanded Central Asian consultative format, which has effectively evolved from the C5 into the C6. Baku has played an important role in regional connectivity. It has developed close relations with both Turkey and Israel, factors that influence geopolitical calculations in the Caspian basin, which directly borders Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. This growing alignment has reinforced efforts to develop the Middle Corridor across the Caspian, linking Central Asia to Europe via the South Caucasus. Turkey maintains political, economic, and cultural influence in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan through the Organization of Turkic States. Russian political discourse has at times portrayed this cooperation as part of a broader pan-Turkic geopolitical project, a characterization widely dismissed by officials and analysts in Central Asia. Nevertheless, Astana and Baku continue to maintain strong relations with Ankara, a development that has periodically caused concern in Moscow. Under President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Kazakhstan has also strengthened ties with Gulf states. Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia have become significant investors in the country’s economy. In this context, Iranian attacks on Gulf states not directly involved in the conflict have shaped Astana’s diplomatic positioning during the current crisis. Reports of drone attacks widely blamed on Iran targeting the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhchivan have further heightened regional tensions. At the initial stage of the escalation, Kazakhstan’s response was largely limited to diplomatic contacts with regional leaders. At the same time, several Central Asian countries, along with Azerbaijan, expressed concern over the humanitarian consequences of the conflict and began dispatching aid to Iran. Azerbaijan sent nearly 30 tons of food and medical supplies on March 10, followed by another 82 tons of humanitarian aid on March 18. Uzbekistan delivered approximately 120 tons of humanitarian supplies, including flour, vegetable oil, sugar, and canned food, according to regional media reports. Turkmenistan also sent humanitarian aid consisting of medicines, medical supplies, and other goods, primarily intended for children. The Tajik government reported sending a convoy of 110 heavy trucks carrying humanitarian cargo to Iran, with a total weight of 3,610 tons. The diplomatic environment shifted further after Israeli air strikes on March 18 targeting Iranian naval facilities in the Caspian Sea. According to Israeli military statements cited by international media, the targets included a major port of the Iranian Navy, where, reportedly, "dozens of ships were destroyed,”...