• KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
11 November 2026

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 85

Opinion: Kazakhstan’s Mineral Ambitions Depend on Water

At the Shalkiya lead-zinc mine in Kyzylorda Region, engineers have designed a processing plant that could handle four million metric tons of ore a year. To keep it running, a pumping station would send up to 2,400 cubic meters of water back through the plant every hour. Even with that water going round again, the plant would still need fresh supplies. How much would it draw in a dry summer, when farmers in Kyzylorda are already working within irrigation limits? Investors need an answer before they commit to building it. Kazakhstan has good reason to process more of its ore at home. It would keep skilled jobs in the country, along with a larger share of the export earnings. Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov made that case at the mining congress in Astana in June. The Development Bank of Kazakhstan has launched a $1 billion program to finance rare and critical materials projects through 2030. At Shalkiya, some of the costs appear in a separate set of plans. These cover rebuilding the mine’s water intake and the pipeline from Zhanakorgan. Both belong in the plant’s budget alongside the machinery that will process the ore. What Farmers Already Face During the 2025 irrigation season, Kazakhstan withdrew 11.01 billion cubic meters of water for agriculture, with the south accounting for 98% of it. For 2026, the government set irrigation limits of 3.8 billion cubic meters for the Turkistan Region and 3.2 billion for Kyzylorda. It also asked farmers to devote less land to particularly thirsty crops. By September 1, 2026, farmers across Kazakhstan were using water-saving systems on 702,300 hectares. The Water Ministry estimates that the systems in use the previous year saved about 874 million cubic meters. For a factory looking for a water supply, though, it is important where those savings were made and who depends on the water downstream. Some water never makes it as far as the farm. Kazakhstan plans to upgrade more than 14,000 kilometers of irrigation canals by 2030 and cut losses along the way from 50% to 25%. A World Bank-backed program has already rehabilitated more than 800 kilometers of lined canals and improved water management on more than 100,000 hectares of farmland. In Kyzylorda, anyone planning decades ahead also has to reckon with hotter conditions. Between 1976 and 2025, the region’s average annual temperature rose by about 0.53 degrees Celsius per decade, according to Kazhydromet. Across Kazakhstan as a whole, the increase was 0.40 degrees per decade. Where the Water Will Come From Stepnogorsk, north of Astana, has a different starting point. Companies there are studying a rare earth separation plant that could produce 8,000 metric tons of rare earth oxides a year. Existing utilities may make the site attractive, but irrigation figures from Kyzylorda are of little help this far north. Investors need to know how much water the plant would draw and whether the local source could supply it through a dry year. In Ekibastuz, the developer of Data Center Valley puts the...

Uzbekistan Cotton Harvest Exceeds 5 Million Tons for First Time Since Independence

Uzbekistan has harvested more than 5 million metric tons of raw cotton in 2026, its highest reported total since independence in 1991. The record comes as the country has sharply reduced the area planted with cotton and expanded mechanized harvesting. In early November, the Ministry of Agriculture announced the milestone, with harvesting still underway in some areas. The harvest is at least 500,000 metric tons above the contractual target of 4.5 million metric tons for farms and cotton-textile companies, providing additional raw material for Uzbekistan’s textile industry. Cotton production has long been central to Uzbekistan’s economy and agricultural landscape. During the Soviet period, nearly 2 million hectares were devoted to the crop, which consumed substantial water resources and depended heavily on manual labor. By 2000, cotton cultivation covered approximately 1.4 million hectares, yielding around 3 million metric tons. In 2026, cotton was grown on approximately 890,000 hectares, according to the Ministry of Agriculture. In a November 4 address to farmers, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev said the area planted with cotton had fallen by 38% in recent years, while average yields had risen from 2.1 to 5.6 metric tons per hectare. He attributed the increase in yields to improved farming methods, new cotton varieties, and investment in irrigation technology. More than 3,000 cotton-picking machines had collected 85% of this year’s crop by November 4, Mirziyoyev said, with harvesting fully mechanized in the Jizzakh and Syrdarya regions. The shift has particular significance in Uzbekistan, where cotton harvesting was once associated with the systematic mobilization of schoolchildren, students, teachers, and public-sector employees. The Cotton Campaign coalition says systemic state-imposed forced labor has ended, although labor rights concerns remain. Mechanical harvesting has further reduced the need for large numbers of seasonal pickers. Cotton cultivation contributed to the depletion of the rivers feeding the Aral Sea, causing one of Central Asia’s most severe environmental disasters. Mirziyoyev said water consumption in cotton production had fallen by half compared with the 1990s, although his address did not explain how that figure was calculated. Despite difficult growing conditions, Karakalpakstan, the autonomous republic bordering the remnants of the Aral Sea, harvested more than 400,000 metric tons of cotton this year, according to the president. He said average yields had increased by 1 to 1.5 metric tons per hectare compared with previous years. The region continues to face the effects of the Aral Sea’s retreat, including soil salinity and water shortages.

Uzbekistan Cotton Harvest Reaches 4.63 Million Tons as Water Losses Persist

Uzbekistan's Ministry of Agriculture says the country had harvested 4.63 million metric tons of raw cotton as of October 22, exceeding its target by 3%. About 76% of the cotton harvested so far was harvested mechanically, reflecting the industry's shift away from manual labor. A new study, however, highlights another challenge: extensive water losses in the country's irrigation system. According to the Ministry of Agriculture, nearly 3,000 harvesting machines collected 3.52 million metric tons of cotton. Mechanized harvesting accounted for 98.5% of the crop in the Jizzakh region, 94.2% in the Syrdarya region, and 81.2% in the Tashkent region. In other regions, the figure was as low as 61%. Although the national target has been exceeded, the first picking is continuing on more than 49,000 hectares. Machines have reduced the need for seasonal workers in an industry that depended on large-scale manual labor for decades. Nevertheless, approximately 1.1 million metric tons of cotton was still picked by hand. At an international seminar on October 19–20, the government-linked Center for Economic Research and Reforms presented a study reporting that cotton yields had increased by 71% and grain yields by 48% between 2017 and 2025, while water withdrawals had declined by 22%. Water-saving technologies now cover 2.6 million hectares of agricultural land, according to the study. The same study, however, estimates that approximately 37% of irrigation water is lost during transportation through canals, while nearly half of irrigated farmland is affected by soil salinization. A 2021 World Bank report estimated that agriculture accounts for nearly 90% of the country's freshwater withdrawals, with cotton the largest user of irrigation water. These losses are particularly significant for Uzbekistan, whose agricultural sector depends on water from the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers. Decades of river water diversion for irrigation have been among the main causes of the Aral Sea's decline. The study also assesses the climate impact of agricultural production, finding that agriculture accounts for 17.5% of the country's greenhouse gas emissions. Methane, primarily associated with livestock farming, makes up nearly two-thirds of the sector's emissions. Proposed measures include reducing water losses, restoring pastures, and improving fertilizer efficiency. The pressure on Uzbekistan's water resources is also expected to increase. In July, the OECD warned that shrinking glaciers, rising temperatures, and growing demand threaten to reduce the country's water availability in the coming decades.

Uzbekistan Rejects Claims That the Amu Darya Is Drying Up

Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Water Resources has rejected claims circulating on social media that the Amu Darya River is drying up. The ministry said water continues to flow through the river, although discharge at some locations is lower than a year ago. On October 9, the water level near Termez, where the Amu Darya enters Uzbekistan, was 27 centimeters higher than it had been at the same time in 2025. Farther downstream, however, discharge at the Kerki monitoring station was approximately 11% lower than a year earlier. These figures provide little indication of the river’s longer-term condition. The ministry noted that river flows typically decline in the fall. As the irrigation season ends, water begins to accumulate in reservoirs for use the following year. The Amu Darya is formed by the confluence of the Panj and Vakhsh rivers, which originate in the mountains of Tajikistan and Afghanistan. It supplies water to agricultural regions in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, making any changes in its flow a source of concern. Concerns about water shortages are not limited to social media. In a September 30 report, the United Nations Development Programme warned that in dry years too little water reaches the Amu Darya delta in Karakalpakstan, leaving some farmland uncultivated and reducing crop yields. Meanwhile, Central Asian countries have reached another agreement on sharing river water. At an October 7 meeting in Avaza, Turkmenistan, the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination agreed on water withdrawal limits from the Amu Darya and Syr Darya for the fall and winter of 2026–2027, as well as reservoir operating arrangements. However, the published documents do not specify how much water each country will receive. Those figures remain in unpublished annexes to the meeting protocol. Officials also called for an examination of discrepancies in flow measurements at Kerki, one of the monitoring stations cited in the Uzbek ministry’s statement. Another concern is Afghanistan’s Qosh Tepa Canal, which is being built to divert water from the Amu Darya for irrigation. In March, Uzbekistan’s Water Resources Minister Shavkat Khamraev warned that Afghan withdrawals of 4 billion cubic meters annually could create a high risk of water shortages for Uzbek agriculture. Afghanistan is not a member of the regional water coordination commission, meaning its withdrawals are not covered by the October 7 agreement.

Central Asia Agrees New Water Limits, but National Quotas Remain Unclear

Water has repeatedly caused friction between Central Asian governments. Uncoordinated releases have flooded communities downstream, while disputes over access have contributed to deadly fighting along contested borders. On October 7, the region's countries agreed on water withdrawals from the Amu Darya and Syr Darya for fall and winter 2026–2027, though published results do not reveal how much water each country will receive. The agreements were reached at the 95th meeting of the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC) in Avaza, on Turkmenistan's Caspian coast near Turkmenbashi. Participants agreed on national water withdrawal limits and projected reservoir operating schedules, but the figures remain in unpublished annexes to the meeting protocol. Regional cooperation has grown in recent years. In June, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan agreed on water releases and electricity supplies for the 2026 irrigation season, continuing efforts to coordinate reservoir operations across borders. Despite this progress, longstanding tensions remain. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan need water in the winter to generate electricity, while Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan need it in the summer for irrigation. Bishkek has revived proposals for its neighbors to share the costs of maintaining reservoirs, while Afghanistan's Qosh Tepa Canal could put further pressure on the Amu Darya. Countries are also trying to resolve discrepancies in river-flow measurements. [caption id="attachment_58085" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Officials from Central Asian countries attend talks on cross-border cooperation and sustainable development in the Amu Darya basin in Turkmenistan. Image: State News Agency of Turkmenistan[/caption] From Flooded Villages to Border Clashes The competing demands of electricity generation and agriculture are particularly evident in the Syr Darya basin. Kyrgyzstan's Toktogul Reservoir sits on the Naryn River, the Syr Darya's main tributary. In winter, Kyrgyzstan releases water to generate electricity, months before downstream farmers need it for irrigation. When these releases exceed the capacity of reservoirs and canals, the excess water can cause flooding. In February 2004, residents of Kazakhstan's Kyzylorda region experienced the consequences of uncoordinated water releases. The Syr Darya overflowed its banks, forcing the evacuation of at least 200 families. Ice had already restricted the river's flow, worsening the flooding. According to NASA, Kyrgyzstan was releasing more water from its hydropower system than the agreements allowed, with the excess flow entering the Shardara Reservoir. Uzbekistan agreed to divert some of the water into the Arnasay lake system, but it was not possible to divert the entire volume needed. As a result, the river flooded areas farther downstream. In the Amu Darya basin, disagreements developed differently. In 2012, then-Uzbek President Islam Karimov warned that disputes over water resources could lead to war. The source of tension was the construction of the Rogun Hydropower Plant in Tajikistan. Tashkent feared that a large dam on the Vakhsh River, a tributary of the Amu Darya, would allow Dushanbe to influence the volume of water reaching Uzbekistan's agricultural regions. The confrontation was accompanied by interruptions in gas supplies to Tajikistan, transport restrictions, and mutual accusations. Dushanbe linked Tashkent's actions to pressure over the Rogun project, although the Uzbek side disputed that...

Opinion: Central Asia’s Old Water Bargain Was Built for Cotton

Central Asia inherited a water bargain built for another economy. In the Soviet system, upstream republics stored water and released it for summer irrigation. Downstream republics used that flow for cotton and other crops. The cost of the exchange stayed inside one plan. Water releases, electricity, fuel, and crop quotas were part of the same political economy. After 1991, the dependence survived, but the plan that balanced it did not. The 1998 Syr Darya agreement already tied reservoir operation to irrigation releases and set compensation for the winter power Kyrgyzstan gave up. The 2000 Chu-Talas agreement went on to share the cost of operating and maintaining shared water infrastructure between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Those agreements were important, and they show why today’s dispute is not new. Central Asia has long known that water regulation carries a cost. What it has not built is a wider settlement that prices storage and seasonal regulation under today’s climate, energy, and market conditions. That question is now open again. In January 2026, Kyrgyzstan’s new Water Code came into force. It recognizes water as a commodity and introduces fees for domestic and external users. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have rejected payment for transboundary river water, saying existing agreements do not provide for it. Downstream governments fear an open-ended bill and a precedent that could turn every dry season into a financial dispute. The old model rested on cotton and central planning. Several conditions have changed. The climate is less stable, energy demand keeps rising, and national economies now want more from water than a cotton plan once did. Uzbekistan’s own reform language has turned against the old cotton model. At the UN General Assembly in 2023, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev said “millions of people were forced to pick cotton” in Uzbekistan over a century. In August 2026, he called the old system one that left Uzbeks “slaves to cotton.” That history shapes the water argument. Uzbekistan is not abolishing cotton. It still grows the crop and continues to reform the sector. But as Tashkent moves away from the old cotton-centered model, the regional water logic built around that model also needs revising. The same pressure runs through the Amu Darya, where agricultural adaptation has become an economic and political issue rather than a purely hydrological one. Less predictable river flows make seasonal storage more valuable. Water is also becoming scarcer in parts of the region. Kyrgyzstan sits at the center of that question. It is the only country in Central Asia whose water resources are almost entirely formed within its own territory, and Kyrgyz officials argue that it carries the upkeep for infrastructure that serves its neighbors. They say the country spent about $80 million on the water sector last year and around $259 million over five years. That spending covers the water sector as a whole, including infrastructure whose benefits reach beyond Kyrgyzstan’s borders. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan reject paying for river water, saying existing agreements do not require it. But storing that water and releasing it...