Regional Security - The Times Of Central Asia

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Organization of Turkic States

Gabala 2025: What the Turkic World Will Discuss Amid Global Turbulence

On October 7, leaders of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) will gather in Gabala, Azerbaijan, for the 12th summit under the theme “Regional Peace and Security.” At first glance, it may look like another routine engagement. Yet against the backdrop of overlapping global crises, the forum is increasingly a test of the OTS’s maturity and relevance. The summit unfolds amid a turbulent international landscape. Afghanistan continues to cast a shadow over Central Asia: economic volatility, migration risks, and the activity of extremist groups remain sources of concern for OTS members. The ongoing war in Ukraine, meanwhile, is reshaping Eurasian transit routes, placing the bloc’s states in delicate positions between East and West. At the same time, violence in the Middle East is adding to the pressures on Turkey’s already complex foreign policy environment. The Middle Corridor at the Center A key theme in Gabala will be the advancement of the Middle Corridor, formally known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route. This east–west route connects China with Europe via Kazakhstan, the Caspian ports of Aktau and Kuryk, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. Investments are moving forward across the chain: Kazakhstan is expanding port and rail capacity, Azerbaijan is modernizing the Port of Baku in Alat, Georgia is upgrading its railway hubs, and Turkey is reinforcing the Baku–Kars line. Once a logistical project, the corridor is evolving into a strategic framework that ties together economic, environmental, and security considerations. Customs harmonization, digital tracking systems, and sustainability standards are now discussed as much as cargo volumes. Security, Coordination, and Soft Power Security will also be on the table, though framed in practical rather than military terms. Issues such as counter-terrorism cooperation, cyber resilience, disaster response, and the safety of emerging transit corridors are likely to feature. In this sense, security is increasingly seen as the foundation for trade and investment rather than a standalone agenda. Beyond infrastructure, OTS continues to develop soft power tools. Educational exchanges, cultural cooperation, green energy initiatives, and water management projects are part of efforts to build intra-regional trust. The recently inaugurated UN Regional Center for the SDGs in Almaty provides another anchor, aligning the Turkic bloc with global sustainability frameworks. A Turning Point for the Turkic Council? Founded in 2009 primarily as a cultural and humanitarian forum, the OTS is now edging toward a broader role. By coordinating infrastructure projects, harmonizing regulations, and cautiously addressing security concerns, it is positioning itself as a relevant player in Eurasian affairs. Much will depend on whether Gabala produces more than communiqués. Concrete steps on the Middle Corridor, digital customs corridors, joint water initiatives, or disaster coordination could demonstrate that the OTS is maturing into a platform for practical solutions. While major breakthroughs are unlikely, even incremental progress would signal that the Turkic Council is becoming a pillar of regional stability and integration.

Afghanistan

Opinion: The Contact Group on Afghanistan – Central Asia Formulates a Regional Position

On August 26, special representatives on Afghanistan from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan met for the first time in Tashkent. The meeting resulted in the creation of a permanent regional platform: the Contact Group on Afghanistan. This gathering was not only a continuation of commitments outlined in the joint statement from the most recent Consultative Summit of Central Asian heads of state, but also a step toward preparing for the next high-level format, scheduled for November in Tashkent. Formally, Turkmenistan was absent. Available information suggests the reasons were purely technical. Ashgabat was ready to join and expressed support for the results through its foreign ministry channels. The key outcome is that Central Asian states have, for the first time, shown their readiness to speak with one voice on an issue long shaped by competing external interests. This is not the start of forming a common position; that had already developed de facto in recent years. All Central Asian countries have supported trade and transit with Afghanistan, continued supplying electricity and food, and maintained working contacts with the Taliban, while avoiding extremes. The Tashkent meeting institutionalized this approach: parallel tracks have now shifted, cautiously, toward coordination. Informal unity has been formalized into a tool. Unlike external players, who often cloak interests in grand rhetoric, Central Asia acts openly and pragmatically. The logic is simple: whatever is done for Afghanistan is, in fact, done for oneself. That is the distinctive feature of the regional approach - no ideological cover, no attempts to reshape Afghanistan. Examples are straightforward. Electricity continues to flow even when payments are delayed - not as charity, but as an investment in security. A blackout in Afghanistan could trigger refugee flows and threats heading north. Exports of flour and fuel sustain Afghan markets but also expand outlets for Central Asian producers. Participation in trans-Afghan corridors is not a gift to Kabul but an opportunity for Central Asia to anchor itself in southern logistics routes. Ultimately, every step “for Afghanistan” is primarily for the region itself. If Kabul ignores basic rules, cooperation will simply stop. In politics, there are no eternal friends, only eternal interests. The new format does not yet imply collective pressure on the Taliban. Rather, it creates conditions for each country to conduct more substantive bilateral dialogue, but grounded in a shared position. Until now, Central Asia has mainly spoken to the Taliban about trade, transit, and infrastructure. The Contact Group now makes it possible to add another dimension: clarifying boundaries of what is acceptable on issues like extremism, border escalation, or water pressure. For now, “red lines” are unlikely, since the Taliban have not crossed them. The situation remains manageable, leaving room for constructive dialogue. Equally important, the Contact Group is not a threat or ultimatum. Coordination is meant to expand opportunities for dialogue, not limit them. In the long run, this could evolve into a sustainable C5+A format. Afghanistan would then be integrated into regional frameworks not as a problem to be managed, but as...

Security

Syrian Forces Intensify Arrests of Uzbek and Foreign Militants in Idlib

Syrian forces under the administration of Ahmed al-Sharaa have escalated their long-running security campaign against foreign fighters in northwestern Syria, targeting individuals affiliated with the Islamic State (ISIS) and other jihadist factions. According to Syrian sources cited by the El Manshar news outlet, the crackdown has gained momentum in recent months, with a focus on detaining commanders and field operatives of various nationalities, particularly in the Idlib region. Among those detained are several Uzbek nationals. In June 2025, security forces in Idlib arrested Ayoub “Abu Dujana” al-Uzbeki, a military trainer, and transferred him to an undisclosed location. In late August, another Uzbek figure, known as Islam al-Uzbeki, was detained during a raid in the Qasour neighborhood of Idlib. On September 3, Syria’s Internal Security Directorate announced the dismantling of an ISIS cell in the Harem area of western Idlib, with all members taken into custody, including fighters from Iraq and Uzbekistan. This is not the first time Uzbek militants have been the focus of security operations. Reports from late 2022 documented more than 20 raids on ISIS-affiliated cells across Idlib province, resulting in the arrests of several Uzbek fighters. Since 2020, forces loyal to Sharaa have also targeted the al-Qaeda-linked “Tawhid and Jihad” battalion, detaining senior figures such as its founder, Abu Saleh al-Uzbeki. Those arrests sparked violent clashes with rival jihadist groups. Analysts suggest the campaign aims to consolidate Sharaa’s authority by bolstering security services, pre-empting the rise of autonomous armed factions, and eliminating groups that resist integration into his command structure. It also appears intended to signal compliance with previous understandings with the United States concerning the handling of foreign fighters in Syria. Despite these efforts, El Manshar notes that extremist groups continue to maintain a limited but persistent presence in eastern Idlib and along the Turkish border. The campaign, therefore, represents a protracted struggle for dominance rather than a definitive resolution of the foreign fighter issue.

Israel-Iran Escalation

The Ripple Effects of the Israel-Iran Conflict on Central Asia

The Israel-Iran conflict has escalated dramatically, with Israel launching large-scale strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities and military targets, including the killing of top Iranian commanders and nuclear scientists. Characterizing these attacks as a “declaration of war,” Iran has retaliated by deploying approximately 100 drones toward Israeli territory, which have been intercepted. The strikes, part of Israel's "Operation Rising Lion," aim to neutralize what it perceives as an existential threat from Iran's nuclear ambitions. The situation has triggered reactions globally, with heightened tensions and calls for de-escalation. Meanwhile, in an interview with ABC News, U.S. President Trump called the strikes "excellent" and vowed there was "more to come. A lot more." The rapidly escalating conflict between Israel and Iran will undoubtedly exert a tangible influence on Central Asia, a region that shares both historical and geographic proximity to Iran. Turkmenistan, which directly borders Iran, is at the forefront, demonstrating how Central Asia sits strategically within a broader landscape of global power struggles. Geopolitical Tensions Within Reach Central Asia’s geographic and political ties to Iran make the region a key area of influence for Tehran. Iran’s relationship with Turkmenistan, grounded in a shared border and energy cooperation, highlights its immediate relevance. Turkmenistan and Iran collaborate on trade and natural gas exports, ensuring intertwined economies. However, these connections make Central Asia exposed to the consequences of Tehran’s ambitions, particularly as tensions with Israel spill over. Israel, meanwhile, has been steadily cultivating its influence in the region through strategic partnerships. Its strong alliance with Azerbaijan, Iran’s neighboring competitor to the north, has allowed Israel to counter Tehran’s reach. Additionally, Israel has deepened ties with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, offering expertise in cutting-edge technologies in agriculture, water-saving technologies, defense, and cybersecurity. This influence balances Iran’s predominance but risks elevating the regional stakes should the conflict further intensify. The nations of Central Asia are navigating a multitude of competing external pressures close to home, relying on multi-vector diplomacy to manage relationships with Iran, Israel, Russia, China, and the West. Economic Interdependence and Vulnerabilities Central Asia’s landlocked geography makes trade routes essential, with Iran serving as a critical gateway to global markets. The Bandar Abbas port facilitates the export of Central Asian goods, particularly for Turkmenistan. In January, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Russia, and Iran reaffirmed their commitment to increasing cargo transportation along the North-South transport corridor. However, sanctions on Tehran and the conflict's unpredictability cast uncertainty over these vital corridors. The Chabahar port, developed in partnership with India, is another crucial lifeline for trade. Unlike Pakistan's China-aligned Gwadar port, Chabahar links Central Asia to the Indian Ocean, offering a more stable and independent trade route. For nations like Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, the port diversifies transit options and reduces reliance on routes controlled by Russia or China. Social Dynamics and Security Challenges Culturally and religiously, Sunni-majority countries like Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan remain alert to both Iranian propaganda and organizations like Hamas, which are considered destabilizing actors. Governments actively look to suppress rhetoric or movements that could spark unrest, prioritizing...

Afghanistan

Recognition of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan: Between Law, Diplomacy, and Pragmatism

After the Taliban returned to power in August 2021, the question of recognizing the new Afghan regime became one of the key issues in regional and global politics. Although no country has granted de jure recognition to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), international engagement with the de facto authorities is becoming increasingly institutionalized. This article attempts to systematize and provisionally classify countries based on their stance toward the IEA. This is not a formal legal typology but rather an analytical tool meant to identify "stable patterns of behavior" in the context of interactions with the de facto authorities in Kabul. This approach does not aim for exhaustive academic precision but provides a basis for further discussion and analysis. To begin, we must clarify some basic principles, first and foremost, the institution of recognition. In international legal doctrine, the recognition of a new state or government is a unilateral act by a state and does not require the approval of international organizations. The UN, including the Security Council, does not formally conduct acts of recognition, but its approval is required for admitting authorities to the UN General Assembly, which constitutes formal recognition of international legitimacy and a willingness by the global community to work with them. The key mechanism here is the UN Credentials Committee. This is a special committee of the UN General Assembly consisting of nine member states, which change on a rotating basis. It annually reviews the lists of delegations accredited to participate in UN General Assembly sessions. Between 2021 and 2024, the committee decided to reject the recognition of seats for the Taliban government. In effect, this constitutes a denial of international recognition at the UN level. While the decision of the Credentials Committee has no formal legal significance as an act of recognition or non-recognition, politically it sends a strong signal to other states: the UN still does not regard the IEA as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. In other words, the Credentials Committee acts as a kind of beacon: until it is "lit," a wave of de jure recognition from other states is highly unlikely. Many countries, especially those following a policy of collective decision-making, will take their cue from the UN. For now, the signal remains unchanged: the international community maintains a cautious distance from legitimizing the Taliban regime. As is well known, there are two types of recognition: de jure recognition, which is complete and official and involves the establishment of diplomatic relations, and de facto recognition, which is limited and does not imply full legitimization of the regime. Removing the Taliban from national terrorist lists (as Kazakhstan and Russia have done) does not constitute legal recognition, even though some may portray it as such. The UN itself uses the term "de facto authorities" to describe the Taliban. At the same time, the UN Security Council sanctions regime on Afghanistan (under Resolution 2255) provides for the application of sanctions on an individual basis, without qualifying the regime as a terrorist regime. The...

Regional Security

Afghanistan and Central Asia: Pragmatism Instead of Illusions

“When the winds of change blow, some build walls, others build windmills.” — Chinese proverb Afghanistan remains one of the most complex and controversial spots on the map of Eurasia. After the Taliban came to power in 2021, it seemed the countries of Central Asia were faced with a choice: to distance themselves from the new regime or cautiously engage with it. However, it appears they have chosen a third path - pragmatic cooperation free from political intentions. Today, a window of opportunity is opening for the Central Asian states to reconsider their relationship with Afghanistan, not as a buffer zone or a source of instability, but as a potential element of a new regional architecture. At the same time, these countries are in no hurry to establish close political ties with Kabul. They avoid making declarations about "integrating" Afghanistan into Central Asia as a geopolitical region. Instead, the focus is on practical, rather than political or ideological, cooperation in areas such as transportation, trade, energy, food security, and humanitarian engagement. This pragmatic approach is shaping a new style of regional diplomacy, which is restrained yet determined. Against this backdrop, two key questions emerge: What role can Afghanistan play in regional development scenarios, and what steps are needed to minimize risks and maximize mutual benefit? Afghanistan After 2021: Between Stability and Dependency Since the end of the war and the Taliban’s return to power, Afghanistan has experienced a degree of relative order. However, the country remains economically and institutionally dependent on external assistance. Historically, Afghanistan has survived through subsidies and involvement in external conflicts, from the “Great Game” to the fight against international terrorism. Today, new actors, such as China, Russia, India, Turkey, and the Arab states, are stepping onto the stage alongside Russia, the United States, and the broader West. In the context of current geopolitical realities after the fall of its “democratic” regime, Afghanistan has found itself in a gap between the experiences of the past and a yet undetermined future. It has a unique opportunity to transcend its reputation as the “graveyard of empires” and determine its fate while simultaneously integrating into the international community. How the de facto authorities in Afghanistan handle this opportunity will not only shape the Afghan people's and the region's future but also influence the development of the entire global security paradigm. In parallel, the countries of Central Asian are building bilateral relations with Kabul on strictly pragmatic terms: participation in infrastructure and energy projects, food supply, and humanitarian aid. All of these steps have been taken without political commitments and without recognizing the regime. [caption id="attachment_30841" align="aligncenter" width="1062"] The border between Afghanistan and Tajikistan near Khorog, GBAO; image: TCA, Stephen M. Bland[/caption] Geo-Economics and Logistics: Afghanistan as a Strategic Hub The regional reality in Central Asia is increasingly taking on a geo-economic dimension. The region is not only an arena for the interests of external powers but also a zone for developing transport, logistics, and energy networks in which Afghanistan is playing an...