Regional Security - The Times Of Central Asia

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Israel-Iran Escalation

The Ripple Effects of the Israel-Iran Conflict on Central Asia

The Israel-Iran conflict has escalated dramatically, with Israel launching large-scale strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities and military targets, including the killing of top Iranian commanders and nuclear scientists. Characterizing these attacks as a “declaration of war,” Iran has retaliated by deploying approximately 100 drones toward Israeli territory, which have been intercepted. The strikes, part of Israel's "Operation Rising Lion," aim to neutralize what it perceives as an existential threat from Iran's nuclear ambitions. The situation has triggered reactions globally, with heightened tensions and calls for de-escalation. Meanwhile, in an interview with ABC News, U.S. President Trump called the strikes "excellent" and vowed there was "more to come. A lot more." The rapidly escalating conflict between Israel and Iran will undoubtedly exert a tangible influence on Central Asia, a region that shares both historical and geographic proximity to Iran. Turkmenistan, which directly borders Iran, is at the forefront, demonstrating how Central Asia sits strategically within a broader landscape of global power struggles. Geopolitical Tensions Within Reach Central Asia’s geographic and political ties to Iran make the region a key area of influence for Tehran. Iran’s relationship with Turkmenistan, grounded in a shared border and energy cooperation, highlights its immediate relevance. Turkmenistan and Iran collaborate on trade and natural gas exports, ensuring intertwined economies. However, these connections make Central Asia exposed to the consequences of Tehran’s ambitions, particularly as tensions with Israel spill over. Israel, meanwhile, has been steadily cultivating its influence in the region through strategic partnerships. Its strong alliance with Azerbaijan, Iran’s neighboring competitor to the north, has allowed Israel to counter Tehran’s reach. Additionally, Israel has deepened ties with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, offering expertise in cutting-edge technologies in agriculture, water-saving technologies, defense, and cybersecurity. This influence balances Iran’s predominance but risks elevating the regional stakes should the conflict further intensify. The nations of Central Asia are navigating a multitude of competing external pressures close to home, relying on multi-vector diplomacy to manage relationships with Iran, Israel, Russia, China, and the West. Economic Interdependence and Vulnerabilities Central Asia’s landlocked geography makes trade routes essential, with Iran serving as a critical gateway to global markets. The Bandar Abbas port facilitates the export of Central Asian goods, particularly for Turkmenistan. In January, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Russia, and Iran reaffirmed their commitment to increasing cargo transportation along the North-South transport corridor. However, sanctions on Tehran and the conflict's unpredictability cast uncertainty over these vital corridors. The Chabahar port, developed in partnership with India, is another crucial lifeline for trade. Unlike Pakistan's China-aligned Gwadar port, Chabahar links Central Asia to the Indian Ocean, offering a more stable and independent trade route. For nations like Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, the port diversifies transit options and reduces reliance on routes controlled by Russia or China. Social Dynamics and Security Challenges Culturally and religiously, Sunni-majority countries like Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan remain alert to both Iranian propaganda and organizations like Hamas, which are considered destabilizing actors. Governments actively look to suppress rhetoric or movements that could spark unrest, prioritizing...

Afghanistan

Recognition of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan: Between Law, Diplomacy, and Pragmatism

After the Taliban returned to power in August 2021, the question of recognizing the new Afghan regime became one of the key issues in regional and global politics. Although no country has granted de jure recognition to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), international engagement with the de facto authorities is becoming increasingly institutionalized. This article attempts to systematize and provisionally classify countries based on their stance toward the IEA. This is not a formal legal typology but rather an analytical tool meant to identify "stable patterns of behavior" in the context of interactions with the de facto authorities in Kabul. This approach does not aim for exhaustive academic precision but provides a basis for further discussion and analysis. To begin, we must clarify some basic principles, first and foremost, the institution of recognition. In international legal doctrine, the recognition of a new state or government is a unilateral act by a state and does not require the approval of international organizations. The UN, including the Security Council, does not formally conduct acts of recognition, but its approval is required for admitting authorities to the UN General Assembly, which constitutes formal recognition of international legitimacy and a willingness by the global community to work with them. The key mechanism here is the UN Credentials Committee. This is a special committee of the UN General Assembly consisting of nine member states, which change on a rotating basis. It annually reviews the lists of delegations accredited to participate in UN General Assembly sessions. Between 2021 and 2024, the committee decided to reject the recognition of seats for the Taliban government. In effect, this constitutes a denial of international recognition at the UN level. While the decision of the Credentials Committee has no formal legal significance as an act of recognition or non-recognition, politically it sends a strong signal to other states: the UN still does not regard the IEA as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. In other words, the Credentials Committee acts as a kind of beacon: until it is "lit," a wave of de jure recognition from other states is highly unlikely. Many countries, especially those following a policy of collective decision-making, will take their cue from the UN. For now, the signal remains unchanged: the international community maintains a cautious distance from legitimizing the Taliban regime. As is well known, there are two types of recognition: de jure recognition, which is complete and official and involves the establishment of diplomatic relations, and de facto recognition, which is limited and does not imply full legitimization of the regime. Removing the Taliban from national terrorist lists (as Kazakhstan and Russia have done) does not constitute legal recognition, even though some may portray it as such. The UN itself uses the term "de facto authorities" to describe the Taliban. At the same time, the UN Security Council sanctions regime on Afghanistan (under Resolution 2255) provides for the application of sanctions on an individual basis, without qualifying the regime as a terrorist regime. The...

Regional Security

Afghanistan and Central Asia: Pragmatism Instead of Illusions

“When the winds of change blow, some build walls, others build windmills.” — Chinese proverb Afghanistan remains one of the most complex and controversial spots on the map of Eurasia. After the Taliban came to power in 2021, it seemed the countries of Central Asia were faced with a choice: to distance themselves from the new regime or cautiously engage with it. However, it appears they have chosen a third path - pragmatic cooperation free from political intentions. Today, a window of opportunity is opening for the Central Asian states to reconsider their relationship with Afghanistan, not as a buffer zone or a source of instability, but as a potential element of a new regional architecture. At the same time, these countries are in no hurry to establish close political ties with Kabul. They avoid making declarations about "integrating" Afghanistan into Central Asia as a geopolitical region. Instead, the focus is on practical, rather than political or ideological, cooperation in areas such as transportation, trade, energy, food security, and humanitarian engagement. This pragmatic approach is shaping a new style of regional diplomacy, which is restrained yet determined. Against this backdrop, two key questions emerge: What role can Afghanistan play in regional development scenarios, and what steps are needed to minimize risks and maximize mutual benefit? Afghanistan After 2021: Between Stability and Dependency Since the end of the war and the Taliban’s return to power, Afghanistan has experienced a degree of relative order. However, the country remains economically and institutionally dependent on external assistance. Historically, Afghanistan has survived through subsidies and involvement in external conflicts, from the “Great Game” to the fight against international terrorism. Today, new actors, such as China, Russia, India, Turkey, and the Arab states, are stepping onto the stage alongside Russia, the United States, and the broader West. In the context of current geopolitical realities after the fall of its “democratic” regime, Afghanistan has found itself in a gap between the experiences of the past and a yet undetermined future. It has a unique opportunity to transcend its reputation as the “graveyard of empires” and determine its fate while simultaneously integrating into the international community. How the de facto authorities in Afghanistan handle this opportunity will not only shape the Afghan people's and the region's future but also influence the development of the entire global security paradigm. In parallel, the countries of Central Asian are building bilateral relations with Kabul on strictly pragmatic terms: participation in infrastructure and energy projects, food supply, and humanitarian aid. All of these steps have been taken without political commitments and without recognizing the regime. [caption id="attachment_30841" align="aligncenter" width="1062"] The border between Afghanistan and Tajikistan near Khorog, GBAO; image: TCA, Stephen M. Bland[/caption] Geo-Economics and Logistics: Afghanistan as a Strategic Hub The regional reality in Central Asia is increasingly taking on a geo-economic dimension. The region is not only an arena for the interests of external powers but also a zone for developing transport, logistics, and energy networks in which Afghanistan is playing an...

Kyrgyz-Tajik Border

Kyrgyz-Tajik Border Agreement Seeks to End Years of Hostility

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed an agreement on March 13 that aims to put an end to tensions that have made their border the deadliest area in Central Asia for more than a decade. Underscoring the significance of this breakthrough was Tajikistan President Emomali Rahmon making his first state visit in nearly twelve years to the Kyrgyz capital Bishkek to sign the deal on the delimitation of the Kyrgyz-Tajik border. A Long-Standing Dispute Marking the border in the mountainous, sparsely inhabited eastern section of the two countries’ border was not difficult, and by 2011, some 520 kilometers had been demarcated. Reaching a final agreement on the western 487 kilometers, located in the Ferghana Valley and more densely populated, however, was far more complicated due to roads and canals that passed through both countries’ territories. Rahmon’s visit in May 2013 came a month after hundreds of residents of border communities clashed near the Kyrgyz village of Ak-Sai and Tajikistan’s Vorukh enclave. Such incidents were increasing, though at that time they were limited to fistfights, throwing sticks and stones, and vandalism of property, usually vehicles. In May 2013, Rahmon and then Kyrgyz President, Almazbek Atambayev, discussed measures to ease tensions along the border, but along the frontier, the meeting of the two presidents in the Kyrgyz capital made little difference. In January 2014, a Kyrgyz construction crew started work on a bypass road around the Tajikistan’s Vorukh enclave, and an argument broke out between border guards of the two countries. Insults led to an exchange of fire, during which Tajik border guards reportedly used grenade launchers and mortars. Five Kyrgyz and two Tajik border guards were wounded in the fighting. It was the first time weapons were used during border conflicts, but from that time on, disputes increasingly involved gunfire, increasing the number of casualties and sometimes resulting in deaths. Both governments sent additional troops and military equipment to the border area, adding fuel to the fire. On July 26, 2019, four days after another clash near the Vorukh enclave left one person dead and 27 injured, Rahmon met with then-Kyrgyz President Soronbai Jeenbekov in the Vorukh enclave. Again, there were promises of new steps to defuse tensions and hasten an agreement on border delimitation, but as had happened previously, it was not long before fights erupted, adding to the growing casualty list along the Kyrgyz-Tajik border. From Bad to Worse On April 28, 2021, Kyrgyz villagers spotted a group of Tajik citizens setting up a camera on a water intake station near the Kyrgyz village of Kok-Tash. An argument quickly led to large-scale clashes that spread along several sections of the Kyrgyz-Tajik border. Armed forces from the two countries used heavy machine guns, mortars, and armored vehicles. Tajikistan even sent helicopter gunships to attack one area in Kyrgyzstan. The fighting only lasted two days, but when it was over, 54 people were dead, hundreds were wounded, thousands were forced to flee the area, and there was damage to homes and other buildings....

Kyrgyz-Tajik Border

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan Finalize Historic Border Agreement, Ending Decades-Long Dispute

On March 13, the presidents of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan met in Bishkek, where Sadyr Japarov and Emomali Rahmon signed a landmark agreement on the delimitation and demarcation of the Kyrgyz-Tajik border. Following the signing, the agreement will be sent to the parliaments of both countries for consideration. Deputies must approve the ratification bill before it returns to the heads of state for final endorsement. The presidents are expected to exchange instruments of ratification on March 31 during the Fergana Valley summit, where Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev is also set to attend. Only then will the demarcation process, marking the border with physical infrastructure, begin. The Kyrgyz-Tajik border stretches 1,006 kilometers. As of 2011, only 520 kilometers had been officially defined. In the past three years, both nations have settled on an additional 487 kilometers of the border. During a recent parliamentary session, Kamchybek Tashiyev, head of Kyrgyzstan’s State Committee for National Security (GKNB) and chair of the intergovernmental commission on border negotiations, outlined key principles that guided the discussions. Notably, Tajikistan agreed to use 1991 documents to define border territories instead of relying on maps from 1924-1927. The negotiations aimed to balance both nations' interests while avoiding unilateral decisions that could lead to renewed tensions. Beyond the border agreement, both governments also signed intergovernmental deals on cooperation between their Foreign Ministries, as well as agreements on water and energy management and road transportation infrastructure. Additionally, the two sides agreed to officially reopen the Kairagach (Leilek district) and Kyzyl-Bel (Batken district) border checkpoints, which had been closed for nearly four years. Both checkpoints resumed operations on March 13.

Women's rights

Opinion: Balancing Rights and Realities – Engaging Afghanistan for Change

The attention of the international community has once again turned to human rights in Afghanistan following the latest report by Richard Bennett, the United Nations Human Rights Council’s Special Rapporteur on Afghanistan. In his report, Bennett recommended that member states consider the concept of gender apartheid and support its codification, noting that Afghan women regard this term as the most accurate description of their situation. This initiative emerged in response to the tightening restrictions on women and girls imposed by the Taliban. The renewed focus on gender issues is not exactly what Central Asian countries expect in the context of Afghan settlement. For them, it is far more important to address pressing issues of security, economic cooperation, and control of migration flows, which directly affect regional stability. Therefore, Central Asian states prefer to concentrate on practical steps and avoid over-politicizing issues that could complicate dialogue with the Taliban and exacerbate the situation in neighboring Afghanistan. Today, women’s rights have become a cornerstone in the international community’s attempts to establish dialogue with the Taliban. The rights of women in Afghanistan have been a journey, with different periods bringing different challenges. Back in the 1920s, Amanullah Khan was a real game-changer, giving Afghan women the official equal status they deserved. But then things changed a bit during King Zahir Shah's reign (1933–1973) when education became a priority, and girls started going to school. By 1973, a heartening number of 150,000 girls were proudly enrolled in schools across the country. And let's not forget the momentous step of Kabul University opening its doors to women in 1947. Since the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021, women’s rights in Afghanistan have been significantly curtailed. Women are banned from attending educational institutions, working in most sectors, traveling without a male escort, and participating in public life. These measures have already received widespread international condemnation — rightfully so — but the official recognition of "gender apartheid" as a crime against humanity could give this issue a new legal status and increase pressure on the Islamic Emirate. The question is: How productive is this approach? The politicization of Afghan settlement, especially through the lens of women’s rights, may only worsen the situation. Making gender issues a precondition for dialogue severely limits the space for negotiations with the Taliban regime. In the United Nations itself, the Taliban are considered the "de facto authorities" of Afghanistan, and dialogue with them takes place at various bilateral and multilateral levels. In this context, strict demands on women’s rights could delay or even halt the process of engagement. This is because the Taliban perceives such conditions as interference in their internal affairs and cultural norms. Dialogue at an Impasse: Is an Inclusive Government Being Set Aside? The international community — primarily its Western segment — and the Islamic Emirate have taken extremely rigid positions. For international actors, women’s and girls’ rights have become the top priority, while the issue of forming an inclusive government in Afghanistan has receded into the background....