• KZT/USD = 0.00225
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00225
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00225
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00225
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00225
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00225
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00225
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00225
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
24 September 2026

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 44

Opinion: Weaponizing Faith – The Cold War Roots of Central Asia’s Security Dilemma

Central Asia’s contemporary security dilemma is partly rooted in Cold War strategies that transformed Muslim identity into a factor of geopolitical competition. Washington viewed Soviet Central Asia’s Muslim populations as a potential pressure point against Moscow. The Soviet Union itself mobilized Central Asian Muslim personnel during its intervention in Afghanistan. These policies did not alone create later radical movements, but they contributed to a regional environment where existing grievances, ideological narratives, and transnational networks could be redirected and intensified. The origins of Washington’s interest in Soviet Muslim populations as a strategic factor emerged during the final years of the Cold War. In 1977, the Nationalities Working Group, an interagency task force within the National Security Council, was established to examine vulnerabilities among the Soviet Union’s non-Russian nationalities. Declassified U.S. records show that American officials studied ethnic, cultural, and religious identities as possible sources of pressure against Moscow. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, this approach became part of Washington’s broader effort to weaken Soviet influence. Through Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the United States provided assistance to Afghan resistance organizations, while Saudi Arabia contributed significant financial support. Pakistan’s military government under General Zia-ul-Haq favored Islamist factions among Afghan resistance groups, helping connect military assistance with religious mobilization against Soviet forces. During his visit to the Khyber Pass in early February 1980, U.S. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski addressed Afghan resistance fighters, declaring: "That land over there is yours. You will go back to it one day because your cause is right and God is on your side." The remarks reflected how the anti-Soviet struggle was framed not only in geopolitical terms but also through religious language and symbolism. [caption id="attachment_56711" align="aligncenter" width="2560"] Soviet T-62 tank leaving Afghanistan; image: U.S. Department of Defense.[/caption] The Afghan conflict was also fought through education and information campaigns. Between 1986 and 1992, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) funded an approximately $50 million educational program through the University of Nebraska–Omaha’s Center for Afghanistan Studies for Afghan refugees and schools. Research has shown that some textbooks incorporated violent imagery, references to weapons and combat, and themes glorifying holy war and the duty of martyrdom. Produced for wartime Afghanistan, these materials reflected, and arguably helped sustain, a militarized ideological environment. Islamic religious life in Central Asia had its own deeper roots. Despite Soviet restrictions, religious learning survived through underground hujra networks and unofficial scholarship. Figures such as Muhammadjon Hindustoniy-Rustamov, born in the Fergana Valley and later one of Soviet Central Asia’s most influential unofficial Islamic scholars, shaped generations of students even as Afghanistan became an arena of international rivalry during the 1980s. Moscow also used Central Asian Muslim identity for strategic purposes. The 154th Separate Spetsnaz Detachment, known as the “Muslim Battalion,” was composed largely of Uzbek, Tajik, and Turkmen soldiers from the Soviet Turkestan Military District. The unit participated in Operation Storm-333 in December 1979, the Soviet operation that killed Afghan President Hafizullah Amin and installed Babrak Karmal. The selection of Central Asian...

For the CSTO, Afghanistan Might Be the Last Credible Threat

The Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization is conducting its “Rubezh (Frontier) 2026” military exercises from September 12-19. Those exercises are designed with Afghanistan in mind, a country that the CSTO has been talking about frequently in 2026, and also one where militant groups pose a shared threat to its members. And even the Taliban are no longer viewed as the threat they once were. Frontier 2026 The Frontier 2026 exercises are taking place at the Koktal training ground in southeastern Kazakhstan’s Zhetysu Province. The CSTO’s Rapid Deployment Force is practicing to repel cross-border incursions in mountain and desert terrain. The exercises come this time as concerns about infiltration by militants in Afghanistan into CIS territory are increasing. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov said on September 8 that Russia is paying special attention to strengthening Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan. The Tajik authorities have been calling for additional aid for the country’s border forces since a series of attacks from Afghanistan in November 2025 left five Chinese workers in southern Tajikistan dead, followed by an attack in December that killed two Tajik border guards. Tajikistan has regularly asked for international help in guarding its frontier with Afghanistan since independence in 1991. But after the violence at the end of 2025, the Tajik government appealed especially to its fellow members in the CSTO for increased assistance. CSTO Secretary General Taalatbek Masadykov said at the end of August that the first shipment of weapons and equipment would be sent to Tajikistan this autumn. Raison D’être The Collective Security Treaty was signed in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, in 1992 by representatives from Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. In 1993, Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Georgia joined. The purpose was simple. If any of the member states was attacked by an external enemy, that state could request aid, including military assistance, from the other members. In the early 1990s, there were potential enemies for the Treaty members in practically every direction. The Soviet Union had collapsed in late 1991. There were questions about how the former Communist Bloc countries and their new Western allies might act. The theocratic regime in Iran was a possible threat to the South Caucasus and Central Asia, and the latter region had unstable Afghanistan to worry about also. China was a concern for Central Asia and Russia. Back then, banding together made sense for the nine newly independent states that signed the treaty. When Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan dropped out in 1999, it appeared the Collective Security Treaty was on the brink of becoming irrelevant. After Vladimir Putin became Russia’s president, he put a new emphasis on a security bloc within the CIS, and in 2002, the remaining six treaty members signed a new charter. However, now, in 2026, the list of the CSTO’s potential external threats is greatly reduced. Far from being a security concern, China is now a leading trade partner for Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, and provides military assistance to all four countries. Iran’s relations with the West remain...

SCO Summit Delivers Institutional Reform but Leaves Development Bank Unsettled

Leaders of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization adopted amendments to the bloc's Charter and approved regulations for two security bodies in Bishkek on September 1, but stopped short of launching the proposed SCO Development Bank. The official outcome list contains 28 documents. They include the Bishkek Declaration marking the SCO's 25th anniversary, a statement on assistance to countries affected by emergencies, and measures covering transport, digital policy, energy, and climate cooperation. For Kyrgyzstan, which used its fourth chairmanship to press for new financial and emergency response mechanisms, the results were mixed. The emergency statement gave political backing to a Kyrgyz initiative, while the bank remained under negotiation. Kazakhstan then made a competing offer to host its headquarters. An institutional package The member states signed a protocol amending the 2002 SCO Charter and approved regulations for the Universal Center for Countering Security Challenges and Threats. They also approved rules for the executive committee of the SCO Anti-Drug Center. The package included programs against drug addiction and synthetic narcotics through 2030, as well as amendments to the 2010 agreement on cooperation against crime. The decisions continue an institutional reorganization begun at the 2025 Tianjin summit. That meeting approved agreements establishing the Anti-Drug Center in Dushanbe and a Universal Center based on the SCO's existing regional counterterrorism structure in Tashkent. President Sadyr Japarov said the organization should remain free of bloc politics and confrontation. He called for the rapid launch of the Universal Center and said Bishkek had prepared the conditions for an SCO center against transnational organized crime. Opening the meeting, he said the anniversary should become the start of a new phase for the organization. Bank progress, but no launch The Bishkek Declaration records progress toward creating an SCO Development Bank among interested member states during Kyrgyzstan's chairmanship, though the wording is qualified. The summit did not produce a founding agreement, capital commitment, or a launch date. Japarov urged members to reach a practical decision on the bank and invited them to use Kyrgyzstan's Tamchy Special Financial Investment Territory for joint projects. Kyrgyzstan had already proposed Bishkek as the bank's headquarters. However, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev used his summit address to make a rival offer. Kazakhstan supports directing the proposed bank's resources toward infrastructure, technology, and industry, he said. "If there is consensus among the member states, Kazakhstan could host this institution, its headquarters," Tokayev said in the official transcript. The two bids underline how much remains unresolved. Members reached political consensus to establish the bank in Tianjin last year, but its membership, governance, capital, and location are still being negotiated. Kyrgyz emergency initiative advances The heads of state adopted a separate statement on assistance to countries affected by emergencies. Kyrgyzstan had spent its chairmanship promoting an SCO assistance mechanism and, in May, sought support for a special account to finance emergency aid after major natural disasters. The statement's adoption is a clear political success for Bishkek. Its published title does not establish whether members accepted the proposed special account or how...

Badakhshan Fighting Raises Risks for Tajikistan and Uzbekistan

In Nusay district, Badakhshan province (northeast Afghanistan), fighting began around August 11 between Taliban forces and followers of Juma Khan Fateh, a local Taliban commander of ethnic Tajik origin who had resisted efforts to disarm his network. The Armed Conflict Location and Events Data Project (ACLED) identifies the immediate trigger as an attempt to remove military equipment and vehicles from areas under Fateh’s control, amid longer-running tensions over disarmament, local authority, and control of gold mining. Similar disputes over gold mines have repeatedly produced clashes between local commanders and Taliban forces since 2021. Fateh surrendered on August 17 after nearly a week of fighting. By August 22, Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said his case was being prepared for trial. Post-surrender reporting also indicated weapons seizures and disarmament activity around Fateh-linked sites and associates, although the scale of the reported seizures and disarmament remained incompletely verified. The Fateh episode came amid a broader increase in armed instability in Badakhshan during 2026. ACLED recorded 22 anti-Taliban armed-opposition events in the province from January through July, compared with four from June through December 2025. In July, one opposition group temporarily seized the Yaftal-e Sufla district headquarters, while the Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF) reportedly fought Taliban forces in Zebak. The Yaftal-e Sufla and Zebak operations were separate from the Fateh confrontation, and there is no credible evidence of coordination with Fateh’s network. Fateh’s surrender ended the immediate confrontation, while separate armed-opposition activity in Badakhshan continued. The fighting has already had a direct cross-border consequence for Tajikistan. Nusay lies opposite Tajikistan’s Darvoz district. On August 13, gunfire from the Afghan side crossed into Darvoz, killing a 21-year-old woman inside her home and damaging residential property. Tajikistan’s Foreign Ministry lodged a formal protest, saying the fighting had violated the country’s airspace and demanding respect for the state border and measures to prevent a recurrence. The Afghan Foreign Ministry acknowledged the death and expressed regret while blaming “disruptive and opportunistic elements.” The one confirmed limited incident does not show that the conflict has extended into Tajikistan on a sustained basis, but it makes the cross-border dimension more than hypothetical. Tajikistan shares a 1,374-kilometer frontier with Afghanistan, much of it facing Afghan Badakhshan. Dushanbe had already treated this border as a persistent security problem. In late November 2025, two attacks launched from Afghanistan’s territory killed five Chinese nationals and wounded five others in Tajikistan, which then instituted tighter border measures, while the Taliban pledged to cooperate on security and investigations. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is also implementing a program to strengthen the Tajik-Afghan frontier with weapons, equipment, and other border-protection means. Its 2026–27 implementation phase antedates the present fighting. A 2026 Security Council monitoring report said Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) was active mainly in northern Afghanistan, particularly Badakhshan, and was developing cells capable of projecting a regional threat, with Central Asia remaining a key focus. It also reported concern in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan over the role of their nationals in the organization and the possible...

Opinion: Kazakhstan’s Demining Expertise Could Provide Boost to Afghanistan

According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Afghanistan remains one of the most heavily mined countries in the world. During the first five months of 2026 alone, 175 people were killed or injured by landmines and unexploded ordnance, with children accounting for approximately 75% of the victims. Behind these figures lies a daily reality of fear: farmers cannot safely cultivate their fields, children cannot walk to school without risk, and road construction equipment cannot reach critical transport routes. In practice, this continues to hinder the development of the entire region. Mine-contaminated land prevents the recovery of agriculture, blocks the construction of roads, complicates the return of displaced populations, and significantly increases the cost of infrastructure projects. According to the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, Afghanistan ranks among the world’s most heavily mined territories, alongside Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Iraq, and Ukraine.  A Barrier to Central and South Asian Integration For Kazakhstan and the other countries of Central Asia, this issue also carries  strategic significance. Without stability in Afghanistan, the implementation of Eurasian transport projects and the expansion of trade links with South Asia become increasingly difficult. Globally, humanitarian demining is no longer viewed simply as a charitable activity. Today, it represents the starting point of any major infrastructure project. Railways cannot be laid, nor can high-voltage transmission lines be built, where the ground itself remains hostile to human activity. Virtually every prospective transport corridor connecting Central Asia with ports on the Indian Ocean passes through Afghan territory, including major projects such as the development of the Trans-Afghan Corridor and the CASA-1000 project electricity project. International experience demonstrates that humanitarian demining in Cambodia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Azerbaijan created the conditions for economic recovery, the return of displaced populations, and the attraction of foreign investment. From Kazbat’s Experience to a New Humanitarian Mission Unlike most countries in the region, Kazakhstan possesses substantial practical experience in conducting mine-clearance operations. Between 2003 and 2008, Kazakhstan’s military engineering unit, Kazbat, participated in the international mission in Iraq, destroying approximately 4.5 million explosive devices. Initially, Kazakh sappers cleared residential neighborhoods and agricultural land of unexploded ordnance. Later, they expanded their operations to locating and destroying underground and above-ground weapons depots abandoned after the conflict. These operations prevented millions of rounds of ammunition from falling into the hands of terrorist organizations. The mission came at a cost. In January 2005, 29-year-old Captain Kairat Kudabayev was killed when munitions detonated during preparations for disposal, while several other Kazakh servicemen were injured. Kazakh specialists also supplied local communities with purified drinking water and provided medical assistance, demonstrating a comprehensive approach to post-conflict recovery. More than 5,000 Iraqi civilians received medical treatment, while approximately 7,000 cubic meters of drinking water were purified. The expertise Kazakhstan accumulated could now evolve into a civilian-focused mission centered on protecting civilian populations and supporting Afghanistan’s long-term economic recovery. How a New Regional Platform Could Operate Kazakhstan’s international development agency, KazAID, could serve as the national...

Opinion: Why the Next Head of UNAMA Should Come from Central Asia

A recent briefing on Afghanistan before the United Nations Security Council again showed that the country’s challenges can no longer be viewed only through humanitarian assistance or debates over recognition of the Taliban government. Afghanistan remains a deeply complex domestic issue, but it is increasingly becoming a regional one as well. The discussion now extends beyond human rights and political dialogue with the de facto authorities. It now includes the return of millions of people from neighboring countries, pressure on cities and rural communities, shortages of jobs and water, cross-border trade, security, and the future of regional transport corridors. Against this backdrop, the question of who should lead the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) is no longer only a personnel decision. It has become part of a wider debate about what international policy toward Afghanistan should look like in its next phase. The catalyst for this discussion was the recent briefing delivered by Georgette Gagnon, the UN Secretary-General’s Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan, before the Security Council. According to Gagnon, the de facto authorities maintain control over both Afghanistan’s territory and administrative structures. At present, they face no significant armed or political challenge. The Taliban themselves view the restoration of security across Afghanistan as one of their principal achievements. Yet this does not mean the situation is stable. Gagnon pointed to a fundamental contradiction within the current system of governance. There are rigid ideological policies that place considerable pressure on society. There are also more pragmatic approaches that have so far allowed the system to function and survive. In other words, Afghanistan appears to have achieved a form of managed stability, but without a clear vision of where that system is ultimately headed. Stability Conceals Deep Structural Problems The economic picture is equally mixed. Afghanistan has recorded positive growth in absolute terms. Fiscal stability has improved, revenue collection has increased, and several infrastructure projects are moving forward. The country has also largely maintained the gains achieved through the reduction of opium poppy cultivation. Yet beneath these signs of stabilization lie significant challenges. According to Gagnon, nearly 5.9 million people have returned to Afghanistan since 2023. This represents a population increase of more than 10%. Another 2.8 million Afghans could return during 2026 alone. Many returnees arrive with no savings, no employment, and limited prospects for rebuilding their lives. For a country with a fragile economy, this creates enormous pressure. Cities and rural communities are struggling to absorb new arrivals. Jobs, housing, water resources, and social services remain in short supply. The humanitarian situation remains severe. In 2026, approximately 21.9 million people, around 45% of Afghanistan’s population, are expected to require humanitarian assistance. Another major concern is demographics. More than half of Afghanistan’s population is under the age of 25. This generation is growing up amid limited opportunities. While the challenges facing girls have received international attention, boys increasingly face difficulties as well. Employment opportunities are scarce, household incomes are declining, and competition for livelihoods is intensifying. Environmental pressures...