Regional Security - The Times Of Central Asia

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UNAMA

Opinion: Why the Next Head of UNAMA Should Come from Central Asia

A recent briefing on Afghanistan before the United Nations Security Council again showed that the country’s challenges can no longer be viewed only through humanitarian assistance or debates over recognition of the Taliban government. Afghanistan remains a deeply complex domestic issue, but it is increasingly becoming a regional one as well. The discussion now extends beyond human rights and political dialogue with the de facto authorities. It now includes the return of millions of people from neighboring countries, pressure on cities and rural communities, shortages of jobs and water, cross-border trade, security, and the future of regional transport corridors. Against this backdrop, the question of who should lead the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) is no longer only a personnel decision. It has become part of a wider debate about what international policy toward Afghanistan should look like in its next phase. The catalyst for this discussion was the recent briefing delivered by Georgette Gagnon, the UN Secretary-General’s Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan, before the Security Council. According to Gagnon, the de facto authorities maintain control over both Afghanistan’s territory and administrative structures. At present, they face no significant armed or political challenge. The Taliban themselves view the restoration of security across Afghanistan as one of their principal achievements. Yet this does not mean the situation is stable. Gagnon pointed to a fundamental contradiction within the current system of governance. There are rigid ideological policies that place considerable pressure on society. There are also more pragmatic approaches that have so far allowed the system to function and survive. In other words, Afghanistan appears to have achieved a form of managed stability, but without a clear vision of where that system is ultimately headed. Stability Conceals Deep Structural Problems The economic picture is equally mixed. Afghanistan has recorded positive growth in absolute terms. Fiscal stability has improved, revenue collection has increased, and several infrastructure projects are moving forward. The country has also largely maintained the gains achieved through the reduction of opium poppy cultivation. Yet beneath these signs of stabilization lie significant challenges. According to Gagnon, nearly 5.9 million people have returned to Afghanistan since 2023. This represents a population increase of more than 10%. Another 2.8 million Afghans could return during 2026 alone. Many returnees arrive with no savings, no employment, and limited prospects for rebuilding their lives. For a country with a fragile economy, this creates enormous pressure. Cities and rural communities are struggling to absorb new arrivals. Jobs, housing, water resources, and social services remain in short supply. The humanitarian situation remains severe. In 2026, approximately 21.9 million people, around 45% of Afghanistan’s population, are expected to require humanitarian assistance. Another major concern is demographics. More than half of Afghanistan’s population is under the age of 25. This generation is growing up amid limited opportunities. While the challenges facing girls have received international attention, boys increasingly face difficulties as well. Employment opportunities are scarce, household incomes are declining, and competition for livelihoods is intensifying. Environmental pressures...

Regional Security

Tokayev Urges Central Asia and China to Strengthen Law Enforcement Cooperation

Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev hosted the interior and public security ministers of the “Central Asia-China” format in Astana during the second meeting of regional law enforcement agencies. The meeting was attended by Chinese Minister of Public Security Wang Xiaohong, Kyrgyz Interior Minister Ulan Niyazbekov, Tajik Interior Minister Ramazon Rahimzoda, Turkmen Interior Minister Muhammet Hydyrov, and Uzbek Interior Minister Aziz Tashpulatov. Participants discussed transnational crime, drug trafficking, cybercrime, and extremism. Tokayev said strengthening cooperation between the law enforcement agencies of Central Asia and China is essential for maintaining regional stability. “Transnational organized crime is becoming increasingly flexible and interconnected. Cybercrime has evolved into a highly profitable global industry,” the president said. According to Tokayev, criminal groups are increasingly using digital platforms to coordinate activities, launder money, and carry out attacks that transcend national borders. He emphasized that Central Asia’s position at the crossroads of major transport and trade routes leaves the region particularly vulnerable to transnational criminal networks. Tokayev said Kazakhstan considers the rule of law a strategic state priority and is continuing the implementation of its “Law and Order” governance concept. He called for stronger efforts to block the financial flows of criminal organizations, suppress the spread of extremist ideology, and detect preparations for terrorist attacks. The president devoted particular attention to cybersecurity threats. “Artificial intelligence in the hands of destructive actors is becoming an information weapon,” Tokayev said. According to him, illegal content and disinformation are spreading online on an industrial scale, while existing mechanisms of international cooperation require substantial modernization. Tokayev also linked security concerns to the expansion of regional transport infrastructure, including the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route. “The growth of cargo traffic is associated with certain risks, including transnational crime and the trafficking of contraband, drugs, and weapons,” he said. In Tokayev’s view, the “Central Asia-China” format should evolve into a platform for developing coordinated and practical security measures across the region. Participants in the meeting reaffirmed their intention to expand operational information-sharing, strengthen professional cooperation, and introduce modern technologies into law enforcement activities.

State Visit

Rahmon Looks to China as Tajikistan’s Options Narrow

Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon just finished a state visit to China. Rahmon has made trips to China many times during the nearly 34 years he has been in power in Tajikistan, but this visit came during a critical period. Simply put, Tajikistan is losing the international importance it once had, and China might now be the most dependable friend remaining for Rahmon and his country. A ‘Sweet’ Start China established diplomatic ties with all five Central Asian countries at the start of 1992. Just months later, a civil war broke out in Tajikistan that would last until June 1997, but that did not deter China from seeking investment opportunities in Tajikistan. China funded the construction of a sugar plant in Kurgan-Tepe in 1992, and later helped build confectioneries in large cities and towns in Tajikistan, as well as providing 10,000 tons of feed for livestock and, in 1994, extending a $50-million loan to Tajikistan. In April 1996, Rahmon and the leaders of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan met in Shanghai and formed the Shanghai Five, which, after the inclusion of Uzbekistan five years later, would become the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). China used the SCO to improve economic ties with all the Central Asian members, but while Chinese investment in Tajikistan was far less than in Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan, it was extremely important for Tajikistan, which was, and remains, the poorest country in Central Asia. After the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, and the start of the U.S.-led campaign in Afghanistan, China gave equipment and winter uniforms to Tajikistan’s border guards. Later, China also helped fund the construction of Tajik border posts along the frontier with Afghanistan, and Beijing is set to help finance nine more border posts. Security along Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan is also in China’s interest. China shares an approximately 475-kilometer border with Tajikistan. Eastern Tajikistan is mountainous, remotely inhabited, and shares a long border with Afghanistan. China is concerned about the ability of potential enemies to move from Afghanistan through eastern Tajikistan and enter China. That is why, less than ten years ago, China built a small, forward observation military post in eastern Tajikistan, not far from the Chinese border. Militant groups such as the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement, comprised mainly of Uyghurs from China’s Xinjiang Region, and the Islamic State of Khorasan Province, which has explicitly threatened China, are present in northern Afghanistan. Chinese companies have been building Tajikistan’s infrastructure for some 20 years: roads, power transmission lines, the Dushanbe thermal power plant, hydropower plants, factories, and other objects. In 2025, China finally surpassed Russia to become Tajikistan’s leading trade partner, and Chinese-Tajik trade turnover in the first three months of 2026 increased by more than 52% compared to Q1 in 2025. Changing Times China is likely to remain Tajikistan’s leading trade partner and more for the foreseeable future. The geopolitical situation in Central Asia has changed, and not in Tajikistan’s favor. The biggest change for Rahmon and his country...

Regional Security

Threats to Regional Security: Why Escalation Around Iran Matters for Central Asia

For Central Asia, the central question is not simply whether a wider conflict involving Iran would destabilize the Middle East, but how that instability could spill north into a region that has repeatedly absorbed the consequences of crises to its south. Central Asian states have seen before how militant infiltration, narcotics trafficking, and extremist mobilization can intensify when neighboring wars weaken state control and create more permissive transit corridors. History gives Central Asia specific reasons to take that risk seriously. During the Tajik civil war and its aftermath, the Tajik-Afghan border became a frontline against crossings by Afghan militants and narcotics traffickers. In 1999 and 2000, fighters from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, or IMU, carried out the Batken incursions into southern Kyrgyzstan, took hostages, and demonstrated how quickly insecurity from the Afghan theater could penetrate Central Asia. At the same time, Afghan opiates moved north through the Northern Route, tying militancy, organized crime, and border insecurity into a single regional problem. Afghanistan remains the most important precedent, but the comparison with Iran must be made carefully. After the fall of Najibullah in 1992, Afghanistan fragmented into competing militias and warlord zones. The Taliban later emerged from that disorder, and the Afghan state collapsed again when the Taliban captured Kabul and returned to power in 2021. Iran is structurally different. It has a centralized state, a denser security apparatus, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC, which is deeply embedded in regime security and domestic politics. For that reason, the most plausible risk is not an immediate Afghanistan-style collapse, but a slower weakening of control in peripheral regions that could open space for armed groups, trafficking networks, and extremist recruiters. Those peripheral regions matter because Iran’s borderlands already contain armed actors with their own agendas. In the northwest, PJAK remains part of the Kurdish militant landscape. In the southeast, Jaysh al-Adl operates in Sistan-Baluchistan and adjoining border areas. Their capabilities should not be exaggerated, and they do not represent entire Kurdish or Baloch populations. But in a period of prolonged instability, such groups could exploit weaker local control, greater arms circulation, and more permissive smuggling corridors. For Central Asia, however, the greatest concern is the interaction between any Iranian crisis and the threat environment centered on Afghanistan. United Nations reporting in 2025 assessed ISIL-K as the predominant extra-regional terrorist threat, and the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center says ISIS-K has carried out attacks in Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, and Russia while using media to recruit new members and advance a vision of “Khorasan” that explicitly includes parts of Central Asia and Iran. In other words, Central Asia already faces a live extremist ecosystem to its south; wider instability involving Iran could amplify that pressure rather than replace it. This is why Central Asia should not be seen as a passive observer. The region sits at the junction of security corridors linking Afghanistan, Iran, the Caspian basin, and Russia. A wider conflict involving Iran could intensify trafficking through existing routes, strain border...

Organization of Turkic States (OTS)

Informal OTS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting Tests Limits of Turkic Coordination

Escalating tensions linked to the widening conflict in the Middle East have tested the political cohesion of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), according to Kazakh political commentator Dzhanibek Suleyev. Recent incidents affecting both Azerbaijan and Turkey — including drone strikes in Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic and a missile intercepted by Turkish air defenses — have raised security concerns across the wider region. Suleyev argues that developments of this scale might normally prompt an urgent summit of heads of state. Instead, Turkey convened an informal meeting of foreign ministers and senior diplomatic representatives from OTS member states. The gathering took place on March 7, when officials convened at the invitation of Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. According to Turkish media, ministers later met with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan during their visit. Speaking to The Times of Central Asia, Suleyev drew attention to how the meeting was covered in the media of Central Asian member states. “In the Uzbek press, coverage was limited, and even on the website of their Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there is not a single word about the informal summit of OTS foreign ministers. Kazakhstan, moreover, was represented not by Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev but by his deputy Alibek Bakayev. Kyrgyzstan’s Foreign Ministry issued four notes about the trip of its minister Jeenbek Kulubaev to Istanbul, three of which were devoted to the summit, but without any particular details,” Suleyev said. Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry published a short summary of the meeting, noting in broad terms that representatives discussed cooperation among Turkic states and regional developments. According to Suleyev, the joint statement adopted after the meeting was difficult to find outside of Azerbaijani media. One of the few outlets to publish the text in full was Azerbaijan’s APA news agency. Much of the statement focused on the incidents affecting Azerbaijan and Turkey, stressing that “any threat to the security of OTS member states causes concern for the entire Organization… The ministers strongly condemned the attacks carried out from the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran against the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic of the Republic of Azerbaijan, including strikes against civilian facilities and the territory of the Republic of Turkey,” the statement continued. “The rest of the statement boils down to destabilization in the Middle East could lead to a global economic crisis, the Palestinian conflict must be resolved taking into account UN resolutions, and so on,” Suleyev told TCA. One notable event during the meeting was the foreign ministers’ reception by President Erdoğan. Official summaries released by participating governments described the discussion in diplomatic terms. “Kazakh sources wrote that ‘prospects for the development of cooperation within the framework of Turkic cooperation were discussed,’” Suleyev said. Kyrgyz statements used similar language, stating that the “President of Turkey… noted the importance of regular dialogue on current regional and international issues and expressed interest in further developing multilateral cooperation within the framework of the Organization.” “In short, these are streamlined diplomatic formulations without specific details,” Suleyev said. According to a press...

Afghanistan

Three Main Principles of Kazakhstan’s Afghan Policy

August 15, 2026 will mark five years since the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan. This substantial period can be assessed in different ways, particularly given the widespread skepticism at the outset regarding the Taliban’s ability to govern effectively and build relations with other countries. The situation in Afghanistan remains complex and multifaceted, with diverging trends. On the one hand, the current Afghan leadership faces a wide range of internal challenges, primarily socio-economic. After the Taliban’s return to power, humanitarian assistance declined sharply. For many years, two-thirds of Afghanistan’s budget had been financed through foreign aid, and its reduction has significantly affected the social conditions of ordinary Afghans. According to the United Nations, only one-third of the $2.4 billion humanitarian response plan required for 2025 has been funded. Over 21 million Afghans require humanitarian assistance. The economic situation has been further complicated by the deteriorating humanitarian environment, largely due to the deportation of millions of Afghan refugees from Iran and Pakistan this year. In total, around 4.5 million Afghans have returned since 2023, primarily through deportations from Iran and Pakistan, resulting in a 10% population increase. Other pressing social issues remain. Several countries continue to focus on security and terrorist threats, as well as government inclusiveness and the rights of women and girls, particularly their access to employment and education. At the same time, nearly five years into Taliban rule, the anticipated “economic and political collapse” has not materialized. The national budget is gradually increasing, and small and medium-sized enterprises are emerging. Industrial parks aimed at developing domestic production have appeared in major cities such as Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif, and Herat. Since 2023, relative macroeconomic stabilization has been observed, although growth rates remain insufficient to offset demographic pressures and reduce poverty. The World Bank forecasts Afghanistan’s gross domestic product (GDP) growth at 4.3% in 2025, with inflation projected to remain low at approximately 2%. According to the United Nations, the area under opium poppy cultivation has declined by 95% during the years of Taliban rule. At the same time, synthetic drug production has reportedly increased, reflecting trends observed in many other countries. Politically, the Taliban maintains consolidated control over most of the country. In other words, a more stable, albeit fragile, reality has emerged, one that Central Asian countries must engage with on a daily basis. Kazakhstan has adopted a pragmatic approach. Its policy toward Afghanistan is based on a model of “pragmatic engagement without recognition,” while developing an independent system of transport, energy, and humanitarian ties with the country. Kazakhstan’s decision to remove the Taliban from its list of banned organizations does not signify a departure from international law nor does it constitute automatic recognition of the current Afghan authorities. On the issue of formal recognition, Kazakhstan relies on decisions of the UN Security Council. From a foreign policy perspective, this step forms part of a broader strategy: Kazakhstan is adapting its instruments to a changed reality while remaining within international norms and avoiding symbolic gestures that could be interpreted as...