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prisoner transfer

Russia Ready to Transfer Over 3,000 Uzbek Prisoners

Russia is prepared to facilitate the transfer of more than 3,000 Uzbek citizens convicted on its territory to serve their sentences in Uzbekistan, but the process remains stalled due to legal obstacles, Kommersant reported, citing Russia’s Human Rights Commissioner Tatyana Moskalkova. Speaking at a meeting of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Human Rights Commission, Moskalkova said Russia is willing to support the transfer mechanism. However, she noted that Uzbekistan cannot currently accept the prisoners because it has not ratified the 1998 Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons. “Russia is ready to assist, but the country of citizenship cannot accept them due to the lack of ratification of the convention,” she said, according to RIA Novosti. The agreement allows individuals convicted in one participating country to serve their sentences in their home country. It is intended to support rehabilitation and improve humanitarian conditions by allowing individuals to remain closer to their families and social environment. Russia ratified the convention in 1998, and it is also in force in several countries in the region, including Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Armenia. For Uzbek nationals, however, Uzbekistan’s absence from the treaty has prevented similar transfers. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, in 2025, 191 Uzbek citizens applied for asylum in Russia, highlighting shifting migration patterns and increasing pressure on legal and humanitarian systems in the region.

EAEU

EAEU Trade Frictions Deepen Despite Shymkent Integration Push

The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) met in Shymkent on March 26-27 with a long agenda and a familiar promise: deeper integration, smoother trade, and a more modern common market. Kazakhstan, which holds the bloc’s 2026 chairmanship, used the meeting to push artificial intelligence, digital logistics, industrial cooperation, and the removal of internal barriers. Twelve documents were signed, covering areas including industrial cooperation, transport, and digital integration. “Kazakhstan aims to become a fully-fledged digital country. We have built a modern ecosystem, including Astana Hub and the Alem.ai AI center, and are ready to share experience with EAEU partners on digital regulation and economic transformation,” Kazakh Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov stated. That sounds ambitious, but it also highlights the bloc’s central weakness. The EAEU has no shortage of plans; it has a shortage of trust between its members, and that matters more. The dynamics extend across the bloc, but are most visible in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The EAEU was built to ensure the free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor across Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia. But the reality keeps drifting away from the treaty. Kazakhstan’s chairmanship agenda calls for a barrier-free internal market, yet the bloc is entering a new phase of tighter controls, retaliatory measures, and disputes over who really benefits. Shymkent made that contradiction impossible to miss. Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov promoted an AI-based system to coordinate cargo flows across the union and speed up transit. He also backed the full electronic handling of veterinary and phytosanitary checks, all of which are practical ideas. Central Asia needs faster, cheaper, and more predictable logistics, but digital tools do not solve a political problem. A system becomes more efficient only if its members want it to be open. When they want leverage instead, technology can only make the controls smarter. [caption id="attachment_46024" align="aligncenter" width="1920"] Image: primeminister.kz[/caption] Kazakhstan’s priorities already show where the friction lies. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev opened his chairmanship by calling for digital transformation, better transport links, and the elimination of internal trade barriers. He also pushed a stronger external profile for the EAEU, with wider links across Asia, the Arab world, and the Global South. That is a serious agenda for a bloc trying to present itself as a Eurasian logistics hub. That push for external expansion comes at a time when internal frictions are becoming harder to manage. It sits uneasily beside everyday trade practice inside the union, where growing trade disputes have become part of the EAEU’s normal life, not an exception to it. The clearest recent example is Russia’s SPOT import-control system, which takes effect for road shipments from EAEU countries on April 1. Importers must submit shipment information two days before trucks reach the border and receive a QR code. Moscow has presented the change as a tax-compliance and anti-fraud measure, with additional financial guarantees expected in later phases of its implementation. In practice, it adds cost, time, and uncertainty before goods even reach the border, the opposite of what a customs union...

Bilateral Trade

Despite Growth Plans, Trade Between Kazakhstan and Russia Declined in 2025

Trade and economic ties between Kazakhstan and Russia showed signs of slowing in 2025. By the end of the year, bilateral trade totaled $27.4 billion, a slight decrease compared with the previous year. The figures were announced by Kazakhstan’s Minister of Trade and Integration, Arman Shakkaliev, following talks in Astana between Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov and Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin. A year earlier, bilateral trade had demonstrated growth. In 2024, trade turnover increased by 3% to reach $27.8 billion, largely driven by rising imports of Russian goods into Kazakhstan. At the same time, exports of Kazakhstani products to Russia declined, pointing to a persistent imbalance in the structure of trade. The contraction recorded in 2025 reflects a broader trend, a slowdown in growth while overall trade volumes remain relatively high. Despite the decline, both sides continue to set ambitious targets for expanding economic cooperation. “At the same time, the goal has been set to bring bilateral trade to $30 billion. During the meeting of the heads of government, measures and priority sectors that could generate additional trade growth were discussed. These include energy, commerce, transport and logistics. We also reviewed issues related to the negotiation process and our integration agenda,” Shakkaliev said. Kazakh authorities expect digitalisation measures to help accelerate trade flows. Kazakhstan’s Deputy Minister of Finance, Yerzhan Birzhanov, outlined plans to introduce electronic waybills and modernize 30 checkpoints along the Kazakhstan–Russia border. These steps are expected to reduce transit times and improve operational transparency. Russia remains one of the largest investors in Kazakhstan’s economy. “There is a very significant presence of Russian business in Kazakhstan, and we welcome it. We are ready to explore new areas of cooperation. I am confident that there are ample opportunities for this. The Government of Kazakhstan will make every effort to intensify and enhance our cooperation,” Bektenov said. In turn, Mishustin highlighted prospects for further joint initiatives. “There is considerable potential in bilateral cooperation to launch joint projects in energy, industry, transport infrastructure, agriculture and the digital economy,” he stated. In addition to economic issues, the two sides discussed joint efforts to preserve the ecosystem of the Caspian Sea and implement environmental initiatives. External factors are also influencing trade dynamics. In particular, tighter foreign trade procedures introduced by Russia could reshape logistics routes and alter commodity flows across Central Asia.

Uzbek Diaspora

Over 100,000 Uzbek Workers Recruited to Work in Russia in 2025

Around 106,000 citizens of Uzbekistan went to work in Russia in 2025 through organised recruitment programs, according to a report prepared by Rahim Khakimov, Deputy Adviser to the President of Uzbekistan, and cited by the Russian state news agency TASS. The report states that about 50,000 of these workers were employed by major companies, including Gazprom, Lukoil, Kamaz, AvtoVAZ, Ozon, and SPAR. Overall, an estimated 1.3 million Uzbek citizens are currently working in Russia on a temporary basis. The document also highlights ongoing efforts to simplify labor migration procedures. Agreements reached in 2025 provide for the partial transfer of work patent processing stages to Uzbekistan, allowing migrants to complete key formalities before departure. Authorities also plan to expand Russian-language testing by opening new centres in the cities of Jizzakh and Andijan to better serve the densely populated Fergana Valley, where nearly one-third of the country’s population lives. At the same time, migration trends are gradually shifting. According to Uzbekistan’s Central Bank, Uzbek labor migrants are no longer concentrated solely in traditional destinations such as Russia, Kazakhstan, South Korea, and Turkey. Increasing numbers are seeking employment opportunities in Europe and other parts of Asia. This diversification is reflected in remittance flows. Data show that transfers to Uzbekistan from the United Kingdom have increased by 39% in recent years, while remittances from European Union countries have risen by 37%. Significant growth has also been recorded from countries such as Ireland, Croatia, Slovakia, Lithuania, and the Netherlands, as well as from the United States and South Korea. Analysts attribute this trend to stable demand for labor abroad, relatively steady wage levels, and favorable currency exchange rates. According to the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), Uzbek labor migrants typically send home between $200 and $300 per month. Separate estimates from the Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford suggest that migrants in the United Kingdom remit between £1,000 and £3,300 annually per person. Overall, the average yearly remittance per recipient in Uzbekistan is estimated at between $2,000 and $4,000. Alongside these broader trends, consular support for Uzbek citizens abroad continues. On March 22, the Dunyo news agency reported that representatives of Uzbekistan’s embassy visited a Temporary Detention Center for Foreign Citizens in Russia’s Tula region. During the visit, Consul General Mehriddin Khairiddinov reviewed living conditions and held talks with Russian officials on accelerating document processing and facilitating the return of detained Uzbek nationals. “Supporting fellow citizens and providing them with the necessary assistance remain among the priority tasks of the diplomatic mission,” Khairiddinov said, emphasizing that the protection of citizens’ rights is a key principle of Uzbekistan’s state policy.

EAEU

New Russian Trade Controls Add Friction to Central Asian Trade

Russia is tightening trade procedures in ways that could reshape how goods move across Central Asia. The changes are technical, but their impact could be significant. The clearest sign is Russia’s new SPOT import-control system, which takes effect for road shipments from Eurasian Economic Union countries on April 1. Under the new rules, importers must file a document on an expected shipment two days before the truck reaches the border. The Russian authorities will assign a QR code, and from July 1, the system is due to move into full operating mode, including a security payment. Moscow says the measure is designed to improve tax compliance and reduce fraud. In practice, it introduces additional control over trade flows before goods reach the border. For transport companies and exporters, that means higher upfront costs, longer planning cycles, and greater uncertainty over delivery times. Even small delays at the border can disrupt supply chains, particularly for perishable goods. The changes are part of a broader pattern in which Moscow is relying more heavily on administrative controls to manage trade within its closest economic partners, and the timing is notable. Central Asian economies have been expanding trade with China and the European Union, while also seeking alternative transit routes that reduce dependence on Russia. The introduction of tighter Russian controls comes as those efforts gain momentum. Over time, such measures may also push Central Asian businesses to accelerate efforts to diversify trade routes and partners. The system may also create new internal barriers within the EAEU. The requirements for advance documentation and financial guarantees could, in some cases, exceed procedures applied to imports from outside the bloc. That would mark a significant shift for a union that was designed to simplify trade among its members. It also underlines a familiar problem within the EAEU, where commitments to free movement often sit alongside recurring administrative barriers. Similar disputes have surfaced repeatedly over the past decade, particularly in relation to agriculture and food, suggesting that the gap between formal integration and practical trade conditions remains unresolved. Russia dominates the union’s economic geography. According to Kazakhstan’s Bureau of National Statistics, mutual trade with EAEU countries reached almost $2.16 billion in January 2026, with 15.4% year-on-year growth. Russia accounted for the vast majority of that total. Kazakhstan’s imports from EAEU partners rose significantly faster than its exports; Russia supplied close to one-third of Kazakhstan’s total imports in January. That imbalance leaves Kazakhstan particularly exposed to changes in Russian trade procedures. For Kazakh businesses, that exposure is most visible at border crossings, where delays and extra checks quickly add to costs. Tensions over regulatory controls have also resurfaced. On March 2, Russia suspended certification for high-fat dairy products from all Kazakh suppliers, affecting butter, cream, cheese, and milk powder. Kazakhstan responded with its own measures, strengthening veterinary controls and imposing temporary restrictions on the import and transit of livestock and animal products from several Russian regions because of a worsening disease situation. Even when such steps have a...

EAEU

Growing Trade Disputes Test the Eurasian Economic Union

Trade disputes within the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) are as old as its creation. Restrictions on the import and export of certain goods have long been common practice. However, analysts increasingly warn that tensions have reached a point at which the organization risks losing its core function, ensuring the free movement of goods across borders and maintaining simplified conditions for migrant workers. Mounting Restrictions The EAEU currently comprises Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia. Economic integration among several post-Soviet states began in 2000 with the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), formed by Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan. Uzbekistan joined in 2006, but suspended its participation in 2008. The foundation of this organization was the Customs Union agreement, intended to abolish customs duties among member states. The structure of the integration project has since evolved. The EAEU treaty was signed in 2014 and entered into force on January 1, 2015. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan did not join, while Armenia became a member in 2015. More than two decades after the first integration agreements, however, many of the bloc’s original promises remain only partially fulfilled. Experts have long argued that protectionist measures remain widespread within the bloc and that full freedom of movement for all categories of goods, including strategic products, has not been achieved. They also point to pronounced economic asymmetry: Russia accounts for approximately 85–87% of the union’s combined GDP, whereas Kazakhstan accounts for approximately 9–10%. Russia’s significantly larger population and political influence have further reinforced perceptions of structural imbalance. Moscow is now preparing new regulatory measures affecting its partners. From April 1, 2026, a national system for confirming the arrival of goods will be introduced for road imports from EAEU countries. According to the Russian authorities, shifting key control procedures to the pre-border stage is intended to improve transparency in the administration of indirect taxes. Previously, such checks were conducted after goods entered the country through desk and field audits. At the same time, Russia has intensified selective customs controls on its borders with Kazakhstan and Belarus, officially citing efforts to combat counterfeit goods. Particular scrutiny is being applied to product labelling and accompanying documentation. Controls were tightened last summer, when mobile checkpoints were established along the Kazakh-Russian border, followed by the inspections of vehicles leaving Belarus in the autumn. Full-scale checkpoints are now operating on the Kazakh-Russian border, while a simplified regime linked to the Union State and EAEU agreements continues to apply on the Belarusian-Russian border. Logistics industry representatives report that stricter controls on the Kazakh border have significantly increased transit delivery times. Carriers often face lengthy delays at checkpoints even when their documentation is in order. According to Alexandra Pokumeiko, head of a freight-forwarding department, the changes have created uncertainty in delivery schedules along Belarus-Russia transport corridors and on transit routes through Russia to Kazakhstan. The growing number of administrative restrictions has begun to spill into specific sectors of the economy, triggering retaliatory measures between member states. Escalating Tensions in the Automotive Sector A new dispute...