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Bilateral Relations

A First for Kyrgyzstan – Japarov’s Historic Visit to Armenia

For the first time, a Kyrgyz head of state has made an official visit to Armenia. President Sadyr Japarov arrived in Yerevan on October 15 at the invitation of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and called the three-day trip “historic.” Talks remained firmly bilateral and produced ten signed agreements, a joint commitment to protect Lake Issyk-Kul and Lake Sevan (Armenia), and a stated interest in expanding transit links. Nothing in Japarov’s statement framed cooperation as directed against any third country. He presented it in terms of trade, cooperation, and friendly relations, with dialogue and peace underpinning regional stability. Japarov opened his remarks by noting that Pashinyan had visited Kyrgyzstan twice this year, including the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council session in Cholpon-Ata in August. Pashinyan, for his part, said Japarov’s first official visit to Armenia would open a new page in bilateral relations. Kyrgyzstan and Armenia have been independent since 1991, and both belong to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), a five-nation bloc with a common market for goods, services, capital, and labor. Even so, their leaders have mostly met on the sidelines of multilateral summits. Quiet to Active Diplomacy Under Japarov, Kyrgyzstan has abandoned its quiet diplomacy and begun taking a more active role in international affairs. This year, Japarov has traveled to Armenia (October 15-17), Azerbaijan (October 14-15 and May 17), Turkmenistan (October 8-9), the United States (from September 19), South Korea (September 15-18), Kazakhstan (July 29, May 28-29, and May 15) and Russia (April 23). He reached Armenia fresh from the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) in Baku, where Central Asian leaders linked trade and security issues. Bishkek’s shift in foreign policy emphasis owes less to geopolitics than to economic necessity and a practical, non-ideological pursuit of national interests. Its commitment to dialogue, regional stability and good-neighborliness is central to a foreign policy aimed at win-win results. Biodiversity Diplomacy In Yerevan, Japarov attended the opening of the Leaders' Summit within the 17th UN Conference of the Parties on Biological Diversity (COP17). On October 16, he addressed the plenary, presenting initiatives on glacier melt and biodiversity in Central Asia, and met UNESCO Director-General Khaled El-Enany. Among the specific proposals, Japarov recommended a special mountain program within the Global Environment Facility at the World Bank to fund environmental projects in mountain regions, and a UN-backed trust fund for Issyk-Kul, to which Kyrgyzstan proposed an initial $10 million contribution from its state budget. He also called for a Global Center for Mountain Region Resilience in Bishkek, where countries could share knowledge and experience on environmental protection. Japarov further backed a debt-for-nature swap mechanism, which would let countries use financial resources more effectively to protect ecosystems, and urged stronger regional cooperation to protect rare animals and birds. The Yerevan Declaration followed the usual diplomatic template, restricted mainly to high-level language. Japarov invited Pashinyan to attend “Bishkek+25,” the Second Global Mountain Summit, on 21–23 October 2027, to mark the culmination of Kyrgyzstan’s Five Years of Action for Mountain Development. Transport at...

Trade Barriers

Kazakhstan Wheat Ban Raises Risk of Renewed Trade Spat With Russia

A truck crossing into Kazakhstan through a northern border post can be declared as carrying 18 tonnes of wheat while hauling as much as 40 tonnes. Grain Union analyst Evgeny Karabanov described that gap as part of the country’s problem with undeclared Russian grain. Astana’s answer is a six-month ban on most wheat imports from July 27. The measure may curb grey-market loads and support domestic farmers, but it also risks reopening a trade dispute with Russia and deepening the gap between the Eurasian Economic Union’s promises and daily commerce. Agriculture Minister Aidarbek Saparov’s order covers wheat arriving by road, water, and rail from EAEU members and other countries. Poultry farms, grain processors, licensed elevators, and the state Food Contract Corporation may still import by rail. Wheat imported for poultry farms and grain processors cannot be resold inside Kazakhstan or abroad. Rail transit through Kazakhstan remains exempt. The government says the ban will support local producers and secure sales. Deputy Agriculture Minister Azat Sultanov said Kazakhstan has large carryover stocks that need storage. “The decision was taken to stimulate the domestic market,” he said in June. The order names every foreign supplier, but its commercial impact will fall mainly on Russia. In January, the Grain Union forecast about one million tonnes of wheat imports during the September 2025 to August 2026 marketing year. Karabanov said practically all of that grain would come from Russia. Cheap wheat crosses a long shared border into Kazakhstan’s main grain belt. That can lower costs for millers and poultry farms, but it also undercuts growers before they sell their harvest. The ban shifts that pressure rather than removing it. Baimurat Group CEO Daniyar Kuanshaliyev called the measure a “crude administrative intervention” that could raise raw-material prices. He argued that reduced competition for wheat could leave processors paying more while traders and exporters compete for the same domestic stocks. Karabanov takes a less alarmed view. “We generally oppose various bans and restrictions,” he said, but the rail exemptions should limit the number of businesses harmed. He said the clearest cost could be higher transport charges, since trucks are often cheaper than trains for journeys under 500 kilometres. Kazakhstan imposed a broad wheat ban in 2024 after Russian grain continued entering despite earlier controls. TCA’s reporting on the earlier grain dispute found that more than 1.1 million tonnes had arrived in six months before Astana tightened the rules. Russia then restricted Kazakh grain and other agricultural products, citing phytosanitary concerns. Exporters said the effects spread beyond the stated products. “Trucks loaded with those products are being turned away at the border,” Karabanov told Reuters in October 2024. The cycle continued in 2025. Russia reinstated restrictions on Kazakh wheat, flaxseed, and lentils from April, while allowing sealed rail transit. The Grain Union said Moscow had lifted one set of restrictions the previous day, then introduced a new ban with altered terms. That history does not prove Moscow will retaliate this time. Kazakhstan’s order is country-neutral and preserves supplies...

Armenia

Pashinyan Victory Points to New Transport Options for Central Asia

Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev congratulated Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan on June 8 after Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party won Armenia’s parliamentary election. The message came through Akorda. Tokayev said the vote, in the preliminary view of most international observers, was open, followed Armenian election law, and allowed citizens to express their will. Armenia’s Central Electoral Commission has released preliminary results from all 2,005 polling stations, giving Civil Contract 727,160 votes, or 49.81%. Samvel Karapetyan’s Strong Armenia bloc took 23.29%, while former President Robert Kocharyan’s Armenia Alliance took 9.94%. Turnout stood at 59%. Pashinyan is on course to form another government, but doesn’t have the two-thirds strength needed to change the constitution without a referendum. That limits his room for maneuver on a final peace agreement with Azerbaijan, since Baku still wants Yerevan to alter constitutional language it sees as a claim to Nagorno-Karabakh. [caption id="attachment_50178" align="aligncenter" width="1535"] A stall in Tsaghkadzor, Armenia, selling Nikol Pashinyan paraphernalia. Image: TCA, Stephen M. Bland[/caption] Kazakhstan has built a close political track with Armenia over the past two years. In November 2025, Tokayev and Pashinyan elevated ties to a strategic partnership during Pashinyan’s official visit to Kazakhstan. The two sides discussed trade, transport, agriculture, digitalization, education, and culture. Armenian government readouts from the visit also linked Kazakh wheat shipments to regional route openings through the South Caucasus. This is the practical Central Asian stake in Pashinyan’s victory: a durable Armenia-Azerbaijan peace settlement would add another layer to westward routes from the Caspian. In October 2025, Azerbaijan removed all restrictions on cargo transit to Armenia. President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev told Tokayev in Astana that a shipment of Kazakh grain through Azerbaijan to Armenia was the first such consignment since transit stopped in the late Soviet period. Kazakhstan already uses the Caspian and South Caucasus to reach Turkey and Europe, but that network depends on a limited number of crossings, ports, and rail links. If Armenia and Azerbaijan reopen transport ties, Astana gains another way to reduce chokepoints and strengthen its position. Pashinyan’s victory also sends a political signal. The vote tested whether Russian pressure could set the limits of Armenia’s domestic politics. International observers said the June 7 election offered voters a genuine choice in a well-run process. They also cited pressure from abroad through trade restrictions and security threats aimed at pushing voters toward the opposition. The same assessment warned of uneven campaign opportunities and perceptions of selective justice inside Armenia. However, Pashinyan still won in a “landslide” despite years of public anger over the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh, a split with old security partners, and strong pressure from opposition groups with better ties to Moscow. The two main pro-Russian opposition forces won a combined 31%. The election came against a backdrop of Armenia’s break with Russian security organizations. When Azerbaijan took full control of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023 as Russian peacekeepers stayed on the sidelines in the breakaway territory’s dormant airport, Armenia concluded that Moscow would not protect it. In February 2024, Pashinyan said...

EAEU

As Armenia Looks West, Could Uzbekistan Move Closer to the EAEU?

Armenia’s increasingly uncertain future within the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) appears to have entered a new phase. On May 29, the presidents of Kazakhstan, Belarus, Russia, and Kyrgyzstan issued a joint statement calling on Yerevan to clarify whether it intends to pursue deeper integration with the European Union or remain committed to the Eurasian bloc. The four leaders announced that members of the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council would present a report at the next meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council in December 2026 outlining the possible consequences of suspending Armenia’s participation in the EAEU treaty framework. “We share the view that the Republic of Armenia should, within the shortest possible timeframe, hold a nationwide referendum on joining the European Union or continuing its membership in the Eurasian Economic Union,” the statement said. Speaking to journalists after the summit in Astana, Russian President Vladimir Putin drew parallels between Armenia’s current trajectory and the developments that preceded the crisis in Ukraine. “I have mentioned this before: the crisis in Ukraine began with attempts to join the EU,” Putin said. He added that significant differences between European and EAEU standards, particularly in agriculture and industry, make simultaneous participation in both integration projects difficult. “Combining the two is practically impossible,” Putin said. “Therefore, we would be forced to curtail much of our economic integration work with Armenia.” The following day, Russia recalled its ambassador to Armenia for consultations amid Yerevan’s growing engagement with the European Union. According to Russian political analyst Arkady Dubnov, the move was a clear diplomatic signal of Moscow’s dissatisfaction with the pro-European course pursued by Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s government and indicated a downgrading of bilateral relations. Dubnov also argued that Armenia’s representative at the Astana summit, Deputy Prime Minister Mher Grigoryan, avoided harsher criticism from Putin partly because of the position taken by Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. “Kazakhstan itself signed an Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the European Union in 2020,” Dubnov noted, suggesting that arguments about Armenia’s European integration harming the EAEU are largely political rather than economic in nature. One recent poll appears to reinforce confidence within Armenia’s ruling camp. A survey conducted ahead of parliamentary elections indicates that Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party could secure nearly 65% of decided voters, positioning it for a convincing victory and a substantial parliamentary majority. Against that backdrop, Moscow’s pressure on Yerevan may be less about influencing the outcome of Armenia’s elections than about preparing for a longer-term strategic realignment. Supporters of Pashinyan increasingly associate his political project with closer ties to Europe, a perception reinforced not only by European leaders but also by U.S. President Donald Trump, who recently expressed support for Pashinyan’s re-election campaign. For his part, Pashinyan appears focused on a broader regional recalibration. Speaking via Facebook Live on May 31, he emphasized the importance of normalizing relations with neighboring states. “I am convinced that we will achieve the goal of normalizing relations with Azerbaijan and Türkiye,” he said. “This means that a balanced and balancing...

Kazakhstan AI Development Takes Center Stage at EAEU Forum

Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has urged Eurasian Economic Union member states to accelerate the use of artificial intelligence across trade, logistics, industry, and agriculture, as Astana seeks to turn Kazakhstan AI development into a wider regional agenda. Speaking on May 28 at the plenary session of the Fifth Eurasian Economic Forum in Astana, titled “The EAEU in the Global Digital Race: Betting on Artificial Intelligence,” Tokayev said digital transformation would be a decisive factor in the bloc’s global competitiveness. The EAEU is a Russia-led bloc of countries which also includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan. “It is critically important to intensify the adoption of new technologies, primarily artificial intelligence, in trade and logistics,” Tokayev said. According to the Kazakh president, integrating national digital systems would allow member states to speed up customs procedures, process documents in real time, forecast cargo flows, and identify logistical bottlenecks. Tokayev also called for the mutual recognition of digital signatures across the EAEU, arguing that such a step could significantly reduce business costs and increase trade volumes within the bloc. He said the analytical capabilities of artificial intelligence could play a major role in strengthening industrial cooperation within the union, modernizing agriculture, and improving regional food security. “The comprehensive application of new technologies will become the most important factor in ensuring dynamic economic growth for EAEU member states,” Tokayev said. At the same time, the president warned that AI development should not deepen the “digital divide” between countries within the union. During the forum, EAEU leaders were expected to adopt a joint declaration on the responsible development of artificial intelligence, an initiative first proposed by Kazakhstan in December 2025. The document is intended to establish common approaches to economic digitalization and the safe deployment of AI technologies while taking into account the interests of all member states. Tokayev said the current transformation of the global economy creates a “unique window of opportunity” for EAEU countries. Citing international estimates, he noted that artificial intelligence could add approximately $7 trillion to global GDP over the next decade. “The key question is whether we will be able to use digital technologies as an effective instrument for accelerated economic and social development,” Tokayev said. Kazakhstan has increasingly promoted initiatives related to AI regulation and development in recent years, seeking to position itself as Central Asia’s leading AI hub. That said, its progress so far has been strongest in state-led digitalization rather than in globally competitive private-sector AI development. In the 2025 Oxford Insights Government AI Readiness Index, Kazakhstan ranked 60th out of 195 countries, up from 76th the previous year, making it the highest-ranked country in Central Asia. The government has declared 2026 the Year of Artificial Intelligence and Digital Development, created a dedicated AI ministry, established an AI Development Council, and promoted the development of national computing infrastructure, including NVIDIA-based supercomputers and expanded data-center capacity. Authorities have also backed Alem.ai, an international AI center in Astana that includes education programs, startup support, research labs, and a planned AI research...

EAEU

Putin’s Astana Visit Shows What Russia Still Wants From Kazakhstan

The Eurasian Economic Union summit in Astana gave Vladimir Putin's state visit a wider stage. The summit produced technical documents and familiar language about integration. The bilateral Russia-Kazakhstan package around it was more concrete. It showed what Moscow still wants from Kazakhstan, and what Astana expects in return. The detail lies in infrastructure, where contracts can last for decades. The setting echoed history. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia signed the treaty creating the Eurasian Economic Union in Astana on May 29, 2014, with Armenia joining in January 2015, and Kyrgyzstan in August of the same year. In 2026, the bloc returned to Astana for the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council and the V Eurasian Economic Forum. The theme of the forum was artificial intelligence, digital regulation, and the EAEU's place in the global technology race. Its website said 14 integration documents were signed on the sidelines, including memoranda, agreements, protocols, and joint action plans. Those documents gave the visit a regional frame. The larger result came on May 28, when Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Putin oversaw a broad set of bilateral agreements. Akorda listed nuclear power, Russian export credit, expanded oil-sector cooperation, a tenge-ruble currency swap, education projects, financial monitoring, transport digitalization, and nuclear safety regulation. That package points to the real agenda: energy, transit, payments, industrial production, and public-facing alliance language. For Moscow, Kazakhstan’s primary value is geographic: it sits between Russia and China, and across routes that connect Central Asia to Europe, the Caspian, and South Asia. Russian crude already crosses Kazakhstan on the Priirtyshsk-Atasu-Alashankou route to China. A KazTransOil contract keeps transit at 10 million tons a year until the end of 2033. The tariff is $15 per ton, excluding VAT. The Atasu-Alashankou pipeline has a design capacity of 20 million tons a year and belongs to Kazakhstan-China Pipeline LLP, a 50-50 venture between KazTransOil and China National Oil and Gas Exploration and Development Company. Reuters has reported that Russia and Kazakhstan agreed last year to raise that flow by 2.5 million tons, although the extra volume had not started flowing before Putin’s visit. The new agreement on oil-sector cooperation gives the issue a political push. For Moscow, the route strengthens access to China as Western sanctions keep pressure on Russian exports and payments. For Kazakhstan, it brings fees and gives Astana a useful position in Russia-China energy flows. The nuclear agreement, meanwhile, gives Russia a long-term role in Kazakhstan’s shift to nuclear power. Kazakhstan and Russia signed a $16.5 billion agreement for the Balkhash nuclear power plant at Ulken, near Lake Balkhash. The project covers two VVER-1200 III+ reactors. Kazakhstan held a groundbreaking ceremony for the plant in August 2025, with the active construction phase expected to begin in 2027, and the first reactor expected in early 2034. Russia will provide export credit for the first plant, with Rosatom leading the Balkhash project after competition with China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), France’s EDF, and Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power. But Kazakhstan has not handed the wider program to Moscow....