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EAEU

As Armenia Looks West, Could Uzbekistan Move Closer to the EAEU?

Armenia’s increasingly uncertain future within the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) appears to have entered a new phase. On May 29, the presidents of Kazakhstan, Belarus, Russia, and Kyrgyzstan issued a joint statement calling on Yerevan to clarify whether it intends to pursue deeper integration with the European Union or remain committed to the Eurasian bloc. The four leaders announced that members of the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council would present a report at the next meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council in December 2026 outlining the possible consequences of suspending Armenia’s participation in the EAEU treaty framework. “We share the view that the Republic of Armenia should, within the shortest possible timeframe, hold a nationwide referendum on joining the European Union or continuing its membership in the Eurasian Economic Union,” the statement said. Speaking to journalists after the summit in Astana, Russian President Vladimir Putin drew parallels between Armenia’s current trajectory and the developments that preceded the crisis in Ukraine. “I have mentioned this before: the crisis in Ukraine began with attempts to join the EU,” Putin said. He added that significant differences between European and EAEU standards, particularly in agriculture and industry, make simultaneous participation in both integration projects difficult. “Combining the two is practically impossible,” Putin said. “Therefore, we would be forced to curtail much of our economic integration work with Armenia.” The following day, Russia recalled its ambassador to Armenia for consultations amid Yerevan’s growing engagement with the European Union. According to Russian political analyst Arkady Dubnov, the move was a clear diplomatic signal of Moscow’s dissatisfaction with the pro-European course pursued by Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s government and indicated a downgrading of bilateral relations. Dubnov also argued that Armenia’s representative at the Astana summit, Deputy Prime Minister Mher Grigoryan, avoided harsher criticism from Putin partly because of the position taken by Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. “Kazakhstan itself signed an Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the European Union in 2020,” Dubnov noted, suggesting that arguments about Armenia’s European integration harming the EAEU are largely political rather than economic in nature. One recent poll appears to reinforce confidence within Armenia’s ruling camp. A survey conducted ahead of parliamentary elections indicates that Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party could secure nearly 65% of decided voters, positioning it for a convincing victory and a substantial parliamentary majority. Against that backdrop, Moscow’s pressure on Yerevan may be less about influencing the outcome of Armenia’s elections than about preparing for a longer-term strategic realignment. Supporters of Pashinyan increasingly associate his political project with closer ties to Europe, a perception reinforced not only by European leaders but also by U.S. President Donald Trump, who recently expressed support for Pashinyan’s re-election campaign. For his part, Pashinyan appears focused on a broader regional recalibration. Speaking via Facebook Live on May 31, he emphasized the importance of normalizing relations with neighboring states. “I am convinced that we will achieve the goal of normalizing relations with Azerbaijan and Türkiye,” he said. “This means that a balanced and balancing...

EAEU

Putin’s Astana Visit Shows What Russia Still Wants From Kazakhstan

The Eurasian Economic Union summit in Astana gave Vladimir Putin's state visit a wider stage. The summit produced technical documents and familiar language about integration. The bilateral Russia-Kazakhstan package around it was more concrete. It showed what Moscow still wants from Kazakhstan, and what Astana expects in return. The detail lies in infrastructure, where contracts can last for decades. The setting echoed history. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia signed the treaty creating the Eurasian Economic Union in Astana on May 29, 2014, with Armenia joining in January 2015, and Kyrgyzstan in August of the same year. In 2026, the bloc returned to Astana for the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council and the V Eurasian Economic Forum. The theme of the forum was artificial intelligence, digital regulation, and the EAEU's place in the global technology race. Its website said 14 integration documents were signed on the sidelines, including memoranda, agreements, protocols, and joint action plans. Those documents gave the visit a regional frame. The larger result came on May 28, when Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Putin oversaw a broad set of bilateral agreements. Akorda listed nuclear power, Russian export credit, expanded oil-sector cooperation, a tenge-ruble currency swap, education projects, financial monitoring, transport digitalization, and nuclear safety regulation. That package points to the real agenda: energy, transit, payments, industrial production, and public-facing alliance language. For Moscow, Kazakhstan’s primary value is geographic: it sits between Russia and China, and across routes that connect Central Asia to Europe, the Caspian, and South Asia. Russian crude already crosses Kazakhstan on the Priirtyshsk-Atasu-Alashankou route to China. A KazTransOil contract keeps transit at 10 million tons a year until the end of 2033. The tariff is $15 per ton, excluding VAT. The Atasu-Alashankou pipeline has a design capacity of 20 million tons a year and belongs to Kazakhstan-China Pipeline LLP, a 50-50 venture between KazTransOil and China National Oil and Gas Exploration and Development Company. Reuters has reported that Russia and Kazakhstan agreed last year to raise that flow by 2.5 million tons, although the extra volume had not started flowing before Putin’s visit. The new agreement on oil-sector cooperation gives the issue a political push. For Moscow, the route strengthens access to China as Western sanctions keep pressure on Russian exports and payments. For Kazakhstan, it brings fees and gives Astana a useful position in Russia-China energy flows. The nuclear agreement, meanwhile, gives Russia a long-term role in Kazakhstan’s shift to nuclear power. Kazakhstan and Russia signed a $16.5 billion agreement for the Balkhash nuclear power plant at Ulken, near Lake Balkhash. The project covers two VVER-1200 III+ reactors. Kazakhstan held a groundbreaking ceremony for the plant in August 2025, with the active construction phase expected to begin in 2027, and the first reactor expected in early 2034. Russia will provide export credit for the first plant, with Rosatom leading the Balkhash project after competition with China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), France’s EDF, and Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power. But Kazakhstan has not handed the wider program to Moscow....

EAEU

EAEU Leaders Meet in Astana Amid Growing Internal Trade Disputes

Astana is hosting Eurasian Economic Union events on May 28-29, with leaders arriving on Thursday and the main meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council scheduled for Friday, May 29. The first part of Thursday was dominated by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin and his delegation during Putin’s state visit to Kazakhstan. At the Palace of Independence, Tokayev and Putin introduced their official delegations to each other during the Russian president’s state visit, while Russian presidential aide Yury Ushakov said the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council meeting would begin on Friday morning in narrow and expanded formats. The Supreme Eurasian Economic Council is the highest body of the Eurasian Economic Union, which came into force on January 1, 2015. Now more than a decade old, the bloc is facing deepening internal contradictions driven largely by external economic pressure on Russia, the Union’s core member. Some of those tensions are linked to the bloc’s expansion beyond its original Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan core. To understand the current state of Eurasian integration, it is necessary to revisit its origins, particularly the role played by Kazakhstan and its first president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, who had sought to preserve a looser union among the Soviet republics as the USSR collapsed. As prime minister and later president of the Kazakh SSR, Nazarbayev understood the economic consequences that would follow the collapse of the integrated Soviet economic system, and how deeply Kazakhstan remained tied to Soviet-era supply chains, infrastructure, and decision-making structures centered in Moscow. Nazarbayev first publicly proposed the idea of Eurasian integration in 1994 during a lecture at Moscow State University. At the time, however, the administration of Russian President Boris Yeltsin showed little interest in the concept. That changed after Vladimir Putin came to power. In 2001, the Eurasian Economic Community, known as EurAsEC, was established, bringing together Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan. The founding agreement had been signed in Astana in October 2000. Uzbekistan joined EurAsEC in 2006, but suspended its membership only two years later. Meanwhile, Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan launched work in 2007 on creating a Customs Union, which officially came into existence in 2010. In the autumn of 2011, Putin announced plans to establish a Eurasian Economic Union based on a future Single Economic Space. Two years later, Nazarbayev proposed dissolving EurAsEC in connection with the planned creation of the EAEU by Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Armenia were invited to join the Customs Union. However, by 2014, when the treaty establishing the EAEU and dissolving EurAsEC was signed, neither Armenia nor Kyrgyzstan had initially been central to the Eurasian project. At that stage, much of the discussion revolved around the possible accession of Ukraine. Russian political commentator and current State Duma deputy Anatoly Wasserman devoted several books to the idea of integrating Ukraine into the Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan project, including Ukraine and the Rest of Russia. Wasserman argued that Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine needed to move away from a raw-materials-based economic model by creating a unified market...

Fuel prices

Kyrgyzstan Introduces State Regulation of Fuel Prices

Kyrgyzstan has introduced temporary state regulation of motor fuel prices amid continued increases in the cost of gasoline and diesel, which the country imports largely from Russia. The Cabinet of Ministers adopted a resolution introducing measures to stabilize fuel prices, ensure economic security, maintain uninterrupted fuel supplies, and support businesses. Under the resolution, the government will subsidize imports of gasoline, diesel fuel, and liquefied petroleum gas from May 25 through September 30, 2026. Authorities have established fixed benchmark prices for imported fuel: AI-92 gasoline: $860 per ton; AI-95 gasoline: $940 per ton; diesel fuel: $950 per ton; liquefied petroleum gas: $575 per ton. The difference between market prices and the state-established benchmark prices will be compensated to importers through government subsidies. At the same time, the Ministry of Economy has been instructed to introduce temporary state regulation of retail fuel prices by establishing maximum allowable prices. The Cabinet of Ministers has also temporarily lifted restrictions on fuel imports by road transport, although most fuel deliveries to Kyrgyzstan traditionally arrive by rail from Russia. The decision comes amid mounting pressure on fuel markets across Central Asia. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that by mid-May, Kyrgyzstan’s fuel reserves covered only around one to one and a half months of consumption, while the country’s annual fuel demand is estimated at approximately 1.6 million tons. Analysts link rising fuel prices across the region to higher global oil prices after tensions involving Iran escalated, as well as to lower refining volumes in Russia following Ukrainian drone strikes on refinery infrastructure. Kyrgyzstan consumes around 1.6 million tons of motor fuel annually and imports roughly 1.2 million tons, remaining heavily dependent on external suppliers because of its limited domestic refining capacity.

Prisons

Uzbek Diplomats Visit Prisoners in Russia’s Sakhalin Region

Officials from Uzbekistan’s Consulate General have visited Uzbek nationals serving prison sentences in Russia’s Sakhalin region to discuss their living conditions, health, and requests for transfer back to Uzbekistan, according to Uzbekistan’s state-run news agency Dunyo. The meeting took place at Correctional Institution No. 1 in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk during a working visit by consular staff. Dunyo reported that eleven Uzbek citizens are currently incarcerated at the facility after being convicted under various articles of Russia’s Criminal Code. During the visit, consular representatives inspected residential quarters, dining areas, and recreation facilities before holding a group meeting with the prisoners. Discussions focused on detention conditions and inmates’ well-being. According to the report, Uzbek officials also warned prisoners that joining foreign military formations could lead to criminal liability under Uzbek law. The issue has drawn attention since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, amid repeated warnings to Central Asian migrants against joining foreign military units. The incarcerated Uzbek citizens reportedly said they were generally satisfied with prison conditions. However, many expressed concerns over prolonged separation from family members and requested assistance in being transferred to Uzbekistan to serve the remainder of their sentences closer to home. Consular staff provided contact details for the Uzbek diplomatic mission and told inmates they could seek support if problems arose during detention. The visit comes amid broader discussions over the transfer of foreign prisoners between Russia and Central Asian countries. Earlier, Russia’s Human Rights Commissioner, Tatyana Moskalkova, said Moscow was prepared to facilitate the transfer of more than 3,000 Uzbek citizens convicted in Russia. However, she noted that the process remains blocked because Uzbekistan has not ratified the 1998 Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons. The issue extends beyond Uzbekistan. Last month, Moskalkova said she had received a positive response from the Tajik authorities, including President Emomali Rahmon, regarding the possible transfer of around 200 Tajik women serving prison terms in Russia on humanitarian grounds. Labor migration from Central Asia to Russia has created a growing number of cases involving citizens imprisoned abroad, increasing pressure on governments in the region to improve legal assistance, consular access, and mechanisms for prisoner transfers. The visit shows Uzbekistan is maintaining consular access to citizens held in Russian prisons, even as a broader transfer mechanism remains unresolved.

Fuel prices

Why Oil-Rich Kazakhstan Is Bracing for Higher Fuel Prices

Fuel prices in Kazakhstan are expected to rise significantly, according to Kazakh energy analysts. Although the country remains a major oil exporter and plans to expand its refining capacity, analysts warn that these measures alone will not resolve the structural problems behind rising fuel costs. Some Kazakh energy analysts have already described 2026 as “the final year of cheap gasoline” before Kazakhstan becomes more closely integrated into the Eurasian Economic Union’s common oil and petroleum products market. The situation is further complicated by the conflict in the Middle East, which has added volatility to global oil markets. For Kazakhstan, however, the deeper problem is domestic: low-regulated prices, refinery constraints, gray-market exports, and the rising cost of crude. Higher fuel prices also carry particular political sensitivity. The unrest that shook the country in January 2022 was triggered by a sharp increase in liquefied petroleum gas prices. Any new surge in gasoline or diesel costs could ripple through the economy, accelerating inflation and increasing social tensions. A Politically Explosive Commodity Kazakhstan’s leadership learned the political risks of fuel pricing during the January 2022 crisis, when protests erupted in the western city of Zhanaozen after liquefied petroleum gas prices rose sharply. Although the government quickly intervened and blamed unscrupulous suppliers, the protests rapidly escalated into nationwide unrest. Over several days, 238 people were killed, government buildings and security facilities were seized in multiple cities, and the country faced its worst political crisis since independence. In response, the authorities imposed a 180-day moratorium on fuel price increases, with some restrictions lasting even longer. Even then, it was clear that artificially suppressing fuel prices required substantial state subsidies, while the cost of oil extraction continued to rise. The “Last Year” of Cheap Fuel? Earlier this year, Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy warned that domestic fuel prices would need to gradually move closer to those in Russia by the end of 2026. Officials linked the expected price convergence to the planned launch of the EAEU’s common oil and petroleum products market on January 1, 2027. At current exchange rates, gasoline prices at Kazakh filling stations remain roughly half those in Russia. A similar price gap exists with Kyrgyzstan, encouraging the unofficial export of cheap Kazakh fuel to neighboring countries. In practice, that means Kazakhstan faces pressure from both sides: raising prices risks public anger, while keeping them low encourages fuel to leave the country unofficially. The Energy Ministry insists that future price increases will not amount to “shock therapy” for consumers. Officials say the transition toward a common EAEU fuel market will occur gradually through legislative harmonization rather than through an immediate equalization of prices across member states. At the same time, the authorities acknowledge that the large price gap with neighboring countries creates strong incentives for gray-market exports of subsidized fuel, increasing the risk of artificial shortages inside Kazakhstan. According to the ministry, the current low-price environment also limits investment in the sector. Significant funding is needed to expand the Shymkent, Atyrau and Pavlodar refineries and,...