Russia's War - The Times Of Central Asia

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Black Sea Tanker Attacks

Security Risks Around Kazakhstan’s Oil Exports Ripple Through European Markets

Europe’s oil market is becoming increasingly exposed to disruption as security risks rise along export routes used by Kazakhstan, which the European Union has long viewed as a reliable alternative to Russian supply. The risks extend far beyond Ukraine itself. “Russia continues escalating its attacks and targeting civilians and civilian infrastructures,” an EU spokesperson told The Times of Central Asia. “Russia’s brutal and unacceptable attacks have left people without hot water, heating and electricity in the current weather conditions. Russia’s war of aggression has also severely impacted Black Sea maritime security, including through its use of shadow fleet vessels to circumvent international sanctions, and the persistent attacks on civilian and port infrastructure in Ukraine. On the other hand, Ukraine has accepted an unconditional ceasefire in March 2025. It shows that Russia does not want peace. The EU and the entire international community need to put pressure on Russia to stop its war. “Kazakhstan plays a crucial role for Europe’s energy security and has been for years a reliable partner in diversifying energy sources and ensuring a stable supply for European markets. More than 12% of all the oil imported by the EU comes from Kazakhstan, contributing to the diversification of energy sources and reducing dependency on a limited number of suppliers. The continuous and safe functioning of the supply chain is hence key also for Europe. “Maritime safety and security in the Black Sea is a fundamental component of the new EU strategic approach to the region, adopted in May 2025. The Black Sea is a critical connector between Europe, the Southern Caucasus, Central Asia and the Eastern Mediterranean. Ensuring maritime security and safety in this region is vital not only for the littoral States but also for broader European interests and for many partner countries, as it supports trade flows, sustainable supply chains and enhanced connectivity.” Kazakhstan produced roughly 1.8 million barrels per day in 2024 and exported the bulk of that volume. More than 80% of its crude exports move through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, or CPC, which links oil fields in western Kazakhstan to Russia’s Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. From there, tankers ship the oil mainly to European refiners. Under normal conditions, the pipeline carries roughly 1.3 million barrels per day, making it one of the most important single supply routes for non-Russian crude entering Europe. Recent events have shown how sensitive European markets are to any disruption along that corridor. On January 14, Bloomberg reported that oil prices in Europe strengthened after shipments of CPC Blend fell short of expectations. Traders cited reduced availability of the light, low-sulfur crude, which is favored by European refiners, forcing buyers to seek alternative grades at higher prices. Despite the recent tightening, traders say the market has so far absorbed disruptions without severe shortages, reflecting high inventories and flexible refinery operations, though that buffer could narrow if attacks persist. That supply pressure followed a series of security incidents in the Black Sea, where commercial shipping and port infrastructure have...

Caspian Pipeline Consortium

Kazakhstan Opens Criminal Probe Over Calls to Attack CPC Oil Pipeline

Kazakhstan has opened a criminal investigation into public statements that authorities say encouraged attacks on the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), the main export route for the country’s crude oil, after months of disruption at the system’s Black Sea terminal turned a foreign security risk into a domestic legal and political issue. Prosecutor General Berik Asylov confirmed the case in a written reply to a parliamentary inquiry on January 6. "On December 17, 2025, the Astana City Police Department launched a pre-trial investigation under Part 1 of Article 174 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan (incitement of social, national, tribal, racial, class, or religious discord) into negative public comments regarding damage to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium," the Prosecutor General stated. The authorities have yet to name suspects, publish the posts under review, or announce any arrests. The file remains at the evidence-gathering stage, and prosecutors have left open whether any charges will ultimately be filed under Article 174, or reclassified under other provisions once investigators assess the intent and impact. The probe follows a request by Mazhilis deputy, Aidos Sarym, who said that some social media commentary crossed from opinion into encouragement of harm to strategic infrastructure, endorsed attacks on the CPC, and urged further strikes on critical sites. The political sensitivity is rooted in the 1,500-kilometer pipeline’s central role in Kazakhstan’s economy. CPC carries crude from western Kazakhstan to a marine terminal near Russia’s Black Sea port of Novorossiysk, where the oil is loaded onto tankers for delivery to global markets. The pipeline is owned by a consortium that includes Kazakhstan, Russia, and several international energy companies. The system dominates Kazakhstan’s oil export economy. More than 80% of the country’s crude oil exports move through the CPC route, which also carries more than 1% of global oil supplies, making it a pressure point for both markets and state revenue when operations are disrupted. The investigation follows a period of repeated disruption at the Novorossiysk terminal in late 2025, after a naval drone strike damaged one of the offshore loading points used to transfer oil from the pipeline to tankers. The damage forced operators to suspend loadings and move vessels away while inspections and repairs were carried out, sharply reducing export capacity. The CPC relies on single-point moorings positioned at sea to load crude onto tankers, a critical constraint on the entire system; when one goes offline, capacity drops quickly. The pipeline cannot store large volumes, forcing upstream producers to cut or slow output. By late December, the impact was visible in Kazakhstan’s production figures. Oil output fell by about 6% during the month after the late November strike constrained exports. Production at the Tengiz oilfield, the country’s largest, dropped by roughly 10%. Exports of CPC Blend crude fell to about 1.08 million barrels per day in December, the lowest level in more than a year, as the terminal operated with only one functioning mooring while others remained offline due to damage and maintenance. Operational pressures continued as...

Sanctions

UK Adds Uzbekistan-Based Companies and Tashkent Businessman to Russia Sanctions List

Britain has expanded its Russia sanctions regime to include four companies based in Uzbekistan and one Tashkent-born businessman, according to official documents published on 18 December 2025. The measures form part of a wider update that added 24 new individuals and entities to the UK’s consolidated sanctions list under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019. The update was set out in a Financial Sanctions Notice issued by HM Treasury and an accompanying Foreign Office policy paper, “List of Russia sanctions targets, 18 December 2025.” The documents confirm that all newly designated names are now subject to an asset freeze and associated financial restrictions in the UK. The four Uzbekistan-linked companies named in the notice are Fargona Kimyo Zavodi LLC, also listed under the English alias Fergana Chemical Plant; Gelion Business Trade MCHJ, registered in Tashkent; Raw Materials Cellulose MCHJ, based in the Jizzakh region; and LLC JV Chemistry International, located in the Navoi region. Each company is subject to an asset freeze, requiring that any funds or economic resources they own or control in the UK be frozen and that UK persons do not make funds or resources available to them without a licence. The Treasury notice also applies restrictions on trust services. Under UK sanctions law, this restricts UK persons from providing trust services to or for the benefit of designated persons unless an exemption applies or a licence is granted. Compliance guidance is published by the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation and linked through the British government’s Sanctions List. The documents do not provide detailed descriptions of the companies’ commercial activities, instead using standard statutory wording. In each case, the Secretary of State notes that there are reasonable grounds to suspect the entity “is or has been involved in destabilising Ukraine or undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty or independence of Ukraine,” including by making available goods or technologies that could contribute to those outcomes. The sanctions update also includes Rustam Muminov, born in Tashkent in 1953. The Treasury notice lists his nationalities as Uzbek, Israeli, and Russian. Muminov is subject to an asset freeze and trust services restrictions, with the reason stated being that the British authorities have reasonable grounds to suspect he has been involved in destabilizing Ukraine by providing financial services or by making available funds, economic resources, goods, or technology. The Foreign Office policy paper groups the new designations with others added on the same date, which include entities linked to Russia’s energy sector, financial circumvention, and the military-industrial complex. The government says the measures are intended to limit access to financial services and resources that could support Russia’s actions against Ukraine.

Caspian Pipeline Consortium

Protecting Critical Infrastructure: Lessons from the CPC Drone Attack

The attack by naval drones on the infrastructure of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) on 29 November was an alarming signal, not only for Kazakhstan but for the global energy sector. The temporary suspension of shipments and the shift to operating through a single remote mooring facility struck at the heart of Kazakhstan’s economy. Around 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports – generating roughly 40% of its export revenues – pass through the CPC, which has handled over 60 million tons of crude annually in recent years. The vulnerability of CPC infrastructure serves as a reminder of how tightly global energy security is intertwined with regional conflicts. The consortium not only carries Kazakh crude; it also plays a stabilizing role for several international stakeholders, including European refiners and multinational shareholders, such as Chevron and ExxonMobil. Any prolonged disruption would reverberate across global markets, raising transport premiums, tightening supplies in Southern Europe, and undermining confidence in the safety of trans-Eurasian energy routes. For a world already grappling with supply shocks, the Novorossiysk incident underscored how the effects from a single strike can ripple far beyond the immediate impact zone. At the same time, the incident revealed a broader and more urgent issue. Military operations are not supposed to target civilian infrastructure, particularly when it belongs to neutral third parties uninvolved in the conflict. While international humanitarian law (IHL) explicitly prohibits attacks on such facilities unless they are being used for military purposes, the reality on the ground is far less clear-cut. In contemporary conflicts, the line between civilian and military use can blur quickly, creating space for competing interpretations and contested justifications. The Legal Grey Zone of Modern Warfare Although the legal framework is clear on paper, its practical application has become increasingly strained in recent conflicts. The increasing use of drones, long-range precision munitions, and cyber tools has blurred the distinction between civilian and military infrastructure and has outpaced the mechanisms designed to protect them. Energy pipelines, ports, and terminal facilities - which once lay far from the frontlines - can now be struck at minimal cost and with limited attribution. This technological shift has opened a grey zone that existing IHL was never designed to manage, heightening the urgency for clearer norms and enforcement tools. The real challenge lies not in the absence of legal norms but in the lack of mechanisms to enforce them, particularly in cases where neutral countries’ assets become collateral damage. There is, therefore, an argument for the introduction of a new international legal framework – or supplementing existing provisions via a UN protocol – to safeguard critical infrastructure. This is especially relevant in an era of precision weapons and drone warfare, where pipelines, energy terminals, and logistics hubs increasingly fall within potential strike zones. Yet the implementation of such a framework faces complications. Under existing IHL, dual-use infrastructure, such as pipelines that may carry resources for both civilian and military use, can be deemed legitimate military targets. Ukrainian officials have justified strikes on Russian energy...

Immigration

How the Russian Relocation Wave Reshaped Kazakhstan’s Economy

In September 2022, northern Kazakhstan’s border crossings experienced huge surges as tens of thousands of Russians fled mobilization for the war in Ukraine. In Almaty and Astana, rental prices soared to historic highs, and social infrastructure came under intense pressure. At the time, the influx seemed poised to destabilize the country’s established equilibrium. Two years on, the situation has transformed. The initial surge subsided, and spontaneous migration underwent a natural filtering process. Many who saw Kazakhstan as a temporary stop have moved on or returned to Russia. Those who made a conscious decision to stay have legalized their status and integrated into the local economy. Despite initial fears, the mass relocation did not damage Kazakhstan’s economy. On the contrary, the so-called "Russian exodus" accelerated Almaty and Astana’s evolution into cosmopolitan urban centers, while introducing lasting economic shifts. A New Diaspora Understanding the impact of the mass migration requires distinguishing transient travelers from those who settled. During the peak in autumn 2022, more than 400,000 Russian citizens crossed the border, though most quickly departed Kazakhstan. According to Kazakhstan’s Interior Ministry, from January 2023 to September 2024, more than 80,000 Russian citizens received residence permits for work. Including family members and remote workers, the core of the relocated population can be estimated at 100,000–120,000 people. Those who remained form a skilled urban middle class, IT specialists, engineers, doctors, and entrepreneurs, largely aged 25 to 40. When the “visa run” legal loophole allowing stay extensions by briefly exiting the country was abolished in January 2023, many were forced to legalize their presence. The rule change pushed many relocants to formalize their stay through work contracts or business registration, which in turn made their economic activity more visible to the state. By the end of 2023, the number of registered legal entities with Russian participation exceeded 18,000, a 70% increase. In 2024, that number rose to more than 23,000. The “Cappuccino Effect” The arrival of tens of thousands of solvent consumers brought not only capital, but also the consumption habits of Russia’s megacities. International institutions, including the IMF, have acknowledged that Kazakhstan’s 2023 GDP growth was supported in part by robust domestic demand. Spending surged in restaurants, delivery services, taxis, and gyms, especially in Almaty and Astana. This boost helped small and medium-sized businesses recover from the pandemic. Russian entrepreneurs, opening everything from coffee shops to architecture firms, raised service standards and intensified competition. Local businesses responded by improving their quality and digitalizing operations. However, this also pushed up consumer prices, contributing to inflation and affecting local purchasing power. Housing remains the most visible pressure point. While the panic of late 2022 has passed, rents remain well above pre-crisis levels. Analysts estimate that average house prices are still 40% higher than in 2021. This has fueled gentrification, with central Almaty’s “Golden Square” and elite areas of Astana becoming expat enclaves. Students, public sector workers, and young families have increasingly been pushed to the outskirts, increasing commuting times and straining public transport. Many relocants are...

Caspian Pipeline Consortium

Why Attacks on the Caspian Pipeline Consortium Could Alter Kazakhstan’s Strategic Plans

Attacks on the infrastructure of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), reduced export flows, and volatility in commodity markets are generating serious pressures for Kazakhstan. In the coming years, both the country’s financial system and its domestic political balance may face significant tests. A number of experts warn that disruptions in oil logistics via the CPC, which remains the main artery for Kazakh crude exports, could depress budget revenues, strain national companies, and worsen the sovereign outlook. Kazakhstan pumps roughly 80% of its oil exports through the CPC system, and oil revenues account for more than half of the country’s total export earnings. Because CPC Blend is Kazakhstan’s primary export-grade crude, even short interruptions can reverberate through the state budget, the National Fund, and the balance sheets of national companies. This could trigger a domino effect, destabilizing broad swathes of the economy and undermining public finances. Already, the recent rounds of disruption around Black Sea oil shipping are eroding a substantial source of tax revenue for the state. Continued Risk of Strikes Political scientist Dosym Satpaev argues that Kazakhstan may be underestimating the intensity and persistence of the conflict surrounding Ukraine. He contends that both sides in that conflict have used strikes on energy infrastructure as key tools, a tactic that will likely continue. The recent strike targeted the CPC’s single-point moorings (SPMs) at Novorossiysk, a coastal terminal on the Russian Black Sea. These offshore loading points sit in relatively shallow waters and are physically exposed, making them susceptible to the naval drones Ukraine has increasingly deployed against Russian maritime infrastructure. Although the attack officially targeted Russian facilities, the collateral implications for Kazakh oil exports were immediate. According to Satpaev, that means further risks for the CPC. The fact that Kazakhstan remains heavily dependent on this single pipeline reflects a broader failure to diversify exports and reduce reliance on raw material transit. The vulnerability is magnified by the CPC’s ownership structure: although Kazakhstan relies on it for most of its exports, the pipeline network and the Novorossiysk terminal lie on Russian territory and operate under Russian regulatory oversight. Russia holds a majority stake in the consortium, while U.S. firms such as Chevron and Exxon also have significant shares, creating a complex web of interests that limits Astana’s room for manoeuvre. Kazakhstan has already experienced how this dependence can be leveraged. In 2022, Russian regulators repeatedly halted CPC operations over alleged “environmental violations,” moves widely interpreted as political pressure at a moment of diplomatic friction. That precedent underscores how strategic vulnerability to CPC disruptions predates the current wave of attacks. Satpaev is skeptical that alternative export routes, such as via pipelines through the Caspian Sea to Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan or transit to China, can substitute for the CPC in the near term. Given the global trend toward reduced oil demand, he believes this leaves Kazakhstan exposed to long-term structural risks. At the same time, Satpaev views as unlikely the possibility that Ukraine would attempt to directly stop the CPC’s operations, given the broader consequences such...