• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00216 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10659 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00216 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10659 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00216 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10659 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00216 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10659 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00216 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10659 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00216 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10659 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00216 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10659 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00216 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10659 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%

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Protecting Critical Infrastructure: Lessons from the CPC Drone Attack

The attack by naval drones on the infrastructure of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) on 29 November was an alarming signal, not only for Kazakhstan but for the global energy sector. The temporary suspension of shipments and the shift to operating through a single remote mooring facility struck at the heart of Kazakhstan’s economy. Around 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports – generating roughly 40% of its export revenues – pass through the CPC, which has handled over 60 million tons of crude annually in recent years. The vulnerability of CPC infrastructure serves as a reminder of how tightly global energy security is intertwined with regional conflicts. The consortium not only carries Kazakh crude; it also plays a stabilizing role for several international stakeholders, including European refiners and multinational shareholders, such as Chevron and ExxonMobil. Any prolonged disruption would reverberate across global markets, raising transport premiums, tightening supplies in Southern Europe, and undermining confidence in the safety of trans-Eurasian energy routes. For a world already grappling with supply shocks, the Novorossiysk incident underscored how the effects from a single strike can ripple far beyond the immediate impact zone. At the same time, the incident revealed a broader and more urgent issue. Military operations are not supposed to target civilian infrastructure, particularly when it belongs to neutral third parties uninvolved in the conflict. While international humanitarian law (IHL) explicitly prohibits attacks on such facilities unless they are being used for military purposes, the reality on the ground is far less clear-cut. In contemporary conflicts, the line between civilian and military use can blur quickly, creating space for competing interpretations and contested justifications. The Legal Grey Zone of Modern Warfare Although the legal framework is clear on paper, its practical application has become increasingly strained in recent conflicts. The increasing use of drones, long-range precision munitions, and cyber tools has blurred the distinction between civilian and military infrastructure and has outpaced the mechanisms designed to protect them. Energy pipelines, ports, and terminal facilities - which once lay far from the frontlines - can now be struck at minimal cost and with limited attribution. This technological shift has opened a grey zone that existing IHL was never designed to manage, heightening the urgency for clearer norms and enforcement tools. The real challenge lies not in the absence of legal norms but in the lack of mechanisms to enforce them, particularly in cases where neutral countries’ assets become collateral damage. There is, therefore, an argument for the introduction of a new international legal framework – or supplementing existing provisions via a UN protocol – to safeguard critical infrastructure. This is especially relevant in an era of precision weapons and drone warfare, where pipelines, energy terminals, and logistics hubs increasingly fall within potential strike zones. Yet the implementation of such a framework faces complications. Under existing IHL, dual-use infrastructure, such as pipelines that may carry resources for both civilian and military use, can be deemed legitimate military targets. Ukrainian officials have justified strikes on Russian energy...

How the Russian Relocation Wave Reshaped Kazakhstan’s Economy

In September 2022, northern Kazakhstan’s border crossings experienced huge surges as tens of thousands of Russians fled mobilization for the war in Ukraine. In Almaty and Astana, rental prices soared to historic highs, and social infrastructure came under intense pressure. At the time, the influx seemed poised to destabilize the country’s established equilibrium. Two years on, the situation has transformed. The initial surge subsided, and spontaneous migration underwent a natural filtering process. Many who saw Kazakhstan as a temporary stop have moved on or returned to Russia. Those who made a conscious decision to stay have legalized their status and integrated into the local economy. Despite initial fears, the mass relocation did not damage Kazakhstan’s economy. On the contrary, the so-called "Russian exodus" accelerated Almaty and Astana’s evolution into cosmopolitan urban centers, while introducing lasting economic shifts. A New Diaspora Understanding the impact of the mass migration requires distinguishing transient travelers from those who settled. During the peak in autumn 2022, more than 400,000 Russian citizens crossed the border, though most quickly departed Kazakhstan. According to Kazakhstan’s Interior Ministry, from January 2023 to September 2024, more than 80,000 Russian citizens received residence permits for work. Including family members and remote workers, the core of the relocated population can be estimated at 100,000–120,000 people. Those who remained form a skilled urban middle class, IT specialists, engineers, doctors, and entrepreneurs, largely aged 25 to 40. When the “visa run” legal loophole allowing stay extensions by briefly exiting the country was abolished in January 2023, many were forced to legalize their presence. The rule change pushed many relocants to formalize their stay through work contracts or business registration, which in turn made their economic activity more visible to the state. By the end of 2023, the number of registered legal entities with Russian participation exceeded 18,000, a 70% increase. In 2024, that number rose to more than 23,000. The “Cappuccino Effect” The arrival of tens of thousands of solvent consumers brought not only capital, but also the consumption habits of Russia’s megacities. International institutions, including the IMF, have acknowledged that Kazakhstan’s 2023 GDP growth was supported in part by robust domestic demand. Spending surged in restaurants, delivery services, taxis, and gyms, especially in Almaty and Astana. This boost helped small and medium-sized businesses recover from the pandemic. Russian entrepreneurs, opening everything from coffee shops to architecture firms, raised service standards and intensified competition. Local businesses responded by improving their quality and digitalizing operations. However, this also pushed up consumer prices, contributing to inflation and affecting local purchasing power. Housing remains the most visible pressure point. While the panic of late 2022 has passed, rents remain well above pre-crisis levels. Analysts estimate that average house prices are still 40% higher than in 2021. This has fueled gentrification, with central Almaty’s “Golden Square” and elite areas of Astana becoming expat enclaves. Students, public sector workers, and young families have increasingly been pushed to the outskirts, increasing commuting times and straining public transport. Many relocants are...

Why Attacks on the Caspian Pipeline Consortium Could Alter Kazakhstan’s Strategic Plans

Attacks on the infrastructure of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), reduced export flows, and volatility in commodity markets are generating serious pressures for Kazakhstan. In the coming years, both the country’s financial system and its domestic political balance may face significant tests. A number of experts warn that disruptions in oil logistics via the CPC, which remains the main artery for Kazakh crude exports, could depress budget revenues, strain national companies, and worsen the sovereign outlook. Kazakhstan pumps roughly 80% of its oil exports through the CPC system, and oil revenues account for more than half of the country’s total export earnings. Because CPC Blend is Kazakhstan’s primary export-grade crude, even short interruptions can reverberate through the state budget, the National Fund, and the balance sheets of national companies. This could trigger a domino effect, destabilizing broad swathes of the economy and undermining public finances. Already, the recent rounds of disruption around Black Sea oil shipping are eroding a substantial source of tax revenue for the state. Continued Risk of Strikes Political scientist Dosym Satpaev argues that Kazakhstan may be underestimating the intensity and persistence of the conflict surrounding Ukraine. He contends that both sides in that conflict have used strikes on energy infrastructure as key tools, a tactic that will likely continue. The recent strike targeted the CPC’s single-point moorings (SPMs) at Novorossiysk, a coastal terminal on the Russian Black Sea. These offshore loading points sit in relatively shallow waters and are physically exposed, making them susceptible to the naval drones Ukraine has increasingly deployed against Russian maritime infrastructure. Although the attack officially targeted Russian facilities, the collateral implications for Kazakh oil exports were immediate. According to Satpaev, that means further risks for the CPC. The fact that Kazakhstan remains heavily dependent on this single pipeline reflects a broader failure to diversify exports and reduce reliance on raw material transit.  The vulnerability is magnified by the CPC’s ownership structure: although Kazakhstan relies on it for most of its exports, the pipeline network and the Novorossiysk terminal lie on Russian territory and operate under Russian regulatory oversight. Russia holds a majority stake in the consortium, while U.S. firms such as Chevron and Exxon also have significant shares, creating a complex web of interests that limits Astana’s room for manoeuvre. Kazakhstan has already experienced how this dependence can be leveraged. In 2022, Russian regulators repeatedly halted CPC operations over alleged “environmental violations,” moves widely interpreted as political pressure at a moment of diplomatic friction. That precedent underscores how strategic vulnerability to CPC disruptions predates the current wave of attacks. Satpaev is skeptical that alternative export routes, such as via pipelines through the Caspian Sea to Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan or transit to China, can substitute for the CPC in the near term. Given the global trend toward reduced oil demand, he believes this leaves Kazakhstan exposed to long-term structural risks.  At the same time, Satpaev views as unlikely the possibility that Ukraine would attempt to directly stop the CPC’s operations, given the broader consequences such...

CSTO Signs New Security Roadmap in Bishkek Amid Armenia Boycott and Putin Ukraine Remarks

The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) reaffirmed its commitment to regional security and political coordination during its annual summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, on November 27. Leaders from five of the bloc’s six members - Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan - attended the event and signed off on a series of military, security, and strategic cooperation agreements. Armenia, the sixth CSTO member, boycotted the summit for the second year running, continuing its protest against the alliance’s refusal to intervene during Armenia’s conflict with Azerbaijan, and marking another low in Armenia’s engagement with the CSTO after months of public grievances against the bloc. Despite Yerevan’s absence, the other members adopted a wide-ranging joint declaration reaffirming the alliance’s collective defense commitments and outlining new initiatives to modernize its security framework. Notably, Armenia did not oppose the adoption of the summit documents in its absence. The CSTO, founded in 2002 and led by Russia, has a charter that guarantees mutual defense among members, though the bloc has often struggled to act decisively during regional crises. Still, it remains the only formal security alliance connecting Russia with post-Soviet Central Asian republics. Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov hosted the summit, marking the end of his country’s chairmanship. Japarov handed over the role to Russian President Vladimir Putin, who announced that Russia will lead the CSTO in 2026 under the motto “Collective Security in a Multipolar World: Common Goal—Shared Responsibility.” The bloc also appointed Kyrgyzstan’s Taalatbek Masadykov as the next Secretary General. The former deputy head of Kyrgyzstan’s Security Council will begin his three-year term on January 1, 2026. In remarks during the summit, Putin also addressed global concerns about the war in Ukraine, stating that a 28-point peace plan proposed by former U.S. President Donald Trump could serve as a “basis for future agreements.” He added that Russia has no intention of attacking Europe, seeking to dispel fears of escalation while reaffirming Moscow’s security agenda. The summit ended with the adoption of a large number of documents. Among them were a strategy to combat drug trafficking and plans to improve border security, peacekeeping readiness, and anti-terrorism efforts. Russia used the summit to offer CSTO members a rearmament initiative. Putin proposed supplying allies with modern Russian-made weapons that had “proven their effectiveness” in recent conflicts. The offer included expanded cooperation in joint production and training. Military exercises will continue under the newly adopted five-year cooperation plan. In 2025, the CSTO held drills in Kyrgyzstan, Belarus, and Tajikistan under the banner “Indestructible Brotherhood.” The plan outlines regular future training, integration of air defense units, and enhancements to peacekeeping logistics. The alliance also adopted an Anti-Drug Strategy for 2026–2030 and signed a joint resolution to intensify Operation “Kanal,” which targets drug routes through Central Asia. The CSTO committed to upgrading its counterterrorism strategy and enhancing cyber defense capabilities, with Russia proposing broader coordination on information security and biosecurity. Tajik President Emomali Rahmon, meanwhile, used the summit to urge partners to accelerate border security aid along Tajikistan’s porous southern frontier...

How U.S. and EU Sanctions Are Rippling Through Central Asia

Russia’s economy has faced renewed pressure following a fresh round of sanctions imposed this past week by both the European Union and the United States. After abruptly canceling a planned meeting with Vladimir Putin in Budapest, President Donald Trump shifted to a more hardline stance, announcing new sanctions. While these sanctions may not cripple Moscow, they are already having secondary effects on Central Asia, particularly on Kazakhstan’s banking and energy sectors. The EU's 19th sanctions package, adopted on October 22, introduces a phased ban on Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG). According to Reuters, short-term contracts will be terminated within six months, while long-term contracts are to expire by January 1, 2027. The package also includes a total ban on transactions with Russian oil giants Rosneft and Gazprom Neft, an expanded blacklist of so-called "shadow fleet" vessels, and sanctions against 45 companies in Russia and third countries supplying military-related technologies. Of growing concern in Central Asia is the inclusion of several regional financial institutions in the EU's sanctions list. These include the Kazakh branch of Russia’s VTB Bank, Kyrgyz banks Tolubai and Eurasian Savings Bank, and Tajik banks Dushanbe City Bank, Kommertsbank of Tajikistan, and Spitamen. These restrictions are scheduled to take effect between November and December 2025. Both Kyrgyzstan’s President Sadyr Japarov and the nation's Foreign Ministry have publicly expressed dismay over the sanctions, with Japarov urging Western leaders to stop “politicizing the economy.” In his speech at the UN General Assembly in New York in September, Japarov criticized the impact of unilateral sanctions, while the Foreign Ministry has stated that the country adheres to its international obligations and maintains an open dialogue with the EU to prevent risks associated with possible sanctions circumvention. The ministry has proposed launching an independent, internationally recognized audit and forming a joint “Kyrgyzstan-European Union” technical working group to facilitate data exchange, transaction monitoring, and risk assessments. In Kazakhstan, the National Bank downplayed the impact of sanctions against VTB. Deputy Chairman Yerulan Zhamaubayev noted that the bank had already been under nominal restrictions, and handles few transactions. “VTB does not affect the country’s financial stability, and we do not expect serious risks for the economy,” Zhamaubayev stated. However, the latest U.S. sanctions may prove more consequential for Kazakhstan, particularly amid efforts to strengthen bilateral trade with the United States, including through the repeal of the Jackson-Vanik amendment. The U.S. Treasury Department has sanctioned Russian oil majors Rosneft and Lukoil. The latter has deep economic ties with Kazakhstan. Just days before the announcement, on October 14, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev personally attended the 30th anniversary of Lukoil’s operations in Kazakhstan, awarding CEO Vagit Alekperov the Order of Barys, first class. Oil and gas journalist Oleg Chervinsky reported that the joint venture Kalamkas-Khazar Operating LLP, co-owned by Lukoil and KazMunayGas, is directly affected. “Only the Tengiz and CPC projects, which Lukoil operates with American partners, have been exempted from the sanctions,” Chervinsky noted. A final investment decision for Kalamkas-Khazar was expected in December 2025. Yerkanat Abeni, a member of...

Central Asians in Putin’s War: Fighting for Ukraine, Forced for Russia

As the war in Ukraine continues to drag on, fighters from across Central Asia have found themselves on both sides of the frontlines. In Kyiv, Kazakh national Zhasulan Duysembin has traded his past life as a sales agent for a rifle, sporting a tattoo of Kazakhstan’s flag on his back as he battles to defend his adopted home. He now fights, he says, to protect his children and believes that “Russia will not stop in Ukraine, it will go further. We must make every effort to ensure that our Kazakhstan does not suffer.” Alan Zhangozha, an ethnic Kazakh who grew up in Kyiv and now serves as a public relations officer in the Ukrainian Army, echoes this sentiment. “Ukraine’s victory will also be a victory for my Motherland,” he told The Diplomat. But as the war drags on, in Kazakhstan, families mourn men like 22-year-old Kiril Nysanbaev - a labor migrant in Russia coerced into signing up for the war who only came home in a coffin. His sister recalls how her brother told her that Russian officers beat and forced him to enlist while he was detained on dubious charges in Chelyabinsk. Nysanbaev was killed in Ukraine’s Donetsk region in March 2024, news that only reached his family three months later. Citizens of all five Central Asian countries have been pulled into the conflict since Russia’s invasion in 2022. Some have volunteered to fight for Ukraine, driven by personal ties or ideals, while others, mostly labor migrants, have been recruited, enticed, or pressured into fighting for Russia. These parallel currents reflect the complex impact of the war on a region that remains officially neutral but was historically deeply entwined with Moscow. While a handful of Central Asians now wear the blue-and-yellow insignia in Ukraine’s defense, far more have ended up in Russia's ranks, often as expendable foot soldiers. From Bishkek to Bucha In November 2022, a Kyrgyz former labor migrant, Almaz Kudabek uulu, announced the creation of the Turan Battalion, a volunteer unit of Turkic-speaking fighters formed to assist Ukraine. “Kyrgyzstan is my homeland; I will always love it. But Ukraine is my home now; I am fighting for Ukraine,” he told reporters. The battalion, joined by volunteers from Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and elsewhere, operates as a semi-autonomous unit supported by private donations and allied Ukrainian brigades. Back in Kyrgyzstan, however, the authorities opened a criminal case against Kudabek, punishable by up to eight years in prison, and local media that covered his story faced pressure. Others have supported Ukraine in tangible, humanitarian ways. Early in the war, members of Ukraine’s Kazakh diaspora erected traditional yurts in cities like Bucha and Kyiv as heated shelters dubbed “Yurts of Invincibility.” These spaces provided food, tea, and electricity during blackouts, a gesture of solidarity that irritated Moscow but drew only a muted response from Kazakhstan’s government. Moscow’s Migrant Recruits: Coercion and Casualties Far greater numbers of Central Asians have ended up fighting for Russia, which hosts millions of migrant workers from...