• KZT/USD = 0.00210
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00210
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00210
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00210
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00210
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00210
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00210
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00210
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 8

Opinion: Can the Aral Sea Be Saved? Central Asia’s Water Cooperation Test

For most people, the Aral Sea is known through climate documentaries and satellite images as shorthand for ecological disaster. Once the world’s fourth-largest lake, it withered after Soviet planners diverted its two lifelines, the Amu Darya and Syr Darya, to turn Central Asia into a cotton empire. Over almost five decades, as much as three-quarters of the water in these river systems has leaked into desert soils rather than reaching the sea. NASA satellite data show that the blue inland ocean has been replaced by dusty basins. We all know that story. But the more urgent question is different: can the Aral Sea still be “saved” in any meaningful sense, in a century of climate stress and water shortages? Is it still capable of being restored to health? The honest answer is yes, but only if Central Asian states and their international partners stop treating it as a frozen symbol of Soviet failure and begin governing the entire basin as a shared, climate-vulnerable commons. Anything less is nostalgia with good drone footage. From Lake to Warning Signal The Aral Sea once covered about 68,000 square kilometers and supported fishing communities along what is now the Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan border. Before the large-scale Soviet irrigation projects of the 1960s, its level depended mainly on inflow from the Amu Darya and Syr Darya, with smaller contributions from precipitation and groundwater. In the arid climate of the basin, the sea’s stability depended on a fragile balance between river inflow and water loss through evaporation. That balance began to collapse after Soviet planners expanded irrigation for cotton and rice, diverting water from rivers that had fed the sea for centuries. Evaporation continued while river inflow fell, and the sea shrank rapidly. By the early 2000s, time-lapse images published by NASA’s Earth Observatory showed large areas of deep blue water turning into exposed seabed and dust plains within a generation. The consequences went far beyond a retreating shoreline. As the water receded, the exposed seabed became the Aralkum Desert, a source of toxic dust contaminated with salt as well as fertilizer and pesticide residues. Winds carry that dust across farms and towns, degrading soil and crops while exposing residents to serious health risks. The IFAS Agency in Uzbekistan, a working body of the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea, coordinates projects and programs in the Aral Sea basin. The collapse of fisheries also devastated local livelihoods and food supplies. Researchers have linked the wider Aral Sea crisis to higher rates of respiratory disease and anemia. Some studies have also reported elevated cancer risks. The loss of such a large body of water has changed the local climate. Without the sea’s moderating effect, summers have become hotter and drier, while winters have become colder. These pressures are now compounded by climate change and the retreat of glaciers in the upstream mountains that feed Central Asia’s river systems. The Aral Sea is therefore more than an environmental tragedy. It is a warning of what can happen when political...

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan Agree on Toktogul Water Releases

Energy and water ministers from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan signed a trilateral protocol in Tashkent on May 7 establishing agreed water release volumes and schedules from the Toktogul Reservoir for the next two months. The Toktogul Reservoir plays a central role in maintaining water and energy stability across Central Asia. The Toktogul Hydropower Plant, located on the Naryn River, the main tributary of the Syr Darya, is Kyrgyzstan’s largest power station and supplies around 40% of the country’s electricity. The reservoir serves a dual purpose: generating electricity for Kyrgyzstan while regulating water flows essential for downstream agriculture in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. During winter, Kyrgyzstan typically increases electricity generation to meet heating demand, often lowering reservoir levels and reducing the amount of water available for irrigation during the following spring and summer. According to Kazakhstan’s Energy Ministry, the newly signed protocol removes uncertainty for farmers in southern Kazakhstan at the start of the agricultural season and allows both Kazakh and Uzbek farmers to begin irrigation activities on schedule. To ensure stable water supplies throughout the remainder of the growing season, the three countries agreed to continue coordination in stages. The next ministerial meeting is scheduled for mid-June in Bishkek, where officials plan to finalize water release schedules for the critical summer months of July, August, and September. The agreement highlights the continued functioning of the region’s interstate water-energy exchange mechanism. Coordination over summer irrigation flows was preceded by extensive cooperation during the winter season. From September 2025 to April 2026, Kazakhstan supplied more than 1.5 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity to Kyrgyzstan, helping the upstream country reduce winter water releases for heating and preserve additional reserves in the Toktogul Reservoir for summer irrigation needs in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. According to Kyrgyzstan’s Deputy Energy Minister Altynbek Rysbekov, the Toktogul Reservoir held 7 billion cubic meters of water on April 1, 2026, down from 9.14 billion cubic meters on January 1 after the winter heating season. The reservoir’s so-called “dead water level,” the threshold below which turbines can no longer operate, stands at 6.5 billion cubic meters.