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Earthquake

Turkmenistan to Send Tents, Food, Other Aid to Afghanistan; Quake Toll Rises

Turkmenistan plans to send humanitarian aid to Afghanistan as the death toll from an earthquake there increased to more than 2,200, Afghanistan’s Taliban government said on Thursday. Rashid Muradov, Turkmenistan’s deputy prime minister and foreign minister, said “urgent humanitarian assistance - including clothing, tents, medicine, and food - will soon be delivered” to Afghanistan, the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs said on X. Muradov announced Turkmenistan’s aid plans in a telephone conversation with Maulvi Amir Khan Muttaqi, Afghanistan’s foreign minister. The Afghan minister thanked Muradov and “assured that the mentioned aid will be delivered to the needy people in a timely manner,” his office said. Some international donors have previously expressed concern that the Taliban diverts aid for its own purposes rather than delivering it to those most in need. The U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction recently released a report that it said looked into how “the Taliban diverts U.S. aid dollars intended for needy Afghans and the culture of denial within the international aid community, which thwarts effective measures to mitigate that diversion.” A 6.0 magnitude earthquake struck eastern areas in Afghanistan on Sunday, and rescue efforts have been hampered by a lack of infrastructure and mountainous terrain. Kunar was the hardest hit province, and parts of Nangarhar and Laghman provinces were also affected. The Afghan Red Crescent Society said on Thursday that at least 2,205 people died and 3,640 others were injured. “Many people are trapped under the rubble of destroyed homes and rescue efforts are ongoing,” the society said. Like Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan shares a border with Afghanistan and has said it is ready to help with quake relief. Central Asian countries have sent aid to Afghanistan in the past as they build ties with the Taliban and work on diversifying trade routes. Security concerns remain. Tajik border guards and Taliban fighters exchanged fire in an area along the Tajik-Afghan border on Aug. 24, though the two sides later met in an effort to reduce tensions.

Tajik-Afghan Border

Gold and Gunfire: Tajik-Taliban Tensions Flare on the Border

Tajik border guards and Taliban fighters have exchanged fire in an area along the Tajik-Afghan border. The incident happened on August 24 and is connected to a Chinese gold mining operation on the Afghan side of the border. The hostilities ended after a rare meeting between local Tajik and Taliban officials, though each side accused the other of harboring enemies. Gold Mining The Tajik authorities have been watching Afghanistan’s Dovang district in Afghanistan’s Badakhshan Province since the start of a gold mining operation there three years ago. Residents of Tajikistan’s Shamsiddin Shohin district, across the Pyanj River from Dovang, reported rising water levels in their area. Sodikjon Rahmonzoda, the head of the district branch of Tajikistan’s Ministry for Emergency Situations, stated that “On the opposite bank of the river, in Afghanistan, industrial gold mining started…. They built infrastructure (including) dams that direct water to our bank.” The Tajik authorities have been reinforcing the bank on the Tajik side of the river to prevent nearby villages from flooding. It is unclear if the two sides were previously in contact about the problems the diversion of water in the river was causing in Tajikistan. The other four Central Asian governments have all established a dialogue with the Taliban since they returned to power in August 2021. Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Turkmen, and Uzbek officials have visited Afghanistan, and Taliban representatives have visited Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan (but so far, not Kyrgyzstan). The Tajik government has kept its contact with the Afghan militant group to a minimum, though several border crossing points are working again, and some bazaars on the Tajik side of the frontier have reopened to Afghan customers. Rising Tensions In May, Tajik authorities detained a group of Chinese and Afghans who drove across the river on excavators from the mining site in Dovang into Tajikistan. According to the Tajik authorities, the Chinese and Afghans were seeking to launder money in Tajikistan. On August 24, a group of Taliban arrived at the border area in Dovang. It is not clear what sparked the shooting, but Tajik border guards and Taliban fighters exchanged fire using heavy weapons. One Taliban fighter was reportedly killed, and four others were wounded. There were no reports of casualties among the Tajik border guards. Neither the Tajik government nor Taliban officials have commented on the clash. A Rare Meeting Following the shooting, the commander of the Tajik border guard unit in the Shamsiddin Shohin district led a group of soldiers across the border to Dovang to meet with the head of mining operations and other officials in Badakhshan Province. The two sides discussed the gold mining operation on the Afghan side of the border, but the conversation degenerated into accusations, with each side complaining that the other was sheltering and training their enemies. Both sides are correct. The Tajik government allows members of the National Resistance Front (NRF), including its leader Ahmad Masoud, to travel to and often stay in Tajikistan. The NRF is a group of mainly ethnic...

Culture

Afghanistan Dismantles Navoi Statue, Plans New Memorial Amid Uzbek Backlash

The Taliban authorities in Afghanistan have dismantled the statue of renowned Timurid-era poet and thinker Alisher Navoi in Mazar-i-Sharif, according to a report by Amu. Local sources told the outlet that the monument, located in the telecommunications square of the city’s third district, was completely removed. The decision has drawn criticism from Uzbek cultural figures and officials, who argue that the Taliban are disregarding the spiritual heritage of other peoples and eroding the region’s historical and cultural uniqueness. In response, Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, through spokesperson Ahror Burhonov, sought clarification on August 21. “As soon as we learned that the monument to the great poet and thinker Alisher Navoi in Mazar-i-Sharif had been dismantled, Uzbekistan’s Foreign Ministry immediately contacted representatives of the Afghan authorities to obtain an official explanation,” Burhonov said. Initial explanations from Afghan officials claimed the statue’s location was not dignified enough to properly honor Navoi. They announced plans to construct a new memorial complex, which would include a new statue, restored inscriptions on Navoi’s life and work, and the renaming of the square in his honor. Burhonov added that Afghan authorities had expressed regret over the statue’s removal without prior consultation with the Ministry of Culture or the public. He emphasized that the Afghan side reaffirmed its commitment to preserving Navoi’s legacy and pledged to take appropriate measures to commemorate him respectfully. Alisher Navoi (1441-1501), born in Herat, modern-day Afghanistan, is widely recognized as the father of early Turkic literature. He remains a powerful cultural symbol for Uzbeks and other peoples across Central Asia. The statue had stood in Mazar-i-Sharif for approximately 17 years. It was previously damaged before its complete removal. As reported by Dunyo, Afghan officials reiterated that the statue’s location was unsuitable and reaffirmed plans to establish a larger and more dignified memorial site. The new monument is expected to include multilingual plaques in Uzbek, English, Dari, and Pashto, recounting Navoi’s life and contributions. At a public event on August 21 attended by local officials, diplomats, and journalists, Mazar-i-Sharif Mayor Abdurahman Himmat said that Afghans deeply respect Navoi’s legacy. “We will turn this monument into a worthy place of remembrance for both local residents and foreign visitors,” he stated. Himmat noted that around 40 projects are currently planned in the city, including restoration efforts for monuments dedicated to cultural icons such as Navoi, Magtymguly Pyragy, and 13th-century poet Jalal ad-Din Rumi. He also highlighted the construction of the Imam al-Bukhari madrasah, supported by Uzbekistan, as a symbol of close bilateral ties. The project was first announced by Uzbekistan last year. Jafar Fattayev, head of the Uzbek Council in Mazar-i-Sharif, welcomed the Afghan initiative, calling it a gesture of respect for Navoi and Uzbek cultural heritage.

Electricity

Afghanistan Generates 250 MW of Electricity, Imports 800 MW from Central Asia and Iran

Afghanistan’s state-owned electricity company, Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS), has signed or prepared agreements for domestic power generation projects totaling 1,070 megawatts over the past 11 months, with 70% of the funding coming from foreign investors, TOLOnews reported. Speaking in an interview, DABS chief Abdulbari Omar said the initiative marks a significant step toward energy self-sufficiency after years of underinvestment in the sector. “In the past 11 months, we have invested 69 billion Afghanis ($1.01 billion), 70% of which came from abroad. This shows we have encouraged foreign investors to enter the Afghan market,” he said. Afghanistan currently produces about 250 MW of electricity domestically and imports around 800 MW from Turkmenistan, Iran, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, at an annual cost of $250-280 million. Omar said the country would need between 6,000 and 7,000 MW to meet domestic demand, rising to 10,000 MW if industrial activity expands. He acknowledged the challenges of developing power from wind, water, gas, coal, and waste, but stressed that projects are moving forward with domestic funds and private investment, without relying on the World Bank or other international organizations. Omar also highlighted the problem of unpaid bills, citing 450 million Afghanis ($6.48 million) owed by former political leaders and warlords. “All individuals, from ministers to ordinary citizens, are treated equally under the law,” he said, noting that power has been cut to ministers who failed to pay. Last year, The Times of Central Asia reported that DABS extended its electricity import agreement with Uzbekistan until the end of 2025. The deal, signed in Uzbekistan by Omar and the National Electricity Company of Uzbekistan, remains vital for meeting Afghanistan’s needs. According to the Taliban-controlled Ministry of Energy and Water, Afghanistan requires around 1,500 MW of electricity, with roughly 720 MW imported and the rest generated domestically.

Bilateral Relations

Kazakh Foreign Minister Visits Kabul, Signs $500M Railway Deal as Mining Push Gathers Momentum

In a major step toward deepening regional engagement, Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister Murat Nurtleu arrived in Kabul this week, signaling a continuing shift towards pragmatic engagement in Astana’s policy towards Afghanistan. The visit resulted in significant diplomatic and economic developments, including the signing of a $500 million agreement on the Herat-Torghundi railway. During his visit, Nurtleu met with Afghanistan’s acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi and other senior officials in the Taliban-led government. In a joint statement, the two sides emphasized their commitment to expanding bilateral ties in transit, trade, education, and regional security. Nurtleu pledged Kazakhstan’s support for Afghanistan’s stabilization, food security, and comprehensive development, stating that Astana is seeking to expand its partnership with Kabul based on shared regional interests. A highlight of the visit was the signing of a memorandum of understanding for the construction of the Torghundi–Herat railway. The 115-kilometer line will link western Afghanistan to Turkmenistan, and is expected to extend connectivity into Iran and further south to the Arabian Sea. Afghanistan’s Deputy Prime Minister Abdul Ghani Baradar welcomed the agreement, stating that the deal will lay the foundation for establishing a logistics hub in Herat. As reported by Baradar’s office, discussions also covered the possibility of relaxing visa regulations for Afghan traders, resuming direct flights between Kabul and Astana, and increasing bilateral trade volumes. The two sides emphasized expanding economic collaboration through joint initiatives in key industries, including mining, transportation, communications, energy, and infrastructure. They also considered formalizing accords on agricultural product safety, cross-border logistics, and reduced transit costs — steps aimed at potentially raising trade between the countries to $3 billion. In parallel to these diplomatic overtures, Kazakhstan’s mining giant Kazakhmys Barlau is exploring Afghanistan’s untapped mineral resources. CEO Galym Nurzhanov confirmed that his team has already begun reconnaissance operations in the mineral-rich Nuristan Province. Nurzhanov described the terrain as a geological time capsule, stating that “For our geologists and miners, it’s like stepping into the 19th century. We looked at lead-zinc deposits, grades of nearly 39%, with concentrates reaching 41%. That’s ready ore, you can crush it and send it straight to the plant.” As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, despite lingering tensions over issues such as Afghanistan’s controversial Qosh Tepa Canal project, Kazakhstan has emphasized an approach to relations with Kabul based on “practicality, not ideology,” highlighting the shared need for regional security, trade corridors, and energy development.

Afghanistan

Recognition of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan: Between Law, Diplomacy, and Pragmatism

After the Taliban returned to power in August 2021, the question of recognizing the new Afghan regime became one of the key issues in regional and global politics. Although no country has granted de jure recognition to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), international engagement with the de facto authorities is becoming increasingly institutionalized. This article attempts to systematize and provisionally classify countries based on their stance toward the IEA. This is not a formal legal typology but rather an analytical tool meant to identify "stable patterns of behavior" in the context of interactions with the de facto authorities in Kabul. This approach does not aim for exhaustive academic precision but provides a basis for further discussion and analysis. To begin, we must clarify some basic principles, first and foremost, the institution of recognition. In international legal doctrine, the recognition of a new state or government is a unilateral act by a state and does not require the approval of international organizations. The UN, including the Security Council, does not formally conduct acts of recognition, but its approval is required for admitting authorities to the UN General Assembly, which constitutes formal recognition of international legitimacy and a willingness by the global community to work with them. The key mechanism here is the UN Credentials Committee. This is a special committee of the UN General Assembly consisting of nine member states, which change on a rotating basis. It annually reviews the lists of delegations accredited to participate in UN General Assembly sessions. Between 2021 and 2024, the committee decided to reject the recognition of seats for the Taliban government. In effect, this constitutes a denial of international recognition at the UN level. While the decision of the Credentials Committee has no formal legal significance as an act of recognition or non-recognition, politically it sends a strong signal to other states: the UN still does not regard the IEA as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. In other words, the Credentials Committee acts as a kind of beacon: until it is "lit," a wave of de jure recognition from other states is highly unlikely. Many countries, especially those following a policy of collective decision-making, will take their cue from the UN. For now, the signal remains unchanged: the international community maintains a cautious distance from legitimizing the Taliban regime. As is well known, there are two types of recognition: de jure recognition, which is complete and official and involves the establishment of diplomatic relations, and de facto recognition, which is limited and does not imply full legitimization of the regime. Removing the Taliban from national terrorist lists (as Kazakhstan and Russia have done) does not constitute legal recognition, even though some may portray it as such. The UN itself uses the term "de facto authorities" to describe the Taliban. At the same time, the UN Security Council sanctions regime on Afghanistan (under Resolution 2255) provides for the application of sanctions on an individual basis, without qualifying the regime as a terrorist regime. The...