Taliban - The Times Of Central Asia

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С5+1

C5+1 Statement Omits Afghanistan, Prioritizes Trans-Caspian Trade

The United States and the five Central Asian republics have issued a joint statement on economic and security cooperation that makes no mention of Afghanistan, once a central concern of U.S. regional policy. The document followed the October 19 C5+1 ministerial meeting in Samarkand, Uzbekistan. Afghanistan's absence from the statement does not mean it has disappeared from negotiations or Washington's strategic interests. Nevertheless, a comparison with earlier C5+1 documents reveals a shift in the published agenda. Where Washington once placed considerable importance on connecting Central Asia with South Asia through Afghanistan, the latest statement focuses on trade across the Caspian Sea and investment in the region's minerals. Afghanistan's Changing Place in C5+1 Talks In July 2021, just weeks before the Taliban retook Kabul, C5+1 participants at a conference in Tashkent explicitly supported closer trade and transport links between Central and South Asia through Afghanistan, as well as efforts to secure peace in the country. That month, the U.S., Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan also announced plans for a quadrilateral platform to support trade and transportation projects linking the two regions. In July 2023, Afghanistan was the subject of a separate C5+1 special session in Astana. Officials called for an inclusive Afghan government that respected women's rights and backed further development of transport and energy links through the country. A joint statement issued by C5+1 leaders that September described Afghanistan as an important factor in Central Asian security. In the 2026 Samarkand statement, Afghanistan goes unmentioned even in the section on border security and terrorism. However, the October 2023 C5+1 connectivity statement had already highlighted the Trans-Caspian Trade Route, which connects Central Asia to Western markets, and also omitted Afghanistan. For Central Asian countries, the Afghan route remains important in practical terms. Uzbekistan is pursuing plans for a railway through Afghanistan to Pakistan, which would give it access to Indian Ocean ports. Kazakhstan is already a major supplier of food to Afghanistan, exporting around $216 million worth of flour and $122 million of wheat in the first seven months of 2026. In September, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also agreed with the United Arab Emirates to study a railway corridor through Afghanistan to Pakistan. Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan all share borders with Afghanistan. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan also face the prospect of reduced water supplies from the Amu Darya as Afghanistan builds its Qosh Tepa Canal. Afghanistan's omission from a joint statement should therefore not be taken as a complete account of the policies of all five Central Asian states. What Constrains Washington One possible explanation lies in the U.S. approach to Afghanistan's current authorities. Washington allows practical contacts with representatives of the Taliban but does not recognize the government it has formed. The movement remains designated as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist, although it is not included in the U.S. Department of State's separate list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. The designation restricts dealings with the Taliban, although U.S. sanctions rules permit many commercial transactions involving Afghanistan's governing institutions, including civilian infrastructure and transportation projects....

CSTO

CSTO in No Hurry to Help Tajikistan

The authorities in Tajikistan have been ringing the alarm bells over events in neighboring Afghanistan for more than three decades. The Tajik government did so again after violence broke out along a small section of the Tajik-Afghan border in the last months of 2025, and specifically called on the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) for assistance. The CSTO has responded, but the promised aid has yet to arrive as Tajikistan continues to seek stronger border defenses. The Perennial Border Problem There had been unrest in Afghanistan since the late 1970s, long before Tajikistan became independent in late 1991, and the instability along Tajikistan’s approximately 1,360-kilometer border with Afghanistan has continued ever since. Most of the border area is mountainous and sparsely inhabited, making it ideal for narcotics and weapons smuggling. Weapons smuggling was a huge problem during Tajikistan’s 1992-1997 civil war, when weapons were being brought back and forth across the Afghan frontier to fuel civil conflicts in both countries. From the first day of Tajikistan’s independence until June 2005, Russian border guards helped keep watch on Tajikistan’s Afghan frontier. At least several hundred Russian and Tajik border guards, and Tajik and Afghan smugglers and militants have been killed along the Tajik-Afghan border in the last 35 years. Many countries worried about Tajikistan’s border problems with Afghanistan. Neighbors such as China, the other Central Asian states, and not so far away, Russia did not want narcotics or militants from Afghanistan reaching their countries. In the mid- and late-1990s, the Taliban push through Afghanistan to the Central Asian border increased these neighbors’ concerns. After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, the United States and its allies used facilities in Central Asia to support troops in Afghanistan. All these countries, and more, contributed to Tajikistan’s border defenses in some way, either by simply donating housing materials or winter uniforms, or providing security monitoring equipment and weaponry. It has never been enough to totally stem the border problems, but the security aid Tajikistan received is far more than the country could ever have allocated for that purpose from its state coffers. Emomali Rahmon was Tajikistan’s president in the late 1990s when the Taliban first seized power in Afghanistan. Rahmon viewed the Taliban as a threat, and Tajikistan’s policies toward the Afghan militant group reflected that. Rahmon’s opinion of the Taliban did not change when they regained power in 2021, and despite the other Central Asian states establishing a dialogue and trade ties with the Taliban, Tajikistan has been slow to engage the returned rulers of Afghanistan. In June 2024, Rahmon’s eldest son and heir apparent, Rustam Emomali, told a meeting of the CSTO’s Parliamentary Assembly Council that “Afghanistan has once again become a breeding ground for terrorism.” Emomali said more than 1,000 radical madrassahs had been established in Afghanistan, some in areas close to Tajikistan’s border, and that these religious schools were also preparing suicide bombers. A Turbulent End to 2025 In late August 2025, Tajik border guards...

Regional Security

The Taliban’s Road Reaches China, but the Border is Closed

After several years of slow progress, the road connecting Afghanistan to China is finally ready. On October 4, Taliban officials inaugurated the 121-kilometer road through Afghanistan’s remote and arid northeastern Wakhan Corridor. China, however, has not been too keen on the project, and, according to one report, when the Taliban reached the Chinese border, the way was barred, with Chinese border guards ordering the Taliban to leave the area. The Hard Road The Wakhan Corridor was part of ancient trade routes through Asia, but was clearly only used by hardy merchants. The area is one of the most isolated regions on the planet. Nearly all of it is 4,000 meters or more above sea level, mostly bare stone mountains with some grass and a few trees and bushes growing on hillsides and in the valleys. The Wakhan Corridor officially appeared on maps as part of Afghanistan at the end of the 19th century. It was a buffer zone agreed to by representatives of the British and Russian empires. Today, the far eastern section of the Wakhan Corridor is the only place where Afghanistan directly borders China. That 74-kilometer border was easy to ignore due to the remoteness of the area, but not long after the Chinese revolution in 1949, officials in Beijing still ordered it closed. The harsh climate and rugged mountains make most of the corridor virtually unhabitable, but that did not stop some from believing a modern trade route could be opened through Wakhan that would connect Afghanistan to China. Dirt roads reached a few of the larger settlements in the western part of the corridor, villages of, at most, several hundred people. The Taliban just finished building a gravel road and four bridges that finally make it all the way to the Chinese border. By itself, this is far from sufficient to qualify as a legitimate trade route. There is no infrastructure to serve traffic through the region, no petrol stations, no accommodation, no places to buy food or drink, and temperatures are well below freezing for at least half the year. China’s Big Objection The bigger obstacle is that China has no strong interest in opening this route, and in fact, would prefer the Afghan border to remain closed. The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is still present in Afghanistan. ETIM is comprised mainly of ethnic Uyghurs from China’s western Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, the same Chinese region that borders Afghanistan. ETIM’s goal is to topple Chinese rule in Xinjiang. ETIM fighters have been in Afghanistan for at least 25 years, and were allies of the Taliban during the years foreign troops were in Afghanistan. The Islamic State of Khorasan Province is active in northern Afghanistan, and that group has also made specific threats against the Chinese government. The Taliban have promised that they will not allow any group to use Afghan territory to plot or carry out attacks on neighboring countries. However, the Wakhan Corridor is part of Afghanistan’s Badakhshan Province, and the Taliban have...

Regional Security

Central Asia’s Afghan Engagement Faces Persistent Security Risks

Central Asian countries are expanding their trade with Kabul despite concerns about armed groups operating from Afghanistan. Russia has renewed warnings about militants seeking to infiltrate the region and is advocating cooperation with the Taliban authorities to contain them. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are interested in trade, energy, and transport projects connecting the region with South Asia. Tajikistan has traditionally taken a more critical position toward the Taliban and places particular emphasis on securing its lengthy border with Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Russia and China are seeking guarantees from the Afghan authorities against the activities of armed organizations that threaten their security. Speaking on October 16 at a joint conference of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Moscow, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said extremist organizations maintained a significant presence in Afghan provinces bordering Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. According to Lavrov, militants intend to use Afghan territory to expand their activities into Central Asia and Russia. Lavrov identified Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), the Afghan affiliate of the Islamic State terrorist organization, also known as ISIS-K, as the main threat, citing Russian security agencies. The group opposes the Taliban, carries out attacks in Afghanistan, and has struck beyond its borders. The name Khorasan refers to a historical region encompassing parts of present-day Afghanistan, Iran, and Central Asia. ISIS-K’s reach extends beyond Afghanistan’s border regions through propaganda, recruitment, and cross-border networks. As The Times of Central Asia previously reported, people from Central Asia have been implicated in ISIS-K activities beyond the region itself, including within migrant communities. Lavrov claimed that militants in northern Afghanistan included ethnic Uyghurs, alongside fighters from Central Asia and the North Caucasus. His reference to Uyghurs echoes Beijing’s security concerns over Xinjiang, where China has used counterterrorism policies to justify sweeping repression. A 2022 UN assessment found that arbitrary detention and restrictions on the rights of Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim groups could constitute crimes against humanity. The TASS report provided no evidence supporting his claims about the fighters’ origins. Lavrov also called for joint action against weapons and drug trafficking through Central Asia. The Taliban as a Security Partner Lavrov urged engagement with the Taliban authorities, who returned to power during the U.S. military withdrawal in August 2021. Russia formally recognized their government in July 2025. Moscow argues that the Taliban’s control of Afghan territory makes them responsible for security within the country, and is seeking international support for Kabul’s efforts to improve regional security. While relying on the Taliban to contain armed groups, Moscow is simultaneously questioning their ability to do so. ISIS-K has attacked Taliban officials, giving Kabul a direct reason to confront the organization. That conflict, however, offers no assurance that the Taliban will act against other armed groups operating in Afghanistan. China also favors working with Kabul on security, with concerns extending to the safety of Chinese nationals and regional trade routes. Two attacks launched from Afghan territory killed five Chinese nationals...

Afghanistan

Afghanistan’s Regional Ties Grow as Global Reintegration Stalls

For Central Asia, Afghanistan is both a source of risk and a potential route south. Governments across the region increasingly see a more stable Afghanistan as a way to open new markets and expand economic links with South Asia. Afghanistan is a direct neighbor of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. The geography is different for Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, but their political and economic interests are no less significant. Many long-term plans for expanding Central Asia’s connections to the south depend in part on Afghanistan’s future and the role it can play in the regional economy. At the UN Security Council’s September 16, 2026, meeting on Afghanistan, Kazakhstan set out a position that may reflect a wider Central Asian view. Astana argued that engagement with Afghanistan’s current authorities should not be equated with recognition and that isolation could not offer a sustainable solution. Astana proposes moving past the current focus on humanitarian aid. In Kazakhstan’s view, the next phase of international engagement should gradually move Afghanistan from dependence on humanitarian aid toward economic self-reliance through job creation, private-sector development, the restoration of financial channels, and expanded trade and investment. The statement also calls for Afghanistan’s integration into the regional economy. Kazakhstan’s representative specifically discussed connections between Central and South Asia, Kazakh-Afghan business ties, trade houses in Herat and Kabul, and the new UN Regional Centre for the Sustainable Development Goals for Central Asia and Afghanistan in Almaty. Astana also expressed concern about restrictions affecting Afghan women and girls. Georgette Gagnon, the UN secretary-general’s deputy special representative for Afghanistan, delivered the main briefing. Five years after the Taliban’s return to power, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) assesses that the de facto authorities face no significant armed or political threat to their control, although risks to long-term stability are accumulating and largely stem from their own policies. UNAMA therefore distinguishes between the Taliban’s control of the country and its prospects for long-term stability. UNAMA views the Doha process as the main multilateral framework for Afghanistan’s gradual reintegration into the international community. It links progress to women’s rights and inclusive governance, along with the fulfillment of counterterrorism commitments. The mission also notes that Kabul prefers bilateral relations to multilateral engagement. Russia and China focused on pragmatic engagement and economic recovery, stressing the need to avoid isolation. China also urged Kabul to step up its efforts against terrorist groups and lift restrictions preventing Afghan women employed by the UN from doing their jobs. Russia called for dialogue without pressure and for steps toward Afghanistan’s international reintegration without preconditions. Afghanistan’s economic ties with some regional partners are expanding while its political normalization at the global level remains unresolved. Kazakhstan’s position illustrates this divide. It allows for engagement without accepting the existing order as permanent or waiting for isolation to change it. Future international discussions on Afghanistan will have to address this tension.

Border Security

Badakhshan Fighting Raises Risks for Tajikistan and Uzbekistan

In Nusay district, Badakhshan province (northeast Afghanistan), fighting began around August 11 between Taliban forces and followers of Juma Khan Fateh, a local Taliban commander of ethnic Tajik origin who had resisted efforts to disarm his network. The Armed Conflict Location and Events Data Project (ACLED) identifies the immediate trigger as an attempt to remove military equipment and vehicles from areas under Fateh’s control, amid longer-running tensions over disarmament, local authority, and control of gold mining. Similar disputes over gold mines have repeatedly produced clashes between local commanders and Taliban forces since 2021. Fateh surrendered on August 17 after nearly a week of fighting. By August 22, Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said his case was being prepared for trial. Post-surrender reporting also indicated weapons seizures and disarmament activity around Fateh-linked sites and associates, although the scale of the reported seizures and disarmament remained incompletely verified. The Fateh episode came amid a broader increase in armed instability in Badakhshan during 2026. ACLED recorded 22 anti-Taliban armed-opposition events in the province from January through July, compared with four from June through December 2025. In July, one opposition group temporarily seized the Yaftal-e Sufla district headquarters, while the Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF) reportedly fought Taliban forces in Zebak. The Yaftal-e Sufla and Zebak operations were separate from the Fateh confrontation, and there is no credible evidence of coordination with Fateh’s network. Fateh’s surrender ended the immediate confrontation, while separate armed-opposition activity in Badakhshan continued. The fighting has already had a direct cross-border consequence for Tajikistan. Nusay lies opposite Tajikistan’s Darvoz district. On August 13, gunfire from the Afghan side crossed into Darvoz, killing a 21-year-old woman inside her home and damaging residential property. Tajikistan’s Foreign Ministry lodged a formal protest, saying the fighting had violated the country’s airspace and demanding respect for the state border and measures to prevent a recurrence. The Afghan Foreign Ministry acknowledged the death and expressed regret while blaming “disruptive and opportunistic elements.” The one confirmed limited incident does not show that the conflict has extended into Tajikistan on a sustained basis, but it makes the cross-border dimension more than hypothetical. Tajikistan shares a 1,374-kilometer frontier with Afghanistan, much of it facing Afghan Badakhshan. Dushanbe had already treated this border as a persistent security problem. In late November 2025, two attacks launched from Afghanistan’s territory killed five Chinese nationals and wounded five others in Tajikistan, which then instituted tighter border measures, while the Taliban pledged to cooperate on security and investigations. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is also implementing a program to strengthen the Tajik-Afghan frontier with weapons, equipment, and other border-protection means. Its 2026–27 implementation phase antedates the present fighting. A 2026 Security Council monitoring report said Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) was active mainly in northern Afghanistan, particularly Badakhshan, and was developing cells capable of projecting a regional threat, with Central Asia remaining a key focus. It also reported concern in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan over the role of their nationals in the organization and the possible...