Taliban - The Times Of Central Asia

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 289

Transit Corridors

Afghan Traders in Ashgabat Discuss Proposed Turkmenistan-Afghanistan Transit Corridor

A delegation from the Afghanistan Chamber of Commerce and Investment was in Turkmenistan in recent days as the two countries explore ways to boost trade and develop transit corridors, according to Afghan state media. Mawlawi Fazal Mohammad Saber, Afghanistan’s chargé d'affaires in the Turkmen capital of Ashgabat, met the group of Afghan traders during their visit, the National Radio and Television of Afghanistan, also known as RTA, reported on Thursday. The Afghan delegates and their counterparts in Turkmenistan discussed a proposal to create a new transit corridor from the Turkmen city of Turkmenabat to the northern Afghan city of Mazar-e-Sharif, according to TOLOnews, a news organization based in Kabul. It said the Afghan side had invited Turkmenistan to send a delegation of 100 traders and investors to Afghanistan. Turkmenabat is an economic hub in eastern Turkmenistan that is close to the border with Uzbekistan. Mazar-e-Sharif is the biggest city in northern Afghanistan and is a significant transit point for trade in Central Asia. Mazar-e-Sharif is closely linked to Uzbek trade and transport networks, though Turkmenistan has also been working to expand its economic presence in the city. The latest outreach between Afghanistan and Turkmenistan reflects a wider policy among Central Asian countries to expand economic ties with Taliban authorities in Kabul and increase access to South Asian and other markets, adding to the landlocked region’s options for trade at a time of geopolitical uncertainty. The leadership of those countries retains concerns about the security situation in Afghanistan, but hopes that engagement will help to stabilize their southern neighbor. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are key drivers of Central Asia’s growing relationship with Afghanistan. One of the high-profile projects featuring Ashgabat’s involvement is the planned 1,800-kilometer Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline, which has faced years of delays and challenges, including heightened Afghan-Pakistani tensions.

UNAMA

Opinion: Why the Next Head of UNAMA Should Come from Central Asia

A recent briefing on Afghanistan before the United Nations Security Council again showed that the country’s challenges can no longer be viewed only through humanitarian assistance or debates over recognition of the Taliban government. Afghanistan remains a deeply complex domestic issue, but it is increasingly becoming a regional one as well. The discussion now extends beyond human rights and political dialogue with the de facto authorities. It now includes the return of millions of people from neighboring countries, pressure on cities and rural communities, shortages of jobs and water, cross-border trade, security, and the future of regional transport corridors. Against this backdrop, the question of who should lead the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) is no longer only a personnel decision. It has become part of a wider debate about what international policy toward Afghanistan should look like in its next phase. The catalyst for this discussion was the recent briefing delivered by Georgette Gagnon, the UN Secretary-General’s Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan, before the Security Council. According to Gagnon, the de facto authorities maintain control over both Afghanistan’s territory and administrative structures. At present, they face no significant armed or political challenge. The Taliban themselves view the restoration of security across Afghanistan as one of their principal achievements. Yet this does not mean the situation is stable. Gagnon pointed to a fundamental contradiction within the current system of governance. There are rigid ideological policies that place considerable pressure on society. There are also more pragmatic approaches that have so far allowed the system to function and survive. In other words, Afghanistan appears to have achieved a form of managed stability, but without a clear vision of where that system is ultimately headed. Stability Conceals Deep Structural Problems The economic picture is equally mixed. Afghanistan has recorded positive growth in absolute terms. Fiscal stability has improved, revenue collection has increased, and several infrastructure projects are moving forward. The country has also largely maintained the gains achieved through the reduction of opium poppy cultivation. Yet beneath these signs of stabilization lie significant challenges. According to Gagnon, nearly 5.9 million people have returned to Afghanistan since 2023. This represents a population increase of more than 10%. Another 2.8 million Afghans could return during 2026 alone. Many returnees arrive with no savings, no employment, and limited prospects for rebuilding their lives. For a country with a fragile economy, this creates enormous pressure. Cities and rural communities are struggling to absorb new arrivals. Jobs, housing, water resources, and social services remain in short supply. The humanitarian situation remains severe. In 2026, approximately 21.9 million people, around 45% of Afghanistan’s population, are expected to require humanitarian assistance. Another major concern is demographics. More than half of Afghanistan’s population is under the age of 25. This generation is growing up amid limited opportunities. While the challenges facing girls have received international attention, boys increasingly face difficulties as well. Employment opportunities are scarce, household incomes are declining, and competition for livelihoods is intensifying. Environmental pressures...

Qosh Tepa canal

Afghanistan Advances Qosh Tepa Canal While Urging Regional Water Cooperation

Uzbekistan just hosted the Tashkent Water Week forum, and the speaker many wanted to hear from was the representative from Afghanistan. Central Asia and Afghanistan are being hit hard by climate change. This region has endured several droughts already this decade, and indications are that this year will bring drought again. Hanging over the forum was Afghanistan’s plan to complete the Qosh-Tepa Canal in 2028, which will draw water from a river that Central Asian countries also use and further complicate the regional water situation. [caption id="attachment_18865" align="aligncenter" width="1280"] Qosh Tepa Canal, artist's rendition; image: TCA, Aleksandr Potolitsyn[/caption] Our Fair Share The forum, which actually spanned only two days, March 25-26, brought together some 80 speakers and more than 1,200 delegates from 19 countries. In the past five years, Central Asia has seen noticeably diminished precipitation, melting glaciers, and record high temperatures, making water conservation a priority. The last days of March saw temperatures soar into the 30s Celsius in southern Kazakhstan. In both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, there were record-high temperatures in February. Rainfall for the last three months of 2025 was also far below normal across Central Asia. When the Taliban government announced in early 2022 that it would build the 285-kilometer-long, 100-meter-wide, 8.5-meter-deep Qosh Tepa to irrigate lands in northern Afghanistan, it added another water concern to Central Asia, particularly the governments in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Afghanistan’s Deputy Minister of Water and Energy, Mujeeb-ur-Rahman Omar, led the Afghan delegation at the Tashkent Water Week. At the forum, he repeated his government’s position that historically, Afghanistan has taken only very small volumes of water from the Amu-Darya River basin, while its northern neighbors have been using large amounts for irrigation for decades. “We believe in the fair and sustainable development of the region,” Omar said, adding, “We intend to develop (water resources) on a legal basis, in accordance with the legal rights of the countries in the region.“ Omar is correct that under international law, Afghanistan has an equal right to water from the Amu-Darya, one of Central Asia’s two great rivers. The river currently marks the border between Afghanistan to the south, and Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and a small section of Turkmenistan to the north. There is no separate regional water use agreement between the Central Asian states and Afghanistan. Since none of the Central Asian governments officially recognize the Taliban as the legitimate Afghan government, Russia is the only country that does at the moment, there is no possibility of a legal treaty on water use being signed. So, shortly after the construction of the canal is finished in 2028, some 20% of the water in the Amu-Darya, starting from the point just west of the Tajik-Uzbek border, will be diverted into the Qosh Tepa canal. It is already clear that this will mean the end of some downstream communities in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan that are on the edge of the Kara-Kum Desert and which are already under strain from insufficient water supplies. Turkmenistan did not send a...

Afghanistan

Three Main Principles of Kazakhstan’s Afghan Policy

August 15, 2026 will mark five years since the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan. This substantial period can be assessed in different ways, particularly given the widespread skepticism at the outset regarding the Taliban’s ability to govern effectively and build relations with other countries. The situation in Afghanistan remains complex and multifaceted, with diverging trends. On the one hand, the current Afghan leadership faces a wide range of internal challenges, primarily socio-economic. After the Taliban’s return to power, humanitarian assistance declined sharply. For many years, two-thirds of Afghanistan’s budget had been financed through foreign aid, and its reduction has significantly affected the social conditions of ordinary Afghans. According to the United Nations, only one-third of the $2.4 billion humanitarian response plan required for 2025 has been funded. Over 21 million Afghans require humanitarian assistance. The economic situation has been further complicated by the deteriorating humanitarian environment, largely due to the deportation of millions of Afghan refugees from Iran and Pakistan this year. In total, around 4.5 million Afghans have returned since 2023, primarily through deportations from Iran and Pakistan, resulting in a 10% population increase. Other pressing social issues remain. Several countries continue to focus on security and terrorist threats, as well as government inclusiveness and the rights of women and girls, particularly their access to employment and education. At the same time, nearly five years into Taliban rule, the anticipated “economic and political collapse” has not materialized. The national budget is gradually increasing, and small and medium-sized enterprises are emerging. Industrial parks aimed at developing domestic production have appeared in major cities such as Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif, and Herat. Since 2023, relative macroeconomic stabilization has been observed, although growth rates remain insufficient to offset demographic pressures and reduce poverty. The World Bank forecasts Afghanistan’s gross domestic product (GDP) growth at 4.3% in 2025, with inflation projected to remain low at approximately 2%. According to the United Nations, the area under opium poppy cultivation has declined by 95% during the years of Taliban rule. At the same time, synthetic drug production has reportedly increased, reflecting trends observed in many other countries. Politically, the Taliban maintains consolidated control over most of the country. In other words, a more stable, albeit fragile, reality has emerged, one that Central Asian countries must engage with on a daily basis. Kazakhstan has adopted a pragmatic approach. Its policy toward Afghanistan is based on a model of “pragmatic engagement without recognition,” while developing an independent system of transport, energy, and humanitarian ties with the country. Kazakhstan’s decision to remove the Taliban from its list of banned organizations does not signify a departure from international law nor does it constitute automatic recognition of the current Afghan authorities. On the issue of formal recognition, Kazakhstan relies on decisions of the UN Security Council. From a foreign policy perspective, this step forms part of a broader strategy: Kazakhstan is adapting its instruments to a changed reality while remaining within international norms and avoiding symbolic gestures that could be interpreted as...

Taliban

Pakistan Declares “Open War” with Afghanistan’s Taliban as Cross-Border Attacks Escalate

Pakistan launched airstrikes inside Afghanistan on Friday following a Taliban-announced offensive against Pakistani military posts along the shared border, marking a sharp escalation in tensions between the two long-hostile neighbors. The Taliban has said it is open to talks. Pakistan’s Defense Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif said on social media that “our patience has now run out. Now it is open war between us,” framing Islamabad’s actions as a response to cross-border attacks. According to Reuters, the Afghan authorities said operations began across several eastern provinces bordering Pakistan, while Islamabad confirmed retaliatory strikes targeting what it described as militant positions. Both sides have released sharply conflicting casualty figures, none independently verified. Pakistani officials said more than 200 Taliban fighters were wounded and over 130 killed in retaliatory operations, while reporting Pakistani military casualties. The Taliban authorities rejected those figures and claimed dozens of Pakistani troops were killed. The clashes threaten a fragile ceasefire reached in October 2025 after earlier border fighting. Pakistan has repeatedly accused the Taliban of allowing Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants to operate from Afghan territory, an allegation Kabul denies. The Durand Line border has long been a flashpoint, but analysts say the scale of recent airstrikes — including reported strikes near Kabul — marks a significant escalation beyond previous localized clashes. For Central Asian states, renewed instability between Pakistan and Afghanistan carries direct strategic and economic implications. Uzbekistan has invested heavily in the proposed Termez–Mazar-i-Sharif–Kabul–Peshawar railway, a flagship trans-Afghan corridor intended to link Central Asia to Pakistani ports and expand southbound trade. The CASA-1000 electricity transmission project, designed to export surplus hydropower from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to Afghanistan and Pakistan, also depends on security conditions in Afghan territory. Turkmenistan’s TAPI gas pipeline project faces similar vulnerabilities. Escalating violence risks delaying these connectivity initiatives and raising concerns about militant spillover into northern Afghanistan, an area closely watched by Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Central Asian governments have pursued pragmatic engagement with the Taliban authorities to stabilize their southern frontier; sustained confrontation between Kabul and Islamabad could complicate that strategy and undermine regional integration plans. The United Nations and regional actors have called for restraint. While both governments describe their actions as defensive, the rhetoric surrounding the latest exchange suggests a dangerous deterioration in bilateral relations. Independent verification of battlefield claims remains limited as diplomatic efforts to contain the escalation continue.

Afghanistan

Taliban Remove Uzbek Language from Samangan University Sign

The Taliban have removed Uzbek and Persian inscriptions from the main signboard of Samangan University in northern Afghanistan, replacing them with a new sign written only in Pashto and English. The move, reported by Afghanistan International, has drawn criticism amid ongoing concerns about the marginalization of non-Pashtun languages and communities since the Taliban’s return to power in 2021. Sources told Afghanistan International that the change followed the appointment of a new university head. The previous sign, which featured the university’s name in four languages, Pashto, Persian, Uzbek, and English, was taken down and replaced approximately four days later with a version that excluded the Persian and Uzbek languages. Samangan province is home to a significant ethnic Uzbek population. The decision has provoked backlash from academics and former officials. Former Faryab governor Naqibullah Faiq condemned the move as “ethno-nationalist,” warning that such actions risk exacerbating ethnic and linguistic tensions in the country. In response, some Uzbek and Persian speakers have publicly called for the reinstatement of their languages on the university sign. Mohibullah Mohib, a lecturer at Samangan University, wrote on Facebook that the sign change coincided with the institution’s transition from an institute of higher education to a full-fledged university. According to Mohib, the Taliban’s Ministry of Higher Education ordered the new sign and formally rejected a request to include Uzbek. He added that the ministry's written response explicitly denied the inclusion of Uzbek alongside the other languages. This is not the first incident of its kind. In October, the Taliban removed Uzbek from the signboard of Jawzjan University, sparking widespread criticism. Following public outcry, Uzbek was later reinstated on that sign. Over the past four years, the Taliban have faced repeated accusations of sidelining minority languages such as Persian, Uzbek, and Turkmen, including by removing Persian-language signage from government buildings and erasing cultural symbols associated with Persian-speaking poets and writers. The latest incident has also drawn attention in Uzbekistan. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Akhror Burkhanov told Qalampir.uz that Tashkent is closely monitoring the situation. He emphasized that any potential restrictions on the Uzbek language are a serious concern for Uzbekistan. Burkhanov stated that Uzbekistan is maintaining an ongoing dialogue with Afghan authorities. According to him, Afghan officials have assured Tashkent that no restrictions on the Uzbek language are currently in place or planned. They have also reiterated their respect for Uzbekistan, the Uzbek language, and the Uzbek people.