• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10798 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10798 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10798 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10798 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10798 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10798 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10798 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10798 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
13 November 2025

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 286

Border Violence Between Afghanistan and Pakistan: A New Risk for Central Asia

The escalating tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan are forcing a reassessment of Afghanistan’s viability as a “partner space.” With cross-border clashes increasingly resembling a prolonged pattern rather than isolated incidents, and with both sides showing little willingness to compromise, the question grows more urgent: Can Afghanistan realistically become a partner for Central Asian countries, or is it destined to remain a persistent source of regional instability? This confrontation is deeply unsettling for the countries of Central Asia. Still in the early stages of formulating coherent policies toward Afghanistan, they have tentatively linked their development strategies to the hope of having a stable neighbor to the south – one that might serve as a bridge to South Asia. Against this backdrop, deteriorating Afghan-Pakistani relations breed more frustration and anxiety than hope. No country in the world, except Russia, has recognized the Taliban regime de jure. This broad reluctance reflects deep skepticism; few are willing to assume legal obligations or share responsibility for Kabul’s actions. Yet, Afghanistan remains far from isolated. Its geographic centrality makes it impossible to ignore. Accordingly, Central Asia has developed a distinct approach to dealing with its southern neighbor. It can be summarized as: We do not recognize, but we cooperate; we do not trust, but we verify; we do not agree, but we engage. In essence, Afghanistan’s neighbors, particularly the ones in Central Asia, have adopted a pragmatic, long-term strategy: engage without illusions or formal recognition, while maintaining the flexibility to adjust based on Kabul’s behavior. For these countries, Afghanistan does not stand as an independent priority. Its role is evaluated solely within the broader regional framework. In the most favorable scenario, Afghanistan serves as a transit corridor linking South and Central Asia. Yet even this utility is not indispensable; viable alternatives through Iran, the South Caucasus, Turkey, and China already exist and are expanding. Looking ahead, three broad scenarios can be envisioned: Optimistic: The Taliban demonstrate readiness for responsible engagement. This would enable Afghanistan’s gradual integration into trade and transport initiatives, expansion of economic ties, and a firm establishment as a bridge between Central and South Asia. Pessimistic: Afghanistan remains a chronic risk factor and flashpoint for regional crises. The ongoing Afghan-Pakistani confrontation, no longer a fleeting episode but an entrenched conflict, is a clear warning sign. If this becomes the norm, it will deter serious investment, no stakeholder will commit to a country that cannot guarantee peace with its neighbors. Inertia: Central Asian states continue their cautious balancing act under the logic that “a bad peace is better than a good war.” While cooperation continues at a minimal level, countries prioritize alternative routes and avoid deep commitments. Under this status quo, ambitious projects like the Trans-Afghanistan Railway and the TAPI pipeline are unlikely to materialize. The former risks losing the “trans” prefix; the latter may, for now, become little more than a Turkmenistan-Afghanistan venture. Nonetheless, there remains a window for diplomacy. Pressured by Turkey and Qatar, Kabul and Islamabad have agreed to resume negotiations aimed...

Tajikistan and the Taliban – Talking and Fighting

Peaceful coexistence is turning out to be complicated for Tajikistan and the Taliban government in Afghanistan. The Tajik government has viewed the Taliban as a threat since the militant group appeared in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s. But now that modest efforts are underway to establish some sort of amicable ties, there has been an uptick of violence directly involving the two sides along the Tajik-Afghan border. Let’s Keep This Between Us Tajikistan is the lone government in Central Asia that remained hostile to the Taliban after the latter returned to power in Afghanistan in August 2021. In the weeks that followed, the Taliban again exerted control over Afghanistan, and the Tajik government and the Taliban sent reinforcements to their common border. Russia and Pakistan had to intervene to ease tensions. The other Central Asian states, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, have all established a business relationship with the Taliban government since the Taliban again seized control, but Tajikistan has remained aloof. Which is why the visit of Muhammad Yusuf Vafo, the governor of Afghanistan’s northern province of Balkh, to the Tajik capital Dushanbe on October 23 came as such a surprise. The Tajik government did not say anything about Vafo’s trip. The independent Tajik news agency Asia-Plus cited Afghan media as reporting on the visit, during which Vafo met with the head of Tajikistan’s National Security Committee (GKNB), Saimumin Yatimov. Vafo and Yatimov reportedly discussed ways to improve ties in a variety of spheres and pledged not to let any “hostile elements” use their territory to plot or carry out attacks on the country. An estimated several hundred Jamaat Ansarullah militants of Tajik origin continue to operate in Afghanistan. The group allied with the Taliban during the last years foreign forces were in Afghanistan, propping up the government of Ashraf Ghani, and stayed in Afghanistan after the Ghani government fell. Jamaat Ansarullah fighters were among the reinforcements the Taliban sent to the Tajik border during the weeks of tension in late 2021. There were reports soon after the Taliban returned to power that Tajikistan was aiding the National Resistance Front (NRF), a mainly ethnic Tajik group of former government soldiers who continue to wage a guerrilla campaign against the Taliban. NRF leader Ahmad Masoud, the son of the legendary Afghan field commander and ethnic Tajik, Ahmad Shah Masoud, has been in Dushanbe several times since August 2021, and there was a report that the NRF opened an office in Dushanbe in October that year. Shortly after Vafo’s visit to Dushanbe, Taliban sources in Balkh Province told the Pakistani-based Khorasan Diary website that Tajik authorities had banned the NRF, but the Tajik authorities stated that no such decision was made. Yatimov’s meeting with Vafo was not the first time the Tajik GKNB chief had met with Taliban representatives. In September 2024, Yatimov went to Kabul to hold security talks with Taliban officials, though the Tajik authorities never confirmed that meeting. Both parties are concerned about militants from the Islamic State of...

Tajik Border Guards Clash with Taliban Fighters Along Afghan Border

Armed clashes erupted between Tajik border guards and Taliban fighters on October 25 along the Tajik-Afghan frontier, according to local sources cited by the Afghan outlet 8 Subh. The confrontation reportedly occurred in the Davanga district of Shahr-e Buzurg, located in Afghanistan’s Badakhshan province. The dispute reportedly stemmed from disagreements over water diversion from the Amu Darya river, which serves as part of the natural boundary between Tajikistan and Afghanistan. The region is also home to Chinese-operated gold mining projects, further complicating the security landscape. Sources on the ground reported casualties and injuries, although official figures have not yet been released. The Tajik government has not issued an official statement. In response to the incident, Taliban representatives in Badakhshan held a meeting with the province’s appointed governor, Ismail Ghaznawi. This is not the first escalation in the area. On August 24, a shootout occurred near a Chinese-operated gold mining facility on the Afghan side of the border. That conflict was halted following emergency negotiations between the two sides, although accusations of harboring hostile groups persisted. The latest incident comes just days after a Taliban delegation visited Dushanbe. Led by Balkh province's Governor Yusuf Wafa, the delegation met with Tajikistan’s National Security Council Chairman Saimumin Yatimov and the Chairman of the Council of Ulemas, Saidmukarram Abdulkodirzoda. Despite this diplomatic contact, Tajikistan remains the only Central Asian country that has not recognized the Taliban government. Dushanbe continues to call for the formation of an inclusive government in Afghanistan and the protection of human rights. Nonetheless, limited trade and humanitarian engagement between the two countries persist. The Afghan embassy in Dushanbe is still headed by a diplomat appointed by the former government, while the Afghan consulate in Khorog is administered by a representative of the current Taliban-led administration. Tajikistan, in turn, maintains its embassy and consulate in Afghanistan.

The Taliban’s Border Rhetoric: Pashtun Frontiers, Not Central Asian Borders

Two incidents in mid-October reignited debate over Afghanistan’s borders, particularly its long-disputed frontier with Pakistan. On October 18, Mohammad Nabi Omari, Afghanistan’s first deputy minister for interior affairs, suggested that Afghanistan’s “historical lands” now in Pakistan could one day return to Afghan control. The next day, Qatar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs referred to “ending tensions on the Afghanistan–Pakistan border” in a ceasefire statement, prompting Taliban objections and a quick retraction. These remarks revived a longstanding Afghan grievance: the Durand Line, a frontier drawn in 1893 by the British between Afghanistan and British India. No Afghan government has ever recognized it as an international border, and the Taliban refers to it as an “imaginary line.” The Taliban’s language may alarm some observers who wonder whether such rhetoric could extend beyond Pakistan to Afghanistan’s northern borders with Central Asia. Those frontiers were defined in the 19th century by treaties between the Russian and British empires, with little Afghan involvement. Yet despite the heated language and recent armed clashes with Pakistan, the Taliban’s stance appears more ideological than expansionist. The Durand Agreement of 1893 established the boundary between Afghanistan and British India as a line separating their respective spheres of influence. When Pakistan gained independence in 1947, that line became an international border, recognized by all states except Afghanistan. The 2,600-kilometer frontier divided Pashtun and Baloch communities between two countries, leaving deep resentment that continues to shape tensions in the region. Pashtuns still move relatively freely across this rugged border, which has served as a haven for militants for decades. Afghanistan’s northern borders tell a slightly different story. They were drawn not by Afghan rulers but under the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1873, which set the Amu Darya River as the boundary between the Russian and British spheres of influence. This arrangement confirmed Afghanistan’s authority over the lands south of the river, including Balkh, Kunduz, and Badakhshan, reinforcing both its territorial control and its legitimacy. In essence, the demarcation of Afghanistan’s northern boundary was a political gain. While the Durand Line came to represent partition and loss, the 1873 agreement brought Afghanistan new territory and legitimacy as a buffer state between the Russian and British empires. The north is largely inhabited by Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Turkmen, with few Pashtuns. This distinction helps explain why the Taliban’s references to “historic lands” focus on the Durand Line rather than Afghanistan’s borders with Central Asian states. Afghanistan’s acting defense minister, Mawlawi Mohammad Yaqoob Mujahid, the son of the Taliban’s late founder Mullah Mohammad Omar, recently reiterated that “[the Durand Line] has never been recognized as an official border, and no agreement has been made on this issue.… This is not a decision any government can make; it is a matter for the people.” Deputy Interior Minister Mohammad Nabi Omari’s call for the “return” of historic lands reflects the same ideological stance: a vision of Pashtun unity shaped by popular will rather than a call for military action or unilateral political moves. The Taliban, a Pashtun-led movement, uses...

Rail, Water, and Helicopters – Uzbekistan’s “Limited Recognition” of the Taliban

Uzbekistan has spent the middle of September embroiled in an increasingly tetchy press battle over an unusual topic: helicopters. The Taliban, who run the de facto government in Kabul, have long claimed that several dozen military aircraft and helicopters currently residing in Uzbekistan are rightfully theirs. On September 11, a Taliban official announced publicly that Uzbekistan had agreed to hand them back. This was reported widely in the regional media, with the Uzbek foreign ministry slow off the mark in denying these claims. The dispute goes back to the fall of Kabul in August 2021, when a total of 57 aircraft were flown from Afghanistan to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan as Ashraf Ghani’s government collapsed. “The helicopters came from the Afghan territory to Uzbek territory illegally, so actually we had the right to confiscate them,” Islomkhon Gafarov, an Afghanistan expert at the Center for Progressive Reform, a Tashkent think tank, told the Times of Central Asia. However, Gafarov adds that the aircraft were the property of the U.S. military loaned to the previous government of Afghanistan, and therefore, Washington will have a say in their return. This has not stopped the Taliban from continuing to demand the helicopters back for use in “humanitarian operations,” in the words of Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi. Such wrangling is part of the daily diplomatic in-tray for Tashkent when dealing with a neighbor whose government has not been recognized by almost the entire world. “Afghanistan is our neighbor,” said Gafarov. “According to the geopolitical situation, we have to conduct a dialogue with this government. It’s true, Uzbekistan hasn’t recognized the Taliban government, but de facto, we work with them; we’ve had diplomatic relations with them since 2018.” Tashkent certainly has reasons to work with the Taliban. Helicopters are a mere sideshow compared to two far larger issues that will define their relations for years to come: rail and water. Railway On the positive side of the ledger, the Taliban have brought to Afghanistan a reasonable degree of stability - enough to start contemplating large-scale infrastructure projects. In July, an agreement was struck between Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Uzbekistan to conduct a feasibility study for a trans-Afghanistan railway, with 647 kilometers of new track being laid to link Uzbekistan with Pakistan’s Indian Ocean ports. This railway could bring significant benefits to Uzbekistan, one of only two double-landlocked countries in the world. Currently, sea-bound exports must travel via Turkmenistan to Iran. Other routes almost all rely on going via Kazakhstan. The China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, currently being constructed, should remove some of the need for sea-bound routes, but the Pakistan route would be faster. “The trans-Afghan route is the shortest way to the seaports of Karachi and Gwadar,” Gafarov told TCA. With a line from Termez, Uzbekistan, to Mazar-i-Sharif in Northern Afghanistan already operational, this only leaves two sections unbuilt - from Mazar to Kabul, and then from Kabul to Peshawar in Pakistan. The teams are still only at the feasibility stage right now, and have, with some chutzpah, predicted...

Taliban Again Urges Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to Return Military Helicopters

Afghanistan’s acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi has once again called on Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to return military helicopters flown out of the country by Afghan pilots during the collapse of the previous government in August 2021. The appeal was reported by Afghan news outlet Tolonews, following Muttaqi’s meeting with diplomats and representatives of international organizations in Kabul. “We ask those countries that, four years ago following political developments, took part of our helicopters and transferred them to neighboring countries, to return these helicopters to the Afghan people so they can be used in humanitarian operations,” Muttaqi said. He also criticized ongoing sanctions on Afghanistan, particularly banking restrictions that he claimed have prevented Afghans abroad from sending money to families affected by natural disasters. “Unfortunately, due to the unjust and unlawful restrictions imposed on Afghanistan, our compatriots have been unable to send aid to those affected by the earthquake,” he added. An earthquake that struck eastern Afghanistan on August 31 killed around 2,200 people and destroyed more than 5,000 homes, according to Al Jazeera. Both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have since sent humanitarian aid, including food, medical supplies, and tents, to assist survivors. Muttaqi emphasized that providing sustained assistance to those affected remains a top priority for the Taliban government. Earlier this month, The Kabul Times quoted Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid as saying that Uzbekistan had agreed to return 57 helicopters. However, Ahror Burkhanov, spokesman for Uzbekistan’s Foreign Ministry, dismissed the claim as “fake news,” stressing that Tashkent’s position on the matter has not changed.