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Recognition of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan: Between Law, Diplomacy, and Pragmatism

After the Taliban returned to power in August 2021, the question of recognizing the new Afghan regime became one of the key issues in regional and global politics. Although no country has granted de jure recognition to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), international engagement with the de facto authorities is becoming increasingly institutionalized. This article attempts to systematize and provisionally classify countries based on their stance toward the IEA. This is not a formal legal typology but rather an analytical tool meant to identify "stable patterns of behavior" in the context of interactions with the de facto authorities in Kabul. This approach does not aim for exhaustive academic precision but provides a basis for further discussion and analysis. To begin, we must clarify some basic principles, first and foremost, the institution of recognition. In international legal doctrine, the recognition of a new state or government is a unilateral act by a state and does not require the approval of international organizations. The UN, including the Security Council, does not formally conduct acts of recognition, but its approval is required for admitting authorities to the UN General Assembly, which constitutes formal recognition of international legitimacy and a willingness by the global community to work with them. The key mechanism here is the UN Credentials Committee. This is a special committee of the UN General Assembly consisting of nine member states, which change on a rotating basis. It annually reviews the lists of delegations accredited to participate in UN General Assembly sessions. Between 2021 and 2024, the committee decided to reject the recognition of seats for the Taliban government. In effect, this constitutes a denial of international recognition at the UN level. While the decision of the Credentials Committee has no formal legal significance as an act of recognition or non-recognition, politically it sends a strong signal to other states: the UN still does not regard the IEA as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. In other words, the Credentials Committee acts as a kind of beacon: until it is "lit," a wave of de jure recognition from other states is highly unlikely. Many countries, especially those following a policy of collective decision-making, will take their cue from the UN. For now, the signal remains unchanged: the international community maintains a cautious distance from legitimizing the Taliban regime. As is well known, there are two types of recognition: de jure recognition, which is complete and official and involves the establishment of diplomatic relations, and de facto recognition, which is limited and does not imply full legitimization of the regime. Removing the Taliban from national terrorist lists (as Kazakhstan and Russia have done) does not constitute legal recognition, even though some may portray it as such. The UN itself uses the term "de facto authorities" to describe the Taliban. At the same time, the UN Security Council sanctions regime on Afghanistan (under Resolution 2255) provides for the application of sanctions on an individual basis, without qualifying the regime as a terrorist regime. The...

Railway Development trans-Afghan railway Taliban

Uzbekistan and Russia Advance Trans-Afghan Railway Project to Pakistan

Uzbekistan and Russia have taken a significant step toward the practical implementation of the long-envisioned Trans-Afghan railway project, which aims to connect Central Asia to Pakistan via Afghanistan. The transport ministries of both countries, along with Russian Railways and the Uzbek national railway company, Uzbekistan Temir Yollari, have signed documents formalizing the start of the project’s development phase. According to Russia’s Ministry of Transport, the two countries will jointly develop a feasibility study in 2025, assessing freight traffic forecasts and economic viability. Two potential routes have been proposed: Route 1: Mazar-e-Sharif - Herat - Dilaram - Kandahar (Afghanistan) - Chaman (Pakistan) Route 2: Termez (Uzbekistan) - Naibabad (Afghanistan) - Logar (Afghanistan) - Harlachi (Pakistan) Further discussions involving Pakistan Railways and an Afghan delegation are scheduled for the Russia-Islamic World Forum in the Russian city of Kazan on May 15-16. Uzbekistan, which already maintains a direct rail connection to Afghanistan, continues to position itself as a logistics hub for trade between Russia, Central Asia, South Asia, and beyond. In January 2025, Tashkent extended its contract with the Taliban-led government in Afghanistan to operate and maintain the Hairaton to Mazar-e-Sharif railway -- a vital segment of the broader China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan-Afghanistan corridor. The corridor’s significance is expected to grow upon completion of the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway. Currently, Central Asia’s rail links to China are limited to routes transiting Kazakhstan. In a major development on April 17, Russia’s Supreme Court lifted its 2003 ban on the Taliban, having until then designated the group a terrorist organization. The decision, formally allowing Russian state institutions to engage with the Taliban, opens the door to deeper trade and infrastructure cooperation. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk stated that this policy shift will facilitate the promotion of Russian exports and the realization of Afghanistan’s transport and logistics potential. Uzbekistan has pursued a consistent policy of engagement with Afghanistan, emphasizing economic cooperation over isolation. In October 2024, Abdul Ghafar Terawi began his tenure as the head of the Taliban-led Afghan diplomatic mission in Tashkent. Speaking at the 79th session of the UN General Assembly in September 2024, Uzbek Foreign Minister Bakhtiyor Saidov reaffirmed Uzbekistan’s commitment to regional stability. “Afghanistan is an integral part of Central Asia,” Saidov told the Assembly. “Addressing the Afghan issue is essential for ensuring sustainable development across the region”. He praised Uzbekistan’s role in implementing the Trans-Afghan railway, which he said would offer landlocked Central Asian economies access to international ports. “This will positively impact the economic development of the entire region,” Saidov noted.

UN Envoy Women's rights Taliban Afghanistan

UN Envoy for Afghanistan Otunbayeva: Taliban Must Uphold International Obligations and Restore Women’s Rights

The Taliban must clearly demonstrate their commitment to Afghanistan’s international reintegration, Roza Otunbayeva, former President of Kyrgyzstan and now Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Afghanistan, told the UN Security Council on March 10. Otunbayeva, who also heads the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), stressed the need for the Taliban to uphold international obligations, particularly concerning human rights and governance. Ongoing Crisis in Afghanistan “The de facto authorities have, so far, treated [Afghanistan’s] international obligations selectively,” Otunbayeva stated. However, she underscored that these commitments “affect not only the possibility of progress along the political pathway but, most crucially, the well-being of Afghanistan’s entire population.” Afghanistan continues to face a severe humanitarian crisis, she warned, adding that the ongoing defunding of aid programs is already having, and will continue to have, a devastating impact on the Afghan people. Welcoming the World Bank’s recent decision to provide an additional $240 million for Afghanistan’s health sector, Otunbayeva highlighted the collaborative approach between the UN and its partners in supporting the country’s economy. While Afghanistan has seen some economic growth and increased investment, she argued that the Taliban’s vision of economic self-sufficiency remains unattainable unless political and diplomatic obstacles to reintegration are addressed. Otunbayeva also expressed concern over the continued restrictions on women’s rights in Afghanistan. UNAMA has closely monitored the Taliban’s enforcement of the Law on the Prevention of Vice and Promotion of Virtue, introduced in August 2024. “The law demonstrates the de facto authorities’ prioritization of ideology over international obligations,” she stated. Afghanistan and Central Asia: Strengthening Regional Ties The Security Council also heard statements from several regional representatives. Kazakhstan’s delegate noted that the country has launched a wheat-farming initiative in central Afghanistan to empower local farmers. Additionally, Kazakhstan has supported the establishment of the United Nations Regional Centre for the Sustainable Development Goals for Central Asia and Afghanistan in Almaty. Both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have removed the Taliban from their lists of terrorist organizations in an effort to deepen trade and economic ties with Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have sought to establish formal political contacts with the Taliban-led Afghan government and expand economic and transport infrastructure cooperation. In contrast, Tajikistan’s relations with the Taliban remain strained. Afghanistan remains heavily dependent on electricity imports from Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, both of which are also involved in Afghan railway construction projects. Turkmenistan is currently participating in the construction of the Afghan section of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline, which will transport Turkmen natural gas to South Asia. Speaking at the 79th session of the UN General Assembly in September 2024, Uzbekistan’s Foreign Minister Bakhtiyor Saidov reaffirmed that Afghanistan is an integral part of Central Asia and that addressing its challenges is essential for regional stability and development. “Uzbekistan is pursuing a pragmatic policy towards Afghanistan. We will continue to contribute to Afghanistan’s economic reconstruction and the development of its transport and energy infrastructure,” he stated. In August 2024, Uzbekistan opened the International Trade Center in Termez, near the Afghan...

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Uzbekistan Sees Opportunities in Afghanistan

Uzbekistan’s business relations with neighboring Afghanistan are booming. In 2024, Uzbek-Afghan trade came to some $1.1 billion, and more than $1 billion of that was Uzbek exports to Afghanistan. It seems after the February 22-23 visit of Taliban acting Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs Abdul Ghani Baradar to Uzbekistan, that figure is likely to continue climbing. Baradar met with Uzbek Prime Minister Abdullo Aripov and Deputy Prime Minister Jamshid Khojayev to discuss trade and investment, which is essentially the basis of Uzbekistan’s relations with Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. The immediate results of these talks were modest, but projects due to start in the near future offer substantial profits for both Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. Uzbekistan agreed to lift restrictions on imports of Afghan agricultural goods, which facilitated another agreement establishing a free economic zone in Uzbekistan’s border area that would have factories for processing pine nuts and cotton from Afghanistan. Agricultural goods are the bulk of Afghanistan’s exports to Uzbekistan, which is not surprising since more than 40 years of war have prevented Afghanistan from building many plants and factories for producing finished goods. A report from November 2024 said in the first ten months of the year, Uzbekistan’s exports to Afghanistan came to some $855.9 million, while Afghan exports to Uzbekistan amounted to only some $28.3 million. Power On Uzbekistan is the leading exporter of electricity to Afghanistan, supplying nearly 60% of Afghanistan’s electricity imports, and that amount could increase soon. Baradar’s delegation discussed progress on the 500 kV transmission line from Uzbekistan’s Surkhan region to Dashti-Alvan, near the Baghlan provincial capital Pul-e-Khumri, which will increase Uzbekistan’s electricity exports to Afghanistan by some 70%. Construction of the 260-kilometer transmission line started in 2018 and has been repeatedly delayed. Baradar said Uzbek officials agreed to cut the cost of building the transmission line from $252 million to $222 million. Turkmenistan is also considering building a 500 kV transmission line to Dashti-Alvan. Uzbek Deputy Prime Minister Khojayev and Baradar reviewed progress at Afghanistan’s Toti-Mardan gas field, just south of the border with Turkmenistan, which is believed to contain vast reserves of natural gas. In November 2024, Uzbekistan signed a ten-year contract to develop the gas field, pledging to invest $100 million in the project each year. According to reports about Baradar’s recent visit, drilling at the site is expected to begin soon. Prime Minister Aripov said Uzbek investors were already preparing to start construction of a cement plant in Afghanistan’s Samangan Province. Taliban officials have been offering Uzbek companies opportunities in Afghanistan’s mining sector for months. The Taliban acting minister of mines and petroleum, Hidayatullah Badri, was part of Baradar’s delegation and he met with Uzbek officials to discuss cooperation in developing Afghanistan’s mineral resources. The Afghan delegation again proposed Uzbek participation in developing mining sites, but there was no word in reports on any agreements. Aripov mentioned Uzbekistan was interested in the exploration and extraction of oil and gas, both of which Uzbekistan needs for domestic consumption, but did not mention mining....

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Uzbekistan and Taliban Agree on Hairatan-Herat Railway Project

Taliban Deputy Chief Minister Abdul Ghani Baradar announced that construction on the planned Hairatan-Herat railway would begin within 10 days of a feasibility study, which Uzbekistan will finance. He also stated that Uzbekistan had agreed to reduce the cost of a power transmission line project to Afghanistan by $30 million, lowering the total to $222 million, Amu TV reports. The announcement followed Baradar’s two-day visit to Uzbekistan. The railway project aims to extend the existing line from Hairatan, a key trade hub on the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan border, through Mazar-e-Sharif and on to Herat. The first phase, a 75-kilometer section from Hairatan to Mazar-e-Sharif, was completed in 2010 with funding from the Asian Development Bank. The planned extension is expected to enhance trade links between Central Asia and the Middle East. During the visit, Baradar and his delegation met with Uzbek Prime Minister Abdulla Aripov and Deputy Prime Minister Jamshid Khodjayev to discuss trade, energy, aviation, and infrastructure. Baradar stated that Uzbekistan had agreed to increase electricity exports to Afghanistan during the summer and reduce tariffs. Taliban Commerce Minister Nooruddin Azizi added that discussions also covered trade and banking cooperation, as well as a potential railway extension from Hairatan to Spin Boldak. Additionally, Uzbekistan will lift restrictions on Afghan agricultural exports and establish four trade centers in major cities across both countries. Aripov visited Kabul last August for talks focused on boosting trade, strengthening energy cooperation, and collaborating on copper, iron, oil, and gas projects. Both sides agreed that trade between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan could reach $1 billion in 2024 and expand to $3 billion in the near future.

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Uzbekistan-Afghanistan Relations Falter Over Return of Taliban Helicopters

Uzbekistan has returned some of the helicopters flown into its territory by Afghan pilots during the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan to the United States, Voice of America reported, citing Pentagon officials at an event at the Uzbek Embassy in Washington. Most of the American aircraft brought to Uzbekistan by Afghan pilots have now been returned. Recently, seven Black Hawk helicopters were sent back to the United States, according to Voice of America. Uzbekistan’s decision has drawn criticism from the Taliban-controlled Ministry of Defense, which claims the aircraft belong to Afghanistan and should be returned. “These helicopters were taken to Uzbekistan when officials from the previous administration fled. They are Afghan property and should not be transferred to the United States,” the ministry stated. It also called on neighboring countries to respect Afghanistan’s rights and urged the U.S. to return the aircraft instead of creating further obstacles. U.S. Ambassador to Uzbekistan Jonathan Henick confirmed that in 2021, Washington and Tashkent reached an agreement regarding the aircraft. He noted that some military equipment remains in Uzbekistan and that both countries have begun working on a joint program related to it. Afghanistan’s Ministry of Defense, however, has rejected any such agreement, stating that the U.S. has no right to seize or transfer Afghan property. It urged Uzbekistan to return the aircraft in the spirit of good neighborly relations. According to Afghan media, prior to the Taliban’s takeover in August 2021, Afghanistan had 164 warplanes, but only 81 remain. Some Afghan pilots also flew aircraft to Tajikistan. Uzbekistan has made it clear that the helicopters are now under U.S. jurisdiction. The Taliban, however, continues to insist that they rightfully belong to Afghanistan and should be returned.