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trans-Afghan railway

Uzbekistan Approves Feasibility Study for Trans-Afghan Railway

President Shavkat Mirziyoyev has approved an intergovernmental agreement on the joint development of a feasibility study for the construction of the Trans-Afghan railway, which will link Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. According to the presidential resolution, the agreement between Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Transport, Afghanistan’s Ministry of Public Works, and Pakistan’s Ministry of Railways provides for the preparation of technical and economic documentation for a new railway line from Naibabad to Kharlachi. The document formalizes cooperation on the next stage of the long-discussed regional transport corridor. Under the resolution, Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been instructed to notify the Afghan and Pakistani sides that all necessary domestic procedures required for the agreement’s entry into force have been completed. The Trans-Afghan railway project was first proposed by Tashkent in December 2018 as a strategic initiative to provide Central Asia with direct access to Pakistani seaports. The original concept envisaged extending Afghanistan’s rail network from Mazar-i-Sharif through Kabul and Logar province before crossing into Pakistan. An earlier proposed route was expected to pass through Nangarhar province and the Torkham border crossing into Peshawar. In July 2023, however, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, and Afghanistan agreed on a revised alignment. The updated route will run from Termez to Naibabad, then through Maidan Shahr and Logar to Kharlachi, excluding the previously discussed Torkham crossing. Once connected to Pakistan’s railway network, cargo will be able to reach the Pakistani ports of Karachi, Gwadar, and Qasim. The railway is expected to stretch approximately 647 kilometers. According to recent statements by Uzbek officials, the estimated construction cost is $6.9 billion, although earlier projections ranged from $4.6 billion to $7 billion. The project is regarded by the participating countries as a key component of efforts to strengthen regional connectivity and expand trade routes between Central and South Asia.

trans-Afghan railway

Icy Relations Between Pakistan and Afghanistan Threaten Central Asian Trade Plans

On November 25, the Afghan authorities accused Pakistan of a new round of airstrikes in eastern Afghanistan. The bombing killed nine children and a woman, injuring several others. The attacks are the latest escalation in rapidly worsening tensions between Islamabad and the Taliban-led government in Kabul, with key border crossings currently closed, and Afghan refugees being expelled from Pakistan. At the heart of the crisis is Pakistan’s claim that Kabul is providing support to the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (Pakistani Taliban, or TPP), a militant group seeking to topple Pakistan’s government and impose its strict interpretation of Islamic law. The fallout may ripple beyond bilateral relations, with significant consequences for Central Asian trade, particularly the Pakistan-Afghanistan-Uzbekistan plan for a Trans-Afghan railway. The planned 647-kilometer line is set to connect the northern Afghan city of Mazar-e-Sharif with Peshawar in Pakistan. When combined with existing infrastructure, this will mean that trains can travel from southern Uzbekistan all the way to the Pakistani ports of Gwadar and Karachi, granting landlocked Uzbekistan and Afghanistan a long-sought gateway to the Indian Ocean. But mounting instability, along with Islamabad’s willingness to shut borders as leverage, may now place the project in serious jeopardy. “The moment a state weaponizes geography, every financier in Tashkent, Moscow, or Beijing prices in risk, delays commitments, and quietly explores alternative alignments,” Anant Mishra, Marie Skłodowska-Curie Research Fellow at the International Centre for Policing and Security at the University of South Wales, told The Times of Central Asia. So, what are the prospects for salvaging the Trans-Afghan railway? How can Pakistan and Afghanistan de-escalate? And what does this turmoil mean for Central Asia’s wider economic ambitions? A sudden frost On July 17, Uzbekistan’s Transport Minister Ilkhom Makhkamov, Pakistan’s Railway Minister Muhammad Hanif Abbasi, and Afghanistan’s acting Public Works Minister Mohammad Esa Thani signed an agreement to conduct a feasibility study for the proposed railway. Many hoped the railway would presage a new era of fraternal relations between Central and South Asia. “Civil society, the intelligentsia, media, and business community of Pakistan have been loudly calling for intimate trade relations with the Central Asian Republics,” Khadim Hussain, Research Director at the Centre for Regional Policy and Dialogue (CRPD), Islamabad, told TCA. For Uzbekistan, which has aggressively pursued diversification of trade routes to reduce reliance on transit through Iran and Kazakhstan, the project promised a cheaper, faster corridor to global markets. According to Nargiza Umarova, Head of the Center for Strategic Connectivity at the Institute for Advanced International Studies, University of World Economy and Diplomacy in Tashkent, the trans-Afghan is one of two high-priority transport projects, along with the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway – work on which began in April 2025. But the ink had barely dried on the July accord when tensions between Afghanistan’s Taliban government and Islamabad began escalating, throwing the ambitious railway into doubt. [caption id="attachment_40211" align="aligncenter" width="1600"] Uzbek passenger and freight trains parked in Andijan; image: TCA, Joe Luc Barnes[/caption] In early October, Pakistan launched an airstrike in Kabul targeting the leader of the...

Geopolitics

Central Asia’s Road to the Southern Seas: A Search for Stability

India has confirmed that it received a six-month sanctions waiver from the United States for its involvement in developing Iran’s Chabahar port. According to The Times of India, the decision followed intensive diplomacy by New Delhi, which convinced Washington that Chabahar provides India’s only practical overland access to Central Asia that avoids Pakistan. Through Chabahar, India is building a land-based counterpart to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, creating an alternative axis linking the Indian Ocean with Eurasia while bypassing Islamabad and Beijing. The exemption, valid until April 2026, gives India room to negotiate with Washington. For Central Asia, the episode reflects a broader challenge: choosing viable routes to the southern seas. Current debates about “Afghan transit” focus largely on the Trans-Afghan Railway and the so-called Kabul corridor connecting northern Afghanistan with Pakistan’s ports. Yet Afghanistan’s transport network is forming along multiple lines. Alongside the eastern route, a western corridor from Herat to Kandahar and Spin Boldak is also developing, offering access both to Pakistan and to Chabahar. The integration of western Afghanistan’s infrastructure with Iran’s transport network makes this corridor more reliable under today’s political and security conditions. It aligns with projects pursued by Iran, Turkmenistan, and Afghanistan and positions Herat as a major hub. It is also close to the North–South Transport Corridor, the Lapis Lazuli and Middle Corridors, and the Caspian and Persian Gulf regions. The planned Mazar-i-Sharif–Herat line fits the logic of the Five Nations Railway Corridor, potentially giving Tajikistan and Uzbekistan access to Chabahar and, if stability improves, to Pakistan’s ports as well. By contrast, the eastern route will remain constrained by the unstable Afghan–Pakistani border and the volatile relationship between Kabul and Islamabad. Afghanistan’s own priorities also differ from outside assumptions: the Herat–Kandahar–Spin Boldak line primarily serves as an internal transport spine linking the west and south. For Kabul, the route to Gwadar is more a political gesture than a practical goal. Some analysts note that developing the western corridor also helps rebalance the country’s economic geography toward its more diverse western regions. These dynamics strengthen the western route’s appeal. The Taliban leadership has even urged Afghan businesses to reduce reliance on Pakistani ports, signaling a structural shift in trade orientation. Both Chabahar and Gwadar face political risks. Pakistan’s transit routes pass through areas affected by insurgency, including Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, as well as the broader narcotics routes of the Golden Crescent. The greatest uncertainty remains the fluctuating relationship between Kabul and Islamabad. Gwadar, while technologically superior, is undermined by chronic instability. Chabahar’s capacity is more modest, but its integration with Iran’s road and rail network provides reliability. The United States adds another layer of complexity. The waiver suggests Washington is balancing its Iran sanctions regime with its strategic partnership with India. The United States is not directly involved in regional infrastructure but retains enough influence to shift the balance between the western and eastern routes. Under certain conditions, Gwadar may appear less problematic for Washington than Chabahar. At the same time, selective sanctions exemptions...

UN General Assembly

Afghanistan Absent, Not Forgotten – Central Asia’s UNGA Strategy

From September 23–29, 2025, the UN General Assembly’s general debate unfolded without an Afghan delegation addressing those assembled amid the unresolved UN seat issue. Yet Afghanistan was hardly absent. Central Asian presidents used their platform to project a collective stance that stopped short of recognition while rejecting isolation. Their message reflected a regional doctrine of managed engagement: keep the neighbor connected enough to limit collapse, through corridors, energy grids, and humanitarian channels. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev of Uzbekistan offered the clearest blueprint, urging the international community to “prevent [Afghanistan’s] isolation,” and calling for support to develop transport and energy corridors across Afghan territory. That language aligns with initiatives already underway: a multilateral framework signed in Kabul on July 17 to move the Trans-Afghan railway toward feasibility, and fresh agreements on the 500 kV Surkhan–Pul-i-Khumri line designed to stabilize Afghanistan’s power supply while linking it to a regional grid. Mirziyoyev’s message was a bid to convert geography into risk management. Kazakhstan struck a technocratic note. Kassym-Jomart Tokayev told the Assembly that “inclusive development in Afghanistan” is the basis for long-term regional peace and stability. This phrasing matches Almaty’s UN-backed hub for the Sustainable Development Goals and Astana’s self-image as the region’s administrative center. The goal is to stabilize the weakest link so trade and transit do not fracture. Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov used part of his brief UN address to demand that roughly $9 billion in Afghan central-bank assets frozen in Western jurisdictions be returned to “the Afghan people,” and called isolation “unacceptable.” In a remittance-dependent economy like Kyrgyzstan’s, collapse next door risks hunger, displacement, and crime. His remarks were both moral and practical, and marked the sharpest public challenge to Western policy voiced by any Central Asian leader this week. Traditionally, Tajikistan has taken the hardest line on the Taliban. This time, Emomali Rahmon emphasized humanitarian assistance, citing drought-hit regions and areas devastated by the August 31 eastern Afghanistan earthquake, and said Dushanbe supports peace, stability, and socio-economic development next door. The quake killed more than 2,000 people and destroyed thousands of homes across Kunar, Nangarhar, and Laghman just as aid budgets were shrinking. Turkmenistan took a different approach. President Serdar Berdimuhamedov did not mention Afghanistan, instead promoting Ashgabat’s permanent neutrality as a proposed UN agenda item, “Neutrality for Peace and Security,” along with broad transport and energy initiatives. This approach preserved flexibility on projects like TAPI without committing to specifics in New York. What makes these speeches consequential is how closely they mirror work on the ground. The Trans-Afghan railway, long dismissed as only a plan, now has a political framework and a declared security pledge from Kabul. Whether it moves forward depends on both capital and security, but for Tashkent, a southern outlet to Pakistani ports is the difference between landlocked and land-linked. The Surkhan–Pul-i-Khumri line is more conventional and urgent: a 200-kilometer fix to keep the lights on and the revenues flowing. The long-troubled CASA-1000 power corridor is also inching back into view after being paused post-2021, with...

Afghanistan

Rail, Water, and Helicopters – Uzbekistan’s “Limited Recognition” of the Taliban

Uzbekistan has spent the middle of September embroiled in an increasingly tetchy press battle over an unusual topic: helicopters. The Taliban, who run the de facto government in Kabul, have long claimed that several dozen military aircraft and helicopters currently residing in Uzbekistan are rightfully theirs. On September 11, a Taliban official announced publicly that Uzbekistan had agreed to hand them back. This was reported widely in the regional media, with the Uzbek foreign ministry slow off the mark in denying these claims. The dispute goes back to the fall of Kabul in August 2021, when a total of 57 aircraft were flown from Afghanistan to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan as Ashraf Ghani’s government collapsed. “The helicopters came from the Afghan territory to Uzbek territory illegally, so actually we had the right to confiscate them,” Islomkhon Gafarov, an Afghanistan expert at the Center for Progressive Reform, a Tashkent think tank, told the Times of Central Asia. However, Gafarov adds that the aircraft were the property of the U.S. military loaned to the previous government of Afghanistan, and therefore, Washington will have a say in their return. This has not stopped the Taliban from continuing to demand the helicopters back for use in “humanitarian operations,” in the words of Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi. Such wrangling is part of the daily diplomatic in-tray for Tashkent when dealing with a neighbor whose government has not been recognized by almost the entire world. “Afghanistan is our neighbor,” said Gafarov. “According to the geopolitical situation, we have to conduct a dialogue with this government. It’s true, Uzbekistan hasn’t recognized the Taliban government, but de facto, we work with them; we’ve had diplomatic relations with them since 2018.” Tashkent certainly has reasons to work with the Taliban. Helicopters are a mere sideshow compared to two far larger issues that will define their relations for years to come: rail and water. Railway On the positive side of the ledger, the Taliban have brought to Afghanistan a reasonable degree of stability - enough to start contemplating large-scale infrastructure projects. In July, an agreement was struck between Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Uzbekistan to conduct a feasibility study for a trans-Afghanistan railway, with 647 kilometers of new track being laid to link Uzbekistan with Pakistan’s Indian Ocean ports. This railway could bring significant benefits to Uzbekistan, one of only two double-landlocked countries in the world. Currently, sea-bound exports must travel via Turkmenistan to Iran. Other routes almost all rely on going via Kazakhstan. The China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, currently being constructed, should remove some of the need for sea-bound routes, but the Pakistan route would be faster. “The trans-Afghan route is the shortest way to the seaports of Karachi and Gwadar,” Gafarov told TCA. With a line from Termez, Uzbekistan, to Mazar-i-Sharif in Northern Afghanistan already operational, this only leaves two sections unbuilt - from Mazar to Kabul, and then from Kabul to Peshawar in Pakistan. The teams are still only at the feasibility stage right now, and have, with some chutzpah, predicted...

trans-Afghan railway

Trans-Afghan Railway: Can Uzbekistan Build a Railway Through Afghanistan to Reach the Sea?

For years, Uzbekistan has planned to gain access to the sea by passing through Afghanistan: The Trans-Afghan Railway is one of the country’s top transport projects. The railway could not only bring Uzbekistan to the sea, but also turn it into a transit hub connecting the north and south. However, no matter how promising the project looks, existing obstacles leave its fate uncertain. The Taliban has not yet established full control over Afghan territories, and many of its state assets are frozen. This leaves the construction costs to Uzbekistan and Pakistan. The Taliban government’s lack of recognition may also complicate attracting international institutions and companies to the project, even after its completion. So how realistic is Uzbekistan’s new Trans-Afghan railway project? Why Is the Railway Needed? Proposed by Uzbekistan in December 2018 for the first time, the Trans-Afghan railway project aims to extend Afghanistan’s rail network from Mazar-i-Sharif through Kabul and Logar, before crossing into Pakistan via Kharlachi - replacing the earlier plan to run through Nangarhar Province. The railway would cross the Torkham border and pass through Peshawar into Pakistan. Once in Pakistan, cargo would be linked to the Pakistani railway system, reaching the country’s seaports of Karachi, Gwadar, and Qasim. However, in July 2023, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, and Afghanistan finalized a different route: Termez → Naibabad → Maidanshahr → Logar → Kharlachi. This means the corridor will not pass through the Torkham border as originally described. Now construction scheduled to start within five months, the railway is expected to handle up to 20 million tons of cargo annually and reduce transit time from Uzbekistan to Pakistan from 35 days to 3–5 days once operational. Financial Obstacles The line is planned to be 647 km long, with an estimated construction cost of $6.9 billion according to more recent Uzbek statements (though earlier estimates ranged from $4.6 to $7 billion). This figure remains subject to change until the final feasibility study is complete. Given Afghanistan’s complex ecological terrain, estimated costs could rise significantly. Pakistan has stated it would raise funds for the construction and financing of the part of the line to be built on Afghan territory. Observers believe the first issue to resolve before construction starts is the provision of security by the Taliban. Independent political analyst Yunus Sharifli argues that statements made by ISIS and threats targeting countries cooperating with the Taliban are further delaying construction. “At present, the deterioration of Afghanistan’s security situation makes it even harder to secure credit lines with financial institutions. The Taliban continues to struggle to establish legitimacy in Afghanistan. Yet the country as a whole remains bogged down in ethnic conflicts,” Sharifli stated. The Taliban’s policies toward women are also seen as one of the reasons complicating access to international financing mechanisms. Multilateral financial institutions and donor states condition their support on certain governance principles. This has become one of the main challenges in securing financing and attracting Western investors. Geographic Obstacles Part of the line is planned to cross the Salang Pass...