TransCaspian - The Times Of Central Asia

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Central Asia-South Korea summit 2026

From Critical Minerals to Connectivity: South Korea’s Stakes in Central Asia

On September 16, Seoul hosted the first Korea–Central Asia Summit, bringing President Lee Jae Myung together with the heads of all five Central Asian states. The meeting elevated a dialogue that has run at a ministerial level since 2007 to the level of heads of state. The leaders adopted a Seoul Declaration setting the terms for future engagement and agreed to hold summits every two years. On September 14, trade and industry ministers from South Korea and the five Central Asian states met in Seoul for the first C5+Korea Industry Ministers’ Meeting. They signed a joint statement launching a standing platform for industrial cooperation. Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Investment, Industry and Trade used the occasion to push for a shift away from raw-material trade toward joint production and localization. Behind the diplomatic choreography sits a practical problem: the minerals both sides keep discussing cannot move without a route to carry them. A Minerals Agenda with Separate Tracks South Korea relies heavily on imported minerals for its manufacturing industries. Seoul has been developing separate plans with each country. With Tajikistan, discussions have focused on gold and silver, alongside antimony. With Kyrgyzstan, Seoul has been discussing antimony and tungsten. Cooperation with Uzbekistan covers minerals and digital manufacturing. With Kazakhstan, a central issue is moving beyond raw exports toward processing inside the country, as The Times of Central Asia reported ahead of the summit. South Korean firms are pursuing supply diversification independently. POSCO International and LX International have been expanding overseas mineral investments, including graphite and nickel projects, amid Chinese export restrictions. The Transport Connection Consider the Bolashak chrome mine in Kazakhstan, which Eurasian Resources Group launched in late 2024. The company plans to ramp it up to a design capacity of 7.5 million metric tons of chrome ore a year. Production on that scale makes reliable transport an essential part of the commercial equation. An Atlantic Council analysis identifies limited processing capacity and underdeveloped westward routes as obstacles to U.S. mineral partnerships with Central Asia. It presents the Trans-Caspian Middle Corridor as a route to Western markets that avoids Russian and Iranian territory. That argument needs a distinction when applied to Korea. The corridor runs westward toward Europe; it is not a prerequisite for minerals to reach South Korea. Its relevance is the wider choice of buyers it could offer Central Asian producers, including potential Korean-backed processing ventures serving those markets. That corridor is being built out. The Aktau container hub has a planned capacity of 240,000 twenty-foot equivalent units. The World Bank-backed Mointy–Kyzylzhar railway is meant to remove a 149-kilometer detour and accommodate 30 train pairs a day, against roughly ten on the existing constrained route. Traffic is already rising: 125 container trains crossed Kazakhstan on the Trans-Caspian route in the first quarter of 2026, up 34.4% year-on-year. Japan has also become involved, pledging in August 2025 to help modernize customs operations at the port of Aktau. The Seoul Declaration also backs Korean participation in transport infrastructure, including modernization and digitalization. In...

Middle Corridor

Middle Corridor Freight Grows, but Eastbound Cargo Lags

Container traffic is growing along the Middle Corridor from China and Central Asia toward Europe, but the route is far less busy in the opposite direction. In the first eight months of 2026, about 80% of container traffic moved westward and only 20% eastward. Operators are now looking for goods in Europe and Türkiye that can be shipped back across the Caspian Sea and Kazakhstan toward Central Asia and China. Container traffic totaled 53,574 TEU along the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, also known as the Middle Corridor, in January–August. One TEU is equivalent to a standard 20-foot container. During the same period last year, the figure was 48,326 TEU, meaning traffic increased by 11%. But the flows were highly uneven. According to ADY Express, 42,642 TEU moved from east to west, compared with just 10,932 TEU in the opposite direction – a ratio of almost four to one. Interest in the route increased sharply after 2022, when companies began looking for additional ways to move goods between China and Europe without transiting Russia. Over the past several years, participants in the Middle Corridor have focused on increasing shipments from China. New train services have been introduced, while countries along the route have invested in railways, terminals, and Caspian ports. Chinese freight has grown, but there is still not enough cargo for the return journey. For transport operators, the issue comes down to finances. Once containers reach Europe, they need to be used again or repositioned. If there is cargo for the return journey, the equipment generates revenue in both directions. Without it, operators can face the cost of moving empty equipment. The 80%-to-20% split, however, does not establish how many containers actually make the return journey without cargo. Railway companies themselves are now acknowledging the shortage of eastbound cargo. “For this, backhaul freight is necessary,” Emil Mammadov, Adviser to the Chairman of Azerbaijan Railways, said at the Black Sea and Caspian Freight Forum 2026 in Baku. According to Mammadov, attracting cargo from Europe would help increase freight volumes, optimize transportation costs, and allow at least some containers to be returned to their countries of origin. Until now, the route has been promoted more actively in China, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye. European companies have received less attention. Railway operators are now looking for customers at the western end of the corridor as well. A shipment from Türkiye showed what such a return journey could look like. In May, KTZ Express and Pasifik Eurasia dispatched a train from Izmir to China carrying household refrigerators. Fifty 40-foot containers crossed the Caspian Sea, traveled through Kazakhstan, and continued into China via the Altynkol border station. For now, such shipments remain limited. The Chinese side continues to push for more westbound traffic. On September 9, Azerbaijan Railways held talks with Shanghai International Port Group and Lianyungang Port on expanding shipments of Chinese goods through Kazakhstan, across the Caspian, and through Azerbaijan toward Europe. ADY Express also reported that 265 container block trains operated along...

Middle Corridor

Insider’s View: Why Uzbekistan’s Caspian Push Might Be Beneficial for Georgia

Over the past year, Georgia has shifted its focus towards Central Asia, establishing strategic partnerships with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The country has long-term plans for the region in several development areas, including trade and transport logistics. However, the current phase of Georgian–Central Asian relations is not solely based on economic pragmatism. It should also be viewed as a means of preserving sovereignty in the face of global challenges that are catalyzing the old-world order to collapse. In this context, strategic connectivity can be defined as a vital component of small states’ long-term stability and security, placing it on a par with defense capabilities. By intensifying political and economic ties with Tbilisi, Tashkent is seeking to reinforce the Western orientation of its foreign policy. This is necessary to successfully balance between the major powers and minimize the risk of becoming overly dependent on neighboring Russia or China, for example. However, this move should not be perceived as a counter to the geopolitical ambitions of non-regional actors in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. It is devoid of political overtones and reflects the parties’ desire to strengthen their sovereignty based on shared economic interests and opportunities. The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (Middle Corridor) is the key driver in this dynamic, and its significance extends far beyond transport connectivity. It is a mutually beneficial initiative whose ultimate goal is to ensure regional stability and sustainable economic growth. Thus, Uzbekistan gains an alternative route to the European Union market — the country’s third-largest trading partner — via the Georgian ports of Poti and Batumi on the Black Sea coast. Meanwhile, the Trans-Caspian route provides Georgia with access to the rapidly growing markets of East and South Asia via Uzbekistan and neighboring countries. The new transit corridor concepts promoted by Uzbekistan in the context of the expanding Central Asian partnership deserve special attention. Tashkent and Tbilisi have enormous potential to develop transport cooperation by establishing intercontinental logistics chains: China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan–Turkmenistan–Azerbaijan–Georgia–Turkey/EU, and India–Pakistan–Afghanistan–Uzbekistan–Kazakhstan–Azerbaijan–Georgia–EU. Both projects involve connecting the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway and the Trans-Afghan Railway Corridor (the Kabul Corridor), which are an absolute priority for Uzbekistan, with the Middle Corridor. This will significantly increase the republic’s exports of transport services by attracting additional transit flows from the South Caucasus, Turkey and Europe, while also expanding the freight base for the aforementioned railway corridors. The issue of jointly promoting new trade routes along the east-west and north-south axes (from Europe to China and India, respectively) through Uzbekistan requires ongoing expert discussion to amplify its relevance. To fully realize its own transit potential, it is insufficient for Uzbekistan to focus solely on the infrastructure development of the Middle Corridor. This is because, even after the launch of the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway, the country’s ability to attract additional transit cargo flows would remain very limited due to Kazakhstan’s dominance in rail transport between the EU, Central Asia, and China via the Caspian Sea. For Uzbekistan, it is far more important to extend the Middle Corridor to China and India. This would...

Central Asia’s C6 Takes Shape in Washington as Ambassadors Push for Practical Integration

Less than two weeks after regional leaders gathered in Cholpon Ata, diplomats from the emerging C6 grouping used a discussion in Washington to shift the focus from declarations of unity to the mechanics of integration: customs, railways, digitalized trade, access to European markets, and stronger links across the Caspian. The sharpest political message came from Kyrgyzstan’s ambassador to the United States, Edil Baisalov, who said that Central Asian states were increasingly recognizing that they were “enough for each other,” and that resolving differences within the region had become a pragmatic national interest. His comments gave unusually direct language to a trend that has accelerated since the region’s consultative meetings began in 2018. The August 12 event at the Caspian Policy Center brought together the U.S.-based ambassadors of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Tajikistan, the sixth country in the emerging C6 framework, was not listed among the participants. The event followed a late-July meeting in Cholpon Ata, where leaders concentrated on transport, energy security, investment, and foreign-policy coordination. The C6 label remains shorthand rather than the name of a formal organization. Its political basis, however, has become more concrete since Azerbaijan was admitted as a full participant in the Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia in November 2025. The shift extended a format once focused on relations among the five Central Asian republics across the Caspian Sea. From Regional Dialogue to Regional Agency Azerbaijan’s ambassador, Khazar Ibrahim, presented Cholpon Ata as evidence that the six states increasingly see themselves as part of one political and economic space. “We are finally holistic. We are all together,” he said. He argued that Azerbaijan’s presence changes the geography of the grouping by turning the Caspian from a dividing line into a connecting space between Central Asia and the South Caucasus. That idea has been developing for some time. TCA has previously examined how Azerbaijan’s entry could turn the C6 framework into a platform for common rules on transport, tariffs, customs systems, and digital data, rather than another layer of summit diplomacy. Kazakhstan’s ambassador, Magzhan Ilyassov, put the emphasis on building an “economically active neighborhood.” He pointed to the frequency of regional meetings and said the value of the current process lies partly in maintaining an inclusive conversation among the Central Asian states. Kazakhstan has also pushed for stronger coordination on transport planning as the consultative format develops. For Uzbekistan, the discussion was more explicitly about market access. Ambassador Furqat Sidiqov said cooperation with Azerbaijan could give Uzbekistan wider access to European and other export markets. He also called for further digitalization of the Middle Corridor. Sidiqov said Uzbekistan had close to 300 joint ventures with Central Asian countries in 2017, and now has about 1,500 with neighboring states. Corridors Become the Practical Core Digitalizing the Trans-Caspian route is not a new proposal. The countries of the UN Special Programme for the Economies of Central Asia, which already brings together the five Central Asian states and Azerbaijan, endorsed a digitalization...

Middle Corridor

Central Asia and Azerbaijan Extend Cooperation Across the Caspian

Central Asia’s presidential forum now spans both shores of the Caspian. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan anchor the principal Caspian crossing at the center of the Middle Corridor, the rail-and-sea network linking Central Asia to European markets through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye. Azerbaijan’s full participation brings the corridor’s eastern and western Caspian gateways into the same regular political setting. The six governments can use it to coordinate the transport, energy, digital, and investment links already developing across the Caspian, even though Georgia and Türkiye remain essential to the route’s westward operation. On July 31, 2026, the presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan signed the Cholpon-Ata Declaration at an informal Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia and Azerbaijan in Kyrgyzstan. The Declaration gave formal political expression to cooperation that had already been developing. Official accounts said the leaders emphasized expanded regional cooperation, including trade, transport and logistics, and energy. The full text has not been released, so those priorities come from official accounts rather than the declaration itself. Proposed by Uzbekistani President Shavkat Mirziyoyev in 2017 and first convened in Astana in March 2018, the Consultative Meetings brought together the five Central Asian states in an informal presidential format. They expanded in November 2025 with Azerbaijan’s admission as a full-fledged participant, while retaining their consultative character. Azerbaijan attended in 2023 and 2024 as a guest; Cholpon-Ata was its first informal meeting in the new capacity. Official documents continue to call the format “Central Asia and Azerbaijan.” C6 is analytical shorthand for the enlargement, not the name of a new bloc or formal organization. Azerbaijan’s admission follows several years of practical cooperation. At a ministerial meeting in Aktau on November 25, 2022, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye signed a 2022–2027 roadmap for the simultaneous elimination of bottlenecks and development of the Middle Corridor. At its 2023 Baku summit, the UN Special Programme for the Economies of Central Asia (SPECA) adopted a digitalization roadmap and established a multi-partner trust fund, followed by work on digital data exchange and port-to-port cooperation. The transport roadmap includes Georgia and Türkiye, while SPECA also includes Afghanistan; neither is institutionally identical to C6. The enlarged format gives the six governments a regular political setting in which to coordinate existing transport, digital, and investment mechanisms. The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route Association reports that freight through the seaports of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan reached 3.3 million tons in 2024, 20% above the 2023 level, while container traffic within the same scope rose 176% to 56,500 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEU). Freight remains the principal basis of integration. Oil transit, prospective electricity links, and joint investment instruments are extending cooperation into adjacent sectors. Kazakhstan's use of the route for oil exports is also rising: according to KazMunayGas reports, Kazakhstani oil shipments from Aktau through the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan route increased by 34% to 1.4 million tons in 2024. At COP29 in Baku on November 13, 2024, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan signed a strategic-partnership agreement on producing and transmitting green energy,...

Caspian Pipeline Consortium

Black Sea Risks Elevate Azerbaijan and Turkey in Kazakhstan’s Export Strategy

Bloomberg reported on August 8 that the Turkish authorities were withholding or delaying transit permission for some vessels bound through the Dardanelles for Novorossiysk. Some applicants were reportedly told that permits were not being issued, while others faced additional review. The practice appeared selective: vessels bound for some other Black Sea destinations continued to transit, while some Ukraine-bound vessels were also reportedly affected. On August 9, however, Turkish officials told Reuters that shipping through the Turkish Straits was proceeding smoothly and described the actions as temporary security measures rather than an ongoing restriction. The reported restrictions followed a sharp increase in attacks on commercial shipping around the Black Sea, including Turkish-linked vessels near Novorossiysk. Turkey’s Foreign Ministry expressed concern after attacks on the Turkish-owned Yaşar and Nadezhda and called on Russia and Ukraine to ensure navigational safety. Novorossiysk is especially important for Kazakhstan, because the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) terminal there handles the overwhelming majority of its oil exports. Although the CPC pipeline itself remains operational, the episode showed how quickly traffic serving Kazakhstan’s principal oil-export outlet could face an additional constraint. The events shed light on an export strategy Kazakhstan began developing several years before the current problems. Tokayev’s July 2022 instructions addressed both oil-export diversification through the Trans-Caspian route and alternative transport chains for other cargo. In particular, he called for greater use of Kazakhstan’s Caspian ports and the development of alternative railway routes. Later that year, KazMunayGas (KMG) and SOCAR established a framework for moving Kazakhstani oil from Aktau across the Caspian Sea and onward through the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline, initially for up to 1.5 million tons annually. Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey also adopted a 2022–2027 roadmap to remove bottlenecks along the Middle Corridor. Kazakhstan continued to develop transport links with Russia and China as it expanded Trans-Caspian routes through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. The strategy extended Kazakhstan’s longstanding geopolitical multi-vector policy, which balances relations with partners in multiple directions, into the geoeconomic sphere. Tokayev made the combination explicit in his 2023 State of the Nation address. Relations with Turkey had meanwhile been elevated to an enhanced strategic partnership in May 2022, including transport cooperation and the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan deepened their strategic and allied cooperation later that year, likewise emphasizing transport and logistics. Closer ties with Azerbaijan and Turkey widened Kazakhstan’s options without displacing established routes through Russia. The CPC pipeline remains so dominant in Kazakhstan’s oil exports that no other existing route approaches its present scale. Of the 78.7 million tons of oil that Kazakhstan exported in 2025, the Energy Ministry reported the volume moving through the CPC pipeline at 64.8 million tons (the CPC itself reported about 63 million tons), meaning that more than four-fifths of Kazakhstan’s exported oil depended on the CPC system. Kazakhstan moved only about 1.4 million tons through the Aktau–Baku–Ceyhan (ABC) route in 2024, and about 1.3 million tons in 2025. Diversification cannot at present mean replacing CPC. The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline gives Kazakhstani oil a westbound egress...