Ukraine - The Times Of Central Asia

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Drone Attack

Ukraine’s Drone Attack: Russian Region Bordering Kazakhstan Cited as Possible Staging Point

Much remains publicly unknown about how Ukraine pulled off a complex drone attack that targeted several Russian air bases, but some initial, unconfirmed Russian reports say the drones were assembled at a rented warehouse in Chelyabinsk, a Russian city in a region that borders Kazakhstan. When asked about the reports, a spokesman for Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said at a briefing on Monday that he was aware of them and could not confirm speculation that Ukraine may have smuggled the drone components into Russia from neighboring Kazakhstan. "I am not an expert in military affairs. Of course, I saw these reports this morning, of course, anonymous Telegram channels are spreading them, there is no official confirmation of this, so I cannot confirm it. I will leave this to the realm of theory for our experts," ministry spokesman Aibek Smatdiyarov said in remarks reported by media in Kazakhstan. The Russian sources said they geolocated the warehouse in Chelyabinsk by studying photos that purportedly show the drones and their containers as well as the interior of the rented building where they were assembled. The photos were published by Ukrainian media. Additional unconfirmed reports say Russian investigators have questioned several truck drivers who said they drove from Chelyabinsk and were duped into delivering the drones to their target areas. The Russian reports have not been confirmed by officials in either Ukraine or Russia. The pro-Russian War on Fakes channel on Telegram said it was “worth noting” that the Chelyabinsk region borders Kazakhstan and that there was a possibility that the drone parts could have been smuggled into Russia from there. It did not offer any direct evidence to support its speculation. International media analysts have described the War on Fakes channel as a disseminator of disinformation, though Russian military bloggers on the war between Russia and Ukraine are closely monitored because they sometimes offer more information than that provided by the Kremlin and other official channels. Some international observers of the war circulated the Chelyabinsk report on social media. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said the “office” of the drone operation was next to a regional headquarters of the FSB, the Russian security agency. He did not identify the region. The border between Russia and Kazakhstan is about 7,600 kilometers, making it one of the longest borders in the world. The two countries have a robust trade relationship. Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries have tried to project a neutral stance in the war between Russia and Ukraine. Ukraine’s security service, known by its acronym SBU, said on Telegram that it hit “34% of strategic cruise missile carriers at the main airfields of the Russian Federation” and that it will provide details about the operation “a little later.” Russia’s Ministry of Defense said attacks on military airfields in the Ivanovo, Ryazan, and Amur regions were repelled. “In the Murmansk and Irkutsk regions, as a result of the launch of FPV drones from the territory located in the immediate vicinity of airfields, several units...

Russia's War

Russia: Thousands of Central Asia-Born Russians Sent to Ukraine Front Line

A senior Russian official has said that thousands of migrants from Central Asia who became Russian citizens were sent to fight in Ukraine after they tried to dodge conscription. "Our military investigations directorate conducts regular raids,” Alexander Bastrykin, head of Russia’s Investigative Committee, said on Tuesday in remarks that were reported by the Russian state-run TASS news agency. “So far, we've tracked down 80,000 such Russian citizens who didn't just avoid the front lines — they wouldn’t even show up at military enlistment offices. We’ve registered them for military service, and about 20,000 of these 'new' Russian citizens, who for some reason no longer want to live in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, or Kyrgyzstan, are now on the front lines," Bastrykin said at the St. Petersburg International Legal Forum. Bastrykin’s comments contributed a piece to the often murky picture of the involvement of people from Central Asia in Russia’s war effort in Ukraine in the last three years. In addition to conscription measures, Russia has also sought to replenish its ranks by offering contracts and other incentives to foreigners willing to fight. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are among Central Asian countries that ban their nationals from fighting in foreign conflicts and there have been several high-profile prosecutions of citizens who fought for Russia and returned home. It is a sensitive political matter in Central Asia, a region that seeks to project neutrality in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Kazakhstan has said it is reviewing a report by a Ukrainian institution that said about 661 Kazakh citizens have fought for Russia since it launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The I Want To Live center, which is run by the Ukrainian security services and assists with surrender requests from soldiers fighting for Russia, published a list of what it said were the Kazakh nationals. Of the 661, at least 78 have been killed, according to the center. Without providing details, it said it received the list from its own sources within the Russian military. Uzbekistan is conducting a similar investigation based on data from the Ukrainian group.

Foreign Affairs

Ukraine Appoints New Ambassador to Türkiye, Born in Uzbekistan

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has appointed Nariman Dzhelal as Ukraine’s new ambassador to Türkiye, according to RBC-Ukraine. The appointment was formalized in a presidential decree signed earlier this month, the president’s press service reported. Dzhelal, a Crimean Tatar politician, journalist, and human rights advocate was born on April 27, 1980, in Navoi, Uzbekistan. His family returned to Crimea in 1989. According to Ukrainian media, Dzhelal graduated from the Political Science Department at Odesa National University. He began his career as a journalist at Avdet, a Crimean Tatar newspaper, and later worked for the ATR television channel. He also taught history and law at an international school in Simferopol. Dzhelal entered politics in 2013 when he was elected first deputy chairman of the Mejlis, the representative body of the Crimean Tatar people. Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, Dzhelal remained in the region, where he continued to advocate for the rights of Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians. He monitored human rights abuses and participated in trials widely regarded as politically motivated. In 2021, after attending the inaugural Crimea Platform summit, Dzhelal was detained by the Russian security services and accused of sabotage. In 2022, he was sentenced to 17 years in prison. Ukrainian authorities confirmed that he was released in a prisoner exchange in June 2024 and returned to Ukraine. Dzhelal’s appointment to the post in Ankara underscores Türkiye’s pivotal role in Ukraine’s diplomatic strategy.

Russia's War

Opinion: The Ukraine-Russia Peace Talks Need Multiple Platforms for Negotiations

The proposed Istanbul meeting between Zelensky and Putin on May 15 did not take place, with no Russian ministers attending the talks Putin himself had called for, leading Zelensky to describe the Russian delegation as "phony". Hopes for peace remain, however, as other stakeholders have expressed their eagerness to support a resolution. With its unique geopolitical position as a bridge between Europe and Asia, Turkey was an obvious choice to host the negotiations. While Turkey has sought to maintain balanced relations throughout the conflict, its provision of military support to Ukraine, including drones, has complicated its image as a neutral party. Despite this, as a NATO member with significant energy partnerships with Russia, Turkey serves as a crucial intermediary. Furthermore, its active role in initiatives like the Black Sea Grain Agreement has reinforced its credibility in international diplomacy. Turkey’s continued involvement, therefore, benefits not only the peace process but also its own economic and strategic interests. Turkey is not the only stakeholder on the periphery of Russia, however; Kazakhstan is also well-positioned to contribute to the peace negotiations. Kazakhstan’s shared history with Russia and Ukraine as former Soviet republics has shaped mutual economic and security frameworks, rooted in decades of centralized governance and cooperation. The continued use of the Russian language as one medium of communication across these nations underscores intertwined cultural and historical links. Kazakhstan’s relationship with Russia spans centuries, marked by alliances, trade, and cultural exchange, further deepening ties beyond the Soviet era. In recent years, Kazakhstan has diversified its alliances through its multi-vector foreign policy. It has forged strong relationships with China, the U.S., the EU, and organizations like the SCO and EAEU while cultivating robust economic ties. Its energy sector has attracted major foreign investors such as Chevron, ExxonMobil, and Shell. By hosting peace talks and global summits, Kazakhstan has established itself as a neutral mediator, balancing traditional ties with Russia while expanding its global influence. Kazakhstan also has an impressive record in terms of peace negotiations. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev hosted pivotal talks in Almaty in 2024 between Armenia and Azerbaijan, addressing over three decades of conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. Kazakhstan also played a key role in facilitating the 2018 agreement on the Caspian Sea’s legal status, which resolved disputes over resources and territorial boundaries. The country hosted multiple rounds of Syrian peace talks starting in Astana in 2017, bringing together the Syrian government, opposition groups, and international stakeholders, including Russia and Turkey. Similarly, it provided a platform for the Iran nuclear talks in 2013 and supported the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. Kazakhstan’s neutrality and commitment to diplomacy have earned it credibility as a Middle Power in fostering agreements on contentious issues. Additionally, Kazakhstan hosted the 2010 OSCE Summit that led to the adoption of the Astana Declaration. This reaffirmed the Helsinki Principles on peace, security, and cooperation from Vancouver to Vladivostok. It represented a critical collective commitment to territorial integrity, sovereignty, and human rights since the dissolution of the USSR. The summit underscored Kazakhstan’s role in...

Military

One Military Alliance (CSTO) Monitors Woes of Another (NATO)

A “zombie” alliance, one Western analysis said. A “paper tiger,” said another. The Collective Security Treaty Organization, a regional group of post-Soviet states that includes Russia and several countries in Central Asia, has come in for some harsh criticism over the years because of perceptions that it is ineffective. Now, the CSTO, described in some circles as a smaller, Russia-dominated counterweight to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, is closely monitoring a widening split in the NATO security alliance between the United States and Europe. It’s a stunning turnaround that raises questions on both sides about whether and to what extent countries would honor alliance obligations as U.S. President Donald Trump shakes up the global order. While he pushes Ukraine to make a peace deal with Russia, Europe is pledging more support for Ukraine, and deadly fighting continues after three years of war. Overnight, Russia attacked Ukrainian energy infrastructure with drones and missiles, officials in Ukraine said Friday. The Collective Security Treaty Organization has appeared to struggle for cohesion and purpose at times. Its members are Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. While Belarus is loyal to Russia, Armenia has frozen its participation in the group because it felt abandoned by Russia during recent military losses to Azerbaijan. None of Russia’s partners in the CSTO have deployed troops to support its war in Ukraine. But a rise in Russia’s military and diplomatic stature, buoyed by perceptions that Trump favors rapprochement with President Vladimir Putin, could inject some momentum into the regional alliance. At the same time, the Central Asian states, at least, are likely to keep a pragmatic course, balancing international relationships and trying to avoid the perception of taking sides. In an interview with the Russian newspaper Izvestia published on Thursday, CSTO Secretary General Imangali Tasmagambetov was asked about reports that some European countries could send troops to Ukraine as part of a peacekeeping force. Tasmagambetov, a former Kazakh prime minister, downplayed the possibility, saying it would create “a dangerous situation on a regional scale” and that the CSTO was following the situation. “In addition, it is unlikely that the population of European countries, tired of the growing negative phenomena in the economy and social sphere, will approve of such a decision by their governments. After all, this will be an additional burden on the shoulders of society, even if these contingents are not involved in offensive operations, but will, for example, perform police or surveillance functions,” he said. “If such risks arise, the CSTO will be ready to offer various options for assistance within the framework provided for in the organization’s statutory documents and, of course, approved by all member states,” Tasmagambetov said. Russia has been blunt on the issue, saying it opposes any arrangement in which European peacekeepers are deployed in Ukraine.

Energy

Ukrainian Drone Strike Disrupts Kazakhstan’s Oil Exports

On February 17, Ukrainian drones struck the Kropotkinskaya oil pumping station, a key component of the pipeline of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) in Russia’s Krasnodar region. The CPC, a 1,500-kilometer pipeline, transports crude from Kazakhstan’s Tengiz field to the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk, a crucial hub for global exports. The attack, confirmed by CPC operators, resulted in the temporary shutdown of the Kropotkinskaya station, the largest such facility on Russian soil. No casualties or oil spills were reported. Ukrainian sources, including the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and Special Operations Forces (SOF), claimed responsibility, citing the pipeline’s role in supporting Russia’s military-industrial complex. The strike reportedly involved seven drones armed with high-explosive warheads, significantly damaging energy infrastructure, including a gas turbine unit and a substation. Russian authorities estimated a 30–40 percent reduction in CPC throughput for the next six to eight weeks, affecting global supply chains. While CPC pipeline operators have not disclosed a precise timeline for repairs, the anticipated disruptions will inevitably place additional pressure on global energy markets. The degree of damage inflicted raises questions about the vulnerability of Russian energy infrastructure and the efficacy of existing defense systems in preventing such attacks. The CPC pipeline handles a substantial share of Kazakhstan’s oil exports. In 2023, it transported 63.5 million tons, or approximately 1.27 million barrels per day (bpd), with 90 percent of that volume originating in Kazakhstan. This pipeline disruption translates into a projected drop in Kazakh oil flows from 1.143 million bpd to an estimated range of 0.69 to 0.80 million bpd. Consequently, Kazakhstan’s total crude exports—including volumes transported via alternative routes such as the Trans-Caspian corridor and rail—are expected to decline by up to 28.6 percent. The revenue impact could be severe given oil’s centrality to Kazakhstan’s economy. Even a short-term disruption will reverberate across multiple sectors, affecting fiscal revenues and potentially leading to a recalibration of investment strategies within the country’s energy sector. Although Kazakhstan has sought to diversify its oil export routes since 2022, alternatives remain limited. The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), connecting Kazakhstan to Azerbaijan via the Caspian Sea and then onward through the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, carried just 1.8 million tons in 2023. This is but a fraction of CPC’s capacity. Other options, such as the Druzhba pipeline to Europe and rail transport, are constrained by infrastructure bottlenecks and geopolitical risks. Given these constraints, Astana has increasingly prioritized the expansion of maritime oil exports, including investments in new tankers and port facilities. However, logistical challenges, cost considerations, and geopolitical uncertainties continue to complicate Kazakhstan’s ability to execute a seamless transition away from Russian transit routes. The attack underscores the vulnerability of Russia’s energy infrastructure amid the ongoing war. Unlike previous Ukrainian strikes targeting refineries and storage depots, this is a direct hit on a critical transit corridor with transnational implications. The disruption may accelerate Astana’s long-term push for diversification, including investment in new tankers and expanded partnerships with U.S. and European firms. In light of these developments, Kazakhstan...