• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10569 0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10569 0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10569 0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10569 0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10569 0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10569 0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10569 0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10569 0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%

Viewing results 655 - 660 of 2424

Kyrgyzstan Hails Border Deal with Tajikistan as Major Diplomatic Success

Kamchybek Tashiyev, head of Kyrgyzstan's State Committee for National Security (GKNB), addressed parliament for the first time regarding the Kyrgyz-Tajik border agreements. He clarified the terms of the final agreement and explained the territorial concessions Kyrgyzstan made to prevent future border conflicts. The document has sparked mixed reactions in Kyrgyz society, with some deputies expressing dissatisfaction with the delimitation results, while ordinary citizens hope for lasting peace between the two countries. Final Agreement Tashiyev stated that the border agreement was based on the 1991 accords, countering earlier Tajik proposals to rely on documents from 1924-27. Years of work by geographers enabled both sides to reach mutual compromises. The Kyrgyz-Tajik border spans 1,006 kilometers. By 2011, 520 kilometers had been delineated, while the remaining 486 kilometers were settled over the past three years. “We have prepared several documents for signing by the presidents of both countries, including an agreement on the state border, an agreement on water resources—a previous water dispute in 2022 led to armed conflict—as well as agreements on cross-border road use and new infrastructure projects,” Tashiyev said. Over the past three years, the two nations have held numerous bilateral meetings, resulting in the signing of 45 protocols. Tashiyev noted that the process could be finalized within a month, as the Kyrgyz parliament has already approved the agreement, leaving only the leaders' signatures. Parliamentary Debate “We are making history! We have responsibly completed border delimitation with Uzbekistan. We approved the agreements with Tajikistan without debate. The people appreciate this. But public opinion is divided—that is common. If 50-60% of citizens support it, stability will follow,” said MP Nadira Narmatova during the parliamentary session. However, some MPs opposed the government's decision. Sultanbai Aizhigitov, an MP from Batken Oblast, criticized the transfer of Dostuk village, where Kyrgyz authorities had previously built roads and reinforced the state border. He also disapproved of the shared water intake arrangement, arguing that the territory had always belonged to Kyrgyzstan. Voices from Border Villages In an interview with The Times of Central Asia, Kanybek Myrzamuratov, a resident of Samarkandek village near the border, said most locals supported the government's decision. While some land was ceded, he emphasized that peace was the priority. “In some places, one street belongs to two countries—Tajiks on one side, Kyrgyz on the other. Disputes often started over minor issues but escalated into larger conflicts. At times, entire villages would mobilize against each other, leading to casualties,” he said. According to villagers, tensions with Tajikistan became serious in 1996, though minor disputes occurred even during Soviet times. The Soviet authorities, however, downplayed such incidents. Both sides engaged in stone-throwing, livestock theft, and occasional violence. Myrzamuratov noted that Kyrgyz authorities kept negotiations with Tajikistan confidential to prevent unrest among border residents. “In Dostuk, Leilek District, houses were burned down in last year’s clashes. Residents would not have accepted a transfer to Tajikistan. To prevent confusion and disputes, the authorities remained silent,” he said. He added that locals now look forward to reopening the...

Afghanistan: Rentier State or Hostage to Foreign Aid?

The current geopolitical turbulence presents Afghanistan and the countries of Central Asia with serious challenges. After the Taliban's return to power in 2021, Afghanistan found itself in a state of deep economic crisis, and its continued stability once again depends on external assistance. However, with the shifting global order, traditional donors such as the U.S. and the European Union are scaling back their involvement in Afghan affairs, while new sources of support remain uncertain. This creates significant risks for the countries of the region, which must find ways to minimize the consequences of Afghanistan’s crisis and ensure their own security. Historical context: dependence through the ages Afghanistan has always been dependent on external sources of income. This historical context was explored by Ali Nuriyev (historian, blogger, and researcher of the Ottoman world) in his article for TRT, "Afghanistan: The Graveyard of Empires or a Rentier State?" “As flattering as it may be for Afghans to have a reputation as [a nation that has kept its independence despite incursions from Great Powers], everything comes at a price, including Afghanistan’s independence”. Nuriyev provides a detailed analysis showing that since the founding of modern Afghanistan in the 18th century by Ahmad Shah Durrani, the country has built its economy and politics on external sources of income. Durrani financed his campaigns through raids on India, while his successors received subsidies from the British in exchange for maintaining neutrality in the "Great Game" between the British Empire and Russia. Later, in the 20th century, Afghanistan skillfully played on the rivalry between the USSR and the U.S., securing billions of dollars for infrastructure, education, and military modernization. By the 1970s, two-thirds of the country's state budget came from foreign aid. Even after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 and the overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001, Afghanistan continued to rely on external support. The governments of Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani survived primarily due to funding from the United States and its allies. Today, following the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, Afghanistan is once again searching for new sources of income. Sanctions and frozen assets have forced the Taliban to seek support from China, Russia, and other nations, further proving that the country’s reliance on foreign aid remains unchanged. This is the historical reality: Afghanistan is a state that, for centuries, has survived thanks to external resources. Its independence has always been closely tied to its ability to extract benefits from the geopolitical maneuvers of great powers. In the present day, this historical context can be interpreted in different ways. However, one fact remains clear, today’s geopolitical turbulence is already having a negative impact on Afghanistan. Afghanistan's adaptation As the global order shifts, the key players on the "Afghan track" are adjusting their strategies toward Afghanistan, exacerbating the country’s economic crisis. United States – For Afghanistan, the new realities in the U.S. mean reduced aid and frozen assets. The U.S., which had long been Afghanistan’s primary donor, is unlikely to increase financial support soon. Following...

Russian Insurer Pays Compensation for AZAL Crash Near Aktau

The Russian insurance company AlfaStrakhovanie has completed payments under aviation hull insurance for the Embraer 190 aircraft operated by AZAL Airlines that crashed near the Kazakhstani city of Aktau. Additionally, compensation payments to passengers have begun, according to Ilya Kabachnyk, Deputy General Director for Aviation and Space Insurance at the company.  "Full payment for the aircraft was made in February," Kabachnyk stated, noting that a significant portion of the risk was reinsured by the Russian National Reinsurance Company (RNPC). While the exact amount of compensation has not been disclosed, industry experts estimate it to be between $25 million and $30 million. Compensation payments to passengers began in January and are ongoing. These payments are being made in accordance with the Montreal Convention of 1999 and Russia’s Compulsory Insurance of Civil Liability of Carriers (OSGOP) law, which provides for compensation of up to 2 million RUB (approximately $22,000) for injury or loss of life. Regarding potential claims for damage to third parties, Kabachnyk said no such claims have been received so far. "If they arise, we will work with the airline accordingly," he added. Investigation and Cause of the Crash The crash occurred on December 25, 2024, during an AZAL flight from Baku to Grozny. There were 67 people on board, 38 of whom died, the majority of them Azerbaijani citizens. According to Reuters, citing an unnamed source, the aircraft was shot down by a Russian Pantsir-S missile. Azerbaijani authorities have supported this claim, stating that they have recovered fragments of the missile. In early February, Kazakhstan published a preliminary report on the crash, which described external damage to the aircraft. 

UN General Assembly Backs Kazakhstan’s Initiative to Establish UN Center in Almaty

The United Nations General Assembly has unanimously adopted a resolution supporting the establishment of the UN Regional Centre for Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) for Central Asia and Afghanistan in Almaty. The initiative was put forward by Kazakhstan on behalf of the Central Asian states. According to the Kazakh Foreign Ministry, 152 UN member states co-sponsored the resolution, underscoring its broad international support and high significance. Kazakhstan’s Role in Regional Development The idea to establish the UN SDG Centre was first proposed by Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev during the 74th session of the UN General Assembly. He suggested locating the center in Almaty’s new Building of International Organizations, which already hosts 18 UN agencies. Tokayev emphasized that, as the largest economy in Central Asia, Kazakhstan is committed to strengthening regional cooperation and promoting sustainable development. He highlighted the growing role of middle powers in global governance, positioning Kazakhstan as a key player in fostering regional integration and international collaboration. A Hub for Regional Cooperation The new UN SDG Centre will serve as a platform for coordinating international and regional efforts, facilitating best practice exchanges, providing technical assistance, and implementing joint projects. It will work closely with governments, international organizations, the private sector, and civil society to achieve measurable development outcomes. Additionally, the center will play a crucial role in revitalizing the UN system at the regional level. Its mission includes enhancing coordination between UN agencies, adapting global initiatives to regional priorities, and promoting inclusive multilateral cooperation, a goal aligned with ongoing UN reforms aimed at improving efficiency and effectiveness. Supporting Afghanistan’s Economic Stability A key focus of the center will be economic development in Afghanistan, as the country’s stability and prosperity are directly linked to the security and well-being of Central Asia. By addressing Afghanistan’s economic challenges, the center aims to contribute to long-term regional stability and growth.

Opinion: Washington Needs a Stronger Policy for the Middle Corridor

The inauguration of President Donald Trump marks a new phase in U.S. foreign policy with direct implications for the Middle Corridor, a key trade route linking China to Europe via Central Asia and the South Caucasus. This corridor, also known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), has been gaining increasing strategic importance as global trade patterns shift and great-power competition intensifies. During Trump’s first term, U.S. engagement in the region was sporadic and lacked a comprehensive strategy. While some policy initiatives were undertaken to counterbalance Russian and Chinese influence in Eurasia, these efforts remained piecemeal. The Biden administration attempted to address this gap by allocating limited funding for infrastructure development and engaging in regional negotiations aimed at fostering greater connectivity. However, Biden’s approach ultimately fell short of a coherent, long-term policy, allowing Moscow and Beijing to consolidate their positions in the region. The significance of the Middle Corridor has been underscored by increased international investment. Beyond economic concerns, the Middle Corridor plays a critical role in Europe’s energy security. The corridor facilitates the westward flow of Caspian resources, providing an alternative to Russian energy exports. The development of the Middle Corridor offers a strategic means of achieving this goal, reinforcing the EU’s energy independence while simultaneously strengthening economic ties with the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Azerbaijan has emerged as a central player in the development of the Middle Corridor. As a crucial transit country, Baku has actively pursued infrastructure investments to bolster the corridor’s efficiency. Azerbaijan’s role is further magnified by its growing energy exports to Europe, solidifying its position as a strategic partner in regional energy security. The Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway, a vital component of the corridor, has received continued investment, underscoring Azerbaijan’s commitment to enhancing trade and transit connectivity. However, Azerbaijan’s increasing importance also intersects with ongoing geopolitical complexities, particularly its relationship with Armenia. The absence of Armenian participation in the Middle Corridor remains a notable gap, one that is directly tied to the resolution of long-standing territorial disputes. The prospect of an Armenia–Azerbaijan peace treaty has gained traction in recent years, supported by Western diplomatic efforts. U.S. policymakers have recognized that sustainable peace between the two nations would not only stabilize the South Caucasus but also unlock Armenia’s potential role in the corridor. Armenia’s geopolitical realignment presents both opportunities and challenges. While Yerevan has signaled its interest in deepening ties with the West, it remains economically dependent on Russia, particularly in energy and financial sectors. Increased Armenian exports to Russia, some of which analysts suspect may involve re-exports of sanctioned goods, further complicate efforts to shift its economic orientation. Recent discussions within U.S. policy circles indicate a growing recognition of the Middle Corridor’s strategic importance. American policymakers have begun exploring ways to expand support for infrastructure development in the region, recognizing that a proactive approach could yield multiple geopolitical and economic benefits. By investing in the Middle Corridor, the U.S. has an opportunity to enhance regional stability, strengthen economic ties with key partners, and counterbalance Russian...

Strategic Cooperation Between Turkey and Turkmenistan Gains Momentum

Turkey and Turkmenistan have accelerated their cooperation in recent years, advancing economic, energy, and diplomatic initiatives that underscore their shared cultural and strategic interests. Their deepening of bilateral ties reflects and expresses both broader regional dynamics and shifts in global energy geopolitics. As The Times of Central Asia reports, the two countries signed a natural gas supply agreement in February 2025 that reinforces Turkey’s ambitions as a regional energy hub while providing Turkmenistan with a new export avenue. Turkmenistan will begin supplying 1.3 billion cubic meters per year (bcm/y) of natural gas to Turkey on March 1 through a swap agreement. Turkmenistan will send gas to Iran for consumption in the northeast of the country, in return for which Iran will transfer an equivalent amount to Turkey. Various press commentaries and diplomatic declarations touting the “export of Turkmen gas to Turkey” are therefore to be regarded skeptically as political grandstanding, even if such an assessment may be supported from a technical standpoint of how the industry calculates flows. Trade and investment relations between Turkey and Turkmenistan have recently seen steady growth, underpinned by Turkish business engagement in Turkmenistan’s infrastructure and construction sectors. Over 600 Turkish companies are active in Turkmenistan, and Turkish direct investment has surpassed $500 million. Turkish contractors have executed projects worth over $50 billion in Turkmenistan since its independence. In this context, the eighth meeting of the bilateral Intergovernmental Commission on Economic Cooperation took place in Ankara on February 25. Following the meeting, a large-scale protocol was signed, including 87 points and covering cooperation over a wide range of issues - areas such as trade and investment, energy, transport and logistics, scientific cooperation, agriculture, and healthcare. The bilateral trade turnover between the two countries reached $2.2 billion in 2024, and Turkey aims to more than double this level to $5 billion. However, reaching that target hinges on further liberalization of Turkmenistan’s economic policies and the expansion of investment-friendly regulations, both of which could be challenging. The two sides also discussed how to integrate Turkmenistan into the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR, “Middle Corridor”) as well as possible cooperation in the field of transport and logistics toward that end. Ankara has successfully positioned itself as a strategic economic partner, but Ashgabat’s tightly controlled economy presents structural barriers that may slow the desired growth. Ankara’s engagement with Ashgabat thus reflects its broader efforts to enhance connectivity across Central Asia. Turkey’s push to integrate Turkmenistan into the TITR aligns with its own ambition to position itself as a logistical bridge between Asia and Europe, complementing its Middle Corridor strategy, which seeks to create an alternative trade route bypassing Russia. However, Turkmenistan’s rigid economic model and cautious foreign policy limit the pace of integration. Practical challenges include regulatory misalignment, infrastructure bottlenecks, and geopolitical sensitivities. Turkey’s Vice-President, Cevdet Yilmaz, affirmed his country’s intention that Turkmen gas and electricity should reach European markets through Turkey. Turkish state-owned companies such as TPAO and BOTAŞ will also seek to develop hydrocarbon fields in Turkmenistan and...