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Organization of Turkic States (OTS)

Opinion: Silk Seven or the OTS? Central Asia May Not Have to Choose

A new proposal circulating in Washington – the Silk Seven Plus (S7+) initiative – aims to reshape Central Asia by linking its five post-Soviet states with Afghanistan and Pakistan into an integrated economic region. Azerbaijan is also seen as a potential addition. The idea, advanced by the New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy, is straightforward: connect landlocked Central Asia to the Black Sea and Arabian Sea through new trade corridors. On paper, the bloc looks compelling. The seven countries form a contiguous zone in the heart of Eurasia, potentially turning geography from a constraint to an advantage. “Central Asia needs an organization built by Central Asian states and for Central Asian states,” said Justin Burke, a resident senior fellow at the New Lines Institute, at a recent event in Washington. “If Central Asia can speak with one voice rather than five different voices, that will make it a more reliable investment destination.” There are signs of momentum. Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev made back-to-back visits to Pakistan earlier this year, highlighting regional connectivity. Proponents argue that if Afghanistan stabilizes, the Silk Seven could become a formidable cluster. But that is a big “if.” It also raises a deeper question: why construct a new, geographically convenient bloc when an existing organization – the Organization of Turkic States (OTS)—already offers something deeper: shared language, history, and identity? While the Silk Seven spans broadly Muslim-majority countries, it is linguistically and culturally diverse. The grouping spans Turkic-speaking Central Asia, Persian-speaking Tajikistan, and Indo-Aryan Pakistan. ASEAN offers a cautionary example. Despite decades of cooperation, its religious, linguistic, and geopolitical diversity – combined with consensus-based decision-making – has often prevented it from speaking with one voice, particularly on China. In The Clash of Civilizations, Samuel Huntington wrote that when ASEAN was created in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, it was an organization of “one Sinic, one Buddhist, one Christian, and two Muslim member states.” Such multicivilizational regional organizations have limits, he said. The Silk Seven risks similar limitations. The OTS, by contrast, rests on a narrower but deeper foundation: its core members—Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, and Uzbekistan—share closely related languages and overlapping historical experiences. Tucked away in the eight-page document issued after the informal OTS summit earlier this month was a revealing signal of intent: clauses dedicated to cataloguing Turkic cultural heritage, promoting youth engagement through Khiva’s designation as the 2026 Youth Capital, and launching a “Turkic Heritage” digital platform. Together, they show that the OTS is actively building a shared cultural space. Yet even as members emphasize common heritage, differences remain over how far the organization should evolve politically. Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, the summit host, stressed in his remarks that “the Organization of Turkic States is neither a geopolitical project nor a military organization,” but rather “a unique platform” for cooperation across trade, technology, culture, and humanitarian ties. Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev struck a more ambitious note, saying that “the Turkic world must grow into one of the influential geopolitical centers of the 21st century,” and pledging...

Education

Opinion: The Cultural Bridge Kyrgyzstan Needs for Global Education

The global deployment of foreign educators has emerged as a response to teacher shortages and the growing demand for high-quality education. Kyrgyzstan is no exception. On May 14, 2026, The Times of Central Asia reported that Kyrgyz lawmakers are actively exploring mechanisms to attract foreign teachers to address the country's shortage of educators. The rationale is compelling: recruiting internationally qualified teachers enables students to access global-standard education without leaving their home country, preserving social capital and mitigating the risk of brain drain. Unfortunately, policy discourse on this issue remains disproportionately focused on academic qualifications and competencies, while largely overlooking a variable of equal consequence: cross-cultural competence. Beyond Qualifications: The Cultural Dimension Even highly qualified foreign educators may encounter significant professional difficulties if they are unprepared for the cultural environment in which they teach. Consider a teacher from Indonesia entering a Kyrgyz school corridor for the first time, only to be asked by random students whether or not he is Muslim. In Indonesian professional contexts, such a question directed at a teacher would typically be regarded as inappropriate, given cultural norms favoring indirect communication and the maintenance of formal boundaries between educators and students. In Kyrgyzstan, however, the same question reflects a culturally embedded expression of warmth and social curiosity rather than disrespect. This moment of potential misinterpretation illustrates a broader challenge; foreign educators must choose between interpreting unfamiliar behaviors through their own cultural frameworks or making a deliberate effort to understand what those behaviors signify in their new context. While the former approach risks persistent misunderstanding, the latter requires cultural preparation and training that most current recruitment models do not provide. Drawing on personal experience as an Indonesian educator working in Kyrgyzstan, the contrast between the two cultural contexts becomes instructive. In Indonesia, students conventionally avoid posing direct questions about a teacher's religion or personal life, as such inquiries may be perceived as presumptuous. After sustained engagement in the Kyrgyz educational environment, however, it becomes evident that directness in social interaction is normative rather than transgressive. Students who pose seemingly personal questions are not seeking to offend; they are engaging in the relational practices through which trust and connection are established within their cultural context. Policy Recommendations for Sustainable Teacher Mobility Attracting foreign educators to Kyrgyzstan offers systemic advantages over sending domestic students abroad. It distributes the benefits of international educational exposure across the entire system, from rural schools to urban universities, without concentrating opportunity among a select demographic. It also reduces dependency on the return of overseas-trained graduates, whose repatriation remains statistically uncertain. Nevertheless, effective implementation requires a policy that extends beyond academic considerations alone. Three measures would make such recruitment more sustainable: First, pre-service cultural orientation should be made a formal prerequisite for all incoming foreign teachers. Such a program should go beyond classroom rules and address community expectations and the distinctive social role of educators in Kyrgyz society. Research on international teacher mobility consistently demonstrates that cultural preparedness is among the strongest predictors of early retention and...

Aral Sea

Opinion: Can the Aral Sea Be Saved? Central Asia’s Water Cooperation Test

For most people, the Aral Sea is known through climate documentaries and satellite images as shorthand for ecological disaster. Once the world’s fourth-largest lake, it withered after Soviet planners diverted its two lifelines, the Amu Darya and Syr Darya, to turn Central Asia into a cotton empire. Over almost five decades, as much as three-quarters of the water in these river systems has leaked into desert soils rather than reaching the sea. NASA satellite data show that the blue inland ocean has been replaced by dusty basins. We all know that story. But the more urgent question is different: can the Aral Sea still be “saved” in any meaningful sense, in a century of climate stress and water shortages? Is it still capable of being restored to health? The honest answer is yes, but only if Central Asian states and their international partners stop treating it as a frozen symbol of Soviet failure and begin governing the entire basin as a shared, climate-vulnerable commons. Anything less is nostalgia with good drone footage. From Lake to Warning Signal The Aral Sea once covered about 68,000 square kilometers and supported fishing communities along what is now the Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan border. Before the large-scale Soviet irrigation projects of the 1960s, its level depended mainly on inflow from the Amu Darya and Syr Darya, with smaller contributions from precipitation and groundwater. In the arid climate of the basin, the sea’s stability depended on a fragile balance between river inflow and water loss through evaporation. That balance began to collapse after Soviet planners expanded irrigation for cotton and rice, diverting water from rivers that had fed the sea for centuries. Evaporation continued while river inflow fell, and the sea shrank rapidly. By the early 2000s, time-lapse images published by NASA’s Earth Observatory showed large areas of deep blue water turning into exposed seabed and dust plains within a generation. The consequences went far beyond a retreating shoreline. As the water receded, the exposed seabed became the Aralkum Desert, a source of toxic dust contaminated with salt as well as fertilizer and pesticide residues. Winds carry that dust across farms and towns, degrading soil and crops while exposing residents to serious health risks. The IFAS Agency in Uzbekistan, a working body of the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea, coordinates projects and programs in the Aral Sea basin. The collapse of fisheries also devastated local livelihoods and food supplies. Researchers have linked the wider Aral Sea crisis to higher rates of respiratory disease and anemia. Some studies have also reported elevated cancer risks. The loss of such a large body of water has changed the local climate. Without the sea’s moderating effect, summers have become hotter and drier, while winters have become colder. These pressures are now compounded by climate change and the retreat of glaciers in the upstream mountains that feed Central Asia’s river systems. The Aral Sea is therefore more than an environmental tragedy. It is a warning of what can happen when political...

Opinion: How AI Is Reshaping the Global Image of Nations

Artificial intelligence is rapidly becoming one of the most powerful geopolitical and economic forces in the world. It is changing how countries compete, build influence, and attract investment. Until recently, discussions about Central Asia’s economic development were dominated by infrastructure, energy, logistics, and natural resources. Today, a new layer of competition is emerging: digital influence shaped by AI systems. According to McKinsey, AI could contribute up to $13 trillion to the global economy by 2030. For Central Asia and Kazakhstan, AI development is no longer just a digital transformation agenda; it is directly tied to technological sovereignty, economic resilience, and long-term competitiveness. Who Shapes a Country’s Image in the Age of AI? Digital influence is increasingly determined by how artificial intelligence systems interpret and represent countries. Consider a Singaporean investor asking Gemini about emerging technology markets in Central Asia. A European procurement manager using ChatGPT to identify logistics partners in the region. A journalist turning to Perplexity for insights on Kazakhstan’s fintech ecosystem before writing a report. In each case, AI generates answers based on the data it has been trained on and can access. This creates a new geopolitical reality: those who shape data and content structure ultimately shape how countries are represented globally. Generative AI is already used at a massive scale, with ChatGPT surpassing 900 million weekly active users as of early 2026. As these systems become default information interfaces, the visibility of countries within AI-generated responses is becoming increasingly important. When high-quality, structured, and authoritative content is missing, AI systems rely on outdated information, fragmented sources, and external narratives. In practice, this means that a lack of structured digital presence can directly influence international perception. How Other Countries Are Responding Several countries have already recognized this shift and are actively responding. According to Axios, Israel paid Brad Parscale’s firm $9 million as part of a campaign aimed at shaping how AI platforms portray the country. The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are investing heavily in AI infrastructure and Arabic-language models, including Gulf-backed data centers, sovereign AI initiatives, and Arabic-first large language models. These efforts go beyond technology development. They represent a broader competition for influence in an information environment where AI-generated responses increasingly shape global understanding. AI Momentum in Kazakhstan In 2025, Kazakhstan was listed among the region’s strongest performers in the Government AI Readiness Index published by Oxford Insights. Kazakh officials cited a ranking of 60th out of 195 countries, while Oxford Insights published a regional report that placed Kazakhstan 58th globally. In either case, it was the highest-ranked of the five Central Asian states and represented a sharp improvement from the previous year. Over the past two years, Kazakhstan has demonstrated rapid progress in artificial intelligence. Venture investment in AI has increased more than fivefold, from $14 million to $73 million. IT service exports surpassed $1 billion in 2025, with later ministry figures putting the total at about $1.14 billion. The Kazakh-linked AI startup Higgsfield AI has also been widely described as Kazakhstan’s...

Middle Powers

Opinion: Middle Powers and the “Voice of the Region” – Is Central Asia Becoming a Coordinated Actor?

Against the backdrop of growing global fragmentation and the weakening of universal international institutions, the role of so-called middle powers is increasing. These are states able to influence regional agendas without possessing great-power status. In this changing system, Central Asia is gradually moving beyond its long-standing image as a geopolitical periphery and is beginning to act more like a region with shared interests. For decades, the region was viewed mainly as a space where the interests of external powers, including Russia, China, the U.S., and others, intersected. Today, that paradigm is beginning to shift. Central Asia is showing greater signs of agency through what may be described as a cluster effect: individually, the countries have limited influence, but collectively they form an important transit hub between Europe and Asia, a growing market, a significant resource base, and a strategic security zone. This creates the conditions for a more coordinated regional position, even if a single regional voice is still emerging rather than fully formed. C5+Azerbaijan as a Foundation for Regional Architecture The institutional foundation of this process is the Central Asian leaders' consultative format, which is now expanding through Azerbaijan's participation. That is turning what was once a C5 dialogue into a looser C5+Azerbaijan, or C6, framework focused on transport, energy, and practical cooperation. Within this framework, the countries of the region are learning to act in a more coordinated manner without supranational pressure. In practice, this process is developing through three main areas. The first is transport and logistics. Azerbaijan's participation has strengthened efforts to make the Middle Corridor more coherent, though the route still faces bottlenecks in capacity, customs coordination, and Caspian crossings. Through tariff coordination, simplified border procedures, and investment in port and rail infrastructure, Central Asia and the Caucasus are increasingly functioning as parts of a single transport artery. That gives the region a faster option for cargo between China and Europe, even if it remains far smaller than traditional maritime routes. Shipping goods via the Suez Canal or the northern route can take between 35 and 45 days, whereas the Middle Corridor can reduce transit times to around 13-21 days under favorable conditions. According to forecasts cited by BCG, shipping volumes along the route could increase three- to fourfold during the current decade. Beyond logistics, the project is creating a new economic framework for the region. Its status as a crossroads is attracting investment in transport hubs and manufacturing facilities along the route, with the potential to turn transit corridors into zones of economic growth. This gives participating countries not only transit revenue but a stronger basis for long-term strategic resilience. The second major area is energy integration, where historical disputes over water and fuel resources are increasingly being supplemented by models of joint development. The Kambarata HPP-1 hydropower project in Kyrgyzstan, being developed with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, has created an important precedent for shared management of water and energy interests. The project is expected to support cleaner electricity generation while helping stabilize irrigation flows...

Organization of Turkic States

Opinion: Turkey’s Third Vector: How the Turkic States Are Expanding Central Asia’s Room for Maneuver

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s May 13-14 state visit to Kazakhstan and the May 15 informal summit of the Organization of Turkic States in Turkistan should not be read as isolated diplomatic events. Together, they point to a larger shift in Central Asia’s geopolitical architecture. During Erdoğan’s visit to Astana, Kazakhstan and Turkey signed the Declaration on Eternal Friendship and Expanded Strategic Partnership, along with agreements covering trade, transport, energy, education, investment, defense cooperation, oil and gas, and financial-sector collaboration. The two sides also reaffirmed their goal of raising bilateral trade to $15 billion. Erdoğan was awarded the newly established Khoja Ahmed Yassawi Order, a symbolic gesture tied to the summit being hosted in Turkistan, the city most closely associated with Yassawi’s legacy. A day later, Turkistan hosted the informal summit of the Organization of Turkic States under the theme “Artificial Intelligence and Digital Development.” The timing matters. Central Asia is no longer operating inside a simple Russia-China framework. Russia remains deeply embedded in the region through security history, infrastructure, language, labor migration, and energy networks. China remains the region’s main infrastructure and trade heavyweight. The West is increasingly focused on sanctions, critical minerals, connectivity, and the Middle Corridor. But Turkey is becoming something different: not a replacement for Russia or China, but a useful third vector. Its influence is built on identity, logistics, defense technology, education, digital cooperation, and institutional networking through the Turkic States framework, rather than overwhelming capital or military dominance. Turkey as a Corridor Power Turkey cannot match China’s investment scale in Central Asia. It also cannot match Russia’s historical security depth. Ankara does not need to replace either power to matter. Its comparative advantage is different. Turkey connects Central Asia westward, to the South Caucasus, the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, and Europe. It also offers a language of partnership that is culturally familiar and politically less threatening than great-power patronage. Tokayev captured this dimension during the joint statements in Astana, describing Turkey as a “golden bridge” connecting Europe and Asia. The framing is telling: not a partner of equal weight, but a connector, exactly the function of a corridor power. A corridor power does not dominate a region directly. It expands the routes, partnerships, platforms, and strategic options available to states that do not want to be trapped between larger powers. That is why the Erdoğan-Tokayev meeting and the Turkistan summit matter. The issue goes beyond bilateral trade. It is the gradual construction of a Turkic corridor linking identity, transport, defense, digital governance, and markets. The OTS as Identity Infrastructure The Organization of Turkic States is often dismissed as symbolic: summits, speeches, flags, cultural rhetoric, and references to shared history. That reading is incomplete. Identity is not just emotion. In international politics, identity can become infrastructure. Shared language, educational networks, media links, cultural affinity, and repeated institutional contact reduce the cost of trust-building. They make it easier to sign agreements, build transport projects, expand student exchanges, coordinate business forums, and create political habits of consultation. The...