Opinions - The Times Of Central Asia

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Iran Protests

Iran Protests and Regional Stability: An Afghan Perspective

The protests that spread across Iran in late 2025 and early 2026 reflected more than short-term public discontent, instead exposing the cumulative effects of a prolonged socio-economic crisis. Persistently high inflation, declining real incomes, and falling living standards have placed sustained pressure on households and weakened the social contract between the state and society. Against this backdrop, the unrest increasingly acquired a foreign policy dimension. Strong statements from U.S. officials warning of consequences in response to Iran’s handling of the protests, combined with Tehran’s rejection of what it described as external interference, heightened the risk of the crisis becoming internationalized. Thus, the protests in Iran ceased to be an exclusively domestic issue and became a factor of regional instability. A key feature of the current situation is that the Iranian crisis is developing simultaneously on three fronts: socio-economic, where protests are fueled by deteriorating living conditions; political, linked to a crisis of confidence and governability; and geopolitical, where internal processes are used by external actors as a tool of pressure. Consequences for Afghanistan For Afghanistan, developments in Iran carry direct and practical significance. Since late 2024, Iran has become a source of large-scale returns of Afghan migrants, both voluntary and forced. By 2025, this process had become systematic, placing a heavy burden on Afghanistan’s western provinces, particularly Herat. In the event of prolonged instability and a deepening economic crisis in Iran, the likelihood of additional waves of migrant returns would increase. This would place further strain on Afghanistan’s labor market, healthcare system, social infrastructure, and already limited economic resources. In a fragile economy, the return of large numbers of migrants intensifies competition for jobs and raises the risk of local social tensions. The trade and logistics dimension is equally significant. Iran remains Afghanistan’s key economic partner and a vital transit corridor, including through the Islam Qala border crossing. Any deterioration in Iran’s socio-economic conditions has a direct impact on trade flows, supply chains, and broader regional economic stability. Significance for Central Asia The ongoing protest movements and the deterioration of the situation in Iran, driven by a systemic economic crisis and growing political and social discontent, could have a significant impact on political and economic dynamics, as well as security, across Central Asia. On the one hand, governments in the region are responding with cautious concern, mindful of the potential spillover effects of instability and rising internal discontent. A prolonged crisis in Iran increases the risks of migration pressure, border instability, and cross-border threats, all of which directly affect regional security. On the other hand, a further deterioration of Iran’s internal situation could disrupt trade, transit, and energy ties with Central Asia, weakening Tehran’s regional influence and reshaping the balance of power. Under such conditions, the role of other regional and external actors, including Russia, China, Turkey, and Western countries, is likely to grow as they gain opportunities to strengthen their positions in the region. As a result, the crisis in Iran is evolving beyond a domestic challenge and is...

Central Asia Japan Summit

Opinion: Central Asia–Japan Summit Signals Shift in Eurasian Geoeconomics — and Russia’s Waning Role

In December 2025, Tokyo hosted the first leaders-level Central Asia + Japan summit — a watershed moment for Eurasian diplomacy that quietly reshapes the region’s strategic architecture. The declaration adopted at the summit lays out a clear economic-geostrategic vision: Japan is no longer a peripheral partner, but a central engine of multi-vector engagement with Central Asia. In the process, it exposes a growing gap in Russia’s regional influence — not because of rhetoric, but because of substance. Japan’s Agenda: Economy, Connectivity, Human Capital The Tokyo Declaration pivots on three pragmatic pillars that align tightly with Central Asian development priorities: Green growth and sustainability - decarbonization, energy security, and climate resilience; Connectivity - transport, logistics, customs facilitation, and digital corridors; Human resource development - education, training, exchanges, and technology transfer. This is not diplomatic abstraction. It reflects Japan’s long-term model of engagement: concessional finance, technology cooperation, and capacity building rather than quick geopolitical wins. In practical terms, there is now a numerical investment target - a combined public-private cooperation envelope of three trillion yen (approximately $20 billion) over five years -marking a shift from consultative dialogue to project delivery at scale. Importantly, the summit also reinforced cooperation in emerging domains such as artificial intelligence, digital transformation, and resilient supply chains - areas where Central Asia aims to leap ahead rather than merely catch up. This underscores how cooperation is being framed: not as charity, but as co-production of future-oriented infrastructure and capabilities. The significance of the summit lies not only in the declaration itself, but in the trajectory it has set for Japan–Central Asia engagement in the months ahead. What This Means for Russia: Substance Trumps Symbolism At first glance, Russia’s absence from explicit mention in the declaration may seem benign; after all, engagement with external partners often requires diplomatic balance. Yet silence in this case is meaningful. For decades, Russia’s influence in Central Asia was rooted in security ties, historical institutions, and energy networks. These were powerful structural levers in the twentieth century, but they are increasingly less relevant in an era defined by diversified markets and technological competition. The Tokyo summit highlights several structural realities: Russia does not offer a comparable economic agenda, particularly in green technologies, digital infrastructure, or human capital development. Russia’s model remains reactive, centered on existing corridors and legacy links rather than on new corridors of integration connecting Central Asia with Asian and European value chains. Russia is overweighted in traditional domains such as security and media presence, yet underweighted in economic agency suited to the twenty-first century. By contrast, Japan’s approach addresses precisely the gaps Central Asian states prioritize: employment, logistics, energy transition, and technological self-sufficiency. Even more strikingly, this shift is occurring without anti-Russian rhetoric. The summit was framed as an exercise in cooperation and development, not rivalry. Nevertheless, the outcomes effectively relegate Russia to the background — a clear indicator of the structural erosion of Moscow’s regional primacy. Multi-Vector Policy in Practice: Central Asia’s Agency For Central Asian states, the Tokyo summit...

Iran

Opinion: Iranian Unrest Creates Opening for U.S., Partners in Central Asia

As protests in Iran enter their third week, nationwide unrest is exerting political strain and societal pressure on the Islamic Republic. The nation’s current escalation reflects a level of sustained mobilization comparable to Iranian demonstrations that erupted in 2022 following the death of Mahsa Amini. While the outcome of these developments remains uncertain, ongoing unrest in Iran is more likely to impact Central Asia’s existing energy, transit, and security dynamics, rather than alter the broader regional landscape. This moment nonetheless offers the United States and its partners a strategic opportunity to advance long-term objectives in Central Asia while supporting regional resilience at a time when geopolitical alignments are rapidly shifting. Combined with ongoing disruptions caused by Russia’s War in Ukraine, the recent protests in Iran may create a heightened sense of uncertainty or risk perceptions in global energy markets. In particular, the current Iranian unrest may raise concerns regarding potential oil supply disruptions and broader geopolitical tensions. For neighboring producers like Kazakhstan, which maintains an oil-dependent economy, this elevated volatility could translate into higher revenues from existing exports. Increased fiscal flexibility from rising oil revenues may therefore provide Astana with the opportunity to expand its scope for economic cooperation with Western partners. The United States, which maintains long-standing bilateral energy ties with Kazakhstan, could draw on these existing partnerships to deepen its bilateral energy and technical ties. Beyond its impact on energy markets, ongoing instability in Iran may also affect regional connectivity initiatives. For example, disruptions could emerge along the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a multimodal network connecting India, Iran, and Russia, with branches that involve the Caspian and Central Asia. Although the Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran railway sits along this route and facilitates the transport of energy resources and critical minerals across the region, the corridor currently plays a more limited role in regional transit across Central Asia. This route nonetheless remains of interest to Central Asia because it offers the region an opportunity to enhance long-term economic diversification through access to new markets in the Persian Gulf. Minor disruptions could therefore underscore the corridor’s growing geopolitical value as a connector for trade and energy transport across multiple countries and regions. This context creates a strategic opening for the United States and its partners to contribute to the region’s long-term trade and connectivity landscape. By supporting Central Asian nations in reducing reliance on Iranian transit, the United States can accelerate investment in alternative routes like the Middle Corridor that bypass both Russia and Iran. During an investors' forum in Tashkent late last year, Europe announced it would increase its investment in the Middle Corridor. However, the United States continues to remain on the periphery of this project. By collaborating with European partners to enhance infrastructure along this route during a critical time, the United States can help Central Asian nations position the Middle Corridor as the region’s most resilient and viable alternative for trade and exports. This would ultimately advance shared interests by enhancing Central Asia’s connectivity and facilitating greater U.S....

Venezuela

Opinion: Central Asia and the Venezuelan Crisis

For Central Asian countries, the central challenge in international politics is no longer choosing alliances, but coping with external shocks and global turbulence that originate far beyond the region. The unfolding crisis in Venezuela is a case in point. At first glance, the situation concerns Latin America and the global oil market, but its implications extend well beyond, directly affecting Central Asia’s strategic interests. The core issue is not oil per se, but the reemergence of force as a legitimate instrument for altering political and economic conditions. For a region positioned at the crossroads of major power interests and reliant on external stability, this shift is profoundly consequential. The Venezuelan crisis should be understood as a precedent, one that signals how global power centers may act as established norms erode. For Central Asia, this heralds a more unpredictable international environment in which regional states must navigate competing interests without the benefit of stable rules. While Venezuela is often reduced to an oil story, the broader economic stakes involve control over the architecture of strategic resource flows. This resonates with the situation in the C5, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, where resources such as oil, gas, uranium, and rare earth metals are also of significant external interest. The logistics and transit of these resources are increasingly entangled in geopolitical bargaining. The Venezuelan example reinforces a growing trend: the nexus of economics and security is tightening, and access to resources is increasingly secured through political leverage. In this context, Iran holds particular relevance. For Central Asia, Iran is not an abstraction; it represents transit routes, energy corridors, access to southern seas, and a component of regional balance. Heightened pressure on Tehran directly affects both the opportunities and risks facing the region. When viewed through the lens of Iran, developments in Venezuela serve as a psychological and political precedent, broadening what appears acceptable within Washington’s strategic calculus. While a direct replication of the Venezuelan scenario in Iran is unlikely, given the vastly different military, political, and regional risks, the mere lowering of the threshold for force-based solutions is significant. The cost of direct confrontation with Iran would be far higher, with potential repercussions for the entire Middle East security architecture. Operation Absolute Resolve has objectively increased the confidence of those who favor the use of force against Iran. This confidence is likely to grow if United States actions in Venezuela carry minimal international consequences, avoid triggering uncontrollable regional escalation, and are perceived as domestically successful. In either case, Venezuela’s “success” has already lowered psychological barriers to coercion, strengthening arguments for hardline scenarios and re-legitimizing force as a policy tool, rather than a measure of last resort. Broadly speaking, the Venezuelan crisis highlights a global shift from rules to precedents. For the five, and increasingly for the emerging six that includes Azerbaijan, the fragmentation of international norms raises costs and leaves each country more vulnerable to external pressure. In this environment, coordination and consistency on issues such as transit, security, and sanctions are...

Railways

Opinion: Prospects for Central Asia’s Access to Persian Gulf Infrastructure

The agreement signed on December 8, 2025, between Saudi Arabia and Qatar to construct a high-speed railway linking Riyadh and Doha marks a pivotal development in transport connectivity across the Persian Gulf. Beyond its bilateral implications, the project could have broader consequences for transregional logistics, particularly for Central Asia and Kazakhstan. The 785-km railway will pass through key cities in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province, including Dammam and Al-Hufuf, and will connect King Salman and Hamad International Airports. Trains are expected to reach speeds exceeding 300 km/h, reducing travel time between the two capitals to approximately two hours. The six-year project is projected by officials to boost the combined GDP of both countries by around $30 billion and create up to 30,000 jobs. The Gulf Railway and New Regional Connectivity The Riyadh-Doha line is a central element of the Gulf Railway initiative, which is seeking to establish a unified railway network among Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman, with a target date of around 2030. Originally envisioned primarily as a freight system, the Gulf Railway is increasingly incorporating high-speed passenger services alongside freight, reflecting the region’s push for greater internal integration and reduced dependence on air travel. The Riyadh-Doha segment forms a vital axis between the Gulf’s political and financial hubs and is expected to link with Saudi, Emirati, and Omani infrastructure, laying the groundwork for a more integrated regional transport system. Beyond the Peninsula While the Gulf Railway’s scope is geographically confined to the Arabian Peninsula, meaningful integration with Eurasia would require additional connectivity, particularly via land and multimodal routes through Iran, Turkey, and the Caspian region. Among these, the overland corridor through Iran is especially significant, though constrained by sanctions, financing risks, and political uncertainty. Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran Corridor Unlike many conceptual infrastructure proposals, the Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran railway, operational since 2014, is already a functioning freight corridor. It provides Central Asian nations with direct access to Persian Gulf ports and Middle Eastern markets. For Kazakhstan, the route offers strategic diversification away from traditional corridors. While no formal plans exist to link GCC rail infrastructure directly with Central Asia, the emergence of high-capacity Gulf rail corridors reshapes the long-term connectivity landscape. A future interface could allow Astana overland access to Gulf markets, while enabling reciprocal flows from the Gulf into Central Asia, China, and Europe. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has previously described Iran as a “gateway” to Southeast Asia and Africa. Kazakhstan has also outlined plans to establish its own logistics terminal in the Iranian port of Shahid Rajai in Bandar Abbas, further enhancing its position in Gulf-Eurasia trade flows. Iran’s Evolving Role Historically, Iran’s role as a transit state has been hampered by international sanctions and regional tensions. However, the 2023 normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, brokered by China, has altered the regional calculus. Although still fragile, this diplomatic thaw improves prospects for long-term infrastructure projects involving Iran as a critical transit link between the Persian Gulf and Eurasia. Alternatives and Their...

Foreign Debt

Opinion: Is Uzbekistan Importing a Future Crisis?

Once hidden from the view of international investors, Uzbekistan is rapidly rewriting its economic narrative. Over the past eight years, the nation attracted over $113 billion in foreign investment, drawing financial firms and mutual funds eager to seize the momentum of Tashkent’s trade liberalization and its ambition to double GDP by 2030. And rightly so; 40% of the country’s population, which is the largest in Central Asia, is under the age of 25, while its gold production is within the top ten globally. Uzbekistan is in its breakout moment. With Uzbek bonds receiving a further upgrade to a BB rating from both Fitch and S&P Global, comparisons to Vietnam or Indonesia no longer seem aspirational. However, the question remains: Is Uzbekistan ready to set foot on the financial global stage, and, more importantly, is it structurally equipped to stay there? Amidst its sweeping economic transformation, IMF officials have warned the administration to remain vigilant against economic shocks beyond its control: volatile commodity prices, contractions in foreign investor liquidity, and consequently, tighter external financing. These warnings are not theoretical. They come from decades of IMF experience with financial crises in other emerging markets, such as the Latin American debt crises in the 1980s, the “Tequila Crisis” in 1994, and the “Asian Flu” in 1997. In those historic cases, newly liberalized economies suffered not because they lacked growth, but because they lacked a defense against the liquidity cycle. The economic reality is that global capital flows are often driven by decisions made in New York or London, not Tashkent. This economic phenomenon is often explained by the “liquidity model,” which argues that changes in exogenous liquidity conditions - driven by the economic situation of investor countries - shape capital flows into emerging markets. Thus, without sufficient financial market depth, emerging capital markets cannot absorb external shocks. And when global liquidity tightens, these flows can abruptly reverse, resulting in prolonged economic instability and loss of monetary sovereignty. The sequence unfolds as follows: capital inflows surge and balance-sheet vulnerabilities quietly build up; then an external shock - such as a monetary tightening in the creditor economy - causes inflows to slow; the local currency depreciates; and a feedback spiral of declining confidence and weakening balance sheets pushes the economy into crisis. Currency loses trust, struggles to recover, and money flees. Some initial signs of this pattern can be observed in Uzbekistan’s current boom. The economy is increasingly reliant on foreign borrowing: external debt as a share of GDP rose from 24.7% in 2017 to 61.4% in 2024, reaching $78.5 billion by June 2025. According to CEIC benchmarks, this level is already comparable to Poland’s 51.8% and Malaysia’s 69.9%, and now exceeds Kazakhstan’s 59.2%, reflecting growing dependence on financing from the World Bank, Eurobond investors, and major East Asian institutions. High debt levels alone do not necessarily imply instability. They can reflect efforts to accelerate domestic development. The real source of fragility in past crises was not the volume of debt but its denomination. When...