• KZT/USD = 0.00221
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00221
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00221
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00221
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00221
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00221
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00221
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00221
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
25 October 2026

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 272

Opinion: I Spent 15 Years in Government. Here Is What the State Can Learn Next

Zhandos Sabit spent more than 15 years in Kazakhstan’s public service, including the Ministry of National Economy, a regional akimat, and the Prosecutor General’s Office. He now works in the private sector. In March 2014, I went to a meeting in Astana on the development of the machine-building industry. It was held at the then Ministry of Industry and New Technologies. Officials from central and local bodies came, along with the National Chamber of Entrepreneurs and several business owners. I was there as a representative of a state body. When the entrepreneurs began to talk about problems in the industry that we had never heard of, and about how to solve them, I was surprised. They were asking how to increase local content. We were asking whether a proposal complied with current legislation. It turned out that we civil servants knew the resolutions and laws of the sector, and not much beyond that. We sat at one table and spoke about different things. I have seen the same in other sectors since. My former colleagues may take offense, but I will say what I think: many civil servants, myself included in those years, were lawyers and bureaucrats first. That is how the system trains us. Faced with a problem, the first question is whether an idea contradicts the law, and only rarely whether the idea works. Nobody can be blamed for this, because the rules are what an official is held responsible for. It does mean that civil servants should lean on people who know a sector from the inside and take their suggestions seriously. I saw another side of this when I worked in a regional akimat. We prepared a road map for developing the communications sector in the region and agreed it with the central body. Wherever an item needed a decision from the center or money from the republican budget, the central body either struck it out or rewrote it as “study the issue”, with “provide information” as the expected result. I understand why: the center answers for the budget and for every precedent it sets. But how long can an issue be studied? Colleagues in the region put it bluntly: go and fight for the money from the republican budget yourselves. An idea can sit for years between two levels of government, and nobody has done anything wrong. Kazakhstan’s “Listening State” concept raises a question: what happens to what the state hears? I spent more than 15 years in public service, and my proposal comes from that work. Kazakhstan already has channels for individual appeals, and eOtinish is one of them. They are there to answer a person. My proposal is the next step: a platform for solving problems that keep coming back. Its unit would be a problem together with a proposed solution, not a letter. Appeals, petitions, input from business associations, and regional statistics are kept in separate places today, and an AI-assisted system could read them together. If dozens of complaints about delayed...

Opinion: China’s Regional Strategy Meets Central Asia’s National Bargains

The China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway spent decades on the drawing board. Disagreements over its route and financing held it up long after the three governments endorsed the project. In 2024, a Kyrgyz parliamentarian asked railway officials a simple question: “Where will we find $1 billion?” A financing agreement signed in Bishkek on December 16, 2025, cleared a major obstacle. The railway is estimated to cost $4.7 billion. Chinese banks will lend about $2.3 billion to the joint project company over 35 years. China holds 51% of the company, while Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan each hold 24.5%. The partners will provide the remaining funding as equity. In June 2026, Kyrgyzstan’s parliament approved in the first reading a separate $304.5 million loan from China’s Export-Import Bank to help fund its own contribution. That loan has a 25-year term. The joint company’s debt and Kyrgyzstan’s borrowing for its stake are different obligations, but both affect how much value the country will need to earn from the line. Kyrgyzstan wants business around the railway, including terminals and freight services; Uzbekistan gains a direct rail link toward China, while Beijing gains another route west. The governments agreed to build the line, but tariffs and terminal operations will help decide how the returns are shared. The same division between shared goals and separate deals runs through China’s C+C5 relationship with the five Central Asian states. At the second China-Central Asia summit in Astana in June 2025, the six countries signed a treaty on eternal good-neighborliness. The Chinese Foreign Ministry also published a list of 55 cooperation documents. The first 14 cover the regional China-Central Asia framework. The other 41 involve Chinese institutions and counterparts in individual Central Asian countries, including local authorities and companies. The count reflects how the agreements are organized rather than their financial weight. The regional documents cover road permits, customs procedures and green minerals. The country-specific agreements extend into particular industries and investment relationships. Customs cooperation shows how regional talks can lead to bilateral action. At a meeting on May 21–22, 2025, customs chiefs from China and Central Asia agreed to joint border inspections. The next day, Chinese and Kazakh officials conducted an inspection of Nur Zholy-Khorgos. They agreed to accept more trucks from Kazakhstan and recognize each other’s X-ray inspection images to reduce repeat checks. Kazakhstan’s customs authority explicitly linked the inspection to the regional meeting. The agreement illustrates how governments can address a shared concern through negotiations at an individual crossing. The Astana investment agreements reflected different national priorities. Kazakhstan pursued investment protection and applications for China’s BeiDou satellite navigation system, while Kyrgyzstan signed documents on an AI application center and processing industries. These were country-specific arrangements within the wider regional framework. The railway illustrates why some projects require only a few governments to agree. After recurring disagreements over its route and funding, China, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan reached a financing settlement in 2025. They did not need all five Central Asian governments to negotiate a single position. Kazakhstan already has direct rail links...

Opinion: The Remittance Economy’s Promise: How Migration Could Support Women Entrepreneurs in Uzbekistan

Migration has become a major socio-economic process, substantially affecting Uzbekistan’s economic development and quality of life. The primary destination countries for labor migrants from Uzbekistan have been Russia, Kazakhstan, the Republic of Korea, and Turkey, as well as certain European and Asian countries. Remittances from migrants have become a major source of foreign currency inflows and a key form of economic support for households. Over time, they have raised economic activity and contributed to greater currency stability. In 2025, remittance inflows to Uzbekistan rose 28% compared to 2024, reaching $18.9 billion. Despite the positive growth of Uzbekistan’s economy, the country still faces limited employment opportunities. Although the unemployment rate dropped to 4.9% in the third quarter of 2025, a noticeable improvement, around 760,000 people remained unemployed and were looking for work. In 2025, the official average monthly salary in Uzbekistan was  6,376,700 soums (about $530 at the year-end exchange rate). This remains relatively low, pushing many working-age people to seek work abroad. When people picture remittances flowing into Central Asia, they usually imagine one scenario: the father who has gone abroad, sending his family in Uzbekistan “survival money” for rent, groceries, and school fees. In some small districts of Uzbekistan, however, this picture is starting to look different. That same money can now also become a source of opportunity: a sewing machine, a voucher for educational courses, or a business plan with a woman’s name on it. A Policy Shift Begins While remittances have substantially improved the living standards of recipient households and have become a crucial source of foreign currency for Uzbekistan, their effect on women is more complex. For some families, money sent home from abroad has been considered “out of the system.” These funds regularly supported family budgets, but financial institutions did not always recognize them as income. Recipients could lack the documented income or credit history needed to qualify for a loan, even when their families had received remittances for many years. However, a pilot program launched in March 2026 by the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the European Union in cooperation with Hamkorbank, one of Uzbekistan’s leading banks, aims to change the picture. According to IFAD, the program’s credit scoring model uses remittances to assess a borrower’s ability to repay a loan. This approach could be transformational for rural women who struggle to access credit directly. It could enable rural borrowers to access formal loans, invest in small businesses, and build a credit history. Alongside the financial support, 900 rural residents, at least 50% of whom will be women, will have access to business and financial literacy training. In addition, 100 participants will receive enterprise mentoring to help them run or scale up their businesses. Faces Behind the Numbers Women face many obstacles in accessing credit, finding employment, and launching a business. According to the World Bank, they own nearly a third of registered micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises in Uzbekistan but receive only about 14% of loans to those businesses. This may be due to limited collateral or...

Opinion: C5+1 in Samarkand: What Uzbekistan Expects and What Washington Wants

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has arrived in Uzbekistan with a delegation representing more than 200 American companies. He is attending a C5+1 ministerial meeting with the foreign ministers of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The agenda includes regional connectivity, energy security, trade, private investment, and economic modernization. The visit brings the format back to its birthplace. The first C5+1 ministerial meeting was held in Samarkand on November 1, 2015, with then-Secretary of State John Kerry. The November 6, 2025, summit in Washington gave the relationship a substantial commercial dimension. Uzbekistan and the United States announced economic agreements and trade contracts worth approximately $34.5 billion. President Donald Trump also said Uzbekistan intended to purchase and invest more than $100 billion in the United States over the following decade. Samarkand is now hosting a ministerial meeting accompanied by a large business delegation. The immediate question is how much of the previously announced portfolio has moved toward financing and implementation. In late September, Uzbekistan's Minister of Investment, Industry, and Trade, Laziz Kudratov, valued the project portfolio with the United States at $35 billion, with approximately $7 billion already completed. On that accounting, about $28 billion remains. In my assessment, the strongest overlap between American and Uzbek interests lies in processing critical minerals inside Uzbekistan, using American financing and technology to serve international supply chains. Washington wants alternative sources of strategic materials. Tashkent wants investment in industrial production rather than simply exporting raw materials. Their positions are less closely aligned on technology and relations with Iran. Uzbekistan seeks access to American artificial intelligence infrastructure while maintaining cooperation with China. It also regards Iran as an important transit partner. Washington's approach to sensitive technologies and sanctions could complicate both ambitions. Another Uzbek priority is ending the application of the Jackson–Vanik Amendment to Uzbekistan, a U.S. trade-law provision dating from 1974 that continues to affect the legal framework for bilateral commerce. Rubio can support its repeal, but Congress must make the decision. Investment Deals The C5+1 format has become more commercially focused. At the Washington summit, the U.S. Department of Commerce organized a dedicated venue for business agreements and announced more than $25 billion in commercial deals involving the five Central Asian countries. Since the Washington summit, Uzbekistan has developed additional channels for economic cooperation with the United States. A bilateral Business and Investment Council has brought together officials and business representatives. Cooperation has also expanded into critical minerals, energy, infrastructure, and advanced manufacturing. In June 2026, Uzbekistan's Ministry of Investment, Industry, and Trade, its Fund for Reconstruction and Development, the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), and the Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM) announced a joint investment platform. Uzbekistan has also adopted a critical minerals development program for 2026–2030, covering 120 projects valued at $4.2 billion. The first stage includes 12 projects worth $166 million, with plans to produce high-purity selenium, tellurium, and rhenium. These plans reflect Tashkent's industrial priorities. Uzbekistan wants foreign partners to help build processing facilities and...

Opinion: China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway: Turning Transit Into Local Benefits

At the eighth Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia and Azerbaijan on October 8, 2026, Azerbaijan joined the forum as a full member after three years of participation as a guest of honor. President Ilham Aliyev stated that “Transport is one of the primary areas of cooperation between Central Asia and Azerbaijan”. Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev called for comprehensive infrastructure along the routes, with logistics hubs and service centers supporting production facilities and industrial zones to generate economic activity around the transport corridors. Construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway is among Uzbekistan’s transport priorities and is important for Kyrgyzstan, making this “integrated transport corridor development” approach particularly relevant. Construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway (also known as the Kashgar-Torugart-Makmal-Jalal-Abad-Andijan railway) has been underway since December 2024. Public discussion of the project focuses mainly on shorter routes linking China and Central Asia with the Middle East and Europe, and on the line’s design carrying capacity. However, growth in transit traffic does not in itself guarantee economic benefits for the Naryn and Jalal-Abad regions of Kyrgyzstan or the Andijan region of Uzbekistan. Local economic impact depends on whether freight services and tariff policy allow small shippers to use the railway’s stations. Border delays can limit those benefits, as can a lack of storage and processing infrastructure nearby. What the Project Involves The intergovernmental agreement on the implementation of the project was signed by China, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan on June 6, 2024. The joint project company was registered in July 2024, the investment agreement was signed on December 20, 2024, and construction officially began on December 27, 2024, in Jalal-Abad. According to the Ministry of Transport of Uzbekistan, the total length of the line is 532.53 km; 20 stations are planned, including two border stations, one transshipment station, four intermediate stations, and 13 passing loops. The Makmal transshipment station will be the transfer point between China’s 1,435 mm track gauge and the 1,520 mm gauge used in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. From Torugart to Makmal, the 165.5 km section will use the Chinese gauge. The 146.26 km section from Makmal to Jalal-Abad will use the wider gauge, connecting to the existing network toward Andijan. At Makmal, containers will be sorted and transferred between trains. Wagons can instead have their wheel assemblies changed to run on the other gauge. Freight trains will be assembled or split up at the station, which will also have facilities to weigh wagons and cargo. The parties estimate the cost of the project at USD 4.7 billion. Under the loan agreement signed on December 16, 2025, about USD 2.3 billion is provided by a syndicate of Chinese banks as a 35-year loan to the project company. Another USD 2.3 billion or so forms the project company’s charter capital. China holds 51% of the shares, while Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan each hold 24.5%. As of October 2026, construction is underway along the entire length of the route. In September 2026, the project company reported the completion of the first tunnel...

Opinion: Central Asia’s Minilateral Diplomacy and the Limits of Cooperation

In the contemporary, largely fragmented world order, the concept of minilateralism has become increasingly relevant. As less powerful, smaller states are struggling with often ineffective multilateral diplomatic frameworks, cooperation on a smaller scale has been gaining momentum in international relations. Central Asian countries, although with an intrinsic set of strengths and resources, still lack the power to individually address some of their own issues and advocate more proactively for their interests, especially in global forums dominated by major powers and entities. Geopolitical weaknesses of each Central Asian country lie in insufficiently developed domestic economic and military power to compete with much stronger neighbors such as Russia or China. Furthermore, unfavorable geography, where Central Asia, as a landlocked region, has limited access to global trade chains, also dilutes its geopolitical strength. In addition, the transboundary nature of critical resources, especially concerning water flows and supply, often causes tensions among states of Central Asia. In such discouraging circumstances, minilateralism promises more realistic solutions that can place Central Asia on a more equal footing with external partners and enable the region to play a more significant role in regional and, to some extent, international politics. That is why the consultative meetings of the five Central Asian countries (C5), now expanded to include Azerbaijan as C6, and C5+1 dialogues with external partners have become important platforms for Central Asia’s diplomatic standing. Minilateralism and Central Asia Minilateralism represents an international relations concept that implies cooperation of a smaller group of countries (usually three to nine members) in order to resolve shared problems or pursue mutual objectives. While bilateralism remains the main form of cooperation in international politics and multilateralism is necessary for tackling global issues, minilateralism has emerged as a more appropriate response for addressing specific regional issues in a more flexible and efficient manner. One of the main features of minilateralism is prioritizing shared interests over values or ideological principles, which allows collaborating states to focus more on solving issues and avoid being burdened by ideological discrepancies. Take, for example, the Abraham Accords that managed to gather countries with very different ideological views, especially Israel and the United Arab Emirates, but still produced tangible results of cooperation. Another advantage of minilateralism is a quicker response to crises, as well as opportunities, with less of the bureaucratic hassle that often follows multilateral diplomacy. For Central Asia, working together provides a stronger platform for negotiating better outcomes, especially in the economic area. While the current major geopolitical tensions, such as the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the Iran war, continue to shake the international order, the Central Asian countries have become more aware of their opportunities, especially in terms of transit routes and natural resource demand. Central Asia has definitely caught the attention of major powers, and its geographical position along alternative transportation routes, as well as its considerable wealth of natural resources, including hydrocarbons and critical materials, opens doors for the region to gain more influence and power. However, for all of these opportunities to materialize, Central...