• KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
22 November 2026

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 280

Opinion: What Central Asia’s AI Investments Should Deliver

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are spending public money to attract international AI companies. They are financing infrastructure and offering preferential electricity tariffs to secure a place in the global AI industry. The return should include opportunities for domestic technology businesses, as well as income from hosting foreign servers. The division of costs and ownership deserves scrutiny. Foreign partners supply advanced processors and bring international customers, while domestic institutions finance the buildings and supporting infrastructure. How much of the resulting income will stay in the host economies, and what will local developers gain? Kazakhstan: Domestic Infrastructure, Foreign Hardware In Kazakhstan’s Data Center Valley in Ekibastuz, the division is explicit. In June 2026, the government announced a $10 billion package of agreements with Firebird and NVIDIA. Kazakhstan’s KT-Telecom will finance the buildings and engineering infrastructure, including electrical and cooling systems. Firebird will pay for the computing equipment and retain ownership, according to the Ministry of Artificial Intelligence and Digital Development’s response to BES.media. KT-Telecom is jointly owned by Kazakhtelecom and Samruk-Kazyna Invest, each holding a 50% stake. Financial disclosures covered by BES.media show that KT-Telecom secured a 50 billion tenge loan from the Development Bank of Kazakhstan in June 2026. The loan runs for 15 years at an annual interest rate of 12.6%. The company also raised $112.5 million through bonds listed on the Astana International Exchange at 6% interest, maturing in 2036. A subsequent bond issue raised approximately 594 million Chinese yuan at 4.5%. KT-Telecom received a government subsidy of 13.3 billion tenge for Data Center Valley. The company has not yet recognized it as income because the subsidized facilities have not entered operation. Kazakhstan’s state-linked institutions are taking on long-term debt to build the facilities. The government has approved a preferential electricity tariff model, and a 215-megawatt substation has been acquired. In its November 6 project update, the government outlined plans for three data centers totaling 304 megawatts, with expansion to one gigawatt envisaged by 2029. These government updates do not give a full account of who will pay for additional electricity generation and wider network upgrades. Uzbekistan: Public Infrastructure and Private Investment Uzbekistan is offering tax incentives and publicly funded infrastructure to attract computing companies. In September 2026, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev announced six AI and data center projects worth $8 billion in Karakalpakstan. He instructed officials to develop a five-year program to ensure a stable electricity supply of one gigawatt for investors. Under Presidential Decree No. PF-189 of October 2025, qualifying AI infrastructure projects in Karakalpakstan’s designated zone that exceed $100 million receive tax and customs benefits, alongside an electricity tariff of $0.05 per kilowatt-hour, excluding value-added tax. Uzbekistan’s official investment portal specifies that the government will finance external infrastructure, including electricity connections and other utilities, provided eligible investors contribute at least 25% equity. In return for these incentives, data center operators must install battery storage systems rated at 30–35% of their electrical load. They must also reduce electricity demand during designated peak hours, when electricity costs 1.5 times the...

Opinion: Kazakhstan and South Korea Need Investment, Not More Memoranda, for Alatau City

There is no shortage of elegant phrases to describe relations between Kazakhstan and South Korea: “strategic partnership,” “immense potential,” “new prospects,” and “mutual interest.” What is still missing is South Korean investment on the scale sought for Alatau City and K-PARK, the international cultural and business center planned for the city. For years, the Korean community in Kazakhstan has been called a “living bridge” between the two countries. But even a golden bridge fulfills its purpose only when it connects both sides. It would be unfair to claim that South Korea is doing nothing. The Korea Overseas Infrastructure & Urban Development Corporation (KIND) is involved in planning, the K-Smart Town concept is being developed, and Korean companies and institutions are discussing possible participation. During President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s September 2026 visit to Seoul, Kazakhstan presented joint initiatives with KIND, the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, and Korea Airports Corporation. They covered urban development, research and education, digital technologies, and urban air transport. These are meaningful steps. But initial interest, a memorandum, project design, financial commitments, and actual foreign direct investment are different stages. We should not present progress at one stage as proof that the next has been achieved. Kazakhstan Is Selling a Vision. Investors Need Projects. The first problem is the gap between what Kazakhstan offers and what investors are prepared to finance. We have become adept at presenting the future. On screen, Alatau City has skyscrapers, smart districts, environmentally friendly neighborhoods, universities, medical centers, advanced transport systems, and AI. After the presentation, Korean businesses ask different questions. Who owns the land? Who pays for electricity, water, and other essential infrastructure? What are the utility tariffs? How are investors protected against changes in legislation? Where will disputes be settled? What return can they expect, and when will they recover their capital? At that point, an attractive rendering must give way to a carefully prepared spreadsheet. This is one of the weaknesses of our investment diplomacy. We too often sell a concept rather than an investable product. A company cannot simply invest “in the city.” It invests in a power plant, hotel, or data center, with a defined site, infrastructure arrangements, and a clear allocation of risks. The second problem is the scale of the undertaking. Alatau is being developed as an entirely new urban and economic environment. Investors must assess more than the prospects of a single enterprise. They must consider future population growth, demand, transport flows, energy and water supplies, and the stability of the regulatory framework. Kazakhstan has already adopted a special legal regime for Alatau City. The constitutional law, adopted on May 8, 2026, establishes a distinct framework for the city’s accelerated development, investment, governance, and economic activity. That is an important institutional step. Yet the existence of a law does not eliminate the need for predictable implementation. An investor must understand how the rules will operate over the next 10 or 15 years. Capital is more conservative than diplomacy. A minister can sign a...

Opinion: Kazakhstan’s Mineral Ambitions Depend on Water

At the Shalkiya lead-zinc mine in Kyzylorda Region, engineers have designed a processing plant that could handle four million metric tons of ore a year. To keep it running, a pumping station would send up to 2,400 cubic meters of water back through the plant every hour. Even with that water going round again, the plant would still need fresh supplies. How much would it draw in a dry summer, when farmers in Kyzylorda are already working within irrigation limits? Investors need an answer before they commit to building it. Kazakhstan has good reason to process more of its ore at home. It would keep skilled jobs in the country, along with a larger share of the export earnings. Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov made that case at the mining congress in Astana in June. The Development Bank of Kazakhstan has launched a $1 billion program to finance rare and critical materials projects through 2030. At Shalkiya, some of the costs appear in a separate set of plans. These cover rebuilding the mine’s water intake and the pipeline from Zhanakorgan. Both belong in the plant’s budget alongside the machinery that will process the ore. What Farmers Already Face During the 2025 irrigation season, Kazakhstan withdrew 11.01 billion cubic meters of water for agriculture, with the south accounting for 98% of it. For 2026, the government set irrigation limits of 3.8 billion cubic meters for the Turkistan Region and 3.2 billion for Kyzylorda. It also asked farmers to devote less land to particularly thirsty crops. By September 1, 2026, farmers across Kazakhstan were using water-saving systems on 702,300 hectares. The Water Ministry estimates that the systems in use the previous year saved about 874 million cubic meters. For a factory looking for a water supply, though, it is important where those savings were made and who depends on the water downstream. Some water never makes it as far as the farm. Kazakhstan plans to upgrade more than 14,000 kilometers of irrigation canals by 2030 and cut losses along the way from 50% to 25%. A World Bank-backed program has already rehabilitated more than 800 kilometers of lined canals and improved water management on more than 100,000 hectares of farmland. In Kyzylorda, anyone planning decades ahead also has to reckon with hotter conditions. Between 1976 and 2025, the region’s average annual temperature rose by about 0.53 degrees Celsius per decade, according to Kazhydromet. Across Kazakhstan as a whole, the increase was 0.40 degrees per decade. Where the Water Will Come From Stepnogorsk, north of Astana, has a different starting point. Companies there are studying a rare earth separation plant that could produce 8,000 metric tons of rare earth oxides a year. Existing utilities may make the site attractive, but irrigation figures from Kyzylorda are of little help this far north. Investors need to know how much water the plant would draw and whether the local source could supply it through a dry year. In Ekibastuz, the developer of Data Center Valley puts the...

Opinion: Overcrowding on Almaty Buses – A Man-Made Transit Crisis

The Kazakh authorities' grand plans to turn Almaty and its picturesque surroundings into Central Asia's next tourist mecca have run headlong into a public transportation crisis this fall. Almaty residents have been flooding social media with photos and videos of overcrowded buses and trolleybuses, saying they have not seen anything like this since the 1990s. But a closer look at the problem suggests that the current chaos is largely man-made. Almaty is a university city, so residents have long been accustomed to several months of crowded conditions each year. Public spaces, inexpensive cafés, and public transportation all become noticeably busier. For years, however, people in Almaty have generally avoided blaming newcomers for the city's infrastructure problems, preferring to put up with the inconvenience. This year, though, that tolerance has been put to a serious test. By October, residents had realized that ignoring the elephant in the room was becoming increasingly absurd. Journalists began picking up complaints from social media and amplifying residents' grievances. One of the most widely circulated images in mid-October showed a young woman's leg trapped in a bus door as she tried to squeeze aboard. City officials responded like firefighters trying to contain a blaze of public outrage. They blamed traffic congestion for throwing buses off schedule and acted as though the problem was limited to just one or two routes. Roadwork commissioned by the Almaty authorities themselves has added to the disruption. Officials have also pointed to fare evasion, claiming that more than 30% of passengers during rush hour were not paying their fares. [caption id="attachment_60039" align="aligncenter" width="1816"] Buses are often full to capacity.[/caption] "Fare payments are also used to calculate how many buses are needed on a route. Currently, 3,238 public transportation vehicles operate in Almaty every day," Almaty's Department of Road Traffic and Public Transport Management explained. On November 5, officials insisted that the number of buses in service had not fallen, although they acknowledged cutting the number of journeys by 20–30% during off-peak hours. They again blamed traffic congestion and claimed that more than 40% of passengers were not paying their fares. These explanations failed to satisfy Almaty residents who regularly pay their fares. They had already uncovered a document that had previously escaped public attention. It turned out to be the city's public transportation tariff commission minutes, published on the department's website. They record meetings through August 7, 2026, and the commission's approval of reductions in planned bus deployments and journeys across city routes "in accordance with consultants' recommendations." "The reductions were made in accordance with international practices. The number of vehicles deployed on city routes was reduced by up to 20% on weekdays, 10% on Saturdays, 25% on Sundays, and 35% on public holidays. The number of round trips on city routes was reduced by 10–20% on weekdays, 5–10% on Saturdays, 12.5–25% on Sundays, and 17.5–35% on public holidays," the document states. As if that were not enough, another revealing document surfaced: an October 22, 2026, publication by the Committee of...

Opinion: What is on the agenda for Central Asia at COP31?

The 2026 United Nations Climate Change Conference, better known as COP31, is taking place in Antalya, Türkiye, from November 9 to 20. Delegations from almost 200 countries will participate in the event, including all the Central Asian republics, but Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan will play an outsize role in coordinating their messaging and ensuring the regional environmental agenda gets the time it needs in the spotlight. The buzzword for the C5 in Türkiye is “cooperation.” Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources will host a meeting for Central Asia’s five environmental ministers at its national pavilion to discuss regional cooperation and joint climate initiatives. Uzbekistan is committed to contributing to common positions on glacier retreat, water security, adaptation needs, and equitable access to climate finance through the multilateral Mountain Group and the Group of Landlocked Developing Countries (LLDCs). Turkmenistan will continue pushing for the formation of the Ashgabat Climate Dialogue as a new multilateral platform for promoting climate change initiatives. In line with its Mountain Agenda, the Kyrgyz Republic will be lobbying for support to establish the Global Mountain Resilience Center in Bishkek. Mobilizing affordable climate finance is critical for all the republics. According to the Climate Policy Initiative, global climate finance reached $2 trillion in 2024, against estimated annual mitigation finance needs of $7.8 trillion through 2030. In an interview with The Times of Central Asia, Aziz Abdukhakimov, Presidential Adviser on Environmental Issues and Chair of the National Committee on Ecology and Climate Change of the Republic of Uzbekistan, stated: “Access to adequate, predictable and affordable climate finance remains essential for developing countries to achieve their climate goals. For Uzbekistan, the implementation of our national climate commitments is estimated to require approximately $33.7 billion for mitigation and $15.7 billion for adaptation by 2030.” Closing, or at least narrowing, that gap requires building support among international financial institutions, multilateral development banks, development partners, and private investors. The GEF Council, meeting in Samarkand ahead of the Eighth GEF Assembly, endorsed a $3.9 billion replenishment package (GEF-9), demonstrating donor interest and tangible commitment to climate projects, including for a restoration project in the Chu and Talas river basins shared by Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and for a risk mitigation facility to attract private investment into Uzbekistan’s renewable energy sector. But there is hope that commitments at COP31 will go further. In September 2026, during Climate Week NYC, President-Designate Murat Kurum announced that Uzbekistan would be one of the first five pilot countries to receive support under the Climate Implementation Bridge (BRIDGE), the flagship initiative of COP31. This represents an important opportunity to translate national climate priorities into investment-ready projects and facilitate access to international financing. In his interview, Abdukhakimov stated that Uzbekistan’s focus will be “mobilizing investment in renewable energy, energy efficiency, climate-resilient infrastructure, sustainable water management, agriculture and ecosystem restoration.” At the same time, Kazakhstan will be presenting its plans to establish a national climate investment platform, plus a framework partnership program for developing the circular economy across Central Asia. Tajikistan will be...

Opinion: A Deeper Understanding of Transshipment

The White House recently issued a report on the transshipment of goods. It focuses on allegations that some countries with lower tariffs seek to evade U.S. tariffs on China by exporting goods that are really produced in China and only slightly modified, if at all, before further export to the U.S. The report groups more than 40 countries in what it terms a “shadow transshipment network” into three different categories based on how much it estimates the risk of transshipment and the integration of the economy into supply chains involving China. The first tier, mostly advanced countries, are larger economies where transshipment can show up in otherwise “broadly legitimate” trade. The second tier are a few larger developing countries, which have close links with the Chinese economy. The third tier the report terms “small, opportunistic Chinese targets” with “specific weak-link advantages” that increase transshipment risk. To be clear, transshipment is a risk in some economies. There is also legitimate transshipment (for instance, through normal supply chains and logistics channels) and illegal transshipment (where an exporter files a false certification as to the origin, character, or value of goods). False certifications are punishable by civil and criminal penalties in the U.S. and in most other countries. The World Customs Organization also has international standards on transshipment. So there are reasons to be vigilant about the risk of illegal transshipment. But to see why the report also misses the mark, consider the example of a country increasingly important to the U.S. with a fast-growing economy. To top it off, the country borders China. It’s Kazakhstan. First, the report is wrong to call Kazakhstan “small.” It’s 49th in the world by GDP – quite an accomplishment for a country which was formerly part of the Soviet Union. Second, to term Kazakhstan an “opportunistic Chinese target” is simply not accurate. There is strong trade and investment between China and Kazakhstan, as one would expect from large neighboring countries. And Kazakhstan, particularly at its Khorgos border cooperation center, plays a vital role in the rapidly growing Middle Corridor of trade between China and Europe. But this is legitimate transshipment of goods, and it is deeply unfair to suggest that Kazakhstan may not be fulfilling its duties. Let’s also not forget why the Middle Corridor is growing: because the West sought another route for Chinese goods after the Russian invasion of Ukraine made shipment through Russia impractical or subject to sanctions. Kazakhstan is a regional and even global leader in digitalization of both tax and Customs systems. The “smart border” policy is a success in facilitating legal trade while maintaining vigilance and security: in the first half of 2026, about 60% of declarations of goods were automatic, and 80% of transit declarations were completed without the need for Customs control forms. Deepening digital exchange protocols with regional partners including China, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan will speed legal trade even further. Digitalization builds honest systems, free from corruption – and by definition lowering the risk of transshipment. Kazakhstan...