• KGS/USD = 0.01181 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00206 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09403 0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 -0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01181 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00206 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09403 0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 -0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01181 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00206 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09403 0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 -0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01181 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00206 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09403 0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 -0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01181 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00206 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09403 0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 -0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01181 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00206 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09403 0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 -0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01181 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00206 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09403 0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 -0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01181 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00206 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09403 0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 -0.28%
07 October 2024

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 71

The Geopolitical Battle for Kazakhstan’s First Nuclear Power Plant

Nuclear power plants currently operate in only 32 countries in the world. Kazakhstan seems poised to join their ranks in the near future; but what does this shift mean for the energy-rich Central Asian nation? Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Kazakhstan has been a strong advocate for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Astana not only eliminated its nuclear arsenal, which was one of the largest in the world at the time, but also closed the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site, where the Soviet Union conducted more than 450 nuclear tests over 40 years. Thousands of people in Kazakhstan experienced birth defects and cancer linked to nuclear testing. This history makes the construction of a nuclear power plant in the former Soviet republic a particularly sensitive issue. Nevertheless, a majority of the population in Kazakhstan is expected to support building a nuclear facility in the national referendum scheduled for October 6. But what comes after the vote? If the citizens of Kazakhstan approve the government’s plans to go nuclear, the country might get its first nuclear power plant no earlier than 2035. In the meantime, Astana will have to find a strategic partner to participate in the development of the facility. Building and operation a nuclear power plant requires advanced technology, engineering expertise, and rigorous safety standards – areas where Kazakhstan currently lacks experience. “As a result, the country will likely need to rely on international partners to design, build, and possibly even operate its first nuclear power plant,” said James Walker, CEO and Head of Reactor Development at NANO Nuclear Energy, in an interview with The Times of Central Asia. Although most policymakers in Kazakhstan would like Western companies to build a nuclear power plant in Ulken, on the western shore of Lake Balkhash, at this point the Russian State Nuclear Energy Corporation Rosatom seems to have the best chance of playing a key role in the project. In Walker’s view, Russia has a long history of cooperation with Kazakhstan in the nuclear sector and could be a logical partner, especially given its extensive experience in building and operating nuclear power plants in other countries. “Rosatom has been actively involved in Kazakhstan’s nuclear sector for years, including uranium mining and nuclear fuel cycle activities. This established presence, coupled with Russia’s geopolitical influence in Central Asia, makes Rosatom a strong contender,” stressed the CEO of NANO Nuclear Energy, pointing out that Chinese corporations are also very interested in the potential construction of the first Kazakh nuclear power plant. Indeed, according to reports, the China National Nuclear Corporation offered to build a 1.2 GW nuclear power plant unit in Kazakhstan for $2.8 billion, with the construction taking five years. Another candidate for the project is South Korea’s Korea Electric Power Corporation. The largest electric utility in the East Asian nation reportedly proposed building a water-cooled power reactor –using water as a coolant to transfer heat away from the core. Walker, however, argues that while South Korea has a competitive edge...

The Ferghana Valley: Navigating Complex Challenges in Central Asia’s Most Volatile Region

The Ferghana Valley is one of Central Asia’s most fertile and densely populated areas, but it is also among the most volatile. Spanning Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, this landlocked region has long been a hotbed of ethnic tension, water disputes, and political instability. These challenges are deeply rooted in the geography, history, and sociopolitical landscape, making the valley a key focal point for understanding broader regional dynamics in Central Asia.   Geographical Importance and Ethnic Diversity Nestled between the towering Tien Shan and Pamir Mountain ranges, the Ferghana Valley covers over 22,000 square kilometers. It is fertile land nourished by the Syr Darya River, making it a critical area for cultivating cotton, fruits, and vegetables. These natural resources have historically drawn diverse populations, creating a vibrant ethnic mosaic. The valley is home to Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, and Tajiks, as well as smaller ethnic groups. While ethnic Uzbeks form the majority, significant Kyrgyz and Tajik minorities inhabit border regions. The ethnic diversity of the Ferghana Valley is both a strength and a source of tension. Soviet-era border policies exacerbated these divisions by creating artificial boundaries that crisscrossed the valley, leaving behind ethnic enclaves — pockets of one nationality surrounded by the territory of another. These enclaves have complicated governance and territorial integrity, making border management a persistent challenge.   The Soviet Legacy and Border Disputes During Soviet rule, the Central Asian republics were organized under Stalin’s divide-and-rule strategy, which deliberately created complex borders to weaken local identities and prevent regional unity. The Ferghana Valley, divided among three Soviet republics, is a prime example of this approach. After the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991, the administrative boundaries became international borders overnight between Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. The lack of clearly defined borders has sparked numerous conflicts over territory, water, and land. A notable clash between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in 2021 resulted in over 40 deaths and the destruction of homes and infrastructure. Many disputes revolve around access to scarce resources like water and arable land. These issues have escalated into violent confrontations, leading to casualties and the displacement of local populations.   Water: A Scarce and Contested Resource Water is the lifeblood of the Ferghana Valley, but disputes over its allocation are a major source of tension. The valley depends heavily on irrigation for its agricultural productivity, and the Syr Darya River, along with its tributaries, plays a crucial role in supplying water to the region. However, the division of the valley among the three countries complicates water management. Uzbekistan, the most populous of the three, relies on the valley’s water resources for its cotton industry, a cornerstone of its economy. Meanwhile, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which control the headwaters of the Syr Darya, often use their upstream position to leverage water access. This dynamic has led to frequent disagreements over water usage. For instance, Kyrgyzstan has at times threatened to withhold water unless it receives compensation, either through payments or electricity.   Ethnic Tensions and Political Instability Ethnic tensions further complicate the Ferghana Valley’s already volatile...

Uzbekistan’s Path to Reform: Navigating the 2024 Elections with a New Electoral System

Uzbekistan’s upcoming parliamentary elections, scheduled for October 27, 2024, mark an important step in the country’s political evolution. These elections will fill 150 seats in the Legislative Chamber, the lower house of the Oliy Majlis, and determine the composition of various regional, district, and city councils. In addition, 65 members of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Karakalpakstan will also be elected. These elections are notable not only because of their timing — shifting from December to October under a 2021 reform — but also due to the adoption of a mixed electoral system that was introduced in December 2023. This shift represents an important evolution from the previous majority-based system, introducing a balance between majority and proportional representation, which will shape the composition of Uzbekistan’s Legislative Chamber. The new system reflects a broader attempt at political reform and modernization. Of the 150 seats, 75 will be decided through single-mandate districts, where the candidate with the most votes will win, while the remaining 75 will be allocated proportionally based on party results. Uzbekistan’s political landscape, however, remains limited, with only five officially registered parties. In the 2019 elections, the Liberal Democratic Party (UzLiDeP), which is closely linked to the presidency, won the most seats. While this mixed system represents a potential step forward, challenges persist in terms of political pluralism and genuine competition. Uzbekistan, in its journey toward stronger democratic practices, can find inspiration in the electoral processes of other established democracies, particularly India — the world’s largest democracy. India’s electoral system, honed over decades, has become a model for managing elections in a complex and diverse society. The parallels between Uzbekistan’s emerging political landscape and India’s robust democratic traditions offer an opportunity for learning and adaptation.

Navigating Challenges: The ICG Reports on Taliban Drug Ban and Its Global Implications

The International Crisis Group, an NGO focused on analyzing conflicts, has reported that “After the Taliban's severe restrictions on women's rights made the regime odious to much of the outside world, the narcotics ban offers a rare opportunity to work with the new authorities on a pressing issue for the benefit of all sides.” Drugs from Afghanistan are a universal problem affecting all regions of the world except for Latin America, with Central Asia remaining one of the main routes for Afghan drugs on their way to Russia and Europe. The so-called “Northern Route” passes through Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, then to Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan before reaching the Russian and European markets. Turkmenistan also plays an important role as a transit country for drugs, but on the “Balkan route.” The drug threat from Afghanistan to the five Central Asian republics is not simply a political narrative used by the governments of these republics for their own political purposes. There is a risk of political instability, criminality, corruption, social degradation, and damage to human health as a result of drug trafficking from Afghanistan. Additionally, the elimination of Afghan drug production and trafficking is a key issue in the fight against terrorism, primarily against the Islamic State, as drugs are one of the main sources of income for these groups. In April 2022, hopes for a resolution to this problem appeared following the ban on opium poppy cultivation imposed by the Taliban. Papaver somniferum, commonly known as the opium poppy, has been cultivated in Afghanistan since at least the early twentieth century. The history of opium production is detailed in the Global Illicit Drug Trends report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Besides the history of opium production, the report provides an overview of measures taken by states in their attempts to regulate and control the drug. Opium began to dominate world drug markets in the early 1980s, after the “April Revolution” and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, when the state began to lose control of rural areas, and agriculture itself began to decline. As the UNODC points out, by 1989, opium production was firmly established as the country's main source of income - Afghanistan had become a narco-state. The civil war continued, and the opium economy became firmly entrenched in the country during the 1990s. The first fall of the Taliban in 2001 and the formation of a republican government failed to change the situation due to the newly formed state still having no control over the regions. As a result, its counter-narcotics measures were not effective. It should be noted that only the Taliban managed to reduce drug production. According to the UN, since the Taliban's 2023 ban, opium crops in Afghanistan have declined by 95%, and opium prices have reached record levels. However, many experts wonder if Afghanistan will be able to continue with its chosen policy. Can the new Afghan authorities alone continue to confront the drug threat, and what should be the role of...

Tokayev Gets Pundits Talking with “Invincible” Russia Remark

Carl von Clausewitz, the Prussian military theorist, described war as “the realm of uncertainty.” So, is Russia militarily invincible? Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev´s emphatic statement earlier this week that Russia can’t be defeated on the battlefield had analysts, observers and history buffs musing about whether the proposition is actually true, and what if any politics were behind the widely reported remark. Tokayev made the point in a conversation with visiting German Chancellor Olaf Scholz as part of a general argument for peace more than two years after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Western-backed Ukraine. The official English-language translation of Tokayev’s comment didn’t include “invincible,” but basically said the same thing: “It is a fact that Russia cannot be defeated militarily.” For some people, the remark was a blunt assessment of a grinding conflict that, according to a report this week in The Wall Street Journal, has killed and injured about one million Russians and Ukrainians. For others, it amounted to a kind of pro-Russian defeatism, even though Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries have angled for neutrality, not endorsing the invasion but maintaining traditional ties with Moscow. Roland Kater, an analyst and former commander in the Germany military, said he agreed – with caveats - with Tokayev’s assessment that Russia was militarily invincible. “With regard to the war in Ukraine, I would say yes at the moment, under the given conditions,” Kater said on Germany’s Welt news channel. He noted that NATO, which supports Ukraine won’t enter the war “as an institution.” “The result is that Ukraine cannot actually win this war at the moment and that the Russians there are, I don’t want to say unbeatable, but they are in the lead,” Kater said. Russia earned a reputation for resilience in past wars, after initial setbacks on its own territory and at great cost. It prevailed over Charles XII at the Battle of Poltava in 1709 after the Swedish king’s invasion of Russia; prevailed over Napoleon during the disastrous 1812 invasion in which the French emperor seized Moscow but was forced to retreat as disease, harsh weather and other problems took a toll; and prevailed over Adolf Hitler when the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 eventually faltered with massive casualties on both sides. Still, the Washington-based Central Asia Consulting group, a critic of Russia, said there was no basis for Tokayev’s comment about Russia’s military invincibility and made some unflattering historical references. “Russia has faced defeats in the past wars (Crimean War, Russo-Japanese War, WWI, Winter War, Afghanistan, First Chechen War, Tajikistan War),” the group said on X. In his remarks, Tokayev also said “further escalation of the war will lead to irreversible consequences” for humanity, in what appeared to be a message for the West since he was in the company of Scholz when he said it. Scholz agreed that peace was the best option but that Russia could end the war anytime by stopping its aggression. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, meanwhile, is expected to present what...

Redefining Diplomacy: Kazakhstan’s Strategic Shift in Relations With Afghanistan

On September 9, 2024, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev signed a decree dismissing Alimkhan Yesengeldiyev from the position of Kazakhstan's Ambassador to Afghanistan. Yesengeldiyev has been at the post since April 2018. Local media have not yet reported on the appointment of a new ambassador. Previously, Astana has made bold diplomatic steps towards normalizing relations with Afghanistan under Taliban rule. For instance, Kazakhstan accredited Taliban diplomats in April 2023, and removed the Taliban from its list of banned organizations in December 2023. On August 21 of this year, Kazakhstan accredited the head of the Afghan diplomatic mission as charge d'affaires in the country. Astana continues to increase trade, economic, and humanitarian cooperation with the de facto authorities, and has actively engaged in various international platforms for initiatives in Afghanistan. Moreover, President Tokayev outlined Kazakhstan's position on the situation in Afghanistan just a month after the Taliban seized Kabul, when the world was still in shock. “Kazakhstan sees the future Afghanistan as a truly independent and united state living in peace with itself and its neighbors," he stated. "At this crucial historical moment, the multinational people of Afghanistan should not be left alone in the face of unprecedented difficulties.” By changing the head of its diplomatic mission in Kabul, it appears that the authorities in Kazakhstan intend to qualitatively improve the state of their relations with the Taliban. The eventual appointment of a new head of the Kazakh embassy will symbolize a new page in relations. In all likelihood, according to recognized international practice, a diplomat will be presented to the Taliban not in the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary but as the Charge d'Affaires of Kazakhstan. This will preserve the principle of parity and be understandable given international disputes surrounding recognition of the Taliban. Overall, Kazakhstan's foreign policy steps have always been characterized by consistency and an unwavering focus on international law. It seems that the world as a whole is now acclimatizing to the idea of pragmatic dialog with the authorities in Kabul, with whom it is necessary to maintain constant bilateral and multilateral diplomatic contacts. On September 27, at the official request of the British government, the embassy of the former Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in London will officially cease operations. The embassy building will not be handed over to the Taliban or any other political representation. The embassy in Oslo representing the former government in Afghanistan has also ceased functions since September 12 at the request of the authorities there. Neither the British nor the Norwegian authorities are currently commenting on the situation. A few days ago, Deutsche Welle reported that the German Foreign Ministry has accepted the Taliban's application to recognize their consulate general in Munich as the sole center for providing consular services in Germany. In July, the Taliban Foreign Ministry declared that documents issued by 14 Afghan missions abroad are illegitimate. They were located in Britain, Berlin and Bonn in Germany, Belgium, Switzerland, Austria, France, Italy, Greece, Poland, Australia, Sweden, Canada, and Norway. Currently, the...