• KGS/USD = 0.01143 -0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00193 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10881 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 -0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00193 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10881 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 -0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00193 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10881 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 -0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00193 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10881 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 -0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00193 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10881 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 -0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00193 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10881 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 -0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00193 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10881 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 -0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00193 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10881 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
21 December 2025

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 237

Kazakhstan Claims Success in Asset Recovery, But Transparency Questions Linger

Kazakhstan’s authorities have presented the results of the campaign to recover illegally acquired or transferred assets as a major success. In September 2025, during his address to the nation, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev signaled a transition from asset recovery to broader investor-protection priorities. According to Prosecutor General Berik Asylov, recoveries totaling hundreds of billions of tenge have been returned to the state since the launch of the asset-recovery campaign. This includes not only cash and securities, but also land plots, business assets, and luxury property. Overall, official estimates put the total value of assets clawed back under the campaign at around 1.2–1.3 trillion tenge (roughly $2.3 billion), though only part of this amount has been directly credited to the state budget. A tax on indulgence When the law “On the Return of Illegally Acquired Assets to the State” was adopted in 2023, it was presented not merely as a fiscal tool but as a means of restoring historical justice. As part of the concept of building a “Fair Kazakhstan,” the authorities promised that assets once hidden in offshore accounts or invested in luxury real estate abroad would be redirected toward social development. Two years later, it is clear that the assets have indeed been returned. Yet instead of a transparent process in which citizens could clearly see how recovered funds were being used, the system has created a dense layer of bureaucracy. Money has been accumulated in the Special State Fund (SSF), the operating mechanisms of which continue to raise questions among experts. Despite official reports highlighting the construction of social facilities financed with seized assets, public debate over the transparency of the fund has not subsided. The authorities have also declined to publish the names of former asset owners or detailed information on specific accounts, enterprises, or land plots transferred to the state. A defining feature of the campaign was the rejection of a purely punitive approach. Instead, the government introduced a mechanism of “voluntary return,” effectively offering members of the elite a compromise: return swathes of your illegally acquired wealth, and the state will refrain from pursuing past offenses. The law clearly defined the target group, focusing on individuals owning assets valued at more than 13 million MCI, or roughly $100 million. This ensured pressure on large capital holders while shielding medium-sized businesses. At the same time, the closed nature of the list created a powerful instrument of leverage over the business elite. Experts have described this approach as a “tax on indulgence.” Rather than engaging in lengthy and uncertain international legal battles over offshore assets, Astana has opted for pretrial settlements. In legal terms, this takes the form of procedural agreements in which suspects acknowledge wrongdoing, return assets, and receive reduced sentences or exemption from liability. The most prominent and controversial example is the case of Kairat Satybaldy, a nephew of former president Nursultan Nazarbayev. After returning assets reportedly worth approximately $1.4 billion, he received a reduced sentence and was released ahead of schedule. From a fiscal standpoint,...

Kazakhstan Increases Criminal Penalties for Attacks on Medical Workers

Kazakhstan’s Mazhilis (lower house of parliament) has approved amendments to the Criminal and Criminal Procedure Codes aimed at strengthening penalties for violence and threats against medical personnel, including doctors, paramedics, and ambulance drivers, while on duty. The legislation introduces a new article establishing specific criminal liability for actions that endanger the life, health, and safety of medical workers. The law also defines penalties based on the severity of the offense. For threats of violence, penalties include: A fine of 200 to 500 monthly calculation indices (MCI), with 1 MCI currently equivalent to $7.66; Or corrective labor in the same amount; Or community service for up to 300 hours; Or restriction or deprivation of liberty for up to 2 years. If the threats occur under aggravating circumstances, the punishment increases to 2-3 years of restricted freedom or imprisonment. For acts of violence not posing a risk to life or health, penalties include: A fine of 500 to 1,000 MCI; Or corrective labor; Or community service for up to 600 hours; Or restriction or deprivation of liberty for 2-3 years. The most serious offenses, violence that endangers life or health, carry prison sentences of 5 to 10 years. If aggravating factors are present, the term increases to 7 to 12 years. The amendments also clarify the jurisdiction of internal affairs bodies, granting them authority to conduct preliminary investigations and inquiries into cases involving attacks on medical workers. According to the Ministry of Health, more than 280 assaults on healthcare personnel have been recorded in Kazakhstan since 2019. In tandem with the legal changes, the government is expanding protective measures. Round-the-clock police posts have been established at 152 hospitals nationwide. In Astana and Almaty, a pilot project has equipped 10 ambulance teams with smart video badges. The Ministry of Health reports that these devices have helped reduce conflicts with patients by 90%. In July, The Times of Central Asia reported that Kazakhstan’s health minister had demanded an end to violence against medical workers, saying attacks on doctors and ambulance crews had crossed a “red line” and threatened the safety of the profession.

Dozens of Human Trafficking Attempts Prevented in Kazakhstan

Kazakh law enforcement agencies have disrupted dozens of serious human trafficking attempts during the nationwide STOP-Traffic operational and preventive campaign, according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The ministry reported 39 recorded cases of attempted human trafficking, including six involving minors. In Almaty, authorities dismantled a criminal group engaged in the illegal sale of newborns. According to investigators, the suspects exploited vulnerable young women by persuading them to give up their babies in exchange for money. More than 20 criminal cases have been opened, and all suspects have been detained. If convicted, they face up to 18 years in prison and confiscation of property. In the Abai Region, law enforcement uncovered forced labor operations involving local citizens. Eleven criminal cases have been initiated, and the case files are being prepared for court proceedings, the ministry said. Routine inspections of nightlife venues in several regions, including Shymkent, Zhambyl, Aktobe, West Kazakhstan, Karaganda, and Kostanay, also led to the prevention of exploitative practices involving both adults and minors. In Astana, police and prosecutors conducted targeted raids near the city’s railway station on Goethe Street. Eight individuals are currently under prosecution for organizing and operating brothels for sexual exploitation. Meanwhile, in the Akmola Region, the activities of a religious group operating a so-called “spiritual center” were halted. Law enforcement seized religious literature, ceremonial items, and ritual objects. Expert examinations have been ordered, and the investigation remains ongoing. Authorities also documented the operations of “elite escort” services in Astana, Almaty, and Shymkent. The organizers allegedly recruited young women from nightclubs and bars. Related criminal cases have been submitted to court on charges of organizing prostitution. In the first half of 2025, Kazakhstan recorded 134 crimes related to human trafficking. This comes amid the implementation of a new national law on combating human trafficking, which took effect in 2024. The law was developed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs with technical support from the International Organization for Migration.

Saltanat Law One Year On: Domestic Violence Crackdown, Hidden Barriers Remain

In the spring of 2024, the world's attention turned to Astana as the trial of former minister Kuandyk Bishimbayev unfolded. Accused of the brutal murder of his common-law wife, Saltanat Nukenova, the proceedings were broadcast live, marking the region’s first live-streamed murder trial, which was widely followed like a reality show. The livestream drew hundreds of thousands across Kazakhstan, with daily clips dissected on TikTok and Telegram channels, a public fixation that turned the courtroom into a national arena Under intense public pressure, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev signed a landmark legislative reform popularly dubbed “Saltanat's Law.” These amendments enhanced protections for women and children. The most consequential change was re-criminalizing battery and intentional infliction of minor bodily harm — offences frequently present in domestic violence cases — which had previously been treated as administrative violations. Now, over a year later, the emotional urgency has waned, giving way to the realities of implementation. The transition from legislative success to consistent enforcement has revealed systemic resistance from conservative communities and infrastructural gaps. A Statistical Paradox The initial police data may appear counterintuitive. Rather than declining, reported cases of domestic abuse surged following the law’s passage. According to the General Prosecutor’s Office and the Institute of Legislation, such offenses increased by 238% within a year, rising from 406 to 1,370 criminal cases by mid-2025. Interior Ministry data shows that more than 70,000 protective orders were issued nationwide in the first nine months of 2025, a surge driven by mandatory registration and proactive police intervention. Experts caution against interpreting this spike as a rise in violence, however. Instead, it reflects the exposure of previously hidden abuse. From 1 July 2023, police could start administrative domestic-violence cases without a victim’s complaint. The 2024 Saltanat Law then reinforced this proactive approach in the criminal sphere. The law also removed the option for repeated reconciliation. Previously, over 60% of domestic violence cases collapsed when victims, often under familial pressure, withdrew their statements. Now, cases proceed regardless. As a result, administrative arrests have doubled, supporting the argument long made by human rights activists: it is the inevitability of punishment, not its severity, that disrupts the cycle of abuse. Uneven Enforcement Across Regions The law's effectiveness varies significantly by region. High reporting rates in cities such as Almaty and Astana and in northern industrial regions often reflect improved enforcement rather than increased violence. In these areas, women are more aware of their rights, and law enforcement responds accordingly. In Astana and Almaty, police units trained specifically on domestic violence now conduct routine checks and intervene based on neighbour reports or video evidence, even without a formal complaint. Conversely, in more traditional regions, particularly Turkestan, Zhambyl, and parts of western Kazakhstan, domestic violence often remains underreported. Here, entrenched patriarchal norms and the cultural concept of uyat (shame) discourage women from seeking legal help. Local police and community leaders sometimes view reporting abuse as a family disgrace and pressure women to resolve disputes privately. In the Turkestan region, activists recount cases in...

Information Sovereignty? Central Asia Tightens Control Over Its Information Space

Across the post-Soviet space, governments are adopting new measures that affect the scope of free expression. Similar trends are visible in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and parts of Eastern Europe, reflecting wider global shifts in how states manage their information environments. In Central Asia, where journalism has long faced political constraints, recent policies indicate a renewed emphasis on controlling the flow of information. From Georgia to Kazakhstan: Pushback Against Foreign Narratives Recent events in Georgia highlight these changes. The adoption of a controversial “foreign agents” law, widely described as a Russian-style or “pro-Russian” measure, reflected the ruling party’s growing hostility to foreign-funded media and NGOs, many backed by European donors, and triggered mass pro-EU protests in Tbilisi. Similar dynamics are emerging in Central Asia, where officials increasingly view foreign narratives as interference in domestic affairs. In Kazakhstan, legislative restrictions on so-called "LGBT propaganda" have sparked both domestic protests and criticism from international partners. At the same time, well-known media figure Gulnar Bazhkenova, editor-in-chief of Orda.kz, has been placed under house arrest, an episode that underscores the tightening environment for journalists. The Bazhkenova Case: A Turning Point for Kazakh Media Bazhkenova, a prominent editor known for critical coverage of Kazakhstan’s political elite and security services, came under scrutiny after Orda.kz falsely reported the arrest of Foreign Minister Murat Nurtleu, an unverified claim that was quickly debunked. Although Nurtleu remained in his position immediately afterward, he was dismissed later in September, prompting speculation that the incident had political consequences. Soon after his departure, law enforcement launched an investigation into Bazhkenova. On December 1, Almaty police searched her residence and the offices of Orda.kz. Authorities stated that a 2024 article had disseminated false information regarding a law enforcement officer allegedly caught accepting a bribe, an incident that officials assert never occurred. Another article reportedly misrepresented details in a property dispute, allegedly damaging the business reputation of the involved party. The Almaty police have since opened additional investigations into past publications from Orda.kz that may contain misleading content. Media organizations have largely responded with condemnation, urging the authorities to decriminalize the dissemination of false information and instead treat such cases under civil law. However, the Union of Journalists of Kazakhstan issued a pointed statement calling on media professionals to “treat the preparation and dissemination of information responsibly. Individual cases for the dissemination of inaccurate information cast a shadow on the entire journalistic community of our country,” the organization said.  An implicit acknowledgment, perhaps, that Bazhkenova’s actions may have crossed legal or ethical boundaries. Parallel Cases and Regional Patterns While suppression of the media in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan has long been widespread, Kyrgyzstan - long considered the most politically open country in Central Asia - has also moved to tighten control over its information space. In early 2024, authorities introduced a controversial “foreign representatives” law requiring NGOs and media outlets receiving international funding to register under a special status, echoing legislation seen in Russia and Georgia. Independent outlets such as Kloop, Temirov Live, and Azattyk...

Kazakhstan vs Eni: How a Swiss Lawsuit Could Reshape the $160 Billion Kashagan Dispute

The legal landscape surrounding Kazakhstan’s energy sector has taken an unexpected turn. What began as a closed commercial arbitration dispute has now entered the public sphere in Switzerland’s courts. This marks a significant escalation in Astana’s confrontation with international oil and gas majors. According to Bloomberg, PSA LLP, a structure representing Kazakhstan’s interests in production-sharing agreements (PSAs), has significantly broadened its claims. The lawsuit now directly targets alleged schemes involving units and executives of the Italian company Eni. Kazakhstan alleges that during the early development of Kashagan infrastructure, including the Bolashak processing plant and pipeline systems, corruption and fraud may have occurred. Arbitration claims against the NCOC consortium, which includes Shell, ExxonMobil, TotalEnergies, and Eni, exceed $150 billion. Within this context, the Swiss case has become the most sensitive element. The Swiss case itself is much smaller – $15 million plus interest – and is being used to gather evidence and strengthen the larger arbitration case. While the financial stakes are high, the proceedings reflect a deeper political shift. Kazakhstan is moving away from the 1990s model of offering investors exceptional privileges. Under President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s “Fair Kazakhstan” policy, the state is aiming to secure more balanced and equitable cooperation with foreign partners. Distinctiveness of Swiss Proceedings The Swiss case is distinctive due to the nature of its allegations. The plaintiffs claim that during the tenure of Agip KCO (an Eni subsidiary) as project operator, contracts were awarded amid corrupt practices. Allegations include inflated prices and kickbacks to contractors. Targeting Eni is deliberate. The company led the project during its most troubled phase from 2001 to 2008. Kashagan’s budget swelled during this period, with repeated delays. Following a 2013 gas leak, production was halted for nearly three years. Kazakh officials have long linked Kashagan’s massive cost overruns and technical failures to poor procurement and mismanagement, and the current legal offensive zeroes in on alleged corrupt tenders. Cost estimates rose from a few tens of billions of dollars to around $60 billion, and by 2007, projections for total project costs had reached about $136 billion. Why Switzerland? The selection of the Swiss jurisdiction is strategic. Switzerland’s laws on corruption and financial crimes allow for the prosecution of both corporations and individual executives. Moreover, many entities connected to Kashagan’s operations are registered there. Another factor is the PSA’s stabilization clause, which forbids altering the contract’s terms. However, under international legal norms, if corruption is proven in the contract’s formation, such protections can be voided. This opens the door for Kazakhstan to challenge key financial terms of the agreement. Resource Nationalism 2.0: Legal Strategy Meets Political Logic Astana’s current posture can be described as a form of “new-generation resource nationalism.” Rather than using administrative leverage, the state is deploying legal tools to address grievances. This is driven in part by Kazakhstan’s fiscal needs, ranging from infrastructure upgrades to social spending. Amid these pressures, the vast expenditures reported by Kashagan operators have drawn public skepticism. Kazakhstan’s claims aim to re-evaluate the cost recovery model...