Kazakhstan Justice - The Times Of Central Asia

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Human Trafficking

Dozens of Human Trafficking Attempts Prevented in Kazakhstan

Kazakh law enforcement agencies have disrupted dozens of serious human trafficking attempts during the nationwide STOP-Traffic operational and preventive campaign, according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The ministry reported 39 recorded cases of attempted human trafficking, including six involving minors. In Almaty, authorities dismantled a criminal group engaged in the illegal sale of newborns. According to investigators, the suspects exploited vulnerable young women by persuading them to give up their babies in exchange for money. More than 20 criminal cases have been opened, and all suspects have been detained. If convicted, they face up to 18 years in prison and confiscation of property. In the Abai Region, law enforcement uncovered forced labor operations involving local citizens. Eleven criminal cases have been initiated, and the case files are being prepared for court proceedings, the ministry said. Routine inspections of nightlife venues in several regions, including Shymkent, Zhambyl, Aktobe, West Kazakhstan, Karaganda, and Kostanay, also led to the prevention of exploitative practices involving both adults and minors. In Astana, police and prosecutors conducted targeted raids near the city’s railway station on Goethe Street. Eight individuals are currently under prosecution for organizing and operating brothels for sexual exploitation. Meanwhile, in the Akmola Region, the activities of a religious group operating a so-called “spiritual center” were halted. Law enforcement seized religious literature, ceremonial items, and ritual objects. Expert examinations have been ordered, and the investigation remains ongoing. Authorities also documented the operations of “elite escort” services in Astana, Almaty, and Shymkent. The organizers allegedly recruited young women from nightclubs and bars. Related criminal cases have been submitted to court on charges of organizing prostitution. In the first half of 2025, Kazakhstan recorded 134 crimes related to human trafficking. This comes amid the implementation of a new national law on combating human trafficking, which took effect in 2024. The law was developed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs with technical support from the International Organization for Migration.

Saltanat Law

Saltanat Law One Year On: Domestic Violence Crackdown, Hidden Barriers Remain

In the spring of 2024, the world's attention turned to Astana as the trial of former minister Kuandyk Bishimbayev unfolded. Accused of the brutal murder of his common-law wife, Saltanat Nukenova, the proceedings were broadcast live, marking the region’s first live-streamed murder trial, which was widely followed like a reality show. The livestream drew hundreds of thousands across Kazakhstan, with daily clips dissected on TikTok and Telegram channels, a public fixation that turned the courtroom into a national arena Under intense public pressure, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev signed a landmark legislative reform popularly dubbed “Saltanat's Law.” These amendments enhanced protections for women and children. The most consequential change was re-criminalizing battery and intentional infliction of minor bodily harm — offences frequently present in domestic violence cases — which had previously been treated as administrative violations. Now, over a year later, the emotional urgency has waned, giving way to the realities of implementation. The transition from legislative success to consistent enforcement has revealed systemic resistance from conservative communities and infrastructural gaps. A Statistical Paradox The initial police data may appear counterintuitive. Rather than declining, reported cases of domestic abuse surged following the law’s passage. According to the General Prosecutor’s Office and the Institute of Legislation, such offenses increased by 238% within a year, rising from 406 to 1,370 criminal cases by mid-2025. Interior Ministry data shows that more than 70,000 protective orders were issued nationwide in the first nine months of 2025, a surge driven by mandatory registration and proactive police intervention. Experts caution against interpreting this spike as a rise in violence, however. Instead, it reflects the exposure of previously hidden abuse. From 1 July 2023, police could start administrative domestic-violence cases without a victim’s complaint. The 2024 Saltanat Law then reinforced this proactive approach in the criminal sphere. The law also removed the option for repeated reconciliation. Previously, over 60% of domestic violence cases collapsed when victims, often under familial pressure, withdrew their statements. Now, cases proceed regardless. As a result, administrative arrests have doubled, supporting the argument long made by human rights activists: it is the inevitability of punishment, not its severity, that disrupts the cycle of abuse. Uneven Enforcement Across Regions The law's effectiveness varies significantly by region. High reporting rates in cities such as Almaty and Astana and in northern industrial regions often reflect improved enforcement rather than increased violence. In these areas, women are more aware of their rights, and law enforcement responds accordingly. In Astana and Almaty, police units trained specifically on domestic violence now conduct routine checks and intervene based on neighbour reports or video evidence, even without a formal complaint. Conversely, in more traditional regions, particularly Turkestan, Zhambyl, and parts of western Kazakhstan, domestic violence often remains underreported. Here, entrenched patriarchal norms and the cultural concept of uyat (shame) discourage women from seeking legal help. Local police and community leaders sometimes view reporting abuse as a family disgrace and pressure women to resolve disputes privately. In the Turkestan region, activists recount cases in...

Freedom of Speech

Information Sovereignty? Central Asia Tightens Control Over Its Information Space

Across the post-Soviet space, governments are adopting new measures that affect the scope of free expression. Similar trends are visible in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and parts of Eastern Europe, reflecting wider global shifts in how states manage their information environments. In Central Asia, where journalism has long faced political constraints, recent policies indicate a renewed emphasis on controlling the flow of information. From Georgia to Kazakhstan: Pushback Against Foreign Narratives Recent events in Georgia highlight these changes. The adoption of a controversial “foreign agents” law, widely described as a Russian-style or “pro-Russian” measure, reflected the ruling party’s growing hostility to foreign-funded media and NGOs, many backed by European donors, and triggered mass pro-EU protests in Tbilisi. Similar dynamics are emerging in Central Asia, where officials increasingly view foreign narratives as interference in domestic affairs. In Kazakhstan, legislative restrictions on so-called "LGBT propaganda" have sparked both domestic protests and criticism from international partners. At the same time, well-known media figure Gulnar Bazhkenova, editor-in-chief of Orda.kz, has been placed under house arrest, an episode that underscores the tightening environment for journalists. The Bazhkenova Case: A Turning Point for Kazakh Media Bazhkenova, a prominent editor known for critical coverage of Kazakhstan’s political elite and security services, came under scrutiny after Orda.kz falsely reported the arrest of Foreign Minister Murat Nurtleu, an unverified claim that was quickly debunked. Although Nurtleu remained in his position immediately afterward, he was dismissed later in September, prompting speculation that the incident had political consequences. Soon after his departure, law enforcement launched an investigation into Bazhkenova. On December 1, Almaty police searched her residence and the offices of Orda.kz. Authorities stated that a 2024 article had disseminated false information regarding a law enforcement officer allegedly caught accepting a bribe, an incident that officials assert never occurred. Another article reportedly misrepresented details in a property dispute, allegedly damaging the business reputation of the involved party. The Almaty police have since opened additional investigations into past publications from Orda.kz that may contain misleading content. Media organizations have largely responded with condemnation, urging the authorities to decriminalize the dissemination of false information and instead treat such cases under civil law. However, the Union of Journalists of Kazakhstan issued a pointed statement calling on media professionals to “treat the preparation and dissemination of information responsibly. Individual cases for the dissemination of inaccurate information cast a shadow on the entire journalistic community of our country,” the organization said. An implicit acknowledgment, perhaps, that Bazhkenova’s actions may have crossed legal or ethical boundaries. Parallel Cases and Regional Patterns While suppression of the media in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan has long been widespread, Kyrgyzstan - long considered the most politically open country in Central Asia - has also moved to tighten control over its information space. In early 2024, authorities introduced a controversial “foreign representatives” law requiring NGOs and media outlets receiving international funding to register under a special status, echoing legislation seen in Russia and Georgia. Independent outlets such as Kloop, Temirov Live, and Azattyk...

Oil and Gas

Kazakhstan vs Eni: How a Swiss Lawsuit Could Reshape the $160 Billion Kashagan Dispute

The legal landscape surrounding Kazakhstan’s energy sector has taken an unexpected turn. What began as a closed commercial arbitration dispute has now entered the public sphere in Switzerland’s courts. This marks a significant escalation in Astana’s confrontation with international oil and gas majors. According to Bloomberg, PSA LLP, a structure representing Kazakhstan’s interests in production-sharing agreements (PSAs), has significantly broadened its claims. The lawsuit now directly targets alleged schemes involving units and executives of the Italian company Eni. Kazakhstan alleges that during the early development of Kashagan infrastructure, including the Bolashak processing plant and pipeline systems, corruption and fraud may have occurred. Arbitration claims against the NCOC consortium, which includes Shell, ExxonMobil, TotalEnergies, and Eni, exceed $150 billion. Within this context, the Swiss case has become the most sensitive element. The Swiss case itself is much smaller – $15 million plus interest – and is being used to gather evidence and strengthen the larger arbitration case. While the financial stakes are high, the proceedings reflect a deeper political shift. Kazakhstan is moving away from the 1990s model of offering investors exceptional privileges. Under President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s “Fair Kazakhstan” policy, the state is aiming to secure more balanced and equitable cooperation with foreign partners. Distinctiveness of Swiss Proceedings The Swiss case is distinctive due to the nature of its allegations. The plaintiffs claim that during the tenure of Agip KCO (an Eni subsidiary) as project operator, contracts were awarded amid corrupt practices. Allegations include inflated prices and kickbacks to contractors. Targeting Eni is deliberate. The company led the project during its most troubled phase from 2001 to 2008. Kashagan’s budget swelled during this period, with repeated delays. Following a 2013 gas leak, production was halted for nearly three years. Kazakh officials have long linked Kashagan’s massive cost overruns and technical failures to poor procurement and mismanagement, and the current legal offensive zeroes in on alleged corrupt tenders. Cost estimates rose from a few tens of billions of dollars to around $60 billion, and by 2007, projections for total project costs had reached about $136 billion. Why Switzerland? The selection of the Swiss jurisdiction is strategic. Switzerland’s laws on corruption and financial crimes allow for the prosecution of both corporations and individual executives. Moreover, many entities connected to Kashagan’s operations are registered there. Another factor is the PSA’s stabilization clause, which forbids altering the contract’s terms. However, under international legal norms, if corruption is proven in the contract’s formation, such protections can be voided. This opens the door for Kazakhstan to challenge key financial terms of the agreement. Resource Nationalism 2.0: Legal Strategy Meets Political Logic Astana’s current posture can be described as a form of “new-generation resource nationalism.” Rather than using administrative leverage, the state is deploying legal tools to address grievances. This is driven in part by Kazakhstan’s fiscal needs, ranging from infrastructure upgrades to social spending. Amid these pressures, the vast expenditures reported by Kashagan operators have drawn public skepticism. Kazakhstan’s claims aim to re-evaluate the cost recovery model...

Corruption

Kazakhstan vs. Eni: Who Is the Key Figure in the Swiss Lawsuit?

Kazakhstan’s $166 billion legal campaign against the oil majors, Shell, ExxonMobil, TotalEnergies, and Eni has expanded to Switzerland. According to Bloomberg, PSA LLP, representing Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy, has launched proceedings aimed at strengthening the country’s position in ongoing international arbitration. Astana is seeking roughly $15 million plus interest from several companies and individuals accused of corruption in projects managed by subsidiaries of Italy’s Eni. The Swiss case centers on evidence already presented in courts in the U.S. and Italy, which Kazakhstan aims to use to prove allegations of bribery in arbitration hearings. Documents submitted by Kazakhstan to a U.S. court claim that contractors providing services to Eni implemented an “illegal scheme” to secure inflated contracts. One such contract was allegedly amended eleven times, with its value rising from $88 million to more than $490 million. While several contractors were convicted by an Italian court in 2017, no Eni employees were found guilty. Kazakh journalist Oleg Chervinsky, known for his coverage of the oil and gas sector, has highlighted that Kazakhstan is requesting the Swiss court to look into Maksat Idenov, a former first vice president of KazMunayGas, who led negotiations with Kashagan project partners between 2007 and 2008. Chervinsky recalls a dramatic episode in 2010, when Idenov resigned from KazMunayGas via a letter sent from abroad using DHL. He subsequently took a senior role at Eni. A U.S. court has approved his questioning for use in the Swiss proceedings, and his representative says he has already testified. “New revelations await us!” Chervinsky asserted. That confidence may be justified. A glance at Idenov’s career reveals his central role in Kazakhstan’s energy sector since 1992, when he began as chief legal counsel at the state holding MunaiGas. In 1993, he became assistant to the Minister of Oil and Gas Industry, and by 1995, he was serving as deputy head of the Energy Department for Europe and Central Asia at the International Bank for Reconstruction in Washington, D.C. He returned to Kazakhstan in 1999 as an advisor to then-President Nursultan Nazarbayev on Caspian energy and oil and gas export pipelines. In that role, he worked on the legal status of the Caspian Sea and other strategic projects. Idenov joined Shell in 2004 as regional vice president for strategic and commercial development in the Middle East, South Asia, and the Caspian region. In 2007, he became the first vice president of KazMunayGas. Three years later, in July 2010, he was appointed senior vice president for strategic planning at Eni. During his time at KazMunayGas, Idenov appeared in U.S. embassy cables later released by WikiLeaks. In one, he reportedly told the U.S. ambassador during a private dinner that the four most influential figures around President Nazarbayev were the Presidential Chief of Staff, Sarybay Kalmurzaev, Head of the Presidential Administration, Aslan Musin, State Secretary and Foreign Minister, Kanat Saudabayev, and the tandem of Prime Minister Karim Massimov and Nazarbayev’s son-in-law, billionaire Timur Kulibayev. Another cable described the rationale for Idenov’s appointment as lead negotiator on...

Domestic Violence

Survey Finds Decline in Kazakh Women Who Justify Domestic Violence

Recent data reveals a marked shift in attitudes toward domestic violence among women in Kazakhstan. While the number of women who justify abuse has declined, certain demographic groups continue to condone it under specific circumstances. These findings are based on a study conducted by analysts at Finprom.kz. Sharp Decline in Justifying Abuse Multi-indicator surveys conducted by the National Statistics Bureau in 2015 and 2024 show a significant decrease in the number of women who view domestic violence as acceptable. Approximately 14,400 women aged 15 to 49 participated in the survey. In 2015, 15.1% of respondents said a man has the right to hit his wife or partner. By 2024, this figure had dropped to just 4%. Respondents who deemed such violence acceptable were asked to specify the justification. The most commonly cited reason was neglect of children (2.8%), followed by refusal to do housework (1.6%), disobedience to the husband (1%), and leaving the house without permission (0.8%). Smaller shares justified violence due to refusal of intimacy (0.3%) or “burning food” (0.2%). Analysts interpret the declining acceptance of these views as a sign of changing social norms and an evolving understanding of women's roles within the family. Who Is More Likely to Justify Violence? The study revealed a notable divide between urban and rural populations. In rural areas, 6.8% of women still justify domestic violence, down from 20.6% a decade ago. In urban areas, only 2.6% expressed similar views. Regional disparities were also evident. In the Turkestan region, 10% of respondents believed a husband has the right to beat his wife. High levels of acceptance were also recorded in the Zhetysu region (9.5%) and Kostanay (8.8%). In contrast, the Mangistau region (0.2%), Aktobe (0.4%), and Atyrau (0.5%) reported the lowest figures. Age was another key factor. Older women were more likely to justify domestic violence: 4.7% of women aged 45-49 and 3.1% of those aged 40-44 approved of it under certain conditions. Younger women, particularly newlyweds, overwhelmingly rejected violence under any circumstances. Legal Reforms and Shifting Statistics Finprom.kz analysts compared these survey results with changes in criminal justice data. According to the Committee on Legal Statistics, reported criminal offenses related to domestic violence have increased 7.2 fold over the past decade. However, this spike is attributed to legal reforms. Until mid-2024, charges such as “Assault” and “Causing minor harm to health” were considered administrative violations. Following criminalization, reported cases rose sharply. From January to October 2025, 3,000 criminal offenses related to family or domestic violence were recorded, up 21.4% year-on-year. Assaults accounted for more than half of the cases (1,700, up 36.8% from June to October 2024), followed by “intentional infliction of minor bodily harm” (680 cases). Meanwhile, serious crimes showed a decline. Murders fell by 30.1%, rapes by 16.7%, and cases of “intentional infliction of serious harm to health” by 10.5%. Regional commissions on women’s affairs have also reported encouraging trends. The number of calls to crisis centers dropped from 30,500 in 2013 to 12,900 in 2024. Of these, 7,400...