• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00202 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10448 -0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00202 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10448 -0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00202 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10448 -0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00202 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10448 -0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00202 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10448 -0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00202 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10448 -0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00202 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10448 -0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00202 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10448 -0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%

Viewing results 13 - 18 of 180

Opinion: Kazakhstan’s Electoral Reforms – Why Officials and Experts Are Reconsidering Local Democracy

The metaphor that history moves in a spiral has resurfaced in Kazakhstan, where ongoing debates over electoral reform and information policy are testing the boundaries of the country’s democratic trajectory. Recent official messaging points toward a more managed model of political participation, framed as a necessary response to emerging challenges. This trajectory was articulated by State Councilor Erlan Karin in his article, "The Politics of Common Sense," published in the state-run Kazakhstanskaya Pravda. In the piece, Karin reflects on the formation of public values in Kazakhstan, portraying it as an evolutionary process. Simultaneously, Karin references government-led social programs, such as “Law and Order,” “Clean Kazakhstan,” and “Adal Azamat” - a program focused on building character, promoting civic responsibility, and fostering national unity - as instruments of state-directed civic education. Karin reiterates his previously stated position on the existence of “red lines” in public discourse, sensitive subjects such as interethnic relations, religion, language, and foreign policy. While insisting that these topics should not be off-limits, he calls for “common sense” in how they are discussed. “When it comes to public stability, the state will not compromise,” he asserts, adding that the government will lawfully oppose any attempts at “destructive information influence and incitement to hatred.” Karin also highlights what he describes as a new category of problematic actors: "This spring, I drew attention to a phenomenon known as ‘inforeket,’ in which certain bloggers and activists engage in outright extortion. This practice stems from past policies of appeasement toward disruptive elements, which encouraged the rise of pseudo-public figures, bloggers, and ‘tame oppositionists.’ Now abandoned by their once-powerful patrons and wealthy clients, they continue to seek income using outdated methods." In the same article, Karin names a group of experts, deputies, and public figures who contributed input to the new internal policy principles. Several of these individuals are currently advancing proposals to revise aspects of Kazakhstan’s electoral system—particularly the mechanisms for selecting district akims. Among them is Berik Abdygaliuly, political scientist, historian, and director of the National Museum of Kazakhstan. In a recent podcast, Abdygaliuly argued for reconsidering the model of electing district akims. He noted that while more than 3,000 rural akims and maslikhat deputies have been elected in recent years, the outcomes have been mixed. Voter fatigue is mounting, he said, and the financial costs of repeated campaigns - amounting to hundreds of millions of tenge - have not corresponded with visible improvements in local governance. His proposal is that district akims should be chosen not by direct popular vote but by maslikhats, the local representative bodies empowered to demand reports, assess performance, express no confidence, and initiate dismissals. This idea quickly gained support from other commentators participating in public discussions of governance reform. Political analyst Marat Shibutov wrote on his Telegram channel that the electorate is “simply getting tired of elections” after several consecutive voting cycles since 2021. Shibutov supported the idea of “revising or freezing” the election mechanism for district akims as “rational.” Meanwhile, political scientist Andrey Chebotarev highlighted...

Opinion: Multi-Vectorism 2.0 – Kazakhstan Seeks Balance in a Shifting Geopolitical Landscape

The world is reverting to the logic of bloc confrontation. Sanctions regimes, technological barriers, and deepening mistrust between major powers are compelling medium-sized states to chart independent courses. Kazakhstan stands at the center of this evolving geopolitical matrix. While Moscow remains a vital partner in defense and energy, Astana is simultaneously cultivating strong ties with other global power centers, including China, the U.S., Turkey, the European Union, and the Gulf states. Yet Kazakhstan refuses to align with any single bloc, adhering instead to a strategy of "flexible autonomy", cooperating broadly while preserving its sovereignty. Russia: Alliance with Strategic Boundaries On November 11-12, 2025, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow. The two leaders signed a declaration on a comprehensive strategic partnership and alliance, reaffirming cooperation on security, energy, and logistics projects. Key discussions included the gasification of border regions, the modernization of energy infrastructure, and the transit of Russian energy via Kazakhstan. Tokayev emphasized Kazakhstan’s interest in a stable and prosperous Russia, calling Putin a “statesman of global stature.” Still, this alignment does not supplant Kazakhstan’s multi-vector policy. The Moscow visit directly followed Tokayev’s talks in Washington, underscoring that Astana views relations with Russia as one of several strategic pillars. The U.S.: Investment and Critical Minerals Diplomacy During Tokayev’s visit to the U.S. in early November 2025, he and President Donald Trump oversaw the signing of 29 agreements totaling approximately $17 billion. The deals spanned industry, energy, digitalization, education, and innovation. Highlights in recent collaboration between Kazakhstan and the U.S. include a $2.5 billion John Deere production facility in Kostanay and Turkestan, a $1.1 billion development of tungsten deposits, and over $1 billion in digital infrastructure cooperation with companies such as Hewlett Packard Enterprise, Oracle, and Starlink. Leading global funds also pledged roughly $1 billion in new investments. These agreements reflect growing trust and a shared commitment to investment-driven, high-tech cooperation. China: Strategic Synergy and Technological Convergence China remains Kazakhstan’s largest trading partner and a cornerstone of its eastern vector. During Tokayev’s October 17, 2023 visit to Beijing, he and President Xi Jinping reaffirmed a “comprehensive strategic partnership” built on political trust and economic cooperation. In June 2025, Xi Jinping visited Astana for the second China-Central Asia Summit, where he and Kassym‑Jomart Tokayev reinforced their countries’ “comprehensive strategic partnership”, oversaw deals spanning energy, infrastructure, agriculture, and digital technology. Later that year, at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Tianjin, the two leaders used the platform to deepen cooperation within a multilateral framework, promoting connectivity and regional trade under the Belt and Road Initiative. Turkey: Civilizational Ties and Strategic Growth Ties between Kazakhstan and Turkey are underpinned by shared cultural and historical foundations. At the fifth High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council meeting in Ankara on July 29, 2025, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan welcomed Tokayev, reaffirming Turkey’s role as a major investor and educational partner. More than 12,000 Kazakh students are enrolled in Turkish universities. Defense cooperation is expanding under the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), and tourism and...

Opinion: Kazakhstan Joins Abraham Accords – More Than a Symbolic Gesture

Kazakhstan has officially agreed to join the Abraham Accords during a C5+1 summit, giving another green flag of legitimacy to Israel for its policies and actions in West Asia, especially in Palestine. Reportedly, not only Kazakhstan but also Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan are set to follow this step. The Normalization process, brokered by the United States to advance the culture of peace among the three Abrahamic religions, was initiated by President Donald Trump during his first term. Since then, four Muslim-majority countries - the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan - have joined the Abraham Accords. However, other Muslim-majority countries have previously followed the stand taken under the Arab Peace Process of 2002, which emphasizes the resolution of the Palestine issue before starting the normalization of ties with Israel. The joining of the Abraham Accords by Kazakhstan and the quest by other Caucasus and Central Asian Muslim-majority countries are distinctive in multiple aspects. As per the official definition, the Abraham Accords encourage the establishment of relations between Israel and its neighbors in the region. In this context, the extension of the Abraham Accords, originally designed to broker regional peace and stability in West Asia, to other regions and securing legitimacy by Muslim-majority countries outside West Asia reflects the pan-Abrahamic outlook of the U.S.-brokered deal. Moreover, Kazakhstan is a country that has established diplomatic ties with Israel since 1992, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. So, the question is, what does the joining of the Abraham Accords by Kazakhstan signify for the Central Asian country, which shares a long border with Russia and already has substantial military and economic ties with it? The significance of the Abraham Accords for Kazakhstan can be comprehensively understood from the point of view of Kazakhstan, the United States, and Israel, the major participants of the agreement. Kazakhstan’s attempt to balance regional and global pressure Firstly, for Kazakhstan, the joining of the Accords with the perspective of enhancing ties with Israel can be taken more as a symbolic move, as Kazakhstan already fulfils 25% of Israel’s energy needs. The countries share a strong diplomatic relationship, with Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu visiting Kazakhstan in 2016; the two countries have signed several bilateral agreements. Kazakhstan has significant relations with Israel in the fields of irrigation and healthcare, and has also pursued discussions on visa-free travel, tourism, and technology. Kazakhstan and Israel have launched the Israel-Kazakhstan Irrigation Demonstration Centre in the Almaty region. Kazakhstan also hosts the largest Jewish population in Central Asia, which lives in peace and harmony with other ethnic groups. Considering the strong ties already in place, the lingering question is why Kazakhstan had to formally sign an agreement that appears to be a symbolic gesture from the outside. To this question, Adil Husain, PhD scholar of Central Asian Studies at Jamia Millia Islamia (JMI), New Delhi, says that “though the decision to formalize the normalization ties with Israel may appear as a formality, the move carries a strategic significance for the Central Asian country...

Opinion: A Trump Visit to Central Asia Would Deliver Results and Anchor a Corridor Strategy

On November 6, Washington will host the C5+1 leaders’ summit, marking the format’s 10th anniversary and signaling a rare alignment of political attention and regional appetite for concrete outcomes. The date is confirmed by regional and U.S.-focused reporting, with Kazakhstan’s presidency and multiple outlets noting heads-of-state attendance in the U.S. capital. This timing is decisive. Russia’s bandwidth is constrained by the war in Ukraine, China’s trade weight in Central Asia has grown, and European demand for secure inputs and routes has intensified. All these developments together create a window where a visible United States presence can meaningfully alter the deal flow. A visit sequenced off the November C5+1 will attach U.S. political attention to minerals, corridors, and standards that regional governments already prioritize, confirming the conversion of the summit's symbolism into leverage. Washington already has the instruments but has lacked a synchronized presence. Development finance, export credit, and C5+1 working groups exist, yet announcements have too often outpaced commissioning. A targeted tour could unveil named offtakes, corridor slot guarantees, and training compacts. This would move from the dialogue to bankable packages if paired with financing envelopes, posted schedules, and third-party verification. Deals, dates, and delivery would make operational signals clear to partners and competitors alike. Strategic Rationale and Operating Concept The United States has three clear goals. These are to diversify critical minerals away from single-point dependency on China, de-risk trans-Eurasian routes that connect Asian manufacturing to European demand, and reinforce the sovereignty of the states in the region without pressuring them to choose sides in great-power competition over other issues. These imperatives already guide the national-security strategies of Central Asian governments, which implement them according to multi-vector doctrines. A presidential visit that treats minerals, corridors, and standards as a single package would show that Washington is prepared to move forward on the same problem set that the region has defined for itself. The ways to do that are through finance-first diplomacy and an end-to-end corridor approach, including the Caspian crossing. Finance-first diplomacy pairs every political announcement with insurance, offtake letters, and term sheets (short non-binding summaries of key commercial and legal terms for a proposed deal). These signal the intention to convert declarations into commissioning. An end-to-end corridor approach accepts the physical reality that Central Asian outputs move west through Central Asia, across the Caspian Sea, and across the South Caucasus, with Azerbaijan functioning as the hinge that makes Europe reachable at scale. Each element of the “minerals–corridors–standards” triad reinforces the others when the whole is pursued as a single program. Reliable customs and traceability raise corridor credibility, which raises project bankability, which in turn attracts the private capital required for mineral processing. The instrumentalities for this already exist. The C5+1 framework can be tasked to track deliverables; the Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and the Export-Import Bank (EXIM) can cover risk and long-term debt; aid and technical programs of the Department of State and Commerce can align standards, procurement integrity, and traceable supply chains; U.S. universities and labs can...

Opinion: The Twelfth Summit of the Organization of Turkic States – A Turning Point for Regional Peace and Integration

The Twelfth Summit of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) was held on October 6–7, 2025, in Gabala, Azerbaijan, under the theme “Regional Peace and Security,” and was hosted by the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev. Attending the summit were Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, President of the Republic of Kazakhstan; Sadyr Japarov, President of the Kyrgyz Republic; Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, President of the Republic of Turkey; Shavkat Mirziyoyev, President of the Republic of Uzbekistan; and Viktor Orbán, Prime Minister of Hungary, participating as an observer. Turkmenistan, represented by Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, represented by Ersin Tatar, also attended the summit as observer members. Among the central topics discussed was support for the Joint Declaration signed between Azerbaijan and Armenia on August 8, 2025, in Washington, D.C. The OTS member states regard this declaration as an important step toward lasting peace and stability in the South Caucasus. The summit also emphasized the need for a collective Turkic effort to sustain peace in the region. In his address, President Aliyev noted that one of the outcomes of the Washington Summit was progress on the Zangezur Corridor, describing it as a new transportation route of great importance within both the Middle Corridor and the North–South Corridor. Speaking before the 80th session of the United Nations General Assembly, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan had countered the use of the term “Zangezur Corridor,” which does not appear in the signed documents and was never used in negotiations. Despite these objections, however, Aliyev again used the term at the OTS Summit, reaffirming his intention to move forward under that framework. The New York meeting on September 22, 2025, between the foreign ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia, where both sides agreed to continue dialogue based on the outcomes of the Washington Declaration, has been widely considered a constructive step toward normalization of relations between the two parties. Another highlight of the summit was President Erdoğan’s call to develop the ‘Turkish Large Language Model.’ “To catch up with global developments in artificial intelligence and to preserve our cultural richness, we need to accelerate the development of the Turkish Large Language Model,” Erdoğan said. “[In] Türkiye, we are taking the first step on the common alphabet issue by printing a work about Chingiz Aitmatov and the Oghuznames in the common alphabet. Today, we are also presenting a copy of this to the leaders.” The initiative reflects the vision for greater cultural, scientific, and digital integration among Turkic states, and it was included as part of the broader digital transformation and innovation agenda outlined in the Gabala Declaration, which followed the summit. Kazakh President Tokayev described the Organization of Turkic States as an “authoritative structure uniting friendly Turkic peoples,” capable of addressing shared challenges, and expressed support for establishing an “OTS+” format to expand cooperation and global visibility. President Aliyev, meanwhile, highlighted growing military collaboration between Azerbaijan and Turkey, referencing more than 25 joint exercises held within one year - although this figure has...

Opinion: Almaty as a Model for the Future: Central Asia’s Role in the Global Agenda

Almaty is gradually becoming a hub for resolving issues of not only regional but also global significance. The recent opening of the UN Regional Center for Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) for Central Asia and Afghanistan here was an event no less significant than the 80th anniversary session of the General Assembly in New York. This is no coincidence: the global agenda at the UN today is increasingly focused on the regional level. Central Asia is not a periphery, but a kind of “model for the future,” where climate, water resources, and security challenges are intertwined. For example, the Tian Shan glaciers have shrunk by more than 25% over the past decade and continue to melt faster than predicted, directly threatening the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers. These rivers are increasingly failing to reach the Aral Sea, and its dried-up bed is turning into a giant source of dust and salt. Air pollution levels in the region's cities, as measured by PM2.5, exceed World Health Organization guidelines by an average of 4–6 times. Extreme heat and drought are leading to the loss of agricultural land and the degradation of ecosystems, which affects not only regional but also global food security. Central Asia has already become a unique “testing ground for the future.” The region is testing mechanisms for cross-border cooperation. The CASA-1000 energy project connects Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan with Afghanistan and Pakistan, creating a “green energy corridor.” Meanwhile, Afghanistan’s Qosh Tepa Canal is altering the balance of water usage on the Amu Darya, forcing neighboring countries to seek new models of agreement. The question is whether these nations can develop a system of joint water and energy management. The outcome will shape not only regional but also global processes. At the same time, the United Nations itself is grappling with a deficit of trust and effectiveness. The Security Council is paralyzed, while General Assembly resolutions often carry only advisory weight. In the face of nuclear risks, environmental upheavals, and the threat of epidemics, the global community is stalling. Even large-scale initiatives such as the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero (GFANZ) remain largely declarative rather than actually limiting “dirty” investments. Therefore, reform proposals are becoming increasingly vocal, in particular, to strengthen regional UN divisions that are capable of responding more quickly to crises and ensuring practical cooperation between countries. Another way to overcome the trust deficit could be to involve independent expert councils – scientists, NGOs, think tanks – more widely in the decision-making process, which would reduce the influence of political gridlock at the global level. Overall, Almaty can be seen as a model of a “UN in miniature” – a regional center capable of promptly addressing issues that may seem “too small” for New York, yet are critically important for the countries of the region. For instance, the SDG Center could initiate the creation of a regional water monitoring system with unified measurement standards and transparent data sharing. Such decentralization could form the basis for future UN reform....