Kazakhstan Opinions - The Times Of Central Asia

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 185

Public Service

Opinion: I Spent 15 Years in Government. Here Is What the State Can Learn Next

Zhandos Sabit spent more than 15 years in Kazakhstan’s public service, including the Ministry of National Economy, a regional akimat, and the Prosecutor General’s Office. He now works in the private sector. In March 2014, I went to a meeting in Astana on the development of the machine-building industry. It was held at the then Ministry of Industry and New Technologies. Officials from central and local bodies came, along with the National Chamber of Entrepreneurs and several business owners. I was there as a representative of a state body. When the entrepreneurs began to talk about problems in the industry that we had never heard of, and about how to solve them, I was surprised. They were asking how to increase local content. We were asking whether a proposal complied with current legislation. It turned out that we civil servants knew the resolutions and laws of the sector, and not much beyond that. We sat at one table and spoke about different things. I have seen the same in other sectors since. My former colleagues may take offense, but I will say what I think: many civil servants, myself included in those years, were lawyers and bureaucrats first. That is how the system trains us. Faced with a problem, the first question is whether an idea contradicts the law, and only rarely whether the idea works. Nobody can be blamed for this, because the rules are what an official is held responsible for. It does mean that civil servants should lean on people who know a sector from the inside and take their suggestions seriously. I saw another side of this when I worked in a regional akimat. We prepared a road map for developing the communications sector in the region and agreed it with the central body. Wherever an item needed a decision from the center or money from the republican budget, the central body either struck it out or rewrote it as “study the issue”, with “provide information” as the expected result. I understand why: the center answers for the budget and for every precedent it sets. But how long can an issue be studied? Colleagues in the region put it bluntly: go and fight for the money from the republican budget yourselves. An idea can sit for years between two levels of government, and nobody has done anything wrong. Kazakhstan’s “Listening State” concept raises a question: what happens to what the state hears? I spent more than 15 years in public service, and my proposal comes from that work. Kazakhstan already has channels for individual appeals, and eOtinish is one of them. They are there to answer a person. My proposal is the next step: a platform for solving problems that keep coming back. Its unit would be a problem together with a proposed solution, not a letter. Appeals, petitions, input from business associations, and regional statistics are kept in separate places today, and an AI-assisted system could read them together. If dozens of complaints about delayed...

Regional Cooperation

Opinion: China’s Regional Strategy Meets Central Asia’s National Bargains

The China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway spent decades on the drawing board. Disagreements over its route and financing held it up long after the three governments endorsed the project. In 2024, a Kyrgyz parliamentarian asked railway officials a simple question: “Where will we find $1 billion?” A financing agreement signed in Bishkek on December 16, 2025, cleared a major obstacle. The railway is estimated to cost $4.7 billion. Chinese banks will lend about $2.3 billion to the joint project company over 35 years. China holds 51% of the company, while Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan each hold 24.5%. The partners will provide the remaining funding as equity. In June 2026, Kyrgyzstan’s parliament approved in the first reading a separate $304.5 million loan from China’s Export-Import Bank to help fund its own contribution. That loan has a 25-year term. The joint company’s debt and Kyrgyzstan’s borrowing for its stake are different obligations, but both affect how much value the country will need to earn from the line. Kyrgyzstan wants business around the railway, including terminals and freight services; Uzbekistan gains a direct rail link toward China, while Beijing gains another route west. The governments agreed to build the line, but tariffs and terminal operations will help decide how the returns are shared. The same division between shared goals and separate deals runs through China’s C+C5 relationship with the five Central Asian states. At the second China-Central Asia summit in Astana in June 2025, the six countries signed a treaty on eternal good-neighborliness. The Chinese Foreign Ministry also published a list of 55 cooperation documents. The first 14 cover the regional China-Central Asia framework. The other 41 involve Chinese institutions and counterparts in individual Central Asian countries, including local authorities and companies. The count reflects how the agreements are organized rather than their financial weight. The regional documents cover road permits, customs procedures and green minerals. The country-specific agreements extend into particular industries and investment relationships. Customs cooperation shows how regional talks can lead to bilateral action. At a meeting on May 21–22, 2025, customs chiefs from China and Central Asia agreed to joint border inspections. The next day, Chinese and Kazakh officials conducted an inspection of Nur Zholy-Khorgos. They agreed to accept more trucks from Kazakhstan and recognize each other’s X-ray inspection images to reduce repeat checks. Kazakhstan’s customs authority explicitly linked the inspection to the regional meeting. The agreement illustrates how governments can address a shared concern through negotiations at an individual crossing. The Astana investment agreements reflected different national priorities. Kazakhstan pursued investment protection and applications for China’s BeiDou satellite navigation system, while Kyrgyzstan signed documents on an AI application center and processing industries. These were country-specific arrangements within the wider regional framework. The railway illustrates why some projects require only a few governments to agree. After recurring disagreements over its route and funding, China, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan reached a financing settlement in 2025. They did not need all five Central Asian governments to negotiate a single position. Kazakhstan already has direct rail links...

Regional Cooperation

Opinion: Central Asia’s Minilateral Diplomacy and the Limits of Cooperation

In the contemporary, largely fragmented world order, the concept of minilateralism has become increasingly relevant. As less powerful, smaller states are struggling with often ineffective multilateral diplomatic frameworks, cooperation on a smaller scale has been gaining momentum in international relations. Central Asian countries, although with an intrinsic set of strengths and resources, still lack the power to individually address some of their own issues and advocate more proactively for their interests, especially in global forums dominated by major powers and entities. Geopolitical weaknesses of each Central Asian country lie in insufficiently developed domestic economic and military power to compete with much stronger neighbors such as Russia or China. Furthermore, unfavorable geography, where Central Asia, as a landlocked region, has limited access to global trade chains, also dilutes its geopolitical strength. In addition, the transboundary nature of critical resources, especially concerning water flows and supply, often causes tensions among states of Central Asia. In such discouraging circumstances, minilateralism promises more realistic solutions that can place Central Asia on a more equal footing with external partners and enable the region to play a more significant role in regional and, to some extent, international politics. That is why the consultative meetings of the five Central Asian countries (C5), now expanded to include Azerbaijan as C6, and C5+1 dialogues with external partners have become important platforms for Central Asia’s diplomatic standing. Minilateralism and Central Asia Minilateralism represents an international relations concept that implies cooperation of a smaller group of countries (usually three to nine members) in order to resolve shared problems or pursue mutual objectives. While bilateralism remains the main form of cooperation in international politics and multilateralism is necessary for tackling global issues, minilateralism has emerged as a more appropriate response for addressing specific regional issues in a more flexible and efficient manner. One of the main features of minilateralism is prioritizing shared interests over values or ideological principles, which allows collaborating states to focus more on solving issues and avoid being burdened by ideological discrepancies. Take, for example, the Abraham Accords that managed to gather countries with very different ideological views, especially Israel and the United Arab Emirates, but still produced tangible results of cooperation. Another advantage of minilateralism is a quicker response to crises, as well as opportunities, with less of the bureaucratic hassle that often follows multilateral diplomacy. For Central Asia, working together provides a stronger platform for negotiating better outcomes, especially in the economic area. While the current major geopolitical tensions, such as the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the Iran war, continue to shake the international order, the Central Asian countries have become more aware of their opportunities, especially in terms of transit routes and natural resource demand. Central Asia has definitely caught the attention of major powers, and its geographical position along alternative transportation routes, as well as its considerable wealth of natural resources, including hydrocarbons and critical materials, opens doors for the region to gain more influence and power. However, for all of these opportunities to materialize, Central...

CAMCA

Opinion: The 2026 CAMCA Regional Forum Concludes – What’s Next?

The 2026 CAMCA Regional Forum has concluded in Baku after two full days of conversation on a range of topics shaping the future of the region. The closing ceremony included an official announcement that next year’s Forum will take place in Uzbekistan in June of 2027. The question now is: in the lead-up to next year’s convening, how do we build on the connections, ideas and momentum built in Baku to truly advance regional cooperation in the months ahead? How do we turn conversation into action? The mechanism and catalyst for this will be the CAMCA Network – the dynamic collection of more than 300 talented leaders spread throughout the entire region and beyond – united by a common conviction that a successful future of the CAMCA region lies in intraregional cooperation and collaboration. Through existing initiatives, such as CAMCA Talking magazine, and forthcoming projects – CAMCA TV and the CAMCA Conversations podcast – the network will utilize these innovative platforms to raise awareness around the important developments taking place within the CAMCA region, and, most importantly, to highlight where regional cooperation is well underway, where more is needed, and how leaders across sectors can do their part to drive tangible collaboration to the next level. While the CAMCA Network can serve as an important stimulus of this effort, it is critical that we continue to expand the CAMCA community across all sectors and build partnerships with individuals, organizations and companies that share our vision for CAMCA’s connected, collaborative and prosperous future. This is the charge we take from Baku and will be an integral part of CAMCA’s next chapter. From his time in public service and at the outset of the Rumsfeld Foundation’s work with rising leaders from the region, Secretary Rumsfeld believed in the incredible potential of the CAMCA region, predicated on the ten countries themselves recognizing the benefit of their enhanced cooperation. 20 years ago, there were few who shared his vision or his optimism. Today, on the heels of the 12th annual CAMCA Forum, this vision has come to life, and global interest and momentum are in CAMCA’s favor. As we look towards the 2027 CAMCA convening in Uzbekistan, we are eager to invite partners from within the region and across the globe to join us in building CAMCA’s next chapter. The groundwork has been laid, and a dedicated and energetic network of regional trailblazers now exists – let’s put it to work and bring CAMCA to a new level. The CAMCA Regional Forum is an annual, non-partisan event dedicated to promoting dialogue, cooperation, and sustainable economic growth across Central Asia, Mongolia, the Caucasus, and Afghanistan. Established as a premier platform for high-level engagement, the Forum convenes diverse stakeholders from government, business, academia, civil society, and beyond. The Forum is co-organized by the Rumsfeld Foundation, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, and the CAMCA Network. Learn more at www.camcaforum.org. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy...

Water Security

Opinion: Central Asia’s Old Water Bargain Was Built for Cotton

Central Asia inherited a water bargain built for another economy. In the Soviet system, upstream republics stored water and released it for summer irrigation. Downstream republics used that flow for cotton and other crops. The cost of the exchange stayed inside one plan. Water releases, electricity, fuel, and crop quotas were part of the same political economy. After 1991, the dependence survived, but the plan that balanced it did not. The 1998 Syr Darya agreement already tied reservoir operation to irrigation releases and set compensation for the winter power Kyrgyzstan gave up. The 2000 Chu-Talas agreement went on to share the cost of operating and maintaining shared water infrastructure between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Those agreements were important, and they show why today’s dispute is not new. Central Asia has long known that water regulation carries a cost. What it has not built is a wider settlement that prices storage and seasonal regulation under today’s climate, energy, and market conditions. That question is now open again. In January 2026, Kyrgyzstan’s new Water Code came into force. It recognizes water as a commodity and introduces fees for domestic and external users. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have rejected payment for transboundary river water, saying existing agreements do not provide for it. Downstream governments fear an open-ended bill and a precedent that could turn every dry season into a financial dispute. The old model rested on cotton and central planning. Several conditions have changed. The climate is less stable, energy demand keeps rising, and national economies now want more from water than a cotton plan once did. Uzbekistan’s own reform language has turned against the old cotton model. At the UN General Assembly in 2023, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev said “millions of people were forced to pick cotton” in Uzbekistan over a century. In August 2026, he called the old system one that left Uzbeks “slaves to cotton.” That history shapes the water argument. Uzbekistan is not abolishing cotton. It still grows the crop and continues to reform the sector. But as Tashkent moves away from the old cotton-centered model, the regional water logic built around that model also needs revising. The same pressure runs through the Amu Darya, where agricultural adaptation has become an economic and political issue rather than a purely hydrological one. Less predictable river flows make seasonal storage more valuable. Water is also becoming scarcer in parts of the region. Kyrgyzstan sits at the center of that question. It is the only country in Central Asia whose water resources are almost entirely formed within its own territory, and Kyrgyz officials argue that it carries the upkeep for infrastructure that serves its neighbors. They say the country spent about $80 million on the water sector last year and around $259 million over five years. That spending covers the water sector as a whole, including infrastructure whose benefits reach beyond Kyrgyzstan’s borders. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan reject paying for river water, saying existing agreements do not require it. But storing that water and releasing it...

CAMCA

Opinion: Building Bridges, Backing the Future: Why Entrepreneurs Must Connect Across Borders

In the age of AI, capital and code travel fast. Trust does not. That is why the most valuable infrastructure our region can build right now is human: entrepreneurs who know each other across borders. This week in Baku, at the CAMCA Forum 2026, two moments stayed with me. The first was a conversation on stage with investor Lucy Chow about what it means to back the future when artificial intelligence is rewriting the rules of business. The second happened a day earlier, quietly, at a signing table. The CAMCA network signed a Memorandum of Understanding with YEGAP, the Young Entrepreneurs Group of Asia Pacific. Mr. Hiromi Aoki travelled from Japan to be with us. The purpose is simple to state and hard to do: build a lasting bridge between the founders of Central Asia, Mongolia, the Caucasus and Afghanistan and their peers across Asia-Pacific. Those two moments are connected. The more powerful technology becomes, the more the advantage shifts to people who are connected to other people. What "backing the future" means now I opened our session by asking Lucy what "backing the future" means to her. We spent the next hour testing that phrase against the realities of AI: what is truly different about this wave, where the signal ends and the hype begins, and where entrepreneurs still have room when so much capital flows to a handful of AI giants. The answer that emerged was reassuring. AI changes the tools, the speed and the cost of building a company. It does not change what makes a company worth backing: a visionary founder, a real problem, a great solution, a customer who will pay to solve it, and a team that can execute and adapt. What AI does change is the bar. When anyone can build a prototype in a weekend, a prototype is no longer proof. The proof is distribution, domain knowledge and trust with customers. Those are exactly the things the world's largest AI labs cannot buy in Almaty, Tashkent, Ulaanbaatar or Baku. That is where the space for our entrepreneurs lies. Not in competing to build the biggest foundation models, but in applying AI to the industries we know better than anyone: agriculture and herding, logistics along new trade corridors, remittances and financial inclusion, energy, health, education and natural resources. The main focus should be to really focus on our uniqueness and take that to the world and showcase our local identity. Investors back people, and people are shaped by their networks When technology moves this fast, how do you judge a founder? The qualities we discussed are not new: resilience, curiosity, honesty about what is not working, and the speed to learn and change course. What is new is how quickly those qualities are tested. A founder today may need to rebuild a product three times in the time it once took to build it once. One quality matters more than it used to: the ability to learn from others. No founder can track...