• KZT/USD = 0.00212
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760

Viewing results 7 - 12 of 165

Opinion: Why Deals Go Quiet – Contracts, Trust, and Business Development in Central Asia

The meeting had gone well. The counterpart had nodded at the right moments, asked sensible questions, and shaken hands warmly at the door. There had been no objection, no pushback, no obvious red flag. Then nothing happened. No follow-up call. No revised term sheet. No polite email explaining what had changed. Just silence, stretching from weeks into months, until the deal that had seemed close was quietly, undeniably dead. Foreign executives who have spent time in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, or elsewhere in Central Asia may recognize this pattern. It is often filed away as bad luck, an unresponsive partner, or a market that “just isn’t ready.” Sometimes those explanations are partly true. But in many cases, something more basic is at work: the parties are operating with different assumptions about trust, commitment, communication, and timing. There is a way to put this more precisely. In many Western commercial settings, the contract gives the commercial relationship its legal form: it records binding obligations, allocates risk, and defines what each side can enforce. In Kazakhstan, and in many business settings across Central Asia, the broader business relationship often remains the framework within which the contract is negotiated, performed, and sustained. Neither approach is irrational. The trouble begins when either side assumes its own is simply how serious business works everywhere. The issue is not that contracts are meaningless or unenforceable. It is that many deals do not close. They stall because the relationship, the people who actually back the deal, or trust around the transaction was never strong enough to carry it forward. In many Western commercial settings, the contract is treated as the main container of trust. Negotiation builds toward a signature, and the signature defines what each party now owes the other. After that point, performance is supported by process: lawyers, clauses, deadlines, courts, regulators, and dispute mechanisms. The relationship matters, but it is often understood as something that produces the contract. In Kazakhstan and across much of Central Asia, business development can work differently. The relationship often remains the container in which an agreement sits. A memorandum of understanding (MOU), for example, may be seen less as the end of the conversation than as one stage in a longer process of confidence-building. A foreign negotiator may believe the signature closes the matter. A local counterpart may believe it has only moved the relationship into a new phase. Neither approach is irrational. Both are ways of managing uncertainty. The difficulty begins when either side assumes its own approach is simply how serious business works everywhere. This is one of the details foreign investors often miss: failure rarely announces itself. There is no confrontation, no dramatic breakdown, no final meeting in which the deal is formally pronounced dead. It shows up instead as an absence. A phone that stops ringing. A term sheet that does not move. A relationship that goes quiet without explanation. A Western team may read silence as the absence of a problem. No news is good news. In...

Opinion: Kazakhstan’s New Income Growth Plan – Administrative Measures Against Market Realities

Kazakhstan’s government has unveiled a Comprehensive Plan to Increase Household Incomes for 2026-2029. The Ministry of National Economy says it contains 59 measures. The stated goals include higher wages and lower inflation. The plan also aims to ease household debt. The full text of the plan has not yet been published in open access. First Vice Minister Azamat Amrin presented its main provisions at a Government press conference on June 11. The central contradiction lies in the fact that guaranteed income growth applies to only a small segment of the population. The plan creates fundamentally different conditions for the public and private sectors. It provides for mandatory salary indexation for civil servants. Their wages will be revised every three years based on accumulated inflation. According to labor market data, this category includes about 85,000 to 90,000 people less than 1% of the country’s total workforce of around 9.3 million. It is this narrow group that receives a reliable long-term mechanism of financial protection. Indexation is also planned for employees of national companies and natural monopolies. This group includes around 700,000 to 800,000 people, or 8-9% of the labor market. Employees in the social sector, teachers, doctors, and others, receive their salaries directly from the state budget. This category numbers around 1.2 million to 1.3 million people, or 13-14% of the workforce. Under Kazakhstan’s law on public service, these workers are not considered part of the state administrative apparatus. The plan does not introduce automatic three-year indexation for them; their incomes are raised through separate government decrees, usually on an annual basis depending on budgetary capacity. More than 7 million people work in the competitive private sector, small and medium-sized businesses, as well as the self-employed, accounting for more than 75% of the workforce. For this dominant category, the plan offers no direct mechanisms for income growth. Instead of financial guarantees, the document proposes using an administrative lever: officials will hold talks with private business owners to encourage them to raise wages. The only basic indicator directly affecting the incomes of low-paid private sector workers is the minimum wage. However, the government has postponed revising the minimum wage until August 2026. Private business bears the main market risks and forms the country’s tax base. It is these taxes that finance guaranteed incomes in the public sector, which in total accounts for around a quarter of the labor market, while the overwhelming majority of working citizens, about three-quarters, have no comparable protection. Economist Murat Temirkhanov, an adviser to the chairman of Halyk Finance who took part in expert discussions of the government’s plan, says this approach distorts market relations. A directive requirement to raise wages could push businesses away from formal hiring and into the shadow economy to cut costs. In his view, the plan ignores the only real source of income growth: higher labor productivity. The document devotes only one point to this factor, even though international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have directly recommended...

Opinion: Central Asia’s Shift from Silk Road Romance to Infrastructure Finance – What the June Forums Are Building

In mid-June, Tashkent and Baku will host two major international finance gatherings within the same regional window: the fifth Tashkent International Investment Forum in Uzbekistan, and the Islamic Development Bank Group’s 2026 Annual Meetings in Azerbaijan. The overlap in timing is useful less as a calendar coincidence than as a signal of how infrastructure, finance, and regional integration are now being discussed together. In Tashkent, the fifth Tashkent International Investment Forum opens under the theme “Investment Resilience: New Frontiers, New Partnerships.” In Baku, the Islamic Development Bank Group will convene delegates from its 57 member countries under the theme “Regional Integration for Sustainable Prosperity.” Add the Astana International Financial Centre’s increasingly active forum calendar, a new cross-border Islamic finance alliance signed in May among regional industry associations, and a stream of connectivity and green investment pledges from recent regional summits, and the wider region looks increasingly focused on turning connectivity talk into investment structures. The more important question is not how much money is being discussed, but what kinds of projects are becoming investable. One answer keeps surfacing: a multi-thousand-kilometer trade route that carries goods from China across Kazakhstan, over the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan, and onward through Georgia and Türkiye to Europe. The Middle Corridor, formally known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, runs through many of the investment pitches now being made across the region. The forums show how infrastructure, finance, and regional connectivity are increasingly being discussed together. The corridor is one of the clearest tests of whether that agenda can move from conference language into bankable projects. For most of the past century, the world categorized this region under two headings. One is heritage: the caravanserais and blue domes of the old Silk Road. The other is hydrocarbons: the oil and gas beneath the Caspian basin. Both cast the region as a place value came out of or once passed through. The corridor proposes something more ambitious: that value should pass through again, but this time on terms shaped by the region itself. The shift is from selling what lies underground to earning from where the region sits on the map. Freight volumes on the Middle Corridor have risen roughly fivefold over recent years, while transit times have been cut from about a month to roughly two weeks as border procedures and port operations improved. The World Bank’s benchmark study sets out the goal of tripling freight volumes and halving travel time by 2030, and regional projections now point to annual throughput of around ten million tons or more by the end of the decade. For landlocked economies long dependent on a single route to world markets, a second viable artery is less a convenience than a form of strategic insurance. But turning a route on a map into a working corridor requires serious capital. It requires expanded port capacity on the Caspian, additional vessels and ferries, rail upgrades, terminal infrastructure, and the less visible digital and customs systems that allow cargo to clear multiple borders...

Opinion: Why the Next Head of UNAMA Should Come from Central Asia

A recent briefing on Afghanistan before the United Nations Security Council again showed that the country’s challenges can no longer be viewed only through humanitarian assistance or debates over recognition of the Taliban government. Afghanistan remains a deeply complex domestic issue, but it is increasingly becoming a regional one as well. The discussion now extends beyond human rights and political dialogue with the de facto authorities. It now includes the return of millions of people from neighboring countries, pressure on cities and rural communities, shortages of jobs and water, cross-border trade, security, and the future of regional transport corridors. Against this backdrop, the question of who should lead the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) is no longer only a personnel decision. It has become part of a wider debate about what international policy toward Afghanistan should look like in its next phase. The catalyst for this discussion was the recent briefing delivered by Georgette Gagnon, the UN Secretary-General’s Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan, before the Security Council. According to Gagnon, the de facto authorities maintain control over both Afghanistan’s territory and administrative structures. At present, they face no significant armed or political challenge. The Taliban themselves view the restoration of security across Afghanistan as one of their principal achievements. Yet this does not mean the situation is stable. Gagnon pointed to a fundamental contradiction within the current system of governance. There are rigid ideological policies that place considerable pressure on society. There are also more pragmatic approaches that have so far allowed the system to function and survive. In other words, Afghanistan appears to have achieved a form of managed stability, but without a clear vision of where that system is ultimately headed. Stability Conceals Deep Structural Problems The economic picture is equally mixed. Afghanistan has recorded positive growth in absolute terms. Fiscal stability has improved, revenue collection has increased, and several infrastructure projects are moving forward. The country has also largely maintained the gains achieved through the reduction of opium poppy cultivation. Yet beneath these signs of stabilization lie significant challenges. According to Gagnon, nearly 5.9 million people have returned to Afghanistan since 2023. This represents a population increase of more than 10%. Another 2.8 million Afghans could return during 2026 alone. Many returnees arrive with no savings, no employment, and limited prospects for rebuilding their lives. For a country with a fragile economy, this creates enormous pressure. Cities and rural communities are struggling to absorb new arrivals. Jobs, housing, water resources, and social services remain in short supply. The humanitarian situation remains severe. In 2026, approximately 21.9 million people, around 45% of Afghanistan’s population, are expected to require humanitarian assistance. Another major concern is demographics. More than half of Afghanistan’s population is under the age of 25. This generation is growing up amid limited opportunities. While the challenges facing girls have received international attention, boys increasingly face difficulties as well. Employment opportunities are scarce, household incomes are declining, and competition for livelihoods is intensifying. Environmental pressures...

Diagnosis and a Suitcase: Why Kazakhstanis with Cancer Still Seek Treatment Abroad

Fundraising appeals for cancer treatment abroad have become a familiar feature of Kazakhstan’s social media landscape. A photograph, a medical report, a bank account number and a plea for help often signal a family’s decision that treatment outside the country offers the best chance of survival. Whether that perception is justified remains one of the most sensitive questions facing Kazakhstan’s healthcare system. According to the Ministry of Health, the incidence of malignant neoplasms in urban areas reached approximately 239 cases per 100,000 people in 2024, up from 230 a year earlier. Kazakhstan records one of the highest cancer incidence rates in Central Asia, ahead of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, according to recent regional comparisons. More than 30,000 new cancer cases are diagnosed in Kazakhstan each year, while thousands of people die annually from malignant tumors. Breast cancer is the most commonly diagnosed form of the disease, followed by colorectal and lung cancers. Lung cancer remains one of the leading causes of cancer-related mortality. The burden of disease is not evenly distributed. The highest incidence rates are recorded in industrial regions such as Pavlodar, Karaganda, Kostanay, North Kazakhstan and East Kazakhstan. Specialists attribute the trend to a combination of environmental pollution, unhealthy lifestyles, population aging and, according to some experts, the long-term effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Kazakhstan’s leading oncologists generally reject the notion that treatment abroad is automatically better. The country’s major oncology centers offer surgery, chemotherapy and radiation therapy using treatment protocols that largely correspond to international standards. Physicians at the National Research Oncology Center in Astana note that many patients who travel to Turkey or South Korea eventually receive treatment recommendations similar to those available in Kazakhstan, often at a much higher personal cost. The difference, doctors and patients say, often lies in speed and service. Private clinics abroad can offer faster access to consultations, diagnostics and treatment, while patients frequently cite more personalized care and greater attention from medical staff. For families confronting a life-threatening diagnosis, such factors can become decisive. At the same time, some limitations within Kazakhstan’s healthcare system are difficult to ignore. The country’s bone marrow donor registry remains relatively small. In leukemia cases where no compatible donor can be found among relatives, patients often depend on international registries and may require treatment abroad. Organ transplantation from deceased donors also remains underdeveloped. In some cases of liver cancer, patients must travel to countries such as Belarus when no living donor is available. Some of the latest targeted therapies and immunotherapy drugs are also not yet registered in Kazakhstan, although oncologists say new treatments are gradually being incorporated into clinical practice. One of the most common complaints among patients with cancer in Kazakhstan concerns delays in diagnostics and treatment. Kazakhstan’s healthcare system formally guarantees a so-called “green corridor” for oncology patients, under which no more than 30 days should pass between the initial suspicion of cancer and the start of treatment. In practice, however, access to high-tech diagnostic equipment remains uneven. PET/CT scanners, a...

Opinion: Beyond Ornaments – Rethinking Kazakhstan’s Architectural Identity

Walking into the Flower of God Mosque in Astana, I was struck not by its grand domes or elaborate decoration, but by the experience of the space itself. Light filtered through the structure in unexpected ways, the interior unfolded gradually, and the building created a sense of calm. It made me wonder: can architecture express cultural meaning without directly reproducing traditional architectural symbols? This question is becoming increasingly important for Kazakhstan. Over the past two decades, the country has transformed its urban landscape through ambitious construction projects. New airports, museums, universities, financial centers, and religious buildings have reshaped cities, particularly Astana. As Kazakhstan seeks to position itself as a modern state connecting Europe and Asia, architecture has become one of the most visible expressions of national identity. Yet a fundamental challenge remains unresolved: how can architecture be modern while also expressing what it means to be Kazakh? National ornaments appear on glass facades and stylized references to the yurt shape public buildings. While these references are familiar and visually recognizable, they do not necessarily create meaningful architecture. Cultural identity cannot simply be attached to a building like decoration. This approach reflects what architects often describe as direct design: the use of recognizable forms and symbols to communicate meaning. Domes, arches, ornaments, and historical references immediately signal cultural identity because they are easy to recognize. Such architecture can create a strong visual connection to heritage, but relying solely on symbolism risks becoming superficial. An alternative approach focuses not on reproducing historical forms but on interpreting the values behind them. Instead of asking how a building should look, architects ask how it should feel. Meaning emerges through light, space, movement, and human experience. Astana's architectural landscape offers several examples of how national identity has been translated into built form. The Baiterek Monument offers perhaps the clearest example of symbolic architecture in Kazakhstan. Drawing on the legend of the Tree of Life and the Samruk bird, it transforms a national myth into a physical structure that is immediately recognizable. Its meaning is communicated directly through form and narrative, making it one of the country's most powerful architectural symbols. [caption id="attachment_50124" align="aligncenter" width="2560"] Baiterek, Astana; image: TCA[/caption] Yet the monument also raises an important question. While visitors can easily recognize the symbolism, do they experience the myth itself? Does the ascent through the tower evoke the journey up the Tree of Life, or does the golden sphere create the sensation of entering the sacred egg of the Samruk bird? The symbolism is clearly represented, but the extent to which it is translated into a spatial experience remains open to interpretation. Khan Shatyr occupies a unique place in Kazakhstan's architectural landscape. Its tent-like form directly references the nomadic heritage of the steppe, making it one of the country's most recognizable cultural symbols. Yet the project also raises an important question: is reproducing a familiar image enough to convey a cultural experience? [caption id="attachment_50122" align="aligncenter" width="1280"] Khan Shatyr, Astana; image: Bgag[/caption] Despite its obvious reference to...