• KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10840
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10840
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10840
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10840
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10840
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10840
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10840
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10840
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
27 October 2026

Viewing results 25 - 30 of 812

Central Asia Trade Rises 25% as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan Dominate

Central Asian countries are trading more actively with one another, although the regional market continues to be dominated by its two largest economies, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. In January-July 2026, the five countries exported $8.1 billion worth of goods to their neighbors, up 25.4% from a year earlier. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan accounted for more than 80% of those shipments. Smaller bilateral routes have expanded as well. Uzbekistan’s trade with Kyrgyzstan increased by more than half, while trade with Tajikistan rose by 45%. Trade between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan rose by a factor of 3.3 after several years of border closure and sharply reduced economic ties. In absolute terms, trade between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan remains the region’s largest bilateral flow. The figures were published by Uzbekistan’s Center for Economic Research and Reforms (CERR). Kazakhstan remains the region’s largest exporter. Over the seven-month period, it shipped $4.5 billion worth of goods to its neighbors, accounting for 55.9% of total intra-regional exports. Uzbekistan exported $2 billion, representing another 24.7%. Kazakhstan’s Central Asian neighbors still account for a relatively small share of the country’s overall foreign trade. In January-July, its total foreign trade turnover amounted to $87.75 billion. Central Asia accounted for around 6.7% of Kazakhstan’s total trade and 8.9% of its exports. By contrast, Kyrgyzstan’s trade volumes are much smaller, but neighboring markets are considerably more important to the country’s exporters, absorbing almost one-third of its exports. During the same period, Kyrgyzstan exported $523 million worth of goods to its neighbors and imported nearly $1.5 billion. Tajikistan buys considerably more from its neighbors than it sells to them. Its imports from Central Asia increased by 35% to $1.2 billion, while exports rose 6.2% to $209 million. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan account for around 94% of Tajikistan’s trade with the region. Figures reported by Turkmenistan’s trading partners show that the country exported $844 million worth of goods to neighboring countries. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan remain its main regional markets. The Eurasian Development Bank estimated that trade among Central Asian countries reached $12.3 billion in 2025, nearly double the 2020 level. Kazakhstan accounted for 54% of regional exports, as The Times of Central Asia previously reported. New transport and energy links are developing alongside intra-regional trade. In February, the World Bank approved an $846 million guarantee to mobilize $1.41 billion in commercial financing for a railway project in Kazakhstan. The project includes construction of the 201-mile Mointy-Kyzylzhar railway line on Kazakhstan’s section of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, or Middle Corridor. The new line is expected to shorten the route by 149 kilometers and relieve congestion on heavily used sections of the corridor. Central Asian countries are seeking closer integration of their power systems. In January, the World Bank approved the 10-year Regional Electricity Market Interconnectivity and Trade Program, with indicative financing of more than $1 billion, to establish Central Asia’s first regional electricity market. Cross-border electricity trade currently amounts to only around 3% of the region’s total electricity demand. In an earlier CERR analysis, researcher Ruslan Abaturov argued...

Kyrgyzstan Develops ‘Natural Kyrgyz Walnut’ Brand in Export Push

Kyrgyzstan is developing a national brand, Natural Kyrgyz Walnut, to promote its walnuts in international markets. The brand will emphasize the origin of the product in the walnut-fruit forests of southern Kyrgyzstan, with labeling and a traceability system planned to verify its provenance. The marketing plan was developed with support from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and presented on September 17. Kyrgyzstan harvests more than 44,000 tons of walnuts annually. According to the Ministry of Agriculture, walnut collection and sales provide income for nearly 60,000 people, primarily in the country’s southern regions. One of the best-known areas is Arslanbob in the Jalal-Abad region, home to ancient walnut-fruit forests. Arslanbob is also associated with a longstanding local legend that soldiers of Alexander the Great took walnuts from the area back to the West. The story is popular in Kyrgyzstan, although there is no historical evidence to confirm it. The FAO describes the walnut-fruit forests of southern Kyrgyzstan as among the world’s most valuable natural ecosystems. Their condition, however, is deteriorating: natural regeneration is declining, while grazing pressure, pests and diseases, land degradation, and climate change are placing additional strain on the forests. Kyrgyz walnuts are already exported to Russia, China, and European Union countries. The brand is intended to help producers distinguish Kyrgyz walnuts in export markets by emphasizing their geographical origin. The next steps will include biochemical analysis of the walnuts and an assessment of opportunities for organic certification, geographical indication registration, and the application of fair-trade standards. A geographical indication would legally establish the link between the product and a particular territory and protect its name. The branding effort comes alongside attempts to improve market access in China. The Times of Central Asia reported on September 18 that Kyrgyzstan and China had begun discussing the mutual recognition of organic certificates. Kyrgyz certification is currently insufficient for products to be marketed as organic in China, meaning the two sides will need to compare their standards and agree on technical requirements.

Russian Diesel Returns, but Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan Remain Exposed

Russia sharply increased diesel supplies to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in August after a summer slump in Russian fuel exports strained both countries’ markets and pushed prices higher. But the August rebound underscored a weakness already exposed over the summer: disruptions at Russian refineries can quickly ripple through fuel markets across both countries. In August, Kyrgyzstan received more than 72,000 tons of Russian diesel, up from just 4,400 tons in July. Supplies to Tajikistan rose from 16,000 tons to more than 56,000 tons, around 3.5 times the July level. Overall, Russia exported more than 370,000 tons of diesel to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Mongolia in August, more than double the July volume. Kazakhstan received around 28,000 tons after no deliveries in July, while Mongolia imported about 215,000 tons. Russia's diesel production recovered to around 170,000 tons per day in August, but Moscow maintained restrictions on exports to protect its domestic market, with exceptions for countries covered by intergovernmental agreements. The summer disruption showed that such arrangements do not insulate Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan from falling production at Russian refineries. Kyrgyzstan Starts to Diversify Kyrgyzstan consumes around 1.6 million tons of petroleum products a year and receives the overwhelming majority of its imports from Russia. The summer disruption pushed Bishkek to look for additional sources. The authorities discussed purchases from Kazakhstan, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. Belarusian deliveries began arriving in July, while China also sent an initial batch of fuel. In August, Kyrgyz officials opened talks with China’s Sinopec over further supplies. Another option is to refine more crude oil domestically. In August, 35,000 tons of crude were shipped through Kazakhstan to Kyrgyzstan for processing at local refineries. The new route gives Bishkek another way to source feedstock while reducing its dependence on finished gasoline and diesel from Russian refineries. The 72,000 tons of Russian diesel delivered in August largely offset July’s collapse rather than establishing a new level of supply. Tajikistan's Options Tajikistan is even more dependent. In the first half of 2026, the country imported 599,500 tons of petroleum products worth $494.7 million. Russia accounted for 91.1% of those supplies. Diesel imports totaled 300,200 tons. The reduction in supplies became visible on the streets of Dushanbe over the summer. In early July, diesel disappeared from some filling stations, while others limited purchases to 20 liters per vehicle. By late July, prices at some stations had reached 17–18 somoni (about $1.90) per liter. As of August 31, the average price was around 16.5 somoni, compared with approximately 11 somoni in early June. Dushanbe responded by increasing purchases from neighboring countries. In July, imports of gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan roughly tripled to 34,000 tons. But average monthly imports of these fuels from all suppliers in the first half of the year were around 97,000 tons. Neighboring suppliers can cover part of the shortfall, but for now they cannot quickly replace Russian volumes. In July, the presidents of Tajikistan and Kazakhstan discussed increasing supplies of Kazakh petroleum...

Kyrgyzstan’s NISI Director on Reform, Red Tape and a Bigger Global Role

On September 15, 2026, The Times of Central Asia spoke with Shumkarbek Adilbek uulu, director of the National Institute for Strategic Initiatives (NISI) under the President of the Kyrgyz Republic. Established in its current form in 2024 through the merger of two institutes, NISI provides strategic advice to the country's leadership and develops proposals to reduce bureaucracy. Adilbek uulu discusses Kyrgyzstan's priorities for its 2027–2028 UN Security Council term and its approach to climate diplomacy. He also outlines NISI's work on economic reform and digital public services, including efforts to help smaller businesses grow. Some views expressed in this interview reflect Adilbek uulu's personal opinions rather than the official position of NISI or the Kyrgyz government, as he notes in his answers. The English text has been lightly edited for readability.   TCA: What have been your main priorities since becoming director, and how did you come to join NISI? Adilbek uulu: We're focused on practical ways to drive sustainable economic growth at home: a smaller, simpler government, more room for business, and productive relations abroad that feed into our domestic agenda. By protecting our national interests, our diplomats support the domestic goal of building up the Kyrgyz Republic, nation-building if you will, without getting caught up in other countries' ambitions. I joined NISI in 2025 to help break through decades of bureaucratic gridlock, a real drag on economic development. Minister Ayaz Baetov brought me in. At the time, he was the Minister of Justice, Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers, and NISI's director, all at once. He told me NISI's job was to give the Presidential Administration strategic advice that's pragmatic and rooted in Kyrgyz insight. I agreed and have been working at it since. That's our core job. Interestingly, Minister Baetov was just named Kyrgyzstan's Permanent Representative to the UN in New York. The significance of the contribution Mr. Baetov has made to the effort to reduce bureaucracy remains to be fully assessed. I am confident it will be rated highly, as we will feel the positive impact of many of his ideas and decisions in the future. TCA: Kyrgyzstan was recently elected a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for 2027–2028. Will NISI be more focused on foreign policy now? Adilbek uulu: With Kyrgyzstan on the Security Council, the government will be pulled into issues outside our usual remit, so NISI will be in even closer contact with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. To be clear, I don't speak for the Foreign Ministry. I help shape strategy for our diplomats, businesspeople, and policymakers, and I track what's happening overseas and in our neighborhood. UNSC issues will be high on our agenda, and we'll support the MFA on long-term thinking. As one example, I just got back from the China Economic and Social Forum in Hangzhou, China. The forum focused on the environment and natural resources. I'll be putting together a memo for the Office of the President with our observations. TCA: How does climate vulnerability...

Kyrgyzstan Pharmaceutical Logistics Complex Begins Construction in Bishkek

Construction has begun in Bishkek on what officials describe as Kyrgyzstan’s first state pharmaceutical logistics complex of its level. The new warehouse is intended to improve the storage and distribution of medicines in a country where imports account for 97% of the market. The complex is being built for Kyrgyzpharmatsiya, a state-owned enterprise under the Ministry of Health that centrally procures and supplies medicines and medical products to public healthcare facilities. It will occupy a 7.1-hectare site. The project will cost 650 million som, or about $7.4 million. The facility will operate in accordance with international Good Distribution Practice, or GDP, standards, which set requirements for the storage, handling, and transportation of medicines to preserve their quality throughout the supply chain. The warehouse will form part of a broader overhaul of Kyrgyzstan’s national pharmaceutical supply system. Established in 2023, Kyrgyzpharmatsiya centralizes orders from public healthcare institutions and enters into direct contracts with manufacturers. Buying in larger volumes is intended to reduce the number of intermediaries and lower procurement costs. A unified state digital platform is also being developed to connect healthcare facilities’ requests with procurement, deliveries, and inventory data. Together with the warehouse, it is intended to provide traceability of medicines from the supplier to the healthcare facility. Funding for medicines and medical products in 2026 is budgeted at 6.8 billion som, or about $77.8 million, compared with 100 million som, or $1.1 million, in 2021. Kyrgyzstan, however, obtains nearly all of its medicines from abroad. Domestic producers account for only about 3% of the market, while medicine imports were projected to reach 34 billion som, or about $389 million, in 2025. This dependence leaves the market vulnerable to exchange-rate fluctuations, border delays, and disruptions affecting foreign suppliers. A domestic logistics center will not reduce the share of imports, but it could reduce storage losses, make it easier to maintain stocks of high-demand medicines, and speed up deliveries to hospitals. Illegal imports remain a separate problem. In November 2025, a Health Ministry official said that 2022 data put the share of smuggled medicines at around 30-40%, an estimate he said remained relevant. The figure is based on older data and should not be treated as a current measure of the market. The new complex addresses an important infrastructure gap, but by itself it does not guarantee lower prices or end shortages. The outcome will depend on procurement planning, contract transparency, and the distribution of medicines from the central warehouse to the regions.

From Critical Minerals to Connectivity: South Korea’s Stakes in Central Asia

On September 16, Seoul hosted the first Korea–Central Asia Summit, bringing President Lee Jae Myung together with the heads of all five Central Asian states. The meeting elevated a dialogue that has run at a ministerial level since 2007 to the level of heads of state. The leaders adopted a Seoul Declaration setting the terms for future engagement and agreed to hold summits every two years. On September 14, trade and industry ministers from South Korea and the five Central Asian states met in Seoul for the first C5+Korea Industry Ministers’ Meeting. They signed a joint statement launching a standing platform for industrial cooperation. Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Investment, Industry and Trade used the occasion to push for a shift away from raw-material trade toward joint production and localization. Behind the diplomatic choreography sits a practical problem: the minerals both sides keep discussing cannot move without a route to carry them. A Minerals Agenda with Separate Tracks South Korea relies heavily on imported minerals for its manufacturing industries. Seoul has been developing separate plans with each country. With Tajikistan, discussions have focused on gold and silver, alongside antimony. With Kyrgyzstan, Seoul has been discussing antimony and tungsten. Cooperation with Uzbekistan covers minerals and digital manufacturing. With Kazakhstan, a central issue is moving beyond raw exports toward processing inside the country, as The Times of Central Asia reported ahead of the summit. South Korean firms are pursuing supply diversification independently. POSCO International and LX International have been expanding overseas mineral investments, including graphite and nickel projects, amid Chinese export restrictions. The Transport Connection Consider the Bolashak chrome mine in Kazakhstan, which Eurasian Resources Group launched in late 2024. The company plans to ramp it up to a design capacity of 7.5 million metric tons of chrome ore a year. Production on that scale makes reliable transport an essential part of the commercial equation. An Atlantic Council analysis identifies limited processing capacity and underdeveloped westward routes as obstacles to U.S. mineral partnerships with Central Asia. It presents the Trans-Caspian Middle Corridor as a route to Western markets that avoids Russian and Iranian territory. That argument needs a distinction when applied to Korea. The corridor runs westward toward Europe; it is not a prerequisite for minerals to reach South Korea. Its relevance is the wider choice of buyers it could offer Central Asian producers, including potential Korean-backed processing ventures serving those markets. That corridor is being built out. The Aktau container hub has a planned capacity of 240,000 twenty-foot equivalent units. The World Bank-backed Mointy–Kyzylzhar railway is meant to remove a 149-kilometer detour and accommodate 30 train pairs a day, against roughly ten on the existing constrained route. Traffic is already rising: 125 container trains crossed Kazakhstan on the Trans-Caspian route in the first quarter of 2026, up 34.4% year-on-year. Japan has also become involved, pledging in August 2025 to help modernize customs operations at the port of Aktau. The Seoul Declaration also backs Korean participation in transport infrastructure, including modernization and digitalization. In...