• KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
16 November 2026

Viewing results 31 - 36 of 625

Cementing Peace in the Ferghana Valley

The Ferghana Peace Forum was just held in Tajikistan’s northern city of Guliston. There were some useful proposals and discussions during the September 28-29 event, but the greatest significance of this peace forum is that it happened at all. For most of the 35 years since the three countries that share the Ferghana Valley – Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan – became independent, the three governments were often at odds with each other, and the valley was the most dangerous part of Central Asia. Keeping the Momentum This was the second Ferghana Peace Forum. The first was in Uzbekistan’s eastern city of Ferghana on October 15-16, 2025. The title of that first forum was “Fergana Valley: Uniting Efforts for Peace and Progress,” and it followed the historic agreement the presidents of the three countries signed in Khujand, Tajikistan, on March 31, 2025, fixing the point where the borders of the three countries meet. The three presidents had met before at multilateral events, such as summits of the Commonwealth of Independent States or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. But the Khujand meeting was the first time just the presidents of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan had met. The Ferghana Valley is one of the most densely populated and fertile areas in Central Asia. Its communities long predate the borders that now divide the valley. Those lines were drawn as internal Soviet administrative boundaries and became international frontiers after 1991. The discussions in Guliston were about how to expand cross-border movement, trade, and mutual development. The heads of the three provinces that border each other in the Ferghana Valley were in Guliston: Khairullo Bozorov from Uzbekistan’s Ferghana Province, Rajabboy Ahmadzoda from Tajikistan’s Sughd Region, and Mamirjan Rakhimov from Kyrgyzstan’s Batken Region. EU Special Representative for Central Asia Eduards Stiprais also attended and addressed the forum, alongside representatives from the EU, OSCE, UN, and other international organizations, along with officials and experts from the three Central Asian countries. Eldor Aripov, Director of the Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies under the President of Uzbekistan, summed up the purpose of the Guliston gathering, saying it was intended to turn mutual understanding into joint initiatives and projects. Among the main goals were facilitating cross-border movement, establishing joint ventures and facilities, educational exchanges between university students in Ferghana Valley cities, and even hosting children from neighboring countries at summer camps. These might seem like small matters, but for those who have watched events in the Ferghana Valley since independence in 1991, they mark a striking change. The third Ferghana Peace Forum will be held in Kyrgyzstan in 2027. The Most Dangerous Area in Central Asia The borders drawn in Moscow during the years Central Asia was part of the USSR were quickly disputed throughout the region after the Soviet Union disintegrated. Nowhere was this more pronounced than in the Ferghana Valley, and predictably so. Agriculture and livestock remain important to livelihoods across much of the valley, so disputes over agricultural land and access to water were inevitable. As the...

Opinion: Central Asia Is More Than Minerals

For years, Central Asia was one of those regions that Washington periodically rediscovered and then forgot. Officials visited and announced new initiatives, but the relationship hardly changed. That is no longer the case. Many pundits see the current surge of American interest in Central Asia through the lens of transactional foreign policy: nowadays the focus has been on critical minerals, supply-chain security, and competition with China. Valid so far as it goes, this approach misses the larger story. Central Asia is not suddenly important because of its minerals or because Washington has decided that it is. Increasingly, Washington must pay attention to Central Asia because the region itself is changing, and in largely positive directions. Over three decades, American investors largely dismissed the region as too poorly governed and too distant. Now the region itself is working to change the conditions that made it unattractive. The transformation is far from complete, but it is real. When the Central Asian states emerged from the Soviet Union in 1991, they faced grave disadvantages. State enterprises dominated their economies, and they fell short of Western investors’ expectations in both the rule of law and transparency. While such problems have not disappeared, they are everywhere being worked on. Uzbekistan provides the clearest example. Since 2017, Tashkent has undertaken reforms to liberalize its economy and improve the environment for private investment. The World Bank now describes Uzbekistan as one of the world's top reformers. Kazakhstan has also built more sophisticated financial and regulatory institutions. Its goal is to position itself as a regional hub for logistics, energy, and finance. The World Bank's new 2026–31 country strategy emphasizes a "business-ready Kazakhstan," with greater private-sector participation, improved infrastructure, and better natural-resource management. The pace of change in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan has been slower, for understandable reasons. Kyrgyzstan’s early political reforms long left the government rudderless, Tajikistan endured a five-year civil war, and Turkmenistan was stymied by Russia’s total control of its gas industry. Now these countries, too, are belatedly advancing. Central Asia has not become Switzerland. Corruption, political interference, and governance problems still afflict the countries’ economies, and the OECD continues to identify these as important obstacles to investment. The question is not whether Central Asia has solved these problems but whether it has changed enough to become investable. The answer increasingly is yes, it has. Moscow's offensive in Ukraine accelerated changes Washington had sought for decades. Secondary sanctions compelled Central Asians to develop new commercial avenues not subject to international restrictions. While Central Asian governments maintain important relations with Russia, they all seek pragmatic alternatives that reduce their former reliance on Moscow. The countries are expanding regional cooperation while reaching across the Caspian to the South Caucasus and beyond. The resulting Middle Corridor promises direct access to global markets. The measure of its success will be whether Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan gain trans-Caspian pipelines to transport their resources directly to Europe. In short, Central Asia is doing what Washington has long wanted it to do: become more...

Why Central Asia Is Diversifying Its Arms Suppliers

India could become another supplier of major weapons to Central Asia. Indian Masterminds reported in July that Samir V. Kamat, former chairman of India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), said India had exported Akash surface-to-air missile systems to Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. The reported deliveries remain unconfirmed by the recipient governments. Publicly available accounts give no contract values, quantities, or delivery schedules. DRDO says an initial Akash battery has been flagged off for export to friendly foreign countries, without naming the recipients. Akash is a mobile medium-range surface-to-air missile system designed to counter aircraft, helicopters, cruise missiles, and drones. If the reported deliveries are confirmed, they would mark the first publicly known Akash exports to Central Asia following India’s deal with Armenia. The region’s armed forces still rely heavily on Soviet- and Russian-designed equipment, but governments are increasingly buying newer systems from other suppliers. Russia retains a strong position where countries need to maintain Soviet- and Russian-designed equipment already in service. Other suppliers are winning orders for drones and aircraft, extending their role in the region’s defense procurement. The figures illustrate the persistence of Russian influence. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Russia accounted for 83% of Kazakhstan’s imports of major arms in 2021–25. These figures measure transfers of major weapons, rather than the full range of military supplies and support. Russia’s exports of major arms, however, fell by 64% in 2021–25 compared with the previous five-year period. Nearly three-quarters of its exports went to India, China, and Belarus. SIPRI attributes much of the fall to reduced deliveries to Algeria, China, and Egypt. The most visible shift has occurred in Uzbekistan. In late August, official footage showed Chinese-built J-10CE fighter jets carrying Uzbek markings. At least six aircraft could be seen. For three decades, Soviet-designed MiG-29s and Su-27s formed the backbone of Uzbekistan’s fighter fleet. Operating the J-10CE requires different training and maintenance arrangements, alongside compatible weapons and ground equipment. The transition moves a key component of the Uzbek Air Force outside its traditional supply chain. On September 25, Brazil’s Embraer delivered the first C-390 Millennium military transport aircraft to the Uzbek Air Force. The handover ceremony took place at the company’s facility in Gavião Peixoto, making Uzbekistan the first C-390 operator in Central Asia. The late-2024 contract includes training to operate the aircraft and covers its upkeep with technical support and spare parts. The aircraft can carry payloads of up to 26 metric tons and can be configured for troop and cargo transport, aerial refueling, medical evacuation, and search-and-rescue missions. Kazakhstan’s military has put Turkish Aerospace Industries’ ANKA drone into service after military trials. In its review of 2024, Kazakhstan’s Defense Ministry reported discussions with Baykar, another Turkish drone maker, on a roadmap for local production of tactical drones and loitering munitions. The latter can remain airborne while searching for a target before striking it. The same review said the Turkish side had offered to provide Bayraktar Kalkan and Bayraktar Mini reconnaissance drones, along with the...

Rubio to Lead Major U.S. Business Delegation to Uzbekistan for C5+1 Talks

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio will lead a delegation including executives from more than 100 American companies to Uzbekistan in October. The visit will bring a substantial business contingent to talks with Central Asia’s foreign ministers in Samarkand. Sergio Gor, the U.S. special envoy for South and Central Asia, announced the visit in a statement published by the U.S. Embassy in India. Gor said the talks would focus on “deepening regional economic connectivity, enhancing energy security,” alongside cooperation on shared regional priorities. The delegation is expected in mid-October, alongside a C5+1 ministerial meeting. The C5+1 format brings together the United States and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Bringing executives from more than 100 companies gives Rubio’s visit a substantial commercial component. The delegation’s composition should indicate which sectors Washington is ready to back following last year’s C5+1 agreements. In November 2025, Rubio announced his intention to visit all five Central Asian countries in 2026. Speaking ahead of the Washington C5+1 summit, he suggested such a tour could take a week. The Samarkand announcement gives a destination and timeframe for his regional engagement, although it does not establish an itinerary covering all five states. President Donald Trump hosted the five Central Asian presidents in Washington on November 6, 2025. Commercial agreements featured prominently in the summit, reflecting a greater focus on investment within the C5+1 framework. The U.S. Commerce Department said the “Deal Zone” business event held alongside the November 2025 C5+1 summit featured more than $25 billion in announced commercial deals. Air Astana’s agreement covered up to 15 Boeing 787-9 aircraft, comprising five firm orders, five options, and five purchase rights. Tajikistan’s Somon Air announced plans to acquire up to four Dreamliners and ten 737 MAX jets. Uzbekistan Airways finalized an order for eight additional Boeing 787-9 aircraft during the summit. Boeing said the purchase brought the airline’s total order to 22 Dreamliners, converting options from an earlier agreement into firm orders. In mining, Cove Capital and Kazakhstan’s Tau-Ken Samruk agreed to develop the Severny Katpar and Verkhne Kairakty tungsten deposits. The projected $1.1 billion investment includes two processing plants and a metallurgical facility. Kazakhstan’s technology announcements included a memorandum for $2 billion in advanced AI-chip procurement, involving NVIDIA, Freedom Holding, and the country’s digital ministry. Critical minerals cooperation has also advanced since the Washington summit. During a February 4 visit to the U.S. capital, Uzbek Foreign Minister Bakhtiyor Saidov attended a ministerial meeting devoted to the sector and held talks with Rubio. Saidov and U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau signed a memorandum on mineral supplies, covering the mining and processing of critical minerals and rare earths. Uzbekistan’s Foreign Ministry said the country was seeking foreign technology and investment to develop the industry, with an emphasis on value-added production. For Tashkent, the unresolved question is how much mineral processing American investors will finance inside Uzbekistan. October’s talks could clarify whether February’s memorandum will lead to domestic processing facilities, allowing the country to retain more of the...

At the UN, Mirziyoyeva Champions “Human Dignity” as Central Asia Seeks a Greater Voice

Uzbekistan called for a more effective United Nations and sought support for its Security Council candidacy during the General Assembly’s September 23 debate. Delivering the national address, presidential administration chief Saida Mirziyoyeva urged countries to work together despite deepening international divisions. “Our choice is human dignity,” said Mirziyoyeva. “Openness does not mean weakness.” Speaking in Uzbek at the Assembly’s 81st session in New York, she argued that a country’s strength should be judged by its ability to protect people’s rights and interests. The message offered a basis for cooperation beyond competing geopolitical camps, with particular emphasis on young people’s opportunities to study and shape their futures. [caption id="attachment_56825" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Image: Saida Mirziyoyeva/Telegram[/caption] A Larger Role at the UN Mirziyoyeva sought support for Uzbekistan’s candidacy for a nonpermanent Security Council seat in 2035–2036. She also highlighted the country’s forthcoming chairmanship of the Non-Aligned Movement in 2027, presenting it as an opportunity to widen dialogue during a period of international tension. She backed the secretary-general’s UN80 reform initiative and an expanded Security Council, arguing that the organization needed greater capacity to prevent conflict and implement its decisions. Her appeal was for international rules that apply consistently, rather than changing with the interests of powerful states. That concern also ran through Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov’s address, although he focused on unilateral sanctions and their impact on developing countries. The two speeches approached the issue differently, but both sought stronger multilateral protections for states with limited influence over the restrictions and conflicts affecting them. Kyrgyzstan has already secured its first Security Council seat for 2027–2028, giving Bishkek a vote on the sanctions and security decisions Japarov criticized. Afghanistan and Regional Cooperation Mirziyoyeva pointed to improving relations among neighboring Central Asian states as evidence that political will can help resolve longstanding disputes. She said disagreements over borders and water had increasingly given way to cooperation, with countries coming to see one another as partners. She applied the same argument to Afghanistan, warning against treating the country solely as a source of danger or abandoning its people to their difficulties. Her emphasis was on giving Afghans the prospect of peaceful development. Kazakhstan’s UN agenda also extends to Afghanistan through the regional Sustainable Development Goals center in Almaty, established to serve Central Asia and Afghanistan. Alongside its longstanding nuclear disarmament priorities, Kazakhstan is promoting cooperation on water security and has proposed an international water organization within the UN system. Measuring Progress in People’s Lives Mirziyoyeva linked her foreign policy message to Uzbekistan’s domestic reforms, citing economic growth and wider access to education. She said the economy had expanded from $50 billion to $147 billion over a decade and that poverty had fallen to 4%, presenting the figures as evidence of improvements in living standards. “The true value of reforms is reflected in people’s lives. Especially in children’s lives,” she said. She outlined forthcoming discussions with the UN Population Fund on demographic stability and human capital, and an international gathering in Samarkand in October focused on children’s...

Central Asia at the UN: Iran Threats and Sanctions Disputes

U.S. President Donald Trump’s threat to “annihilate” Iran brought the vulnerability of Central Asia’s southern trade routes into focus as the UN General Assembly’s general debate opened in New York. Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov challenged unilateral sanctions, while diplomacy over Ukraine raised the prospect of a halt to attacks on energy infrastructure. For landlocked Central Asia, these developments carry consequences far beyond the speeches. Iranian ports provide access to overseas markets, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan rely heavily on fuel from Russian refineries, and restrictions on international payments can complicate commerce even where transport links remain intact. Iran and Access to the Sea Addressing the General Assembly on September 22, Trump presented a choice between reaching an agreement with Tehran and carrying out his threat to “annihilate the Islamic Republic and do it quickly.” He also predicted that an agreement could follow the U.S. midterm elections, while defending U.S. military action against Iran. [caption id="attachment_56719" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Image: UN[/caption] That framing leaves Central Asian countries facing costs regardless of their position on Tehran. Iran provides overland connections to ports serving the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. Damage to Iranian infrastructure can therefore disrupt trade between Central Asia and countries that are not parties to the conflict. Uzbekistan’s exposure illustrates the distinction. According to its Ministry of Economy and Finance, goods worth $3.9 billion entered Uzbekistan through Iran in 2025. That represented about 9% of total imports, including approximately $1 billion in technological equipment. Uzbek exports transiting Iran were worth another $1.4 billion. Those figures measure transit, not simply purchases from Iranian suppliers. Pressure intended to isolate Tehran can also obstruct Uzbekistan’s access to equipment and customers elsewhere. Kazakhstan has also sought a larger southern outlet. A 27-year agreement provides for a Kazakh transport and logistics terminal at Shahid Rajaee Port in Bandar Abbas. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Trade says the project would expand access to Gulf markets and destinations in Asia and East Africa. The risks differ by port. Bandar Abbas faces the Strait of Hormuz, while Chabahar sits on the Gulf of Oman, outside the strait. Both depend on Iranian infrastructure and remain exposed to the wider conflict and sanctions environment. Developing alternative routes does not make these southern connections dispensable. Nor is exposure uniform. Kazakh officials have emphasized the limited existing role of Persian Gulf shipments in the country’s logistics. For Astana, the threat concerns future diversification as well as current trade. For Uzbekistan, the transit figures show a substantial flow already at risk. Tajikistan, meanwhile, has sought 2.55 million tons of Iranian crude oil and fuel following shortages in Russian supplies. Its search for an alternative leaves Dushanbe exposed to two conflicts, with attacks on Russian refineries disrupting its established supplier, and the conflict involving Iran threatening a potential replacement. Japarov Challenges Sanctions In his General Assembly address, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov argued that unilateral sanctions harm smaller developing states and can become instruments of political pressure. “The right to impose sanctions against a particular state should, in our view,...