Opinions - The Times Of Central Asia

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Critical Minerals

Opinion: Supply Chains of Power: How Critical Minerals Are Shaping China–U.S. Competition in Central Asia

Central Asia is no longer a distant frontier for global geopolitics. It is developing into a central arena of competition for critical minerals, supply chains, and industrial power, where minerals are no longer simple commodities but have instead become key components of contemporary statecraft. In essence, this transformation highlights a recognition in Washington and other capitals that critical mineral supply chains are fundamental to next-generation energy systems, the development of artificial intelligence (AI), and strategic defense capabilities. Even as the global economy is multipolar, critical mineral supply chains remain highly concentrated and dominated by China. Control of rare earths is increasingly geopolitical, with clear economic, political, and security consequences. The significance of that imbalance is now shaping U.S. foreign policy, Central Asia’s development strategies, and the future of global economics. China’s Strategy: Control the Chain, Not Just the Mine Though many years in the making, China’s critical minerals strategy is still often misunderstood as focused primarily on resource access. However, Beijing’s efforts are far broader and more effective. Not only securing raw materials, the Chinese leadership has also worked to control the entire supply chain—from extraction to processing, refining, and manufacturing. China’s long-term focus and investments began in the 1980s with efforts that culminated in the Made in China 2025 plan for national and overseas manufacturing. In 2023 alone, Chinese firms invested more than $120 billion in overseas mining and processing, targeting key elements used in energy supply chains. Beijing also fed its industrial base by providing over $220 billion for the production of electric vehicles, batteries, and renewable infrastructure. As a result, China now controls approximately 60% of lithium processing, more than 70% of cobalt refining, and over 90% of battery material manufacturing. Strategically, China controls roughly 90% of global rare earth refining and associated technologies. Early investments in supplies enabled Beijing to subsequently concentrate funds into refining capacity to feed its industrial sector. This integrated approach has shifted the power dynamic for global supply chains tied to the critical minerals economy. As evidenced by Beijing’s near monopoly on processing, market control is not just associated with geological supplies but with processing capacity. China’s willingness to weaponize access not only to rare earths but also to processing technology demonstrates Beijing’s market muscle. This distinction is critical. Rare earth elements are not inherently scarce, but they are rarely found in concentrated deposits, making them difficult to extract and refine. Over decades, Beijing developed unique refining capabilities and subsidized an industrial base that disincentivized competition and encouraged processing to shift to China. The Vicious Circle Prohibitive investment costs, long development timelines, and market volatility have discouraged Western investment in alternative supply chains. Each stage (mining, processing, refining, manufacturing) is interdependent: miners won’t invest without buyers and offtake agreements, processors and refiners need secure financing and stable mineral supply, and manufacturers need steady inputs. Such interdependence creates an investment standoff and heightens perceptions of risk. By integrating all stages, Beijing exerts influence across global markets, from pricing to production. This has conditioned global markets...

C6+1

Opinion: Trump Has Golden Opportunity to Launch C6+1 on Sidelines of UN

Representatives of the five Central Asian states — Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan — along with Azerbaijan, are expected in New York for the United Nations General Assembly in September. Historically, meetings between the Central Asian states and the United States – the C5+1 – have taken place on the sidelines of the United Nations. It is the most natural and logistically efficient venue for President Donald Trump to re-engage with the C5 partners he hosted at the White House last November. As of now, only foreign ministers are expected to attend the UNGA. But this could change if Trump extends an invitation to the leaders, according to a Central Asian diplomatic source. This time, however, he has the opportunity to add Azerbaijan, transforming the format into a C6+1. Baku has already been invited to participate as a full member in Central Asian gatherings, and Washington should build on that momentum. Azerbaijan is uniquely positioned: close to both Israel and Turkey – two of America’s most important regional partners – it sits astride one of the most important connectivity corridors linking Europe and Asia. Its inclusion would turn the C5+1 into a genuinely trans‑Caspian framework that reflects the emerging realities of Eurasian integration. The move would also link two major diplomatic achievements of Trump’s second term: the launch of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), a 43-km strategic transit corridor connecting mainland Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave through Armenia, and Trump’s elevation of the C5+1 to a White House-level summit. While TRIPP was discussed at the C5+1 meeting in November, bringing Azerbaijan into the next gathering would allow the administration to present itself as the architect of a new Eurasian trade and energy map. Strategically, a C6+1 format carries significant implications for great-power competition with China. This is because Central Asia is so crucial to Beijing’s grand strategy. In its recently adopted 15th five-year plan, neighborhood diplomacy is listed as the top priority — ahead of relations with major powers or developing countries. Beijing seeks to build a “community with a shared future” with 17 neighboring states, including all five in Central Asia, to “create a favorable external environment” for national rejuvenation, as Foreign Minister Wang Yi has stated. For China, Central Asia is a vital “hinterland” for energy and resource security, and a buffer against maritime disruptions. The United States does not need to dominate the Eurasian Heartland or force Central Asian states to choose between Washington and Beijing. It simply needs to ensure that any Chinese westward access runs through a vast landmass of countries that maintain constructive relations with the United States. A C6+1 format helps shape that environment without confrontation. A stable Middle Corridor – the energy and trade route running through Central Asia, across the Caspian Sea and through Azerbaijan to Turkey and the Mediterranean – also benefits America's energy-hungry allies in Asia, such as Japan and South Korea. Both increasingly look to Kazakhstan as an alternative oil supplier as they...

Perceptions

Opinion: Central Asia Through Western Eyes – Misconceptions Among Young People

Do you know where Kazakhstan is? Although the question is straightforward, it often causes hesitation on a university campus in Washington, D.C. Some students gesture uncertainly toward Eastern Europe. Others guess the Middle East. Some admit they have never heard of it, often with a nervous laugh. Central Asia remains one of the least understood parts of the world for many young people in the West. It is often defined more by pop culture, history, and imagination than by its diverse reality. “I honestly thought Kazakhstan was somewhere near Afghanistan,” said Michael, a student from Georgetown University. “I didn’t realize it was its own region.” Such knowledge gaps are not unusual. Central Asia is rarely mentioned in Western education systems or media coverage, despite its size, strategic significance, and rich cultural heritage. As a result, assumptions often take the place of understanding and tend to follow similar patterns, which over time may shape Western attitudes toward the region. A Region Reduced to Stereotypes When Western students are asked what comes to mind when they think about Central Asia, their responses often follow a familiar pattern: deserts, nomads, the Soviet Union, and sometimes confusion with other regions. Emily, a student from American University, remarked, “I picture a lot of sand and heat, and perhaps those who ride horses?” Although this image is partial, it is not entirely inaccurate, as the region’s customs and natural surroundings do contribute to its character. However, contemporary cities, academic institutions, businesses, and the region’s cultural diversity are largely absent from these perceptions. Perceptions have also been shaped by pop culture. For some, Kazakhstan is associated less with geography or history than with Borat, the fictional journalist from a Hollywood comedy. Despite being widely recognized as satire, the persona has nevertheless made a lasting impression on viewers unfamiliar with the region. As Sacha Baron Cohen explained, Kazakhstan was chosen precisely because it was largely unknown to Western audiences. According to his explanation, he selected the country because “no one had heard anything about it,” making it a blank canvas onto which Western attitudes about backwardness could be projected. None of the scenes depicting Borat’s “home village” were filmed in Kazakhstan; they were shot in rural Romania. The language Borat speaks is not Kazakh, and the customs he describes bear no relation to everyday life in Kazakhstan. Daniel, a student from George Mason University, asked, half-jokingly, “Is that where Borat is from?” These examples illustrate how humor and media can fill gaps in knowledge. When Kazakhstan first appeared in popular Western media, it was often portrayed through harsh stereotypes, introducing global audiences to a country still defining its image. Between Curiosity and Ignorance However, alongside these misconceptions, there is also genuine interest. “I had no idea it was so multicultural,” said Emma, a student from American University. “We never really learned about it.” This response points to a broader issue: Central Asia is often misunderstood not only because of misinformation, but because of its limited visibility in the...

Islamic State – Khorasan

Opinion: Islamic State Khorasan Province and the Strategic Risks for Central Asia

In modern Eurasia, threats are increasingly becoming part of the strategic environment. At times, they even turn into political instruments. When discussing terrorism, analysis usually focuses on the level of danger it poses. Far less attention is given to whether such threats are assumed to be manageable. The problem lies not only in the existence of radical groups, but also in the illusion that they can be controlled or used to serve someone’s strategic interests. Iranian analyst Nozar Shafiee, writing for the Tehran-based Institute for East Strategic Studies, describes ISKP as a decentralized and transnational network that can continue operating even after losing territorial control. This perspective is rarely discussed in public analysis of the region, which is precisely why it deserves attention. Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), the Afghan branch of the Islamic State group operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan, with demonstrated intent for external operations, has long ceased to depend on localized footholds. Even after losing territorial control, the organization did not disappear. Instead, it transformed. Today, it functions as a flexible network of small cells. It no longer needs to control a city or province to remain dangerous. It relies on the internet for recruitment and propaganda, operates through autonomous groups, and conducts high-profile attacks designed to attract attention and create an atmosphere of instability. However, there is another aspect that receives far less attention. In the context of regional competition, there is sometimes a temptation to view such structures as potential proxy forces, instruments of pressure that could theoretically be restrained or directed in a desired direction. The logic is simple: as long as the threat is not directed at us, it can be treated as part of a broader geopolitical game. History, however, demonstrates that this is a dangerous illusion. Radical networks do not function as controllable instruments. They operate according to their own logic and eventually move beyond the limits within which they were meant to be contained. There are numerous historical examples in which support for radical groups as a temporary strategic tool has “backfired.” Organizations created or supported for tactical purposes eventually began acting autonomously and turned their weapons against their former patrons. As Western analysts often note, supporting proxies who do not share your ideological legitimacy inevitably carries the risk that they will eventually turn against you. This represents a key risk for neighboring regions. Unlike traditional conflicts, networked extremist structures are not confined to a single territory. Their influence spreads through digital platforms, ideological narratives, and transnational connections. Even if attempts to instrumentalize such groups occur far from the region’s borders, the consequences can still affect it directly. This discussion is particularly relevant for Central Asia. First, modern terrorism no longer depends on physically crossing borders. In the mid-2010s, several thousand individuals from Central Asian countries became involved in conflicts in Syria and Iraq. Recruitment did not take place primarily through physical training camps but through online networks. Geographic distance offered little protection. Second, ISKP propaganda materials are distributed in Central...

Shavkat Mirziyoyev

Opinion: Uzbekistan’s Strategic Reorientation in an Evolving International System

Almost as if responding to the pressures of a transforming international environment, the early twenty-first century has witnessed the emergence of Uzbekistan as a state seeking to redefine its strategic identity after decades of caution and relative isolation. When Shavkat Mirziyoyev assumed the presidency of Uzbekistan in 2016, he inherited a state possessing considerable demographic weight, a pivotal geographic position, and untapped economic potential, yet constrained by regional mistrust and international isolation. His policy has combined internal reform with a multi-vector diplomacy grounded in pragmatic calculations of national interest rather than ideological aspirations. At the global level, Mirziyoyev has pursued a diplomacy of equilibrium. Rather than aligning unequivocally with any major power, Uzbekistan engaged simultaneously with Russia, China, the United States, and Europe, seeking economic modernization and strategic autonomy in equal measure. This multivectorism is tantamount to a classical calculation: that for a state situated at the crossroads of great-power interests, independence is preserved not by isolation but by balanced engagement. In that sense, Uzbekistan’s involvement in the Board of Peace established by U.S. President Donald Trump highlights Tashkent’s readiness to engage in emerging diplomatic frameworks beyond traditional multilateral institutions. In his address during the first summit of the Board of Peace on February 19, Mirziyoyev stressed that “...Uzbekistan has supported the peacebuilding initiative of establishing the Board of Peace, and firmly declared its commitment to take a practical part in its successful implementation.” He added, “...Uzbekistan is ready to make a tangible contribution to the construction of residential buildings, kindergartens, schools, and hospitals.” Uzbekistan is driven by several motivations in joining the new organization beyond its multi-vector diplomacy. First and foremost, Tashkent seeks to elevate U.S.–Uzbekistan relations to the level of a strategic partnership grounded in economic cooperation and selective collaboration on global security and peace initiatives. In addition, Uzbekistan’s seat at the organization means its contribution to solving global crises, not just regional issues, which enhances its image as a ‘middle power’ in the foreseeable future. Secondly, this organization is aimed at maintaining international peace and stability through economic development. In this regard, it creates an opportunity for Uzbek construction and engineering firms to gain access to Middle Eastern markets and form partnerships with major global contractors by being involved in construction, engineering, and infrastructure development. This experience earns credibility for future projects. It should be noted that significant supply chains are needed for reconstruction, which presents Uzbekistan with opportunities to participate through its transport companies, air cargo services, transit routes, and railway logistics. Also, it is perfectly aligned with Uzbekistan’s vision of presenting itself as a regional connectivity hub. From a political perspective, supporting U.S.-led initiatives can secure potential diplomatic backing from international financial institutions and open avenues for partnerships across multiple sectors, particularly in technology. It sends a strong signal to Western investors that Uzbekistan is a reliable and responsible partner, which would potentially lead to increasing foreign direct investment. Political backing should be added to this list as the U.S. would assist Central Asia, including...

Social Media

Opinion: Tajikistan Narrows Online Extremism Liability — Debate Intensifies in Uzbekistan

Tajikistan’s Prosecutor General has reported a decrease in terrorist and extremist crimes. Officials attributed the decrease to the easing of penalties for “likes” and shares on the internet, which came into force in early May 2025, when the authorities stated that “liking” certain types of online materials and sharing them on social networks would no longer, in themselves, constitute a criminal offense. From 2018 onward, criminal liability was applied to the distribution, storage, or public endorsement of materials deemed extremist or prohibited. According to human rights groups, more than 1,500 Tajiks were imprisoned under the policy. Following recent changes, however, Prosecutor General Habibullo Vohidov said the number of terrorist and extremist crimes had decreased by more than 23%, by 314, compared to 2024. According to Reuters, the clarification applies to online materials deemed extremist or terrorist in nature; “likes” or shares of such content would no longer automatically trigger criminal liability. The recent changes implemented in Tajikistan have led to heated discussions among the public in Uzbekistan, where liability for online “likes”, posts, and comments continues. International organizations have for years characterized Uzbekistan’s enforcement of online speech provisions as a form of pressure on freedom of expression. In Uzbekistan, enforcement previously focused primarily on materials related to extremism and terrorism, but legal changes in 2021 introduced criminal liability for online “discrediting” of the president and state authorities. Local activist Rasul Kusherbayev wrote the following on his Telegram channel: “This issue is urgent for us, too. Law enforcement agencies, which lack the ‘nerve’ to punish officials who are illegally destroying the property of citizens, are not ashamed to hold citizens liable for a ‘like’”. Some observers argue that Uzbekistan’s legislation is more regulated compared to that in Tajikistan. While liability for prohibited content had been established in Tajikistan, the exact list of prohibited materials was not consistently disclosed. In Uzbekistan, however, this list has been regularly updated and publicly announced in recent years. Article 244.1 and the Prohibited List Draft decisions related to prohibited information have appeared in Uzbek legislation since the 1990s. Documents regarding information policy signed in March 1999 on the Lex.uz website speak about banned information. However, what was included in this list was not announced in open sources in Uzbekistan for years. The draft law on disclosing the list to the public was signed in 2014. Publicly available information about the evidentiary basis for earlier cases remains limited. The list of social network accounts and sites prohibited in Uzbekistan was last updated in January 2026. Around 1,600 channels, pages, and materials were included in the list. Specifically, it includes 249 pages and channels on Facebook, 790 on Telegram, 265 on Instagram, 167 on YouTube, 36 on the Odnoklassniki social network, and 53 on TikTok. Materials in audio, video, and text formats on websites and social networks were included. Although the list is publicly available, questions have arisen regarding its comprehensibility and clarity. Observers argue that the breadth of the list risks encompassing ordinary religious and political expression. Activists emphasize...