• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00198 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10628 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00198 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10628 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00198 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10628 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00198 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10628 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00198 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10628 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00198 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10628 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00198 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10628 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00198 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10628 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
02 February 2026

Viewing results 7 - 12 of 578

Central Asia Launches Regional Electricity Market with World Bank Support

On January 22, the World Bank’s Board of Executive Directors approved the 10-year Regional Electricity Market Interconnectivity and Trade (REMIT) Program, an ambitious initiative to establish Central Asia’s first regional electricity market. The program aims to boost cross-border electricity trade, expand transmission capacity, and lay the foundation for large-scale renewable energy integration across the region. Electricity demand in Central Asia is projected to triple by 2050 under a business-as-usual scenario. Yet electricity trade in the region currently accounts for only 3% of total demand. The REMIT Program seeks to harness Central Asia’s diverse and complementary energy resources: hydropower in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, thermal power from coal and natural gas in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, and the region’s rapidly expanding solar and wind potential. Over the next decade, REMIT aims to: Increase regional electricity trade to at least 15,000 GWh annually, enough to supply millions of consumers Triple regional transmission capacity to 16 GW Enable up to 9 GW of clean energy integration The initiative is designed to enhance regional energy security, reduce power outages, lower electricity costs, and promote a more resilient and interconnected grid system. Total indicative financing for the program is $1.018 billion, to be deployed in three phases. These funds will support the creation and operation of a regional energy market, boost transmission infrastructure, introduce digital technologies to improve grid reliability, and strengthen regional energy institutions and coordination mechanisms. Investments are also expected to generate both construction-related employment and high-skilled jobs tied to market operations. In the program’s first phase, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and the Central Asian Countries’ Coordinating Dispatch Center (CDC) Energia will benefit from grants and concessional financing totaling $143.2 million. This comprises $140 million from the World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA) and $3.2 million from the Central Asia Water and Energy Program (CAWEP). “The REMIT Program supports Central Asian countries’ ambition to deepen energy cooperation and create a regional electricity market,” said Najy Benhassine, World Bank Regional Director for Central Asia. “This will enable more efficient use of energy resources, including cross-border deployment of clean energy, improve access to reliable and affordable electricity, and support jobs. By 2050, stronger regional connectivity could generate up to $15 billion in economic benefits.” Charles Cormier, World Bank Regional Infrastructure Director for Europe and Central Asia, added that REMIT will advance energy security and unlock private sector investment. “The first phase alone is expected to enable about 900 MW of new clean energy capacity, leveraging $700 million in private investment. This will pave the way for a more resilient and interconnected power system across this dynamic region,” he said. CDC Energia will lead the implementation of market and institutional activities, while national transmission companies will be responsible for infrastructure investments.

Finland’s President Stubb Warns Russia’s Imperial Thinking Poses Risks for Central Asia

Russia’s imperial worldview may pose a greater long-term risk to Central Asia and the South Caucasus than to NATO member states, Finnish President Alexander Stubb said in an interview with The Washington Post, highlighting concerns that continue to resonate across the post-Soviet space. Speaking with columnist David Ignatius, Stubb referenced Finland’s long and complex history with its eastern neighbor, noting that expansionist thinking remains deeply rooted in Russian political culture. “I think the DNA of Russia is still expansion and imperialism,” he said, arguing that President Vladimir Putin views the collapse of the Soviet Union as a historical injustice. While much of the Western debate centers on potential threats to NATO countries such as the Baltic states, Finland, or Poland, Stubb suggested that more vulnerable regions lie elsewhere. “I think the more worrying aspect for others is the Central Asian countries, the Southern Caucasus and others,” he said, pointing to what he described as a top-down political system driven by the ideology of Russkiy mir, or the “Russian world.” Stubb also spoke about his personal interactions with Russian officials, including Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, stressing that meaningful political dialogue remains unlikely while the war in Ukraine continues. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, Russian television host Vladimir Solovyov sparked backlash after suggesting that Moscow could conduct “special military operations” in Central Asia and Armenia. The remarks were widely condemned by Uzbek scholars, journalists, and analysts as destabilizing and provocative. More recently, Russian ultranationalist Alexander Dugin, often described as an ideologue of the “Russian world”, publicly questioned the sovereignty of several former Soviet republics, including Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. A video of his comments circulated widely online, drawing sharp criticism across the region. Russia’s Foreign Ministry later sought to distance the Kremlin from such statements. Spokesperson Maria Zakharova stated that Solovyov’s remarks did not reflect official policy and reaffirmed that Moscow’s relationships with Central Asian countries are based on partnership and respect for sovereignty.

Tajikistan Is Drowning in Plastic: Inside a Waste System Under Strain

According to domestic sector-specific sources, more than nine million tonnes of municipal solid waste (MSW) are generated annually in Tajikistan, of which around 322,000 tonnes is plastic. The key feature of plastic waste is its extreme resistance to decomposition; it can persist in natural environments for decades or even centuries, accumulating in soil and water bodies. However, estimates of total waste generation vary widely depending on the source, with international organizations offering more conservative figures. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), for instance, reports approximately two million tonnes of formally collected municipal waste generated annually in Tajikistan. This discrepancy is likely due to differing accounting methodologies. National statistics typically include waste from unauthorized dumps and the informal sector, while international estimates often rely on formally collected and officially documented waste. Still, even the most conservative figures highlight the significant environmental burden posed by Tajikistan’s waste-management system. Tajikistan’s Position in International Waste Rankings Waste accumulation and limited recycling capacity are reflected in global assessments. According to domestic reporting citing the 2024 Mismanaged Waste Index (MWI), 87.1% of Tajikistan’s waste is either not collected through organized systems or is disposed of in violation of environmental standards. This would place the country among those with the most vulnerable waste-management systems. In practice, this means waste is often dumped at unauthorized sites, openly burned, or dispersed into the environment. These practices place pressure on soil, water resources, and air quality, while also posing long-term risks to public health. This crisis is unfolding amid a global plastic-waste emergency. Even in countries with advanced recycling systems, the proportion of recycled plastic remains low. UNEP estimates that only around 9% of all plastic ever produced has been recycled; the rest remains in the environment. Regional Disparities: Cities vs. Rural Areas Tajikistan’s domestic statistics divide the country into three groups based on waste generation. The “Mega” group includes the largest cities and adjacent areas (e.g., Dushanbe, Khujand), home to roughly 4.2 million people. Average daily waste generation here is 1.013 kg per person, resulting in up to an estimated 148,000 tonnes of plastic waste annually. The “Medium” group comprises 10 mid-sized cities (e.g., Bokhtar, Kulob, Kanibadam), with a combined population of 1.99 million. Daily per capita waste generation in this group averages 0.902 kg, leading to an estimated 62,000 tonnes of plastic annually. In rural areas and smaller districts, with over 4 million residents, waste generation averages 0.79 kg per person per day. While the plastic share here is less precise, these regions still generate an estimated 100,000 tonnes of plastic waste per year. It is in these smaller settlements that waste-management infrastructure is most deficient. While cities have basic municipal services and landfills, many rural areas lack even waste-collection containers. As a result, waste is often dumped in ravines, rivers, or burned in backyards, meaning much of it goes unrecorded in official statistics and may significantly exceed documented levels. Where the Plastic Goes: Disposal, Loss, and Recycling Most plastic waste in Tajikistan is either buried or left in...

Disability Inclusion Is Emerging as Central Asia’s Next Social Frontier

More than 1.3 billion people worldwide live with some form of disability, yet disability remains one of the least visible dimensions of social and economic life. In Central Asia, that invisibility is especially pronounced. As governments focus on infrastructure, growth, and modernization, far less attention is paid to whether people with disabilities are becoming more present in schools, workplaces, and public life, or whether they remain largely confined to families and institutions beyond the reach of public discussion. Across the region, cities are expanding, labor mobility is increasing, and younger generations are more connected to global ideas through study and migration. These shifts are often treated as shorthand for progress. At the same time, people with disabilities consistently face lower educational attainment and weaker labor market outcomes, making inclusion a practical test of whether development reaches beyond headline indicators into everyday life. Disability policy across much of Central Asia has long centered on legal classification, benefit eligibility, and institutional care. Long-term institutionalization is associated with reduced autonomy and poorer social outcomes, yet institutions remain a common default, reinforcing the idea that disability is primarily an administrative or medical issue rather than a social one shaped by access and expectations. In practice, families remain the primary providers of care throughout the region. In Kyrgyzstan, around 200,000 people are officially registered as living with disabilities, and outside major cities, most daily support is provided by family members due to limited community-based services. In Turkmenistan, public disability data remain sparse, and undercounting is widely acknowledged, leaving extended families as the central source of long-term care. In Tajikistan, official estimates place the number of people living with disabilities between 150,000 and 200,000, with caregiving overwhelmingly home-based due to constrained public resources. Family-based care provides continuity and belonging, but it also carries an economic cost. Caregivers are more likely to reduce paid employment and experience long-term income loss, a burden that falls disproportionately on women and shapes household economic outcomes. This reliance on family support is often contrasted unfavorably with wealthier countries, but the comparison is more complicated. In the United States, more than one in four adults lives with a disability, and people with disabilities report significantly higher rates of loneliness and depression despite extensive legal protections and formal services. By contrast, strong family networks are associated with lower levels of severe social isolation, even in settings with fewer public resources. In recent years, small but notable shifts have begun to appear. Local organizations across the region are experimenting with community-based rehabilitation, inclusive education, and supported employment models that move beyond institutional care. These efforts remain fragmented and under-resourced, but they reflect a growing recognition that disability policy is about protection and participation. As Central Asian governments seek to retain talent, expand their labor force, and project social modernization, inclusion is increasingly intersecting with economic and demographic realities rather than remaining a niche social issue. Institutional care remains common across Central Asia, yet community-based rehabilitation is consistently linked to better social participation and quality...

Central Asia Trade with China Tops Record $100 Billion in 2025

Trade between China and Central Asia increased to a record of more than $100 billion in 2025, despite challenges to global economic growth, the Chinese government said on Monday.  Citing data from China’s General Administration of Customs, Foreign Ministry spokesman Guo Jiakun said the trade structure with the Central Asian nations of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan had improved and that more high-end products were entering the Chinese market from the region.   “As global economic growth remains sluggish and the international trading system faces serious challenges, the economic and trade cooperation between China and Central Asian countries has withstood external headwinds, and the trade volume surpassed US$100 billion,” Guo said.  He attributed the increasing cooperation in part to a China-Central Asia summit in Astana, Kazakhstan last year that was attended by Chinese President Xi Jinping and the five Central Asian leaders.  China’s Belt and Road initiatives, which include the development of trade routes that pass through Central Asia and link up with Europe, are also making progress, according to the Chinese official.  Total trade between China and Central Asia was $106.3 billion in 2025, an increase of 12 percent over the previous year, China’s state-run Xinhua news agency reported. Chinese exports such as machinery, electronics and high-tech goods were $71.2 billion, an increase of 11 percent over the previous year. Imports from Central Asia amounted to $35.1 billion, a rise of 14 percent from 2024. China is involved in major projects in Central Asia, including the extraction of minerals used for “clean” technology, equipment manufacturing and the modernization of agriculture. China imports oil and natural gas as well as a growing number of other products from the region.  Russia was once the main trading partner of Central Asia after the fall of the Soviet Union, but China has the lead position now. The United States is also seeking to develop more trade with resource-rich Central Asia, which is diversifying its international partnerships.     

From Tehran to Tashkent: How Iran’s Crisis and U.S. Tariffs Reverberate Across Central Asia

At the end of 2025, Iran once again emerged as a flashpoint on the global political map. Mass protests erupted across the country, fueled by spiraling inflation and economic hardship. At present, the Iranian rial has plummeted to the point where it is effectively worth less than the paper it's printed on. The current wave of unrest, already the largest and deadliest nationwide unrest Iran has seen since 2022, is not occurring in isolation. U.S. President Donald Trump has renewed what his administration describes as a policy of “maximum pressure” on Tehran, and his administration is now pursuing what observers have characterized as a strategy of “pushing the falling,” a move aimed at reshaping the political order of the Middle East. What might this mean for neighboring Central Asia? Tajik political analyst Muhammad Shamsuddinov argues the crisis must be viewed within a broader geopolitical context. “The situation in Iran is directly tied to Trump’s second-term pressure campaign,” Shamsuddinov said, referencing a string of destabilizing events. “These include the 12-day U.S.-Israel war against Iran and the reimposition of U.N. sanctions in September 2025," he added, referring to the 12-day June 2025 conflict between Israel and Iran, during which U.S. forces also struck Iranian nuclear facilities. "All of these have deepened the domestic crisis in Iran.” In a further escalation, on January 12, Trump announced 25% tariffs on countries conducting trade with Iran. The move appears targeted primarily at Russia, China, and India - Iran’s largest international partners, but also has implications for Central Asian economies. In the first nine months of 2025, trade between Kazakhstan and Iran grew by nearly 45%, reaching $310.8 million. Tajikistan, which maintains the closest economic ties to Tehran among Central Asian states, reported trade worth $430.7 million in the first eleven months of 2025, an increase of 28% over the same period in 2024. Uzbekistan, while less directly exposed to Iran than Kazakhstan or Tajikistan, has also moved cautiously in recent years to expand trade links with Tehran, making it sensitive to further sanctions pressure. Turkmenistan, meanwhile, faces its own exposure through gas swap arrangements involving Iran, which could become collateral damage of escalating regional tensions. Iranian investments in Tajikistan are also substantial. Among the most prominent projects is the Sangtuda-2 hydroelectric power plant, estimated at $256 million. The Iranian government contributed approximately $180 million, with an additional $36 million from an Iranian contractor. The remainder was financed by Tajikistan. According to official data, roughly 160 companies with Iranian capital are currently operating in Tajikistan across multiple sectors. In Kazakhstan, around 650 Iranian companies are registered, with over 350 operational, primarily in manufacturing, infrastructure, and agriculture. By contrast, trade between Iran and Russia, a strategic partner since the signing of a bilateral cooperation agreement in January 2025, increased by only 8% in the first nine months of 2025, according to official figures. Despite modest growth, Russian analysts view the figures optimistically. “Growth is happening under challenging geopolitical conditions, with sanctions, logistical restructuring, and financial hurdles,” said...