• KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
21 September 2026

Viewing results 13 - 18 of 509

Badakhshan Fighting Raises Risks for Tajikistan and Uzbekistan

In Nusay district, Badakhshan province (northeast Afghanistan), fighting began around August 11 between Taliban forces and followers of Juma Khan Fateh, a local Taliban commander of ethnic Tajik origin who had resisted efforts to disarm his network. The Armed Conflict Location and Events Data Project (ACLED) identifies the immediate trigger as an attempt to remove military equipment and vehicles from areas under Fateh’s control, amid longer-running tensions over disarmament, local authority, and control of gold mining. Similar disputes over gold mines have repeatedly produced clashes between local commanders and Taliban forces since 2021. Fateh surrendered on August 17 after nearly a week of fighting. By August 22, Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said his case was being prepared for trial. Post-surrender reporting also indicated weapons seizures and disarmament activity around Fateh-linked sites and associates, although the scale of the reported seizures and disarmament remained incompletely verified. The Fateh episode came amid a broader increase in armed instability in Badakhshan during 2026. ACLED recorded 22 anti-Taliban armed-opposition events in the province from January through July, compared with four from June through December 2025. In July, one opposition group temporarily seized the Yaftal-e Sufla district headquarters, while the Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF) reportedly fought Taliban forces in Zebak. The Yaftal-e Sufla and Zebak operations were separate from the Fateh confrontation, and there is no credible evidence of coordination with Fateh’s network. Fateh’s surrender ended the immediate confrontation, while separate armed-opposition activity in Badakhshan continued. The fighting has already had a direct cross-border consequence for Tajikistan. Nusay lies opposite Tajikistan’s Darvoz district. On August 13, gunfire from the Afghan side crossed into Darvoz, killing a 21-year-old woman inside her home and damaging residential property. Tajikistan’s Foreign Ministry lodged a formal protest, saying the fighting had violated the country’s airspace and demanding respect for the state border and measures to prevent a recurrence. The Afghan Foreign Ministry acknowledged the death and expressed regret while blaming “disruptive and opportunistic elements.” The one confirmed limited incident does not show that the conflict has extended into Tajikistan on a sustained basis, but it makes the cross-border dimension more than hypothetical. Tajikistan shares a 1,374-kilometer frontier with Afghanistan, much of it facing Afghan Badakhshan. Dushanbe had already treated this border as a persistent security problem. In late November 2025, two attacks launched from Afghanistan’s territory killed five Chinese nationals and wounded five others in Tajikistan, which then instituted tighter border measures, while the Taliban pledged to cooperate on security and investigations. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is also implementing a program to strengthen the Tajik-Afghan frontier with weapons, equipment, and other border-protection means. Its 2026–27 implementation phase antedates the present fighting. A 2026 Security Council monitoring report said Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) was active mainly in northern Afghanistan, particularly Badakhshan, and was developing cells capable of projecting a regional threat, with Central Asia remaining a key focus. It also reported concern in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan over the role of their nationals in the organization and the possible...

Tajikistan Seeks 2.55 Million Tons of Iranian Oil and Fuel as Russian Supplies Falter

Tajikistan has asked Iran to supply 2.55 million metric tons of crude oil and petroleum products as Dushanbe looks for alternatives to increasingly unreliable Russian fuel supplies. The request includes 2 million tons of crude oil, 300,000 tons of diesel, 150,000 tons of gasoline, and 100,000 tons of aviation fuel, according to Tajikistan’s Ministry of Transport. The ministry said the volume would require about 51,000 railway tank cars. The proposal was discussed in Tehran on August 15 during talks between Tajik Transport Minister Azim Ibrohim and Iran’s Minister of Roads and Urban Development Farzaneh Sadegh. It is not yet a purchase agreement, and Tajikistan has not announced a delivery timetable, price, or supplier. The timing, however, places the proposed trade directly inside a worsening sanctions environment. On August 20, U.S. President Donald Trump threatened economic consequences for countries providing support to Iran, promising “Economic Warfare and Isolation on an unprecedented scale.” Washington has not announced specific new measures linked to that statement. Significant purchases and transport of Iranian petroleum already carry U.S. sanctions exposure. Executive Order 13846 authorizes sanctions against people and financial institutions involved in significant transactions for the purchase, sale, transport, or marketing of petroleum from Iran. A temporary U.S. authorization covering Iranian crude and petroleum products, issued in June, was revoked on July 7, with its wind-down period ending on July 17. Russia’s Fuel Crunch Reaches Tajikistan Dushanbe’s request to Iran is driven by a more immediate problem: dependence on Russian fuel. In 2025, Tajikistan imported about 1.7 million tons of fuel and lubricants, more than 1.2 million tons of which came from Russia. Tajik officials said in July that Russia supplied 84% of imported petroleum products. That dependence has become more difficult to manage as Ukrainian drone attacks have reduced Russian refinery output and forced Moscow to protect its domestic market. Russian fuel shortages began spilling into Central Asia in early summer. Tajikistan’s fuel imports fell sharply in July, pushing Dushanbe to seek additional supplies from China, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iraq, and Iran. Russia still accounted for 72.3% of fuel supplied to Tajikistan in the first half of the year, while talks with Kazakhstan had reached presidential level by the end of July. The pressure was already visible in Dushanbe. In early July, diesel disappeared from some filling stations, while others imposed sales limits. On July 10, Energy and Water Resources Minister Daler Juma said Tajikistan had roughly two months of petroleum reserves and was seeking alternative suppliers. The scale of the request is striking. At 2.55 million tons, it exceeds Tajikistan’s total fuel and lubricant imports in 2025, although 2 million tons of the proposed volume is crude oil rather than finished fuel. The Ministry of Transport has asked Iran to help organize dedicated tanker trains and create a “green corridor” giving Tajik fuel cargoes priority on the Iranian rail network. Further transit arrangements would still be needed because Tajikistan and Iran do not share a border. The Refinery Question The large crude component also highlights...

Trump’s New Threat Against Iran Collides With Central Asia’s Economic Interests

U.S. President Donald Trump has threatened economic consequences for any country that continues to provide support to Iran, promising Tehran “Economic Warfare and Isolation on an unprecedented scale.” Washington has not yet announced specific new measures. For Central Asia, the warning comes as economic and transport links with Iran are developing. Kazakhstan is building its own terminal at Iran’s largest port, Tajikistan is discussing fuel purchases and new transport routes, Uzbekistan is trying to protect trade that passes through Iran, and Turkmenistan is expanding transport and energy cooperation with Tehran. Each country has its own reasons for developing these ties, but they share one concern: for landlocked Central Asia, Iran provides one of the few overland routes to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Washington’s attempt to tighten Iran’s economic isolation therefore affects not only the region’s relations with Tehran, but also its own plans to diversify trade and transit. None of this means that Central Asian governments are prepared to disregard U.S. sanctions or enter into a political confrontation with Washington on Tehran’s behalf. The threat of secondary restrictions could cause banks, carriers, and private companies to withdraw from individual transactions even without formal decisions by their governments. Trump has not yet explained exactly what instruments he intends to use to enforce the isolation he announced. Kazakhstan Looks to the Persian Gulf Iran intensified its work with Central Asia well before Trump’s latest threat. In mid-June, the Iranian Minister of Roads and Urban Development Farzaneh Sadegh visited Astana. In talks with Kazakhstan’s Deputy Prime Minister Serik Zhumangarin, the two sides noted that bilateral trade had increased by 26.4% in 2025 to $430.2 million. Astana and Tehran now want to raise it to $3 billion, using, among other things, the free trade agreement between Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union, of which Kazakhstan is a member. The plans go beyond trade. Freight traffic along the International North-South Transport Corridor, which links Russia and Central Asia with Iran and Persian Gulf ports, rose by 12% in 2025 to 3.5 million metric tons. Rail freight between Kazakhstan and Iran also increased by 69%. Astana’s main interest lies even farther south. Iran has allowed Kazakhstan to establish its own transport and logistics terminal at Shahid Rajaee in Bandar Abbas, the country’s largest commercial port. On June 28, the two sides signed a Build-Operate-Transfer agreement. It runs for 27 years, with two years allocated for construction and another 25 for operation. Commercial operations are scheduled to begin in the project’s third year. For Kazakhstan, this is more than simply an overseas terminal. Its Foreign Ministry explicitly links the project to opening access for Kazakh cargo to markets in the Persian Gulf, South and Southeast Asia, and East Africa. In July, Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev again reaffirmed Astana’s interest in the project during a visit to Iran. The ministry also cited a 26.4% increase in bilateral trade in 2025 to $430.2 million. Astana is also considering another Iranian port, Chabahar, on the Indian Ocean....

Opinion: Tajikistan’s Digital Finance Boom Faces Its Next Challenge – Keeping Money Digital

Tajikistan’s e-wallet numbers are striking. As of June 30, 2026, 28 credit financial institutions reported 19.8 million electronic wallets, up 25.9% from a year earlier. In the first half of 2026, e-wallets were used for 14.6 million non-cash transactions worth 3.6 billion somoni. But those figures should not be read as if 19.8 million people are actively using wallets. The National Bank of Tajikistan’s published aggregate data do not state how many wallets belong to unique users or how many are active. Nor do they show how usage is distributed among them. Without that denominator, the headline figure tells us much less about actual use. Tajikistan has clearly expanded digital access. It now needs a clearer picture of usage and stronger reasons for people and businesses to keep money inside the digital system. I call this the shift from digital access to digital retention. The headline number is 19.8 million wallets out of an official population of 10.721 million as of January 1, 2026. The more useful number would be how many are meaningfully active. Do Not Confuse Registration With Usage A registered wallet is an access point, not proof of financial behavior. One person may hold several wallets, and some may sit dormant. Usage may also be concentrated among a smaller group of frequent users. Without active-wallet and unique-user data, none of those possibilities should be assumed as fact. What we can say is that non-cash activity is growing. The National Bank reports that cashless payments for goods and services made with electronic payment instruments reached 41% in the first half of 2026, 13 percentage points higher than a year earlier. It also reports 9,425 POS terminals at trade and service points and 33,620 QR codes. That 41% figure covers electronic payment instruments, including bank cards and e-wallets. It is not an e-wallet usage rate. To understand how wallets are actually being used, Tajikistan needs a clearer view of active wallets, transaction frequency, and what happens to money after it enters a digital account. Trust Is Part of the Infrastructure For many people, the move from cash to bank cards was already a significant behavioral change. They learned to trust money represented by a balance on a screen rather than notes in a hand. Wallets, QR payments and app-based financial services require another layer of trust. Users need to know where their money is and whether a payment went through. They also need a clear route when something goes wrong. Fees should be easy to understand. This is why simplicity is part of financial trust, not merely user experience. Tajikistan’s Financial Literacy Program for 2026–2030 makes the same connection at a policy level. It links financial literacy and consumer protection with public confidence as digital financial services expand. A good digital-finance service should be usable by ordinary people without making money feel harder to understand. Users should not need fintech expertise to trust the product. Merchants Need a Reason Not to Cash Out Consumers are only one part of...

Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan Give Conflicting Accounts of Four-Country Blackout

Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have given differing accounts of what triggered the August 14 blackout that cut electricity across swathes of Central Asia. Three days later, the initiating event remains unresolved, and the times released by the two sides do not fit neatly into the same sequence. Kazakhstan’s national grid operator KEGOC says two hydrogenerators at Kyrgyzstan’s Toktogul Hydropower Plant, with a combined capacity of 600 MW, disconnected at 2:37 p.m. Kazakhstan time. KEGOC said the sudden loss of generation overloaded the North-East-South transit corridor, separating southern Kazakhstan from the rest of the national grid and the interconnected systems of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. A special commission is investigating the causes. Meanwhile, Kyrgyzstan’s National Electric Grid has given a different chronology. It said that at 3:34 p.m. Kyrgyzstan time, an external disconnection occurred on a high-voltage line linking the northern and southern parts of Kazakhstan’s power system. The Central Asian network then split into an isolated section, and Kyrgyzstan temporarily operated separately while automatic protection systems worked to protect equipment. The one-hour difference between the countries’ clocks makes the discrepancy clearer. Kazakhstan has used UTC+5 nationwide since 2024, while Kyrgyzstan uses UTC+6. That puts Kyrgyzstan’s reported line disconnection at 2:34 p.m. Kazakhstan time, three minutes before KEGOC’s stated 2:37 p.m. Toktogul shutdown. The two times may describe different stages of a fast-moving cascade, but they do not establish the same starting point. A third timestamp complicates the sequence. Alatau Zharyq Company said three 500 kV KEGOC transmission lines shut down at 2:38 p.m., and that those lines triggered automatic load-shedding and frequency protection in Almaty and the surrounding region. Taken together, the public statements leave a sequence of 2:34 p.m., 2:37 p.m., and 2:38 p.m. that investigators will need to reconcile. TCA reporters in Almaty and Bishkek experienced power cuts, while local media reported outages in Dushanbe, Khujand, and southern parts of Uzbekistan. In Kazakhstan, the disturbance affected consumers in the Zhambyl, Turkistan, Kyzylorda, Zhetysu, and Almaty regions, with further restrictions in Karaganda, Ulytau, and Abai. KEGOC said supplies were restored across the affected regions later that afternoon. The four-country impact reflects how tightly the systems are connected. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan operate in parallel through the Central Asian power system. Cross-border links allow operators to share electricity and reserve capacity, but also mean that a sudden loss of generation or a major transmission line can be felt beyond one national grid before protection systems isolate the disturbance. Central Asia has been here before. In January 2022, a major blackout hit southern Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. The event also involved a sharp imbalance on the regional network and the separation of Kazakhstan’s northern and southern grids. Its precise starting point was disputed in the immediate aftermath. The regional grid dates to the Soviet period. Uzbekistan later withdrew from the old electricity ring, leaving Tajikistan largely isolated for years. Regional links have since been rebuilt; Tajikistan began reconnecting to the unified system in 2024. An Asian Development Bank project is adding...

What Do Former Presidents Do? From Akayev to Nazarbayev, the Fates of Central Asia’s Ex-Leaders

Central Asia has produced remarkably few former presidents who simply retired from public life. In Kyrgyzstan, former leaders have been driven from office, prosecuted, imprisoned, or forced into exile. Kazakhstan’s Nursultan Nazarbayev has followed a different path, largely withdrawing from public view after losing much of his political influence. Elsewhere, some of the region’s founding presidents died in office, leaving no post-presidential career to examine. The Times of Central Asia has previously examined how political succession has developed across the region. The fate of leaders after they leave office reveals another side of that political tradition. The architect of Kyrgyzstan’s early post-Soviet political model was its first president, Askar Akayev, who remained in office until 2005. Akayev introduced democratic institutions in Kyrgyzstan, but gradually tightened the pressure on his opponents as his presidency progressed. His rule was badly shaken by the Aksy shootings in 2002, which followed the prosecution of opposition lawmaker Azimbek Beknazarov and a territorial dispute with China. Akayev’s government had agreed to transfer disputed border territory to China, a decision fiercely criticized by the opposition. In March 2002, demonstrators in southern Kyrgyzstan demanded Akayev’s impeachment. Security forces opened fire during the unrest, killing several people. The shootings became one of the defining political crises of his presidency. In a 2003 referendum, Akayev significantly strengthened presidential powers at parliament’s expense. Economic hardship, unemployment, widespread corruption, and allegations of fraud in the 2005 parliamentary elections eventually helped trigger the Tulip Revolution in March of that year. Akayev had to flee, with rumors at the time claiming that he was smuggled out in the trunk of an official car, wrapped in a carpet. Criminal cases involving corruption were opened against him and members of his family in Kyrgyzstan. The authorities repeatedly sought his extradition from Russia, but were unsuccessful. After leaving Kyrgyzstan, Akayev lived in Moscow and taught at Moscow State University. In 2006, he became a foreign member of the Russian Academy of Sciences. In August 2021, Akayev reappeared in Bishkek. He unexpectedly flew into the country and was immediately questioned as part of the criminal investigation into corruption surrounding the Kumtor gold mine. Afterward, he said he had come to Bishkek for a week and was prepared to assist investigators. “I came to speak honestly and sincerely about how we built Kumtor, why we built it, and what mistakes may have been made. The investigation will continue,” he said. In 2023, Kyrgyzstan’s Prosecutor General’s Office announced that the criminal prosecution of Akayev had been terminated because the statute of limitations had expired. Tajikistan’s former president Rahmon Nabiyev was also forced from power. The former Soviet politician lost power amid the country’s civil war in 1992. He died at his home in Khujand the following year, at the age of 62, reportedly from a heart attack. According to his wife, Nabiyev spent his final months in Khujand in conditions resembling house arrest and received a pension of just five rubles. While Tajikistan did not repeat the experiment of violently...