Tajikistan Features - The Times Of Central Asia

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Growth Forecasts

Why Central Asia Growth Forecasts Differ So Sharply

How fast can Central Asia continue to grow? The Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) give markedly different answers. The contrast is sharpest in Kyrgyzstan, where the EDB expects another year of double-digit growth, while the IMF sees a much more pronounced slowdown. Both institutions are looking at the same countries and have access to broadly the same set of macroeconomic data. Their forecasts, however, reflect different assessments of how much of Central Asia’s recent momentum can be sustained. The EDB expects strong investment to keep growth high, while the IMF is more cautious about how long the recent pace of expansion can continue. The EDB is itself a regional development institution. It was established by Russia and Kazakhstan in 2006, with Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan later becoming shareholders. Uzbekistan joined the bank in 2025. The EDB is headquartered in Almaty. The comparison covers the four Central Asian states that are EDB members; Turkmenistan is not included. Its latest forecast for Central Asia is optimistic. In 2026, the EDB expects growth of 10.2% in Kyrgyzstan, 8.3% in Tajikistan, 7.9% in Uzbekistan, and 5.5% in Kazakhstan. The region’s economy as a whole is expected to grow by more than 6.5%, with its combined GDP exceeding $600 billion for the first time. The IMF gives lower figures. Its latest available country projections put 2026 growth at 4.6% for Kazakhstan, 6.8% for Uzbekistan, 6.1% for Kyrgyzstan, and 6.0% for Tajikistan. These projections were published at different times rather than as a single set of four country forecasts. The largest gap is in Kyrgyzstan, where the forecasts differ by 4.1 percentage points, but there are nevertheless modest percentage point gaps between the forecasts for Tajikistan (2.3), Uzbekistan (1.1), and Kazakhstan (0.9). These differences are large enough to raise the question: why the difference in expectations? Part of the answer lies in how the institutions assess the effect of a more uncertain global economy. The IMF expects the world economy to grow by 3% in 2026 and 3.4% in 2027. Its July update said the conflict in the Middle East was weighing particularly heavily on energy importers and warned that renewed conflict or financial-market disruption could weaken the outlook. For the four countries, this means different things. Kazakhstan exports oil and benefits from high prices, although it also depends on the condition of export routes and external demand. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan import a significant share of their fuel, while their economies are closely linked to migrant remittances. Uzbekistan has a larger domestic market and its own resource base. Kazakhstan illustrates the logic of the IMF forecast particularly well. Its GDP grew by 6.5% in 2025, one of its strongest performances in recent years. The Fund does not expect that surge to be repeated. Oil production is expected to stabilize after last year’s increase, with growth slowing to 4.6% in 2026, according to the IMF forecast. This does not mean that the Fund attributes everything to oil. Domestic demand remains strong,...

Middle Corridor

Central Asia and Azerbaijan Extend Cooperation Across the Caspian

Central Asia’s presidential forum now spans both shores of the Caspian. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan anchor the principal Caspian crossing at the center of the Middle Corridor, the rail-and-sea network linking Central Asia to European markets through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye. Azerbaijan’s full participation brings the corridor’s eastern and western Caspian gateways into the same regular political setting. The six governments can use it to coordinate the transport, energy, digital, and investment links already developing across the Caspian, even though Georgia and Türkiye remain essential to the route’s westward operation. On July 31, 2026, the presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan signed the Cholpon-Ata Declaration at an informal Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia and Azerbaijan in Kyrgyzstan. The Declaration gave formal political expression to cooperation that had already been developing. Official accounts said the leaders emphasized expanded regional cooperation, including trade, transport and logistics, and energy. The full text has not been released, so those priorities come from official accounts rather than the declaration itself. Proposed by Uzbekistani President Shavkat Mirziyoyev in 2017 and first convened in Astana in March 2018, the Consultative Meetings brought together the five Central Asian states in an informal presidential format. They expanded in November 2025 with Azerbaijan’s admission as a full-fledged participant, while retaining their consultative character. Azerbaijan attended in 2023 and 2024 as a guest; Cholpon-Ata was its first informal meeting in the new capacity. Official documents continue to call the format “Central Asia and Azerbaijan.” C6 is analytical shorthand for the enlargement, not the name of a new bloc or formal organization. Azerbaijan’s admission follows several years of practical cooperation. At a ministerial meeting in Aktau on November 25, 2022, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye signed a 2022–2027 roadmap for the simultaneous elimination of bottlenecks and development of the Middle Corridor. At its 2023 Baku summit, the UN Special Programme for the Economies of Central Asia (SPECA) adopted a digitalization roadmap and established a multi-partner trust fund, followed by work on digital data exchange and port-to-port cooperation. The transport roadmap includes Georgia and Türkiye, while SPECA also includes Afghanistan; neither is institutionally identical to C6. The enlarged format gives the six governments a regular political setting in which to coordinate existing transport, digital, and investment mechanisms. The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route Association reports that freight through the seaports of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan reached 3.3 million tons in 2024, 20% above the 2023 level, while container traffic within the same scope rose 176% to 56,500 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEU). Freight remains the principal basis of integration. Oil transit, prospective electricity links, and joint investment instruments are extending cooperation into adjacent sectors. Kazakhstan's use of the route for oil exports is also rising: according to KazMunayGas reports, Kazakhstani oil shipments from Aktau through the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan route increased by 34% to 1.4 million tons in 2024. At COP29 in Baku on November 13, 2024, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan signed a strategic-partnership agreement on producing and transmitting green energy,...

Succession

The Tradition of Power – Why Political Succession in Central Asia Follows Its Own Rules

In January 2027, Kyrgyzstan will hold a presidential election, an event that is anything but routine for the Central Asian republic. Over the past three decades, political crises, often surrounding disputed elections, have repeatedly ended in the removal of presidents. Kyrgyzstan remains an outlier in the region, although it, too, has gradually been moving towards a political model that has long become the norm across the rest of Central Asia. This year marks 35 years since the Soviet republics embarked on independent political lives following the collapse of the USSR. Yet many of the mechanisms governing the transfer of supreme power, shaped during the Soviet era, continue to define politics across the independent states. In Central Asia, three decades of independence have produced a distinctive model of political succession. The final years of the Soviet Union became known as the era of the so-called "gun-carriage race." As one ageing General Secretary after another passed away, an unwritten rule appeared to emerge: the official who chaired the state funeral commission for the deceased leader often became his successor. A remarkably similar pattern later emerged in Central Asia – first in Turkmenistan, then in Uzbekistan. Turkmenistan's first president, Saparmurat Niyazov, died in December 2006. The state funeral commission was chaired by Deputy Prime Minister and Health Minister Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, who simultaneously became acting president. It was during those funeral ceremonies that the wider public was introduced for the first time to the family of Turkmenbashi. Under the constitution, parliamentary speaker Ovezgeldy Atayev should have assumed the presidency. Instead, he was stripped of immunity and arrested, clearing the way for Berdimuhamedov to take the acting presidency. After assuming the presidency in 2007, Berdimuhamedov gradually abandoned the more eccentric elements of his predecessor's personality cult while building a political system centered on his own leadership. If Niyazov styled himself Turkmenbashi – Leader of All Turkmens – his successor adopted the title Arkadag, or Protector of the Nation. In February 2022, Berdimuhamedov unexpectedly announced that he would step down following an early presidential election scheduled for March 12. He explained the decision by saying it was time to "give the younger generation an opportunity to govern the country." Few doubted that he was referring to his son Serdar Berdimuhamedov, who by then had already occupied most of the key positions within the state hierarchy. That is precisely what happened. Serdar Berdimuhamedov became president, while his father moved to the chairmanship of the Halk Maslahaty, retaining the title of National Leader of the Turkmen People. Uzbekistan followed a similar pattern, although under different circumstances. Islam Karimov built a highly centralized presidential system that left virtually no room for political competition. This applied not only to political opponents, but also to those closest to the president. His eldest daughter, Gulnara Karimova, was placed under house arrest while her father was still alive. Following his death, she was convicted and remains imprisoned in Uzbekistan. When Karimov died in September 2016, reports of his death circulated for several days...

Islam and National Identity

Dombra Dispute and Niqab Bans Fuel Religious Debate in Central Asia

Standing before a court in Aktobe in June, 35-year-old Azat Konys apologized to “the entire Kazakh people” for insulting one of the country’s most cherished cultural symbols. Two months earlier, during a TikTok livestream, he had declared the dombra forbidden under Islam, compared the two-stringed instrument to part of the devil’s anatomy and called clerics from Kazakhstan’s official Islamic authority “dogs of hell.” Konys asked the court not to imprison him. The judge instead sentenced him to three years and six months for inciting religious and national hatred. The controversy began when Konys cited the Hanafi school of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence, the dominant legal tradition among Muslims in Kazakhstan, to argue that the dombra and other stringed instruments, including the guitar and balalaika, were haram, meaning forbidden under Islamic law. The remarks caused particular anger because the dombra is more than a musical instrument in Kazakhstan: it has accompanied oral poetry and storytelling for generations and is officially celebrated as a symbol of cultural heritage and national identity. Police identified Konys after clips from the livestream circulated on social media and detained him in April. The case is an unusually stark example of how online religious disputes are spilling into legal and political life across Central Asia. Arguments that might once have remained within mosques or religious communities are now spreading through social media, forcing governments and official Islamic authorities alike to decide where religious expression ends and attacks on national culture begin. A more recent controversy arose in Kazakhstan’s Turkestan Region, where a 66-year-old guest at a toi, a traditional wedding feast, called for stricter adherence to Islamic law. He urged the organizers to separate men and women and remove music and alcohol from the celebration, while describing musicians as “heralds of Satan.” The video spread rapidly on social media, prompting nationwide debate. The man was detained and placed in a temporary detention facility for incitement of religious and social hatred. In a statement, the Ministry of Internal Affairs said that freedom of expression does not extend to statements that degrade the dignity of others or could provoke religious or social hostility. The Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kazakhstan (SAMK), the country’s main official Muslim body, later issued its own response. It stated that Islam does not prohibit music in itself and stressed that publicly insulting artists or women is inconsistent with Islamic ethics. Another controversy centered on Nauryz, the spring equinox holiday celebrated throughout Central Asia and across much of the Turkic and Iranian cultural world. In March, a blogger in the Almaty Region described the holiday as “non-Muslim” and argued that it should not be celebrated. Police opened a criminal case against him on suspicion of inciting religious hatred. Kazakhstan’s Prosecutor General’s Office subsequently warned of legal liability for statements attacking Nauryz and other national traditions. The SAMK, meanwhile, publicly celebrated Nauryz as a national holiday promoting social harmony and charitable acts. The debate soon spread beyond social media into politics and the entertainment industry. Producer and television presenter Bayan Alaguzova said...

Bride Kidnapping

Bride Kidnapping in Central Asia: Why the Practice Persists Despite Tougher Laws

Bride kidnapping for the purpose of forcing women into marriage remains one of the least visible forms of gender-based violence in Central Asia. Although abduction and coercion into marriage are punishable under criminal law across the region, the offenses are defined differently from country to country. Their true scale is difficult to measure. Many victims never report the crime, while some cases are still viewed as a continuation of tradition rather than a violation of criminal law. Over the past decade, governments across Central Asia have begun revising their approaches to the problem. Kyrgyzstan strengthened criminal penalties following several high-profile cases. Kazakhstan did not close a legal loophole that allowed many perpetrators to avoid prosecution until 2025. Uzbekistan has a specific criminal provision covering the abduction of women for marriage, while Tajikistan does not appear to define bride kidnapping as a separate offense. In Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, however, assessing the prevalence of the practice remains particularly difficult because of limited research and incomplete official data. The term “bride kidnapping” has not always referred to the same practice. Anthropologists note that historically it covered a range of marriage customs, from mutually agreed elopements and staged abductions to the violent kidnapping of women. Contemporary researchers stress that the presence or absence of a woman’s free consent is the key distinction between these practices. Comparable customs once existed among a number of Central Asian peoples. One documented motive has been the desire to avoid kalym, the traditional bride price paid by the groom’s family to the bride’s relatives. Economic motives, however, did not alter the nature of the crime when a woman did not consent to the marriage. The issue has been studied most extensively in Kyrgyzstan. A nationally representative survey conducted in 2015–2016 by the National Statistical Committee with support from UN Women, UNFPA, and the International Organization for Migration found that 22.1% of marriages involved some form of bride abduction. Of these, 16.3% were reported as taking place with the woman’s consent, while 5.8% occurred without it. The frequently cited claim that more than one in five Kyrgyz marriages begins with bride kidnapping therefore combines consensual and non-consensual practices. It should not be presented as an estimate of forced abduction. The figures were based on respondents’ accounts and may not capture every form of family or social pressure surrounding consent. Known locally as ala kachuu, or “grab and run,” the non-consensual abduction of a woman for marriage is a criminal offense in Kyrgyzstan. In 2013, the penalty for abducting an adult woman for marriage against her will was increased to between five and seven years in prison. The corresponding sentence when the victim was under 17 was increased to between five and ten years. Tougher penalties, however, have not prevented further tragedies. One of the best-known cases was the 2018 murder of Burulai Turdaaly Kyzy, a 20-year-old medical student. After she was abducted, her family contacted the police. Officers brought both Burulai and her abductor to a police station but left...

U.S. Visa Bond

U.S. Makes Visa Bond Program Permanent, Raises Maximum to $20,000

The United States has made its Visa Bond Program permanent, raising the maximum refundable deposit to $20,000 for certain business and tourist visa applicants from 50 countries, including Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. The final rule took effect on August 3, replacing a 12-month pilot launched in August 2025. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan remain outside the program. The requirement applies to B-1 business visas, B-2 tourist visas and combined B-1/B-2 visas. Applicants from covered countries who are otherwise eligible for a visa must generally post a bond of $10,000, $15,000 or $20,000, with the amount determined by a consular officer. Officers are expected to set most bonds at $15,000. The amount may be reduced to $10,000 when an applicant’s circumstances justify a lower deposit or increased to $20,000 when officials believe a larger bond is needed to ensure that the traveler leaves the country on time. The bond is returned when the traveler complies with the terms of the visa and leaves the United States within the permitted period. It can also be refunded if the visa holder does not travel before the visa expires or is denied admission at the border. No interest is paid on the deposit, and posting a bond does not guarantee that a visa will be issued. Travelers who post a bond must enter and ultimately leave the United States through commercial airports, including U.S. Customs and Border Protection preclearance locations abroad. They cannot use land or sea crossings for their initial entry or final departure. Turkmenistan has been covered by the policy since January 1, while Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were added on January 21. The Times of Central Asia reported the regional expansion at the time. The broader list includes 50 countries, 30 of them in Africa, as well as countries in Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean and the Pacific. The current program began as a pilot on August 20, 2025, initially covering Malawi and Zambia. Under the pilot, bonds were set at $5,000, $10,000 or $15,000. The permanent version removes the $5,000 option and increases the maximum deposit by $5,000. The $20,000 maximum will be adjusted for inflation beginning on October 1, 2027, and every seven years thereafter. An earlier visa bond pilot was announced in 2020 during Donald Trump’s first administration, but it was not implemented because international travel had fallen sharply during the Covid-19 pandemic. The State Department said the policy is intended to address visa overstays, inadequate information sharing, weaknesses in identity and criminal-record verification, and concerns over screening and the security of travel documents. Countries can be added to the list on a rolling basis, while removals can take effect immediately. According to the department, the 50 countries currently covered recorded 45,488 overstays during the 2024 fiscal year. Fewer than 50 overstays were recorded during the first ten months of the pilot, while visa issuance to nationals of the listed countries fell by 83% compared with the same period a year earlier. The department said some eligible applicants appeared to have...