Turkmenistan - The Times Of Central Asia

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Russia's War

Central Asians in Putin’s War: Fighting for Ukraine, Forced for Russia

As the war in Ukraine continues to drag on, fighters from across Central Asia have found themselves on both sides of the frontlines. In Kyiv, Kazakh national Zhasulan Duysembin has traded his past life as a sales agent for a rifle, sporting a tattoo of Kazakhstan’s flag on his back as he battles to defend his adopted home. He now fights, he says, to protect his children and believes that “Russia will not stop in Ukraine, it will go further. We must make every effort to ensure that our Kazakhstan does not suffer.” Alan Zhangozha, an ethnic Kazakh who grew up in Kyiv and now serves as a public relations officer in the Ukrainian Army, echoes this sentiment. “Ukraine’s victory will also be a victory for my Motherland,” he told The Diplomat. But as the war drags on, in Kazakhstan, families mourn men like 22-year-old Kiril Nysanbaev - a labor migrant in Russia coerced into signing up for the war who only came home in a coffin. His sister recalls how her brother told her that Russian officers beat and forced him to enlist while he was detained on dubious charges in Chelyabinsk. Nysanbaev was killed in Ukraine’s Donetsk region in March 2024, news that only reached his family three months later. Citizens of all five Central Asian countries have been pulled into the conflict since Russia’s invasion in 2022. Some have volunteered to fight for Ukraine, driven by personal ties or ideals, while others, mostly labor migrants, have been recruited, enticed, or pressured into fighting for Russia. These parallel currents reflect the complex impact of the war on a region that remains officially neutral but was historically deeply entwined with Moscow. While a handful of Central Asians now wear the blue-and-yellow insignia in Ukraine’s defense, far more have ended up in Russia's ranks, often as expendable foot soldiers. From Bishkek to Bucha In November 2022, a Kyrgyz former labor migrant, Almaz Kudabek uulu, announced the creation of the Turan Battalion, a volunteer unit of Turkic-speaking fighters formed to assist Ukraine. “Kyrgyzstan is my homeland; I will always love it. But Ukraine is my home now; I am fighting for Ukraine,” he told reporters. The battalion, joined by volunteers from Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and elsewhere, operates as a semi-autonomous unit supported by private donations and allied Ukrainian brigades. Back in Kyrgyzstan, however, the authorities opened a criminal case against Kudabek, punishable by up to eight years in prison, and local media that covered his story faced pressure. Others have supported Ukraine in tangible, humanitarian ways. Early in the war, members of Ukraine’s Kazakh diaspora erected traditional yurts in cities like Bucha and Kyiv as heated shelters dubbed “Yurts of Invincibility.” These spaces provided food, tea, and electricity during blackouts, a gesture of solidarity that irritated Moscow but drew only a muted response from Kazakhstan’s government. Moscow’s Migrant Recruits: Coercion and Casualties Far greater numbers of Central Asians have ended up fighting for Russia, which hosts millions of migrant workers from...

Gas Exports

The Power of Siberia 2 Project and Central Asia’s Gas Bargaining Power

The proposed Power of Siberia 2 (PoS-2) pipeline from Russia to China has re-entered the headlines on the strength of a new memorandum between Gazprom and CNPC. Russia calls the memorandum “legally binding,” but China has avoided the phrase, because the only thing that is legally binding is an agreement to negotiate. The memorandum affirms a design capacity up to 50 billion cubic meters per year (bcm/y), a route via Mongolia, and a total trunk length of roughly 2,600 kilometers (km) on the Russian side before crossing Mongolian territory. Feasibility work has highlighted a 1,420-millimeter (56-inch) pipe diameter, and an indicative cost cited in some trade reporting near $13–14 billion. The political signaling is strong, but pricing terms remain unresolved. For Central Asia, the significance is immediate: even without a final sales contract, the expectation of future Russian volumes tightens China’s negotiating posture with Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, the three states already connected to China by the Central Asia–China Gas Pipeline (CAGP). Central Asia's Gas Supplies to China China’s westbound import corridor from Central Asia consists today of three parallel pipelines that together provide a nominal capacity of 55 bcm/y (Lines “A” and “B” at 15 bcm/y each, and Line “C” at 25 bcm/y). Construction of the first two lines began in 2008, with operations starting in 2009–2010; Line C entered service in 2014. Line D, planned at 30 bcm/y through Uzbekistan–Tajikistan–Kyrgyzstan to China, has been delayed for years; if completed, it would raise corridor capacity toward 85 bcm/y. Turkmenistan is the anchor supplier. The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (OIES) estimates its deliveries to China at 32.9 bcm in 2022 (roughly 81% of the country’s gas exports that year), with long-term sales structured on formulas linked to the price of oil. Interfax reports that in the second quarter of 2025, the price for Turkmenistan’s gas fell below $290 per thousand cubic meters (mcm). This figure is consistent with oil-price linkage rather than hub-indexed European benchmarks. Recent industry and regional reporting puts Turkmenistan’s deliveries averaging approximately 35 bcm/y in the mid-2020s. Kazakhstan had committed to supply up to 10 bcm/y, but domestic constraints have kept actual flows lower. S&P Global cites 4.4 bcm in 2022 and 5.86 bcm in 2023, with winter interruptions to protect domestic consumers; of the 29.8 bcm of commercial gas produced in 2023, 19.4 bcm was consumed at home. Uzbekistan’s volumes have been more variable as Tashkent balances domestic demand, imports, and swap operations. Jamestown noted a fall in Uzbek gas export value to China from $1.07 billion in 2022 to $563.5 million in 2023, before a rebound in 2024 and 2025 according to Chinese customs-based press summaries. PoS-2’s Route, Mongolian Gatekeeping, and Central Asian Implications The geography of the route matters for Central Asia. On the Russian side, public summaries describe a corridor from Yamal via Urengoy through Krasnoyarsk and Irkutsk, then across Buryatia toward Kyakhta near the Mongolian border. In Mongolia, official communications stress underground installation across the steppes and local economic benefits, but final...

Cotton

Central Asia’s Cotton Harvest: Between Reform, Coercion, and Economic Strain

The 2025 cotton harvest is underway across Central Asia, revealing the region’s ongoing struggle to reconcile long-promised reforms with persistent coercion and deepening economic pressure. Once the crown jewel of Soviet central planning, cotton, long dubbed “white gold”, remains a politically sensitive and economically vital crop from Turkmenistan to Tajikistan. Turkmenistan: Forced Mobilization Persists In Turkmenistan, mass mobilization for the cotton harvest continues largely unchanged. Chronicles of Turkmenistan reported that during a September cabinet meeting, President Serdar Berdimuhamedov ordered all regions to begin picking on September 10. Just two days earlier, the Ministry of Health had instructed medical institutions to send doctors, nurses, orderlies, and even technical staff to the fields, each assigned a daily quota of 45 kilograms. In the town of Turkmenabat, hospital workers said doctors were expected to go to the fields immediately after overnight shifts. Those who refuse must hire substitutes at their own expense, paying about 50 manats ($14) per day. As a result, up to two-thirds of monthly salaries are spent covering these unofficial harvest duties. While younger staff are dispatched to the fields, older employees are left to maintain hospital operations with minimal support. Uzbekistan: Reform, but Lingering Coercion Uzbekistan, by contrast, has officially ended Soviet-style forced labor. The government abolished child and public-sector mobilization, scrapped state cotton quotas in 2020, and partnered with the International Labour Organization (ILO) to monitor the transition. In March 2022, the Cotton Campaign, a global coalition of rights groups, unions, and apparel brands, lifted its boycott of Uzbek cotton, citing the end of systemic forced labor. The campaign, which began in 2011, had gained the support of more than 330 global brands, including H&M and Zara. Yet coercion has not entirely disappeared. In a recent video published by Kun.uz, Dilfuza Tashmatova, deputy hokim (governor) for family and women’s affairs in the Surkhandarya region's Sariosiyo district, was seen berating mahalla (local governance body) employees for failing to recruit enough pickers. She demanded that each “women’s activist” find five to ten additional laborers, totaling 150 people, and threatened dismissal for non-compliance. “Are you even a woman? Shameless! Unscrupulous! If you don’t want to work, then leave!” she shouted from a cotton field. According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, approximately 70% of Uzbekistan’s cotton is still harvested by hand, despite recent gains in mechanization. Labor shortages have plagued the past two harvests as fewer people are willing to take on the physically demanding work for low wages. Mahalla councils are often pressured to mobilize unemployed or low-income residents. Following public backlash, Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Poverty Reduction and Employment fined Tashmatova 20.6 million UZS (about $1,660) under Article 51 of the Administrative Code, which prohibits forced labor. From Soviet Monoculture to Market Reforms Uzbekistan’s long history of forced cotton labor dates back to its designation as the Soviet Union’s cotton monoculture. For decades, students, teachers, and medical staff were sent into the fields to meet state quotas. After independence, the system endured until international scrutiny spurred reforms. The ILO hailed...

Afghanistan

Opinion: The Contact Group on Afghanistan – Central Asia Formulates a Regional Position

On August 26, special representatives on Afghanistan from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan met for the first time in Tashkent. The meeting resulted in the creation of a permanent regional platform: the Contact Group on Afghanistan. This gathering was not only a continuation of commitments outlined in the joint statement from the most recent Consultative Summit of Central Asian heads of state, but also a step toward preparing for the next high-level format, scheduled for November in Tashkent. Formally, Turkmenistan was absent. Available information suggests the reasons were purely technical. Ashgabat was ready to join and expressed support for the results through its foreign ministry channels. The key outcome is that Central Asian states have, for the first time, shown their readiness to speak with one voice on an issue long shaped by competing external interests. This is not the start of forming a common position; that had already developed de facto in recent years. All Central Asian countries have supported trade and transit with Afghanistan, continued supplying electricity and food, and maintained working contacts with the Taliban, while avoiding extremes. The Tashkent meeting institutionalized this approach: parallel tracks have now shifted, cautiously, toward coordination. Informal unity has been formalized into a tool. Unlike external players, who often cloak interests in grand rhetoric, Central Asia acts openly and pragmatically. The logic is simple: whatever is done for Afghanistan is, in fact, done for oneself. That is the distinctive feature of the regional approach - no ideological cover, no attempts to reshape Afghanistan. Examples are straightforward. Electricity continues to flow even when payments are delayed - not as charity, but as an investment in security. A blackout in Afghanistan could trigger refugee flows and threats heading north. Exports of flour and fuel sustain Afghan markets but also expand outlets for Central Asian producers. Participation in trans-Afghan corridors is not a gift to Kabul but an opportunity for Central Asia to anchor itself in southern logistics routes. Ultimately, every step “for Afghanistan” is primarily for the region itself. If Kabul ignores basic rules, cooperation will simply stop. In politics, there are no eternal friends, only eternal interests. The new format does not yet imply collective pressure on the Taliban. Rather, it creates conditions for each country to conduct more substantive bilateral dialogue, but grounded in a shared position. Until now, Central Asia has mainly spoken to the Taliban about trade, transit, and infrastructure. The Contact Group now makes it possible to add another dimension: clarifying boundaries of what is acceptable on issues like extremism, border escalation, or water pressure. For now, “red lines” are unlikely, since the Taliban have not crossed them. The situation remains manageable, leaving room for constructive dialogue. Equally important, the Contact Group is not a threat or ultimatum. Coordination is meant to expand opportunities for dialogue, not limit them. In the long run, this could evolve into a sustainable C5+A format. Afghanistan would then be integrated into regional frameworks not as a problem to be managed, but as...

Economic Cooperation

Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan Finalize $555 Million Investment and Trade Agreement

Kazakhstan’s Senate on September 4 ratified a bilateral agreement with Turkmenistan aimed at bolstering mutual investment and economic cooperation, Kazinform reported. The agreement, which sets out conditions for the promotion and protection of investments, is expected to create a more transparent and predictable environment for investors from both countries. Senator Amangeldy Nugmanov emphasized that the agreement provides comprehensive legal safeguards for investment across all sectors, from state-led initiatives to private enterprise. For the first time at the interstate level, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have formalized clear guarantees to protect investor interests. The agreement includes provisions for dispute resolution, including access to international arbitration, and ensures fair and equal treatment for foreign investments. Energy Sector as Strategic Priority Energy cooperation figures prominently in the agreement. Kazakhstan has expressed readiness to invest in the development of Turkmenistan’s gas condensate fields and to support the expansion of pipeline infrastructure. Nugmanov highlighted a separate agreement signed between Kazakhstan’s QazaqGaz and Turkmenistan’s state concern Turkmengaz, describing it as a “golden bridge” that will enhance both nations' economic prospects and contribute to regional energy security. Trade and Transport Ties Expand Senator Sergey Ershov noted that bilateral trade reached $555.7 million in 2024. Kazakh investors injected $16.1 million into Turkmenistan’s economy, while Kazakhstan received $400,000 in direct investment from Turkmenistan. Beyond energy, cooperation now includes rail, road, and maritime transport. Turkmenistan has also shown interest in modernizing armored vehicles and supplying spare parts to Kazakhstan. During a summit held in April, the presidents of both countries agreed to target $1 billion in annual trade turnover in the near future. They also underscored the strategic importance of expanding cooperation in energy and transport. Key projects under discussion include Kazakhstan’s potential participation in Turkmenistan’s Galkynysh gas field and the development of the Turgundi-Herat-Kandahar-Spin Boldak railway. The rail line, which would pass through Afghanistan, is seen as a means of diversifying trade routes and unlocking new regional markets.

Gasoline

Russia’s Gasoline Export Ban: Limited Shock, Broader Lessons for Central Asia

Russia’s decision to prolong restrictions on gasoline exports has raised concerns in energy markets, but for Central Asia, the immediate fallout appears limited. The true significance lies in what the move reveals about structural dependencies, the role of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), and the region’s long-term push to diversify energy supplies. Moscow Extends Ban On September 2, Russian officials confirmed that the government may prolong its gasoline export ban for oil producers into October, extending measures first introduced in late summer. Deputy head of the Federal Antimonopoly Service, Vitaly Korolev, told state media that the authorities were weighing a one-month extension beyond the current deadline of September 30. As reported by Reuters, the aim is to stabilize domestic fuel supplies following refinery outages and a seasonal spike in demand. Ukrainian drone strikes have also damaged key refineries, reducing Russia’s production capacity by an estimated 10–17%. The ban affects a relatively small share of Russia’s overall fuel output but highlights the state’s readiness to intervene in energy markets. Previous restrictions in 2023 and 2024 temporarily halted shipments to stabilize domestic prices. The latest decision reflects similar concerns: tightening inventories, growing demand from the agricultural sector, and pressure to prevent inflation ahead of winter. While Moscow insists the measure is temporary, traders and governments across post-Soviet space are watching closely. Russia remains one of the world’s largest fuel exporters, and even marginal policy changes can cause significant ripples. Fuel Security in Central Asia For Central Asia, the impact of the ban will be blunted by exemptions. As members of the EAEU, both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan continue to import Russian gasoline without interruption. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy issued a statement stressing that the country is self-sufficient, pointing to its refineries in Pavlodar, Shymkent, and Atyrau. “For countries that have signed the relevant intergovernmental agreement… these restrictions do not apply,” Minister of Energy, Yerlan Akkenzhenov, stated. Kyrgyzstan is highly dependent on Russian imports. However, according to Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Energy, the 1.6 million tons of fuel the country consumes annually, 93% of which is imported from Russia under intergovernmental agreements, will remain unaffected by the export ban. Since mid-summer, gasoline and diesel prices have climbed, driven by rising global oil benchmarks and repair work at several Russian refineries. Talks are already in progress to set revised supply volumes for 2026. Non-EAEU states face a different challenge. Uzbekistan sources fuel through state-brokered contracts with Russian companies, ensuring stability for now, but smaller private importers outside of these deals have reported difficulties accessing volumes. Late last year, the Chairman of Uzbekistan’s Central Bank warned that the country’s growing reliance on Russian fuel imports could increase vulnerability to supply shocks, which may translate into limited competition and rising prices. Tajikistan remains heavily dependent on Russian fuel through bilateral import agreements, and its virtually non-existent refining capacity makes it highly susceptible to external price fluctuations, a vulnerability underscored by seasonal diesel shortages and repeated spikes in domestic fuel prices. Turkmenistan, meanwhile, continues subsidizing its energy sector heavily:...