• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00205 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10722 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00205 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10722 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00205 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10722 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00205 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10722 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00205 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10722 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00205 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10722 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00205 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10722 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00205 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10722 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 826

Extradited Turkmen Activist Sentenced to Five Years in Prison

Turkmen activist Saddam Gulamov, who was extradited from Russia to Turkmenistan last year, has been sentenced to five years in prison, according to Turkmen.news, citing documents it said were obtained from Russia’s Prosecutor General’s Office. The new information appears to revise earlier reports that Gulamov had received an eight-year sentence. Those accounts were based on sources in Turkmenistan’s law enforcement system and on information from inmates at the LB-E/12, also known as the Seydi Prison Labor Camp, where Gulamov is reportedly serving his sentence. According to Turkmen.news, Turkmenistan’s Prosecutor General’s Office requested Gulamov’s extradition. Russian authorities approved the request on December 20, 2023, and transferred him to Turkmen law enforcement agencies on March 1, 2024, after the decision entered into force. The documents cited by the outlet say the Judicial Panel of the Ashgabat City Court sentenced Gulamov on May 13, 2024, to five years in prison. They do not specify the charges or the legal provisions under which he was convicted. Turkmen.news also reported that Russian Embassy employees in Turkmenistan had visited Gulamov in prison and asked about his conditions of detention. No details about the outcome of those visits have been made public. The outlet said records from Turkmenistan’s wanted persons database showed that, as of 2021, Gulamov was being sought under Article 175, Part 2, of the country’s Criminal Code, which concerns public calls to violently change the constitutional order through mass media, and under Article 175-2, Part 2, which concerns public calls to extremist activity through media channels. Both offenses carried maximum prison terms of five years. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, Gulamov publicly criticized Turkmen authorities and former president Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov on social media in 2020 and 2021. His posts focused on food shortages, economic difficulties, the government’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the official response to a destructive hurricane. In several posts, Gulamov called on citizens not to be afraid of what he described as authoritarian rule. Human rights organizations have repeatedly expressed concern about the treatment of political activists and government critics in Turkmenistan, one of the world’s most closed countries, where independent political activity and public dissent remain tightly restricted.

ILO Reports Rise in Child Labor in Turkmenistan’s Cotton Fields

The International Labour Organization has reported a rise in child labor during Turkmenistan’s 2025 cotton harvest, despite improvements in some working conditions and continued cooperation with the government. The findings were published in the ILO’s second consecutive assessment of labor conditions during the country’s cotton campaign. The monitoring mission was conducted between August 28 and November 4, 2025, across all five regions of Turkmenistan. Observers interviewed 1,611 cotton pickers, 458 farmers, and 1,415 public-sector employees, as well as local officials and farm managers. Children were not interviewed for safety reasons, meaning conclusions regarding child labor were based on direct observations by monitors and testimony from adult respondents. One of the report’s most significant findings was a sharp increase in reports and observations of children in cotton fields. The share of cotton pickers reporting the presence of children in the fields rose to 20% in 2025 from 11% a year earlier. Among public-sector employees surveyed, the figure increased from 14% to 18%, while among farmers it rose from 17% to 34%. ILO monitors themselves encountered children during 38% of field visits, compared with 23% in the previous year’s assessment. The highest incidence was recorded in Dashoguz Region, where children were observed on 59% of surveyed fields. Comparable figures were 41% in Mary Region, 28% in Lebap Region and 25% in Ahal Region. The report also documented increased interference by local officials in monitoring activities. Attempts to influence inspections were recorded during 35% of field visits in 2025, up from 23% in 2024. Interference was also reported during 34% of inspections involving public institutions. In Dashoguz Region, officials were present during interviews with public-sector employees in 62% of cases, according to the report. The use of public-sector workers during the cotton harvest also continued. Twelve percent of surveyed government employees said they participated in cotton picking, while around one in five of those respondents said they had been sent to the fields by employers, officials, or farming associations. Fifteen percent of farmers reported seeing public-sector employees or military personnel working in the fields. The report found that concerns about negative consequences for refusing cotton work also increased. Fifteen percent of pickers reported fearing repercussions, compared with 12% a year earlier. Nearly one-quarter of surveyed public-sector employees expressed similar concerns. Respondents cited fears of losing social benefits, employment, income, or social standing within their communities. Meanwhile, the ILO reported improvements in several labor indicators. The share of workers earning below the official minimum wage fell from 29% to 13%, while average pay increased from 4.6 cents to 4.9 cents per kilogram of cotton harvested. Access to drinking water and food also improved. However, significant challenges remain. Only 7% of cotton pickers had written employment contracts, down from 22% in 2024. More than half of workers lacked at least one required piece of protective equipment, while 11% reported health problems during the harvest. The ILO noted that cooperation with the Turkmen government has resulted in some reforms, including amendments to the Labor Code that...

From Culture to Critical Minerals: C5+1 Opens Busy U.S. Week in Central Asia

The United States and Central Asia moved another part of the C5+1 agenda into a working-level form on June 5, when culture officials from the five Central Asian states and Washington met in Tashkent. The meeting came just days before a separate C5+1 critical minerals session in Astana, giving the week a wider agenda: cultural heritage, public diplomacy, mining, investment, and supply chains are now moving forward in the same regional format. The Tashkent meeting brought together Uzbekistan's Minister of Culture Ozodbek Nazarbekov, Kazakhstan's Minister of Culture and Information Aida Balayeva, Kyrgyzstan's Minister of Culture, Information and Youth Policy Mirbek Mambetaliev, Tajikistan's Minister of Culture Matluba Sattoriyon, Turkmenistan's Deputy Minister of Culture Gurbanmurad Miradaliev, and Sarah Rogers, the U.S. Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. The agenda covered cultural and humanitarian cooperation, joint cultural projects, creative exchanges, and the protection and promotion of cultural heritage. Participants discussed a permanent C5+1 Working Group on Culture, a C5+1 Culture and Innovation Forum, closer cooperation in the creative industries, and more places for Central Asian cultural professionals in U.S. education and exchange programs. Uzbekistan also proposed joint English for Culture centers with U.S. partners at cultural education institutions. In practical terms, that could mean joint training for museum staff, touring exhibitions, film and music exchanges, English-language programs for curators and cultural managers, and U.S.-backed workshops for people working in heritage, tourism, and the creative industries. For Uzbekistan, the proposed centers would give the agenda a physical base inside cultural education institutions rather than leaving it at the level of declarations. The meeting ended with a protocol, which reaffirmed the parties' commitment to the cultural heritage agenda adopted after the Washington summit in November 2025. The International Institute for Central Asia said it covered cooperation through joint events and festivals in art, literature, theater, cinema, and music. Kazakhstan's side also tied the discussion to museum partnerships, digitization of heritage, professional exchanges, tourism routes, and digital projects. The Tashkent talks grew out of the C5+1 leaders’ meeting in Washington, where culture joined a wider list of priorities. That summit marked ten years of U.S. engagement with the region through the format, which began in 2015 and has since expanded from foreign-minister meetings to expert groups and presidential-level summits. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that the November 2025 summit shifted the format from broad diplomacy toward deliverable agreements, with critical minerals, aviation, supply chains, and business ties among the main areas of focus. Culture fits into that agenda, as Central Asian governments see heritage, tourism, film, music, museums, and the creative industries as economic sectors as well as identity markers. For the United States, public diplomacy gives Washington a way to stay active in the region outside security and energy talks. It also gives the C5+1 a soft-power layer, using language programs, museum links, heritage projects, and creative exchanges to build influence without framing the relationship only around security or resources. Heritage protection has a security side as well. Trafficking...

Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Out Now

As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, from October 19, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team covers the latest Eurasian Economic Union talks, a new defence deal between Moscow and a very unlikely ally, Kazakhstan putting itself forward to play a major role in the Iran nuclear talks, Turkmenistan once again conscripting public servants into forced labour, new developments in the Tashiev trial, and a major crackdown on madrasas and religious institutions in southern Kyrgyzstan. Before then turning to our main story this week, where Kyrgyzstan has just won itself a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, a major diplomatic breakthrough for the country, and a massive development for Central Asia more broadly. Special guest: Kadyr Toktogul (Fmr. Kyrgyz Ambassador to the United States and Canada)

Turkmen Rights Activist Diana Dadasheva Receives French Humanitarian Visa

Turkmen human rights activist Diana Dadasheva, founder of the civil rights platform Dayanch, has received a French humanitarian visa and relocated to Paris, a move that could allow her to seek political asylum. Dadasheva’s arrival in France follows years of activism focused on human rights issues in Turkmenistan and concerns among rights groups about her personal safety while she was living in Turkey. Although she had resided legally in Turkey for several years, activists feared she could face deportation to Turkmenistan. According to rights advocates, Dadasheva received repeated threats linked to her public activities. Her human rights work began after she personally experienced restrictions imposed by the Turkmen authorities. Dadasheva has said she was barred from leaving Turkmenistan for six years without explanation, an experience that later motivated her advocacy on behalf of migrant workers and women, as well as her engagement with international organizations. One issue she has frequently highlighted is the practice of travel bans imposed on Turkmen citizens, which rights groups have long criticized as arbitrary and lacking transparency. Concerns about Dadasheva’s safety were heightened by the experiences of other Turkmen opposition figures and activists living in Turkey. In 2023, Turkish authorities reportedly deported several Turkmen activists, including Farhad Meymankuliyev, Rovshen Klychev, and Serdar Durdylyev, according to rights advocates. Others, including Merdan Muhammedov, Alisher Sakhatov, and Abdulla Oruzov, were reportedly forcibly returned to Turkmenistan or faced a serious risk of deportation. Another prominent activist, Dursoltan Taganova, left Turkey after years of alleged harassment and detention and later received asylum in Canada. Dadasheva’s relocation to France was reportedly facilitated in part by the opposition movement Democratic Choice of Turkmenistan. Dadasheva has said she intends to continue her human rights work from France, including advocacy for the Turkmen community abroad.

Megaprojects Instead of Quotas: How Central Asia’s Water Diplomacy Is Changing

Central Asia’s water politics are moving beyond Soviet-era quotas. As glaciers in the Tien Shan retreat and climate pressure increases, river management has become a question of energy security, food production, and regional stability. The Soviet-era system of river-water allocation has reached its limits, forcing Central Asian states to look beyond traditional negotiations and toward joint ownership of strategic water infrastructure. Even as regional governments learn to cooperate more closely, a new challenge is emerging on Central Asia’s southern frontier, one that could disrupt the region’s hydrological balance. The Illusion of Control Formally, Central Asia’s water resources are governed through a network of interstate institutions. The principal mechanisms are the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC) and the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS). On paper, the system appears effective. Twice a year, ahead of the spring-summer irrigation season and the autumn-winter period, representatives of the region’s countries meet to approve water-withdrawal quotas from the Syr Darya and Amu Darya river basins. At the end of 2025, for example, officials meeting in Ashgabat agreed on water allocations for 2026, setting total withdrawals from the Amu Darya at nearly 55.4 billion cubic meters. This framework has helped prevent open interstate conflicts by providing a permanent forum for dialogue. However, its foundation remains the 1992 Almaty Agreement, which essentially preserved a Soviet-era quota system designed for a single centrally planned state rather than a group of independent countries with competing interests. The greatest weakness of the system is the absence of any meaningful enforcement mechanism. If one country exceeds its agreed allocation during a drought year, there are no legal or economic penalties. Disputes are instead resolved through emergency negotiations between ministries or, in some cases, direct interventions by heads of state. A system dependent on political goodwill and personal relationships is increasingly fragile in an era of climate stress. Turning Water Disputes Into Joint Investments As the quota system shows signs of strain, Central Asian countries have begun experimenting with a more pragmatic approach: shared ownership of infrastructure. The central paradox of the Syr Darya basin is that upstream and downstream countries need water at different times of the year. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which control the river’s headwaters, require releases in the winter to generate electricity and heat their cities. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, meanwhile, need that same water in summer to irrigate millions of hectares of farmland. Winter releases often flow downstream when demand is low, while shortages emerge during the peak agricultural season. The proposed solution is the Kambarata-1 hydropower plant on Kyrgyzstan’s Naryn River, a project now estimated to cost around $4.2 billion. What makes the project unusual is its ownership structure. Under a 2024 agreement, Kyrgyzstan will hold a 34% stake, while Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan will each own 33%. By investing billions of dollars in infrastructure located outside their territory, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are effectively purchasing seats at the decision-making table. As shareholders, they gain a direct role in determining reservoir operations, helping ensure water is...