Turkmenistan Features - The Times Of Central Asia

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Central Asia-Russia Summit

Russia–Central Asia Summit in Dushanbe Tests Putin’s Grip

Russian President Vladimir Putin arrived in Tajikistan on October 8 for a three-day state visit that includes a Russia–Central Asia summit in Dushanbe, and a larger Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) meeting. His arrival comes at a time of geopolitical flux in Central Asia, with Russia seeking to reaffirm its waning influence amid migration tensions, economic pressures, and security challenges on its southern flank. The Visit and Summit: What Has Happened So Far Putin was greeted at Dushanbe airport by Tajik President Emomali Rahmon, who has governed the country since 1992. Upon his arrival, the two leaders conducted a private meeting and later presided over expanded talks with their delegations. In his opening remarks, Putin told Rahmon that Russia and Tajikistan are “reliable allies” and pledged that Moscow would fulfil its obligations to Dushanbe, particularly in terms of security. In the first seven months of 2025, bilateral trade rose by more than 17%, a figure Putin cited to underscore that relations are developing “very positively.” Following the meeting, the two leaders signed a joint statement on “deepening the strategic partnership and alliance” between their countries. Alongside Rahmon, on October 9, Putin met with the presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan as part of the Russia–Central Asia summit. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, the summit agenda includes cooperation in trade, transport, energy, security, migration, and environmental policy. A concluding communiqué is expected to lay out joint priorities for 2025–2027 in these fields. Following the Russia–Central Asia gathering, a broader CIS head-of-state meeting is scheduled for October 10. Alongside Russia and the Central Asian states, representatives from Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Belarus will also attend. Draft agendas suggest the adoption of a military-cooperation concept through 2030, counterterrorism and border security strategies, efforts to fight transnational crime, and discussions on a “CIS Plus” format that would allow third-party countries and international organizations to participate in selected CIS events. Russia’s Defense Minister Andrei Belousov held talks in Dushanbe with his Tajik counterparts on October 8, stating that “cooperation between our two military institutions” is key to regional stability. Tajikistan hosts Russia’s largest foreign military base and shares a long, porous border with Afghanistan, which makes the security relationship central to both sides’ calculus. Historical and Geopolitical Context Russia has long viewed Central Asia as its strategic backyard, but since 2022, its dominance has been challenged. Sanctions on Russia due to the war in Ukraine have constrained its economic leverage, while China has expanded its presence via Belt and Road investments. At the same time, the European Union has elevated its engagement with Central Asian states through trade, infrastructure funding, and diplomatic outreach. Central Asian governments have shown increasing boldness in balancing their relations between Moscow, Beijing, and the West. None of the Central Asian governments has openly backed Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Surveys in Kazakhstan show that only 15% of respondents explicitly support Russia, while a larger share leans toward Ukraine or nonalignment. Kazakhstan has refused to recognize the...

Trump Administration

S. Paul Kapur Confirmed as U.S. Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs

The U.S. Senate has confirmed political scientist S. Paul Kapur as Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs to lead the State Department bureau that oversees relations with Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal, Maldives, Bhutan, and the five Central Asian republics. The position carries responsibility for guiding U.S. diplomacy across the region, coordinating security and development strategy, and advising on policy toward regional powers such as China and Russia. Kapur, 56, is an Indian American scholar known for his work on nuclear deterrence and South Asian security. He was born in New Delhi to an Indian father and an American mother, but grew up in the United States. After studying the region in graduate school, he pursued an academic career, earning a doctorate in political science from the University of Chicago and a bachelor’s degree from Amherst College. Kapur taught at Claremont McKenna College and Stanford University before joining the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, where he is a professor of national security affairs and runs U.S.–India strategic dialogues for the Department of Defense. Paul Kapur, a seasoned academic and security specialist, now takes a post that places him at the center of Washington’s engagement with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. His confirmation fills a key regional portfolio in the Trump administration, which may shape how the United States approaches Central Asia within its broader regional strategy. Kapur’s portfolio covers both South and Central Asia, but his confirmation has been closely watched in the five republics that straddle the heart of Eurasia. Central Asian governments and business leaders are eager to see whether the new Assistant Secretary will continue Washington’s traditional emphasis on security partnerships or shift toward deeper economic and investment ties. Kapur brings a distinguished scholarly pedigree and deep expertise in international security. He has written extensively on nuclear deterrence, South Asian security, and great-power competition. While much of his work focuses on India, Pakistan, and U.S. grand strategy, he has also examined how India manages its relationships with larger powers such as the United States and China - an enduring middle-power dynamic. That perspective is particularly relevant to Kazakhstan, an emerging middle power, and to Central Asia acting collectively, which is seeking to balance Russian and Chinese influence. During his confirmation hearing, Kapur emphasized that U.S. engagement in Central Asia will focus on advancing the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the regional states. He noted that, if confirmed, he would leverage the C5+1 framework and bilateral partnerships to pursue cooperation in areas such as energy, critical minerals, counterterrorism, combating transnational crime, and developing physical and digital infrastructure. His remarks reflected a commitment to strengthening regional independence and stability while deepening practical cooperation with the United States. For Central Asian governments, Kapur’s arrival comes at a time of shifting geopolitics. Russia’s war in Ukraine has unsettled long-standing assumptions, while China’s Belt and Road Initiative continues to expand Beijing’s economic influence. The United States has not always prioritized matching these dynamics. However, Kapur’s testimony...

CIS

Putin in Tajikistan for CIS Summit Amid Migration Tensions

When President Vladimir Putin arrives in Dushanbe on 8 October for his first state visit, Tajikistan will briefly become the focal point of regional diplomacy. Currently holding the rotating chair of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Dushanbe is preparing to host both the CIS Heads of State Council and the second Russia–Central Asia summit. For Moscow, Central Asia has remained a priority since the invasion of Ukraine, and the visit highlights what is at stake for both Russia and its host. Tajikistan depends heavily on Russia for security, trade, and employment opportunities for its citizens, but relations have been tested by the aftermath of the March 2024 Crocus City Hall attack, which exposed the fragility of migration-driven economics and the risk of renewed extremism. An Old Relationship Tested by New Tensions Russia and Tajikistan have been closely entwined since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Putin has already made twelve trips to Tajikistan since taking office, and this will be his first with state‑visit status. Security cooperation remains the backbone of the relationship. Russia’s 201st military base in Tajikistan - formerly the 201st motor rifle division and now Moscow’s largest overseas facility - has long been billed as a shield along the Afghan frontier; the two sides continue to coordinate through the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization), and within the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) framework. Trade between the two nations has expanded despite sanctions headwinds. On the eve of the visit, presidential aide Yuri Ushakov said bilateral turnover rose by more than 17 % in the first seven months of 2025, and reached about US$1.5 billion in 2024. Russia accounts for over 22 % of Tajikistan’s foreign trade. Meanwhile, more than 1.2 million Tajik citizens work in Russia, making up about 16 % of all foreign workers there. They remitted US$1.8 billion back home last year, roughly 17 % of Tajikistan’s GDP. This symbiosis means that the two leaders routinely discuss labor migration and social issues alongside security and trade. Yet the relationship has been strained by a wave of xenophobia following the Crocus City Hall attack, which killed 145 people, which the Russian authorities accused militants from Tajikistan of perpetrating. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, following the arrest of four Tajik suspects, Central Asian migrants in Russia have faced arson attacks, beatings, and boycotts of their businesses. Russian law enforcement has launched aggressive street inspections and created special units to check hostels and businesses frequented by Central Asians. Even long‑time Tajik residents with Russian citizenship have reported menacing phone calls and threats. In the wake of the attack, diaspora leaders urged compatriots not to leave their homes, and the Tajik interior ministry publicly rebutted Russian media reports, stating that three of the four suspects named were not involved. Those pressures hit a country heavily reliant on remittances. The World Bank’s 2025 update estimates that money sent home by migrants accounted for 49 % of Tajikistan’s GDP in 2024. Since the start of the Ukraine war, Russian politicians and media have become increasingly hostile toward Central Asian migrants, leading Moscow to deactivate all foreign‑owned SIM cards and...

Gas Import

Hungary Eyes Turkmen Gas to Diversify Energy Imports

Hungary, one of Gazprom’s largest remaining clients within the European Union, is exploring the prospect of importing natural gas from Turkmenistan, The Moscow Times reported. During a recent visit to Ashgabat, Hungary’s Deputy State Secretary for Eastern Relations Development, Ádám Stifter, described Turkmenistan as a promising partner in the energy sector. “Hungary depends on gas imports from different countries, and we view Turkmenistan with great hope. We expect Turkmenistan to become a supplier of gas to Europe, and particularly to Hungary, in the near future,” Stifter said, as quoted by Interfax. The announcement aligns with Budapest’s broader efforts to diversify its energy supply. On Thursday, Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó confirmed that Hungary had signed its longest-ever liquefied natural gas (LNG) agreement, a 10-year deal with French company Engie. Starting in 2028, the contract will provide Hungary with 4 billion cubic meters of LNG, with deliveries continuing through 2038. Earlier in September, Hungary also signed a contract with Shell to purchase 2 billion cubic meters of gas annually for ten years, beginning in 2026. That gas will be delivered via the Czech Republic and Germany. Analysts view Hungary’s interest in Turkmen gas as a notable policy shift. Natalia Milchakova, a senior analyst at Freedom Finance Global, said the move signals a desire to reduce dependence on Russian energy. “Hungary and Slovakia have long relied on Russian oil and gas, but the change in tone from Budapest suggests a drive to diversify supply routes,” she noted. However, the logistics remain complex. Milchakova pointed out that Turkmen gas would likely have to transit through Azerbaijan or Iran, routes complicated by infrastructure limitations and geopolitical challenges, or possibly via the TurkStream pipeline, which is operated in partnership with Gazprom. Hungary currently imports about 4.5 billion cubic meters of Russian gas annually under a long-term contract valid until 2036. According to the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA) in Finland, Hungary spent approximately €500 million on energy imports from Russia in July 2025 alone, €285 million on gas and €200 million on oil. Turkmenistan holds the world’s fourth-largest proven natural gas reserves. However, 80-90% of its gas exports are sent eastward to China via the Central Asia-China pipeline, highlighting the country's long-standing reliance on a single buyer. Strengthening ties with Hungary could signal Ashgabat’s intent to diversify its export geography.

Domestic Development

Central Asia and Regional Integration: Logistics, Water, Energy

Central Asia is undergoing a profound transformation, where questions of domestic development and the region’s ability to act in a coordinated way are coming to the forefront. For many years, Central Asian states were viewed as fragmented, each pursuing separate strategies that often put them in competition. Today, however, shared challenges and growing interdependence are making gradual convergence increasingly likely. The region now confronts common pressures such as water scarcity, energy imbalances, environmental degradation, and the fallout of instability in Afghanistan -- issues that no single country can effectively address in isolation. Increasingly, regional platforms such as the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC) are being leveraged to mediate water-energy tradeoffs, while joint initiatives in transport, transit, and energy infrastructure foster new integration. Moreover, leading actors like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are pushing coordinated strategies -- modernizing rail and aviation links, coordinating transboundary water allocations, and exploring nuclear cooperation -- that point toward a more interconnected regional future. Shared Challenges and Points of Convergence The region faces problems that no country can solve alone. These include water shortages, energy imbalances, environmental risks, and instability in Afghanistan. Such challenges can be seen as both threats and opportunities, since they also represent areas of overlapping interest. Joint action in these fields can deliver more than fragmented national strategies. Water is particularly important, remaining one of the most sensitive issues in interstate relations. Yet it also offers opportunities for coordinated action through existing regional platforms, such as the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination of Central Asia. The “water for energy” model is increasingly seen as a practical tool, already under discussion and applied in bilateral and multilateral projects. Environmental issues are similarly shared. The disappearance of the Aral Sea, land degradation, air pollution, and glacier melt create threats that transcend national borders. Joint monitoring, data exchange, and coordinated adaptation measures, particularly within the United Nations Regional Centre for the Sustainable Development Goals for Central Asia and Afghanistan, opened in August 2025 in Almaty, could become a new direction for regional cooperation. Afghanistan remains another risk factor that affects the security of the entire region. At the same time, transportation and energy projects linking Central Asia with South Asia through Afghan territory can turn a challenge into an opportunity. Reducing instability and integrating Afghanistan into regional trade and transit networks serves the interests of all Central Asian states. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan as leading forces To understand how closer integration might work in practice, it is useful to examine the strategies of the region’s two key players: Astana and Tashkent. The major agreements concluded by Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan with the United States in transport and aviation should be viewed not as isolated deals, but as evidence of the complementary strengths of the two largest economies in Central Asia. Kazakhstan signed its largest locomotive contract to date with U.S. company Wabtec, a $4.2 billion agreement for 300 TE33A freight locomotives to be assembled at the Wabtec Kazakhstan plant in Astana, along with servicing support. This will modernize...

Qosh Tepa Canal

Afghanistan’s Qosh Tepa Canal Raises Water Security Fears

Water has long been one of Central Asia’s most contested resources, shaping agriculture, energy policy, and diplomacy across the region. Recently, Afghanistan’s Qosh Tepa Canal project has emerged as a central point in this debate. Promoted by the Taliban as a vital step toward achieving food security and economic growth, the canal also raises alarm bells among downstream neighbors who heavily depend on the Amu Darya River. Now, according to Islamic Emirate spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid, the second phase of the project is expected to be completed within five months, raising further concerns among downstream countries about its potential impact on regional water security. Progress on the Ground In August, the Afghan authorities stated that 93% of the second phase had been completed. Videos show the canal lined with concrete and stone in some sections, alongside the construction of large and medium-sized bridges to link surrounding settlements. The project spans 128 kilometers from Dawlatabad district in Balkh province to Andkhoy district in Faryab province and involves over 60 contractors, making it one of Afghanistan’s largest infrastructure projects. Origins and International Support The canal’s roots trace back to earlier international efforts. While some sources attribute its conceptual origins to Soviet or British engineers in the 1960s, significant development began in 2018 under President Ashraf Ghani. The project was supported by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and Indian engineering firms. According to the Scientific-Information Center of the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (SIC ICWC), a $3.6 million feasibility study was launched in Kabul in December 2018, funded by USAID and conducted by AACS Consulting and BETS Consulting Services Ltd. The study was coordinated with several Afghan ministries, but has not been published. Following the Taliban’s takeover, the Islamic Emirate held an official inauguration ceremony on March 30, 2022. The full canal is designed to stretch 285 kilometers, measuring 100 meters wide and 8.5 meters deep, and is expected to divert an estimated six to ten cubic kilometers of water annually from the Amu Darya. Afghan media have quoted water management expert Najibullah Sadid, who projected the canal could generate between $470 million and $550 million in annual revenue. Regional Concerns and Environmental Risks The project has raised alarm in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan, countries that depend heavily on the Amu Darya for irrigation. Experts at SIC ICWC point out that no environmental impact assessment was conducted for downstream states, nor were they formally notified of the construction, as required by international water conventions. In December 2022, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev called for practical dialogue with Afghanistan and the international community to strengthen regional water security. Adroit Associates estimates that the canal could eventually divert up to 13 billion cubic meters annually, nearly one-quarter of the Amu Darya’s average flow. Environmental risks are also mounting. Analysts warn that Uzbekistan, which relies heavily on the river for agriculture, could face soil degradation and declining crop yields. Turkmenistan, where agriculture accounts for 12% of GDP, may also suffer severe disruptions. Some studies suggest Uzbekistan and...