Turkmenistan International Affairs - The Times Of Central Asia

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Pakistan Declares “Open War” with Afghanistan’s Taliban as Cross-Border Attacks Escalate

Pakistan launched airstrikes inside Afghanistan on Friday following a Taliban-announced offensive against Pakistani military posts along the shared border, marking a sharp escalation in tensions between the two long-hostile neighbors. The Taliban has said it is open to talks. Pakistan’s Defense Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif said on social media that “our patience has now run out. Now it is open war between us,” framing Islamabad’s actions as a response to cross-border attacks. According to Reuters, the Afghan authorities said operations began across several eastern provinces bordering Pakistan, while Islamabad confirmed retaliatory strikes targeting what it described as militant positions. Both sides have released sharply conflicting casualty figures, none independently verified. Pakistani officials said more than 200 Taliban fighters were wounded and over 130 killed in retaliatory operations, while reporting Pakistani military casualties. The Taliban authorities rejected those figures and claimed dozens of Pakistani troops were killed. The clashes threaten a fragile ceasefire reached in October 2025 after earlier border fighting. Pakistan has repeatedly accused the Taliban of allowing Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants to operate from Afghan territory, an allegation Kabul denies. The Durand Line border has long been a flashpoint, but analysts say the scale of recent airstrikes — including reported strikes near Kabul — marks a significant escalation beyond previous localized clashes. For Central Asian states, renewed instability between Pakistan and Afghanistan carries direct strategic and economic implications. Uzbekistan has invested heavily in the proposed Termez–Mazar-i-Sharif–Kabul–Peshawar railway, a flagship trans-Afghan corridor intended to link Central Asia to Pakistani ports and expand southbound trade. The CASA-1000 electricity transmission project, designed to export surplus hydropower from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to Afghanistan and Pakistan, also depends on security conditions in Afghan territory. Turkmenistan’s TAPI gas pipeline project faces similar vulnerabilities. Escalating violence risks delaying these connectivity initiatives and raising concerns about militant spillover into northern Afghanistan, an area closely watched by Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Central Asian governments have pursued pragmatic engagement with the Taliban authorities to stabilize their southern frontier; sustained confrontation between Kabul and Islamabad could complicate that strategy and undermine regional integration plans. The United Nations and regional actors have called for restraint. While both governments describe their actions as defensive, the rhetoric surrounding the latest exchange suggests a dangerous deterioration in bilateral relations. Independent verification of battlefield claims remains limited as diplomatic efforts to contain the escalation continue.

C5-UK

Uzbekistan Eyes UKEF Backing and Market Access at C5–UK Talks

London is hosting the first formal meeting of Central Asian foreign ministers with the United Kingdom on February 26, opening a new “Central Asia–UK” ministerial track after a broader parliamentary program in London earlier in the week. Foreign ministers from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are attending. Kyrgyzstan’s Foreign Minister Jeenbek Kulubayev is expected to hold bilateral talks with UK Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper, while Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev has also been holding meetings in London focused on trade, investment, and critical minerals cooperation. With delegations from all five Central Asian countries present, the format provides scope for further bilateral engagements on the margins. On the eve of the ministerial meeting, Central Asian foreign ministers, led by Kazakhstan’s Yermek Kosherbayev, held a session with the UK’s All-Party Parliamentary Group on Cooperation with Central Asia, with British MPs emphasizing political dialogue, legislative exchange, and deeper interparliamentary ties as foundations for advancing economic and regional cooperation. For Tashkent, the London meeting comes after a burst of bilateral engagement that has put finance and infrastructure at the center of the relationship. On February 17, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev received the UK Prime Minister’s Trade Envoy to Central Asia and Azerbaijan, Lord John Alderdice, and highlighted how heavily Uzbekistan has leaned on London’s markets: Uzbek sovereign and corporate bonds worth more than $15 billion have been placed on the London Stock Exchange, while trade turnover has doubled over the past five years, according to the presidential press service. Mirziyoyev also flagged potential projects spanning energy, finance, geology, and transport, and the sides agreed to prepare a joint roadmap. That roadmap is already acquiring project language. Uzbekistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy and Finance, Jamshid Kuchkarov, met Alderdice in Tashkent with representatives of the London Stock Exchange Group, Arup, and UK Export Finance (UKEF), as well as the UK ambassador, Timothy Smart. According to the Uzbek government, talks focused on transport and logistics infrastructure—rail and road projects, airport modernization—alongside green energy and public–private partnerships. The same meeting produced a memorandum of understanding between Arup and the Ministry of Economy and Finance aimed at engineering and transport infrastructure planning and capacity-building for regions. Alderdice has also put a number on the UK’s offer. Speaking at a UK–Uzbekistan infrastructure conference, he said the UK has “about £4 billion available for export guarantees in Uzbekistan specifically,” linking the figure to potential backing for projects ranging from rail and airports to urban development. He pointed to London as a venue for Uzbek IPOs and bond issuance and said he was exploring potential collaboration with Uzbekistan’s mining sector, noting that the city also hosts the London Metal Exchange. The data suggests why Uzbekistan is pushing: the UK reported total trade in goods and services with Uzbekistan of £2.2 billion in the four quarters to the end of Q3 2025, including £545 million in UK exports and £1.6 billion in imports. Uzbek borrowers have already treated London as more than a diplomatic stop. In 2024, Uzbekistan’s National Bank...

Syria

Syria After Assad: What the New Regional Order Means for Central Asia

The overthrow of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 fundamentally reshaped Syria’s regional position. The collapse of the old power structure weakened Iran’s entrenched military and economic networks and left Russia’s previously secured foothold uncertain. As Damascus enters a new political phase, external actors are recalibrating their strategies in a landscape that looks markedly different from that of the past decade. For Central Asian governments, the shift is not merely regional. Syria is becoming a testing ground for how mid-sized states navigate post-conflict environments shaped by larger powers, and a potential arena for economic and diplomatic outreach. As influence is redistributed and new investment and trade corridors are reconsidered, decisions taken in Damascus will increasingly intersect with Central Asia’s own foreign policy and economic calculations. In this emerging landscape, a power vacuum is being filled by states seeking to advance their interests. From the earliest days of Syria’s post-Assad transition, Turkey has been particularly active. As part of its declared comprehensive support for the new Syrian authorities, Ankara has taken steps to consolidate its position in the Syrian Arab Republic. Turkey is actively participating in infrastructure reconstruction, investing in economic projects, and expanding military-technical cooperation with Damascus. In August 2025, Syria and Turkey signed a military cooperation agreement covering areas including counterterrorism training, cybersecurity, demining, military engineering, logistics, and enhanced coordination between their armed forces. That same month, the two sides agreed to establish an intergovernmental business council under the Turkish Foreign Economic Relations Board to promote trade and investment cooperation between public and private companies. Turkish exports to Syria reached $3 billion in 2025, reflecting the rapid expansion of Ankara’s economic presence. For Central Asia, Ankara’s activism carries particular weight. Turkey has simultaneously deepened its political, economic, and security cooperation across the Turkic world, meaning its posture in Syria intersects with its broader regional strategy. A central element of Turkey’s Syria policy remains the issue of refugee returns. However, the prospect of large-scale repatriation is complicated by several factors, notably the long-term presence of around 2.5 million Syrian displaced persons in Turkish society and the absence of stable socio-economic conditions in Syria to support reintegration. Over more than a decade of conflict, a generation of Syrians has grown up in Turkey, many of whom are deeply embedded in the country’s social and economic life. Turkey’s obligations under the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, including the principle of non-refoulement, further constrain policy options. Taken together, these factors make large-scale return unlikely until Syria achieves sustained political stabilization and adequate living conditions. In the longer term, Turkey’s objective of neutralizing what it describes as the Kurdish threat emanating from Syrian territory will continue to shape its strategy. Israel has also intensified its military and political engagement since the change of power in Damascus. It has taken steps to establish control over areas adjacent to the Golan Heights and to create a buffer zone, arguing that such measures are necessary to safeguard national security against potential terrorist threats. Israeli officials...

Organization of Turkic States

Turkic States Set to Expand Mutual Trade and Strengthen Economic Integration

The 14th meeting of ministers responsible for economy and trade of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) was held on February 20 in Turkistan, Kazakhstan. The gathering brought together ministerial delegations from member states to advance economic cooperation, deepen trade ties, and promote sustainable and inclusive growth across the Turkic region. Founded in 2009 to foster comprehensive cooperation among Turkic-speaking nations, the OTS includes Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, and Uzbekistan as full members. Turkmenistan, Hungary, and Northern Cyprus participate as observers. According to the OTS Secretariat, the Turkic region recorded an average economic growth rate of 6.86% in 2025, more than double the global average. Despite this performance, OTS Secretary General Kubanychbek Omuraliev called for intensified efforts to expand intra-regional trade. Omuraliev highlighted ongoing negotiations on the Agreement on Services and Investment Facilitation, describing it as a decisive step toward deeper economic integration. He also pointed to strengthened institutional mechanisms, including the Council of Central (National) Banks of the OTS, the Turkic Green Finance Council, enhanced cooperation among Financial Intelligence Units and Competition Authorities, and closer coordination between the Turkic Investment Fund and the Union of Turkic Chambers of Commerce and Industry (TCCI). Delegations discussed practical measures to increase intra-OTS trade, improve the investment climate, and enhance regional connectivity. Participants emphasized the need for coordinated policies to reduce trade barriers, support small and medium-sized enterprises, and facilitate cross-border commerce. Kazakhstan’s Deputy Minister of National Economy, Asan Darbayev, underscored the symbolism of holding the meeting in Turkistan, a historic spiritual center of the Turkic world and a key node of the ancient Silk Road. He noted that the OTS is steadily evolving from a dialogue platform into a mechanism for practical cooperation, building new value chains and expanding trade links. In 2025, mutual trade among OTS member states exceeded $11.9 billion. Kazakhstan’s largest trade volumes were with Turkey ($4.9 billion), Uzbekistan ($4.3 billion), Kyrgyzstan (nearly $2 billion), and Azerbaijan ($425 million). Investment ties are also strengthening. Between 2005 and 2025, foreign direct investment from OTS countries into Kazakhstan surpassed $6.3 billion. Over the same period, Kazakh investments in OTS economies reached $5 billion, including more than $1.3 billion in 2025 alone. The meeting concluded with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on Partnership in Trade and the adoption of a Roadmap for Cooperation in Economy, Trade, Investment, and Finance. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, in December 2025 the Board of Governors of the Turkic Investment Fund announced that the fund would begin operations in the first quarter of 2026. Headquartered in Istanbul, the Turkic Investment Fund is the first joint financial institution established by OTS member states. Its mandate is to promote economic cooperation, boost intra-regional trade, and finance major joint initiatives aimed at strengthening long-term regional integration.

Afghanistan

From Security Threat to Economic Partner: Central Asia’s New ‘View’ of Afghanistan

Afghanistan is quickly becoming more important to Central Asia, and the third week of February was filled with meetings that underscored the changing relationship. There was an “extraordinary” meeting of the Regional Contact Group of Special Representatives of Central Asian countries on Afghanistan in the Kazakh capital Astana. Also, a delegation from Uzbekistan’s Syrdarya Province visited Kabul, and separately, Uzbekistan’s Chamber of Commerce organized a business forum in the northern Afghan city of Mazar-i-Sharif. A Peaceful and Stable Future for Afghanistan The meeting in Astana brought together the special representatives of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan for Afghanistan. The group was formed in August 2025. There was no explanation for why the fifth Central Asian country, Turkmenistan, chose not to participate. The purpose of the Astana meeting was to coordinate a regional approach to Afghanistan. Comments made by the representatives showed Central Asia’s changing assessment of its southern neighbor. Kazakhstan’s special representative, Yerkin Tokumov, said, “In the past [Kazakhstan] viewed Afghanistan solely through the lens of security threats… Today,” Tokumov added, “we also see economic opportunities.” Business is the basis of Central Asia’s relationship with the Taliban authorities. Representatives noted several times that none of the Central Asian states officially recognizes the Taliban government (only Russia officially recognizes that government). But that has not stopped Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, in particular, from finding a new market for their exports in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan’s special representative, Ismatulla Ergashev, pointed out that his country’s trade with Afghanistan in 2025 amounted to nearly $1.7 billion. Figures for Kazakh-Afghan trade for all of 2025 have not been released, but during the first eight months of that year, trade totaled some $335.9 million, and in 2024, amounted to $545.2 million. In 2022, Kazakh-Afghan trade reached nearly $1 billion ($987.9 million). About 90% of trade with Afghanistan is exports from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. For example, Kazakhstan is the major supplier of wheat and other grains to Afghanistan, and Uzbekistan is the biggest exporter of electricity to Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan’s trade with Afghanistan is significantly less, but from March 2024 to March 2025, it came to some $66 million. To put that into perspective, as a bloc, the Central Asian states are now Afghanistan’s leading trade partner, with more volume than Pakistan, India, or China. Kazakhstan’s representative, Tokumov, highlighted Afghanistan’s strategic value as a transit corridor that could open trade routes between Central Asia and the Indian Ocean. Kyrgyzstan’s representative, Turdakun Sydykov, said the trade, economic, and transport projects the Central Asian countries are implementing or planning are a “key condition for a peaceful and stable future for Afghanistan and the region as a whole.” The group also discussed humanitarian aid for Afghanistan. All four of these Central Asian states have provided humanitarian aid to their neighbor since the Taliban returned to power in August 2021. Regional security was also included on the agenda in Astana, but reports offered little information about these discussions. A few days before the opening of the meeting in Astana, Russian Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan Sergei...

Gurbanguly Berdymuhamedov

Gurbanguly Berdymuhamedov’s Unannounced Visit to Florida Draws Attention

From February 16 to 18, Gurbanguly Berdymuhamedov, Turkmenistan's former president and current Chairman of the Halk Maslahaty, Turkmenistan’s highest representative body, visited the U.S. state of Florida. Turkmen state media did not disclose details of the visit’s program, limiting coverage to a brief report on the trip. Berdymuhamedov arrived at Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport aboard a government Boeing 777 (tail number EZ-A780). Local journalists and aviation observers reported possible damage to the aircraft’s horizontal stabilizer. The green-and-white liveried airliner remained parked at the airport for several days. Aaron Rosen, president of the World Affairs Council of Miami, noted that the visit coincided with renewed U.S. interest in Central Asia. According to Rosen, the region is strategically significant due to its energy resources, geopolitical location, and security considerations. He also referred to recent statements by Turkmenistan’s Foreign Ministry emphasizing the importance of dialogue with Washington to develop constructive relations. U.S. media reported that Berdymuhamedov’s trip overlapped with President Donald Trump’s weekend stay at his Mar-a-Lago residence, located approximately a 45-minute drive from Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport. Local 10 News footage showed heightened security measures and a VIP passenger boarding the Boeing 777 prior to departure. The aircraft left Florida several days later. Separately, a government Boeing 737 (tail number EZ-A700) arrived from Ashgabat, refueling in Glasgow before continuing to Florida. After a brief stop in Florida, the Boeing 737 returned to Turkmenistan, making an additional refueling stop in Munich. Turkmen authorities have not officially disclosed the purpose of Berdymuhamedov’s visit. Turkmenistan’s current president is Serdar Berdymuhamedov, Gurbanguly Berdymuhamedov’s son.