• KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
17 September 2026

Viewing results 25 - 30 of 49

Opinion: The Twelfth Summit of the Organization of Turkic States – A Turning Point for Regional Peace and Integration

The Twelfth Summit of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) was held on October 6–7, 2025, in Gabala, Azerbaijan, under the theme “Regional Peace and Security,” and was hosted by the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev. Attending the summit were Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, President of the Republic of Kazakhstan; Sadyr Japarov, President of the Kyrgyz Republic; Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, President of the Republic of Turkey; Shavkat Mirziyoyev, President of the Republic of Uzbekistan; and Viktor Orbán, Prime Minister of Hungary, participating as an observer. Turkmenistan, represented by Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, represented by Ersin Tatar, also attended the summit as observer members. Among the central topics discussed was support for the Joint Declaration signed between Azerbaijan and Armenia on August 8, 2025, in Washington, D.C. The OTS member states regard this declaration as an important step toward lasting peace and stability in the South Caucasus. The summit also emphasized the need for a collective Turkic effort to sustain peace in the region. In his address, President Aliyev noted that one of the outcomes of the Washington Summit was progress on the Zangezur Corridor, describing it as a new transportation route of great importance within both the Middle Corridor and the North–South Corridor. Speaking before the 80th session of the United Nations General Assembly, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan had countered the use of the term “Zangezur Corridor,” which does not appear in the signed documents and was never used in negotiations. Despite these objections, however, Aliyev again used the term at the OTS Summit, reaffirming his intention to move forward under that framework. The New York meeting on September 22, 2025, between the foreign ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia, where both sides agreed to continue dialogue based on the outcomes of the Washington Declaration, has been widely considered a constructive step toward normalization of relations between the two parties. Another highlight of the summit was President Erdoğan’s call to develop the ‘Turkish Large Language Model.’ “To catch up with global developments in artificial intelligence and to preserve our cultural richness, we need to accelerate the development of the Turkish Large Language Model,” Erdoğan said. “[In] Türkiye, we are taking the first step on the common alphabet issue by printing a work about Chingiz Aitmatov and the Oghuznames in the common alphabet. Today, we are also presenting a copy of this to the leaders.” The initiative reflects the vision for greater cultural, scientific, and digital integration among Turkic states, and it was included as part of the broader digital transformation and innovation agenda outlined in the Gabala Declaration, which followed the summit. Kazakh President Tokayev described the Organization of Turkic States as an “authoritative structure uniting friendly Turkic peoples,” capable of addressing shared challenges, and expressed support for establishing an “OTS+” format to expand cooperation and global visibility. President Aliyev, meanwhile, highlighted growing military collaboration between Azerbaijan and Turkey, referencing more than 25 joint exercises held within one year - although this figure has...

Opinion: China’s Diplomatic Power Play Unfolds in Tianjin

On August 31, the next SCO Plus summit will begin in the Chinese city of Tianjin and run through to September 1. Judging by the list of participants, China, under Chairman Xi Jinping, is positioning itself to challenge the United States for influence over the global geopolitical agenda. As part of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit, Xi will host a formal banquet for the attending heads of state, according to the Chinese Foreign Ministry. Xi is also scheduled to chair the 25th meeting of the SCO Council of Heads of State and lead the expanded SCO Plus session - the largest since the establishment of the organization - where he will deliver a keynote address. Clues to the themes of Xi’s speech can be found in the diverse array of leaders expected to attend. Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Liu Bin confirmed at a Beijing press conference that among the SCO member states, participants will include Russian President Vladimir Putin, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Pakistani Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov, Tajik President Emomali Rahmon, and Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev. Several leaders from non-member states will also join, including Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan; Mongolian President Ukhnaagiin Khurelsukh; Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev; Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto; and Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov, whose participation suggests Ashgabat’s cautious but growing interest in regional dialogue. Also in attendance will be the prime ministers of Armenia (Nikol Pashinyan), Cambodia (Hun Manet), Nepal (Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli), Egypt (Mostafa Madbouly), Malaysia (Anwar Ibrahim), and Vietnam (Pham Minh Chinh). The summit will also host key international institutional leaders, including UN Secretary-General António Guterres; SCO Secretary-General Nurlan Yermekbayev; CIS Secretary-General Sergey Lebedev; ASEAN Secretary-General Kao Kim Hourn; CSTO Secretary-General Imangali Tasmagambetov; EAEU Chairman Bakytzhan Sagintayev; and AIIB President Zhou Ji. Kazakhstan will be prominently represented. In addition to President Tokayev, three high-profile Kazakhs mentioned above - Yermekbayev, Tasmagambetov, and Sagintayev - will attend in their capacities as heads of international organizations. Their presence signals Astana’s growing diplomatic weight and reflects the strategic outreach led by Tokayev, himself a former UN Deputy Secretary-General. This background likely contributes to the rapport between Kazakhstan and Guterres. The summit will also inevitably draw attention due to the presence of the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders, figures central to the ongoing realignment in the South Caucasus. Both Baku and Yerevan have increasingly distanced themselves from Moscow, favoring closer ties with Turkey and the United States. The recent peace agreement between Aliyev and Pashinyan, signed in the presence of President Trump, underscored the growing American role in the region and the diminishing influence of Russia. While Moscow appears willing to tolerate this shift, Tehran views it with deep concern, especially after its recent 12-day conflict with Israel. Russia, for its part, seems to be signaling disengagement from the region. Its silence in response to Baku and Yerevan’s Western overtures suggests strategic apathy, if not withdrawal. Beijing, of course, is...

Opinion: Gas, Geopolitics, and Realism: U.S.–Turkmenistan Talks Signal Shift

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and his Turkmen counterpart Rashid Meredov wrapped up bilateral consultations last week in Washington, DC. The encounter suggested a new awareness on Washington’s part of Turkmenistan’s pivotal geostrategic location in the heart of Central Asia and its status as a major hub of natural resources. Since becoming head of state in March 2022, Turkmenistan’s President Serdar Berdimuhamedov has shifted his country’s foreign policy from one of strategic isolation to what might be called practical realism, whereby priority is given to fair trade and investments that are in line with national interests and long-term development. Like the other Central Asian heads of state, Berdimuhamedov also champions a pragmatic, interest-based foreign policy. Consequently, they find the current, pragmatic U.S. administration with its concern to work out deals (presumably mutually beneficial ones) more congenial than its predecessor, with its penchant for geostrategic maneuvering and ideology. Secretary Rubio recently observed: “A mature foreign policy requires a balancing of interests - that’s a fact.” This way of thinking goes over well in smaller independent states such as Turkmenistan and other Central Asian countries, whose key national priorities include establishing their statehood on a firm basis and safeguarding their sovereignty amid the turbulent great power politics being played out in their vicinity. Oil and Gas Over the years, Berdimuhamedov has insisted that foreign entities seeking access to the country’s vast natural gas reserves must play by Ashgabat’s rules. Home to the world’s fourth-largest gas reserves, Turkmenistan invites foreign participation in its energy sector, provided that agreements are structured as win-win arrangements and don’t give suitors the geostrategic upper hand. In this context, it would make sense for Washington to get the word out about two upcoming conferences in Ashgabat: The Turkmenistan Investment Forum, September 18– 19, 2025, which will serve to attract long-term investment into the country's economy, and the 30th Oil & Gas of Turkmenistan – 2025 International Conference & EXPO (OGT 2025) on 22–24 October. Turkmenistan had a strong 2024 in terms of energy, producing 77.6 billion cubic meters of natural gas and 8.3 million tons of oil. The OGT 2025  will showcase the country’s resource potential and new investment opportunities, focusing on upstream projects such as the Galkynysh gas field and the Caspian blocks, as well as on initiatives in the areas of renewable energy, methane mitigation, and infrastructure modernization. Moreover, Ashgabat wants to expand its Trans-Caspian and north-south economic corridors and complete the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline, among other initiatives in transport and logistics. U.S. companies may want to explore these new opportunities. Travel Limitations to the U.S. Ashgabat is working with the U.S. Department of State to lift recently imposed restrictions on Turkmen citizens wishing to travel to the U.S. Both sides are aiming to ensure that applicants are properly screened before a visa is granted and that recipients comply with its terms. To further deepen ties, Washington should view Turkmenistan’s neutrality towards others on the global stage in security and foreign-policy matters not as an obstacle, but as an advantage that facilitates dialogue. While maintaining its advocacy for democratic principles,...

The Rise of Regionalism in Central Asia: From Divisions to Dialogue

In recent years, Central Asia has undergone a remarkable transformation — from a region historically marked by political divisions and competing national interests, to one increasingly characterised by cooperation and dialogue. Today, Central Asian countries are exploring the idea of strategic autonomy and greater regional solidarity, not as an abstract ambition, but as a practical response to the shared challenges and opportunities they have. A key institutional vehicle for this evolving cooperation is the Consultative Meeting of Central Asian Leaders. Unlike formal international summits, this forum allows for open and informal dialogue between heads of state. It is valued precisely because it enables leaders to discuss sensitive regional matters candidly, without the constraints of protocol. The momentum for regional cooperation is clearly growing, and this forum has become a symbol of Central Asia’s desire to take its future into its own hands. Beyond this, the countries of Central Asia cooperate through platforms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Organisation of Turkic States, both of which offer multilateral mechanisms for addressing regional security, economic integration, and cultural exchange. Importantly, what was once a region of competing national agendas is now evolving into a space of shared strategic vision, including coordinated positions in international forums such as the United Nations. Additionally, in recent years, the foreign policies of Central Asian countries have demonstrated more and more coordination and regional alignment, especially in their engagement with external partners. This shift is reflected in the emergence of multilateral dialogue formats between Central Asia and key global actors. Notably, the European Union–Central Asia Summit, most recently held in Samarkand in 2025, underlined a shared commitment to regional connectivity, sustainable development, and mutual security. Similar formats have been institutionalised with other global players, such as the C5+1 format with the United States, focusing on green transition, economic reforms, and regional security. Germany has also advanced a Central Asia–Germany high-level dialogue, including the “Berlin Initiative,” aimed at promoting green energy, vocational training, and the rule of law. Meanwhile, Italy has launched its Central Asia + Italy format as part of its strategy to diversify partnerships in Eurasia and promote economic diplomacy. These platforms reflect a common approach, where Central Asian countries are increasingly choosing to engage as a bloc, rather than solely through bilateral channels. This enhances their negotiating capacity, visibility, and strategic coherence on the global stage. While each country maintains its sovereignty and specific foreign policy priorities, there is a growing recognition that regional solidarity amplifies voices and leverage in an increasingly complex geopolitical landscape. This shift aligns with the broader regional identity-building efforts under the Consultative Meetings of Central Asian Leaders, and reflects a pragmatic understanding that shared challenges — such as water management, climate adaptation, and migration — are better addressed collectively and in concert with international partners. Common regional challenges also drive this growing convergence. Climate change, water scarcity, and labor migration are issues that transcend borders. One of the most pressing concerns is the region’s vulnerability due to...

Opinion: From Xi’an to Astana – Elevating China–Central Asia Cooperation to a New Height

As summer awakens the vibrant landscapes of Kazakhstan, with lilac blossoms aglow and the Ishim River meandering through the capital, Astana is once again at the center of regional diplomacy. From June 16 to 18, Chinese President Xi Jinping will visit Kazakhstan to attend the Second China–Central Asia Summit — an event of both symbolic weight and strategic substance. This year’s summit marks more than a diplomatic gathering — it signifies the maturing of a young but increasingly impactful multilateral framework born from centuries-old ties. From the ancient Silk Road to today’s modern infrastructure corridors, the five Central Asian nations and China are deepening a relationship rooted in trust, driven by mutual benefit, and destined to shape the region’s collective future. Ancient Friendship, Strategic Renewal More than 2,100 years ago, Chinese envoy Zhang Qian opened the first pathway to Central Asia, laying the groundwork for millennia of exchange. In 2013, standing in Kazakhstan, President Xi unveiled the Silk Road Economic Belt, the founding vision of what would become the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), reviving the spirit of the ancient Silk Road for a new era. Since then, cooperation between China and Central Asia has grown from historical affinity into a full-spectrum partnership. Over the past decade, this partnership has reached “three completions”: the full establishment of comprehensive strategic partnerships between China and all five Central Asian countries, full coverage of BRI cooperation documents, and full alignment with the concept of a shared future for humanity. These milestones demonstrate not just diplomatic intent but a shared strategic outlook that has withstood global uncertainties. As Xi noted, the decision to deepen China–Central Asia cooperation is not a product of convenience, but a generational choice made by leaders with long-term vision, responding to the will of their peoples and the imperatives of regional stability. Tangible Results: A Shared Path to Modernization Since the launch of the China–Central Asia mechanism in 2020, progress has accelerated. The elevation of this platform to the leaders’ level in 2023 during the Xi’an Summit underscored its growing relevance. From the Xi’an Declaration to the establishment of a permanent secretariat, institutional foundations are now firmly in place. More importantly, the mechanism is delivering real results. Trade between China and the five Central Asian states reached a record $94.8 billion in 2024, a $5.4 billion increase from the previous year. New cooperation structures in transport, agriculture, customs, and emergency management are enabling efficient multilateral coordination. A flagship example is the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway, now under active construction, marking a milestone in physical connectivity. This long-anticipated project, personally championed by the three heads of state, will reshape regional logistics and unlock new trade routes across Eurasia. Beyond rail, a web of cooperation is forming: the high-functioning Khorgos Gateway and the newly launched Kazakhstan Xi’an Terminal, increased Caspian Sea corridor traffic, and regularized freight trains between China and Central Asia. These are not mere infrastructure projects — they are lifelines of mutual development. Kazakhstan, in particular, is actively reinforcing its role as...

Opinion: Strengthening the Silk Bonds — India’s Renewed Push Towards Central Asia

The velvet-draped tables of New Delhi’s 4th India-Central Asia Dialogue convened under the stewardship of External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar on June 6, 2025, radiated congeniality, with history and strategy converging. This high-level engagement, attended by foreign ministers from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, marked more than a diplomatic ritual — it signaled India's deepening resolve to recalibrate its strategic posture in a region too long shaped by other powers. Yet beneath pledges of shared civilizational futures and energy corridors, an uncomfortable truth lingered as India remains a guest, not a player, in Central Asia’s great power theatre. Further, India’s internal socio-political landscape presents notable challenges that inadvertently shape its foreign policy credibility, particularly in the eyes of Central Asian nations. Persistent communal tensions — most visibly manifested in the Hindu-Muslim divide, the controversial demolition of the Babri Masjid in 1992, and the politically charged construction of the Ram Mandir — have deepened perceptions of religious polarization. Such domestic developments, while largely internal, resonate beyond India’s borders, especially in the Muslim-majority Central Asian republics, raising concerns about inclusivity and pluralism in India’s governance model. Simultaneously, India’s strained relations with key neighbors — Pakistan, and China, and increasingly volatile dynamics with Nepal, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka — have reinforced a regional image of discord and inconsistency. These internal and regional complexities contribute to a trust deficit, making Central Asian countries cautious in placing long-term strategic confidence in India. For New Delhi to emerge as a dependable partner in the region, addressing internal fissures and presenting a coherent, inclusive national vision is as vital as economic or diplomatic outreach. Central Asia sits at the center of ancient trade routes and modern geopolitical competition. For India, its importance is twofold: the region is a bridge to Eurasia and a repository of energy resources critical to India’s growing economy. But India’s historical connectivity to Central Asia — through the Silk Road, shared cultural legacies, and spiritual exchanges — has, for decades, been overshadowed by geographic and political barriers, notably the lack of direct overland access due to Pakistan. Recognizing these constraints, the dialogue showcased a strategic pivot. India reaffirmed its commitment to enhancing regional connectivity through the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and the Chabahar Port in Iran. While geopolitical instability in Iran and Afghanistan poses challenges, India's emphasis on multimodal routes demonstrates pragmatic flexibility. In an era defined by supply chain resilience and multipolar geopolitics, connectivity is no longer just an infrastructure question — it is a currency of influence. The dialogue also addressed the evolving regional security architecture. India’s proposal for counter-terrorism cooperation, capacity building, and intelligence sharing was timely and necessary. However, the dialogue echoed with familiar refrains, viz. civilizational bonds, shared destiny, and multipolar cooperation. Yet beneath the diplomatic choreography lies a haunting question. Can India transcend its historical role as Central Asia’s cultural cousin to become its strategic confidant? History whispers caution. The Burden of History: From Silk Roads to Shadow Roads For centuries, the Silk Road...