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Victory Day Diplomacy: Central Asia’s Balancing Act and Putin’s Diminished Spotlight

Every year, Moscow’s Red Square transforms into a stage for one of Russia's most celebrated traditions: Victory Day, an event which marks the Soviet Union’s triumph over Nazi Germany in World War II. Yet, as tanks roll through the cobblestone streets and military bands echo under the Kremlin walls, the occasion feels more heavily laden with geopolitical undertones than historical reminiscence these days. Against the backdrop of ongoing conflicts and shifting alliances, the presence of Central Asian leaders at this year’s event speaks to the region’s delicate relationship with the Russian Federation. But the question remains: amidst the pomp and circumstance, is there much for Vladimir Putin to celebrate? Central Asia’s Careful Balancing Act The attendance of Central Asian leaders at the Victory Day parade is a striking show of diplomatic choreography. On the surface, their presence will underscore the shared historical legacy of the Soviet era, when the sacrifices of the Central Asian republics contributed to the Allied victory in the Second World War. However, a more pragmatic lens reveals a balancing act that defines the region’s foreign policy. The region finds itself at the crossroads of global powers vying for influence in Central Asia. While Moscow leans on historical ties and cultural commonalities to retain its sway, Beijing’s economic clout continues to reshape the region’s trade networks and infrastructure projects. Meanwhile, as the inaugural EU-Central Asia Summit attests to, the European Union is eager to expand its reach, whilst hungry for Rare Earth Elements in which the region is rich, the U.S. is waiting in the wings. For Central Asian leaders, participating in Victory Day celebrations signals a nod to Russia’s historic role but also keeps the door open for economic and security cooperation. Amidst the shifting architecture of global politics, their diplomatic strategy remains one of pragmatism, seeking benefits from multiple partners while avoiding any over-alignment. What Does Russia Gain from the Optics? The presence of 29 leaders from across the globe – including Chinese President Xi Jinping - offers Moscow valuable optics at a time when its international relationships face significant strain. Last year, only nine attended. Isolated by Western sanctions over the invasion of Ukraine and with much of the world’s media painting Russia as cut off from the global stage, the impression of a united front with Central Asia helps the Kremlin portray the opposite. Victory Day, therefore, becomes a geopolitical tool, with the attendance of Central Asian leaders enabling Putin to send a message of shared unity within Russia’s historical sphere of influence. It tells both domestic and international audiences that Moscow retains significant allies, reinforcing the image of resilience despite ongoing challenges. How Much Does Moscow Truly Celebrate? The Victory Day parade is an event that is watched by an estimated three-quarters of the Russian public, drumming up patriotism as the state seeks to become the custodian of collective memory. Behind the spectacle, however, signs of disquiet are proving hard to ignore. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has disrupted trade and migration flows...

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Opinion – Central Asia’s Looming Water Crisis: A Ticking Time Bomb

When people think of Central Asia, they often picture vast deserts, ancient Silk Road cities, and oil pipelines stretching to distant markets. Yet the region’s most urgent and combustible resource is not buried underground — it flows above it. Water, or more precisely the lack of it, is rapidly becoming the defining fault line of Central Asia’s future. For decades, the five Central Asian republics have tiptoed around a growing water crisis. The two major rivers that sustain life in this arid region, the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya, are now so contested and depleted that what was once a technical issue has metastasized into a geopolitical threat. The region's major rivers, the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya are under immense pressure, threatening agriculture, livelihoods, and regional stability. At the heart of the crisis is a tragic irony. The upstream countries, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, are rich in water but poor in energy and cash. They need to release water in winter to generate hydropower. Downstream nations, particularly Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, want water stored until the summer to irrigate vast cotton and wheat fields. The result? Mutual distrust, occasional diplomatic spats, and an accelerating race to dam, divert, and hoard water in a region already gasping under the weight of climate change. A Region Parched Central Asia annually utilizes over 60 billion cubic meters of water for irrigation from the Amu Darya and Syr Darya basins. However, recent years have seen a decline in river flows, with the actual flow of the Syr Darya being 20–23% less than the norm. Further, the ghost of the Aral Sea — a once-thriving inland lake that has now shrunk by over 90% in its volume and 74 % in surface area — serves as a haunting reminder of the cost of mismanagement. The Soviet legacy of excessive irrigation has morphed into a post-Soviet scramble for control, where water is not just a tool of survival but a lever of power. This desiccation has transformed the region, leading to the emergence of the Aralkum Desert and causing severe ecological and health issues. Climate Change Intensifies the Crisis Climate change is exacerbating water scarcity in Central Asia. A recent study revealed that an extreme heatwave in March 2025, with temperatures soaring 5 to 10°C above pre-industrial levels, was significantly amplified by global warming. Such temperature surges accelerate glacier melt and increase evaporation rates, further reducing water availability. By some estimates, Central Asia could lose over 30% of its freshwater resources by 2050. Yet, rather than galvanize cooperation, this existential threat has sparked more competition. International efforts have largely fallen flat. The International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS), the region’s main water cooperation body, is riddled with inefficiencies and lacks enforcement power. External actors like China and Russia have their own interests, often deepening the regional divide rather than healing it. Inefficient Water Management Inefficient agricultural practices remain one of the most profound and persistent contributors to water mismanagement across Central Asia. In...

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Opinion: In Central Asia, the EU Defies Its “Geopolitical Dwarf” Label

As the United States and Russia reportedly aim to create a new global security architecture, other major actors in the international arena are working to improve their positions in the redefined world order. Often underestimated in terms of its geopolitical influence, the European Union has actively focused its attention on the post-Soviet space, particularly the strategically important Central Asian region. The EU, despite Russia’s and the United States' attempts to undermine its role in the settlement of the Ukraine War and to portray it as a “geopolitical dwarf”, is seeking to increase its presence in global affairs. In Central Asia, the 27-nation bloc is often viewed as a key actor that Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan can rely on to balance China’s growing dominance, as well as their security and dependence on Moscow. The EU's desire to strengthen cooperation with Central Asia can be seen as Brussels’ attempt to reduce Russia's influence in the region. Indeed, bogged down in Ukraine, Moscow is slowly but surely being pushed out of Central Asia – a region that has traditionally been within the Kremlin’s geopolitical orbit. As a result, China has managed to significantly increase its economic presence in all five Central Asian nations. The EU is now attempting to do the same. The recent visit of the European Commissioner for International Partnerships Jozef Síkela to Central Asia, as well as the upcoming EU-Central Asia summit scheduled for April 3-4, 2025 in Samarkand, clearly indicates the intensifying geopolitical competition between the EU and China over the region. One of Síkela’s major goals was to expand the scope of the EU's investment strategy, Global Gateway, in Central Asia. The project, launched in 2021, is often viewed as the EU’s version of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). As part of its strategy to increase its economic presence in Central Asia, the European Union seems to have four priorities: the development of transport infrastructure (particularly the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, also known as the Middle Corridor), cooperation in raw materials, digital connectivity, and the development of the water resources, energy, and climate sectors. The problem for Brussels is that China, due to its proximity to Central Asia and the lack of bureaucratic procedures, is ahead of the EU in most, if not all of these areas. Beijing has had 12 years to strengthen economic ties with the region through the BRI. As a result, in 2024, China’s overall turnover with Central Asia reached $94.8 billion, nearly double the EU's trade volume with the region in 2022, which stood at $47 billion. Last year, the world’s second-largest economy replaced Russia as Kazakhstan's biggest trade partner. In neighboring Uzbekistan, it remains the top trading partner, while in Tajikistan, over the past 18 years, China has become the major investor in the landlocked nation’s economy. The same applies to Tajikistan and China’s neighbor Kyrgyzstan. The European Union, however, is now intensifying its efforts to position itself as a major foreign power operating in Central Asia. According to...

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Power Shifts in Central Asia: The Unpredictable Path of Leadership

European Union Commissioner for International Partnerships Josef Sikela has concluded his tour of Central Asia, a visit conducted against the backdrop of global geopolitical turbulence. Unlike previous engagements, where European officials often criticized the region’s leadership for a lack of democratic progress, Sikela refrained from making demands on local governments. Historically, Europe has accused Central Asian states of authoritarianism and the entrenchment of long-serving leaders. However, the idea that power is uniquely permanent in the region is increasingly questioned. Critics point to Western examples, such as Angela Merkel’s 16-year tenure as Germany’s chancellor, and alleged electoral manipulation within the EU, such as in Romania, where elections were annulled after an undesired candidate’s victory. Meanwhile, in Central Asia, even presidents once considered “eternal” have eventually left office, sometimes peacefully, sometimes under turbulent conditions. Kyrgyzstan: The Unpredictable Outlier Kyrgyzstan is often described as a "democratic exception" within Central Asia, yet its history is marked by political instability and frequent leadership changes, arguably more so than in many of the world’s most conflict-prone regions. The country’s first president, Askar Akayev, held power from 1990 to 2005. Though re-elected three times, his rule ended in March 2005 when protests erupted over parliamentary election results that heavily favored pro-government candidates. Demonstrators stormed the Government House in Bishkek, prompting Akayev to flee. Reports, though unverified, claimed he was smuggled out wrapped in a carpet. Following Akayev’s ouster, Kurmanbek Bakiyev took power, but his rule ended in 2010 after violent unrest. His downfall was allegedly facilitated by Kazakhstan’s intelligence services, and he later found political asylum in Belarus under President Alexander Lukashenko. Since Bakiyev’s departure, Kyrgyzstan has continued to experience political turbulence. Presidents Almazbek Atambayev (2010-2017) and Sooronbai Jeenbekov (2017-2020) both left office under pressure. Atambayev’s tenure saw a diplomatic fallout with Kazakhstan, while Jeenbekov resigned in 2020 amid protests over parliamentary elections. His successor, Sadyr Japarov, remains in office, but whether he will complete his term is an open question. Uzbekistan: Reform Within Limits Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan’s first post-Soviet leader, ruled for over 26 years before his death in 2016. While he maintained a strictly centralized government, his tenure was also marked by violent crackdowns, most notably the Andijan uprising in 2005, which resulted in a Western diplomatic fallout. His successor, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, has introduced some reforms, loosening restrictions on civil liberties and the economy. However, the fundamental structure of state control remains intact, with opposition movements still tightly monitored. Kazakhstan: From Nazarbayev to Tokayev Kazakhstan’s transition from Nursultan Nazarbayev to Kassym-Jomart Tokayev is often described as managed succession rather than a genuine power shift. Nazarbayev, who led Kazakhstan for nearly three decades, officially stepped down in 2019, yet retained significant influence until the January 2022 unrest, which forced him to relinquish much of his remaining power. These protests, initially sparked by fuel price hikes, rapidly escalated into anti-government riots. While official accounts describe the unrest as an attempted coup orchestrated by figures within Nazarbayev’s inner circle, critics suggest Tokayev used the crisis to consolidate power....

Opinion: What the Loss of RFE/RL Would Mean for Central Asia

The decision to terminate the federal grant agreement funding for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) is a crushing blow for hundreds of millions of people. These people know their governments are not telling them the full truth about what is happening in their countries or in the world outside. The objective information provided by RFE/RL has been important to people such as these. Perhaps as important, since the end of the Cold War, was the platform RFE/RL provides, whenever possible, for people in these countries to explain their views to the outside world. I know, because I worked at RFE/RL for 25 years covering Central Asia. RFE/RL was founded in 1950, and I didn’t show up there until 1997. I can only speak about what I saw and heard when I was an RFE/RL employee. My understanding of my tasks as an RFE/RL employee was that we were supposed to keep close track of what was happening in Central Asia, cover as many of the important topics of the region as possible, and make objective and accurate information on these topics available to the people in Central Asia. During Tajikistan’s 1992-1997 civil war, for example, RFE/RL’s Tajik service, Radio Ozodi, was the most trusted source of information for the people of Tajikistan. During the Coronavirus pandemic, the Turkmen government would not even allow the word COVID to be spoken and denied there were any cases of the virus in the country, leaving RFE/RL’s Turkmen service, Azatlyk, as one of the only sources of information for Turkmenistan’s people about the illness. I lived in Central Asia before joining RFE/RL, so I had some idea of what was important to people there. Calling for respect for fundamental rights is a big part of RFE/RL’s work. Read the constitutions of any Central Asian country and you will see enshrined there the right to freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, the right to freely receive or disseminate information, and much more. In practice, these rights are not always observed in Central Asia. In such a situations RFE/RL’s Central Asian services are a voice for those who, with good reason, are afraid to speak out publicly, or more importantly, for those who did speak out and are punished for that. At RFE/RL we looked for “impact stories,” testimony from people of the region about unfulfilled government promises, abuses, or state mismanagement that were hurting communities and individuals. Central Asian government officials are among the most faithful RFE/RL listeners, and often RFE/RL reports that raised social issues led officials to rectify the situation. Ramshackle buildings or schools were suddenly repaired, electricity or running water became accessible to city districts and rural areas, sufficient food became available to communities. The pleas of average citizens too often fell on deaf ears in government halls, but the criticism of an international organization such as RFE/RL, which was broadcasting to the entire country and Central Asian region, was too embarrassing for officials to ignore. This made RFE/RL unpopular with Central...

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Opinion: How Central Asia Has Strengthened Ties with the West Since 2022

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has changed the relationship between Russia and Central Asia. Russia’s decision to invade a neighboring country, and the devastation and destruction that followed, has forced Central Asia to reconsider its relationship with the Russian Federation. Russia is no longer seen as an “invincible superpower,” meaning it cannot be relied on to protect other members of the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization). In addition, the U.S. and European countries have levied heavy sanctions on Russia for its invasion of Ukraine. Russia has attempted to evade these sanctions by conducting business with third parties, but the international community has warned several organizations and countries not to partake in these relations. Otherwise, should these businesses and countries opt to help Russia, then the international community has said that it will impose stiff penalties on these Russian intermediaries as well. Given these events, the Central Asian states have now been actively pursuing new relationships beyond Russia to bolster national, economic, and energy security within the region. During this process, China has attempted to assert itself as Central Asia’s new ally. Like Russia, China already has a significant trade relationship with Central Asia. In addition, China is Central Asia’s largest gas consumer, meaning the Chinese have attempted to force Central Asia into an economic and energy partnership. Despite this relationship, the countries of Central Asia have opted not to increase their reliance on China. Instead, recent developments have led them to improve their relations with the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union. But how has the West strengthened its relationship with Central Asia since 2022? Take, for example, the United States. When Russia’s invasion began in February 2022, the then U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken met with foreign ministers from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan to discuss the war. During their meeting, Secretary Blinken stated that the United States supports Central Asia’s “sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity.” He also said that the United States will continue to strengthen its relationship with the region. Since this meeting, Blinken has met with foreign ministers from Central Asia on several occasions in 2023 and 2024, where they further discussed how Central Asia can “develop the strongest possible capacities for their own security, their growing economic prosperity, and the strength and resilience of their societies.” Furthermore, U.S. President Joe Biden met with senior officials from Central Asia. During his meeting with his Central Asian counterparts in September 2023, Biden said that the United States would help “invest in and develop Central Asia’s energy infrastructure.” The United States also established a new business initiative with Central Asia, where the United States has provided hundreds of millions of dollars in assistance to the region. Then, during the United States-Central Asia Trade Investment Framework Council in June 2024, the United States and the Central Asian states discussed new investment opportunities and how they could diversify trade. These discussions were well received, and the United States called for future engagements between it and Central...