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Saudi Islamic Development Bank Increasing Its Presence in Central Asia

The Saudi-based Islamic Development Bank (IDB) has been particularly active in Central Asia so far in 2024. The growing IDB role is part of Central Asian region’s foreign policy shift toward the Arab world as financial backers to replace Russia, which is devoting huge attention and resources to its war in Ukraine, and China, which is increasingly reluctant to spend large sums of money in Central Asia after pouring in tens of billions of dollars there during the last 25 years. Some of the Central Asian governments owe China substantial amounts of money that they are unlikely to be able to pay for possibly decades. The Central Asian states have been members of the IDB for many years. Kyrgyzstan was first, joining in 1993, followed by Turkmenistan in 1994, Kazakhstan in 1995, Tajikistan in 1996, and Uzbekistan in 2003. One of the IDB’s three regional offices is in Almaty, Kazakhstan (the other two are in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia and Rabat, Morocco). The IDB has been dealing individually with the five Central Asian countries on a wide range of projects and programs in recent months. Energy Resources In February, Tajik Minister of Economic Development and Trade Zavqi Zavqizoda announced a deal was reached for the IDB to provide $250 million to Tajikistan. Zavqizoda said $150 million of that would go toward construction of the Rogun hydropower plant (HPP). The Rogun HPP was a Soviet-era project. Construction started in 1976 but was discontinued shortly after the Soviet Union collapsed. Tajikistan restarted work on the HPP in 2008. Tajik President Emomali Rahmon has repeatedly said that building the HPP with a planned 3600 MW capacity will make the country energy independent and even allow Tajikistan to bring in extra revenue exporting electricity to neighboring countries. In its 28 years as an IDB member, Tajikistan had received some $620 million from the IDB, so the $250 million announced in February 2024 represents a significant jump in IDB financial help. Not surprisingly, when IDB President Muhammad Al-Jasser visited Kyrgyzstan in June, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov sought IDB investment in the Kambar-Ata-1 HPP, another decades-old project with a multi-billion-dollar price tag that has barely made any progress in being realized during the 33 years Kyrgyzstan has been independent. Al-Jasser did not commit to IDB financing for the Kyrgyz HPP. However, less than a week after Al-Jasser was in Kyrgyzstan, the IDB was one of several international financial organizations that signed on at a conference in Vienna to be a members of a coordination donors’ committee for the Kambar-Ata-1 projects. At a meeting in Istanbul in February, the IDB reaffirmed its support for the Central Asia-South Asia-1000 (CASA-1000) project that aims to export electricity from HPPs in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Kyrgyz Energy Minister Taalaybek Ibrayev met with Al-Jasser in June during the latter’s visit to Kyrgyzstan to discuss funding for Kyrgyzstan’s section of CASA-1000. Not Only Energy In June, the IDB pledged up to $2 billion in funding for improvements to water management...

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Signs of Racism in Central Asia

By Bruce Pannier Incidents in May showed two Central Asian countries – Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan – are afflicted by racism that is tacitly or explicitly supported by their governments. Overnight on May 17-18, hundreds of young Kyrgyz men gathered in eastern Bishkek near a dormitory used by foreign students. The Kyrgyz men were angered by a video posted on popular Kyrgyz social media sites on the morning of May 17 that showed a fight in Bishkek on May 13 between a small group of Kyrgyz and foreigners. The foreigners in the fight on May 13 turned out to all be Egyptians, and they were all detained. However, some social media posts claimed at least some of the foreigners involved in the fight were Pakistanis. Many people from Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan come to Kyrgyzstan to study at universities, particularly at medical colleges. More than 90% of foreign students at Kyrgyz universities are from India and Pakistan. A smaller number, in the low thousands, are working there illegally. In March, Kyrgyz authorities launched a campaign to find and deport illegal migrant laborers some 1,500 Pakistanis and 1,000 Bangladeshis have been caught. There have been isolated incidents when Kyrgyz were involved in physical altercations with South Asians in recent years, but nothing on scale of what happened in May 17-18. Besides bursting into the dormitory and assaulting foreign students, a group of some 60-70 Kyrgyz men broke into a sewing factory in Bishkek early morning May 18 and attacked foreign workers, who mostly from Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. At least 41 people were injured, most of them South Asians. Pakistan in particular reacted, summoning the Kyrgyz Charge d'Affaires in Islamabad while a group of Pakistanis protested outside the Kyrgyz Embassy. Pakistani authorities also sent charter flights to Kyrgyzstan that brought back more than 1,000 Pakistani citizens. Kyrgyz authorities criticized the police for failing to calm the situation before it went out of control and later 10 policemen were sacked. Deputy Cabinet Chairman Edil Baisalov went to the dormitory to meet with some of the foreign students and apologize for the harm done to them “by a bunch of hooligans.” The top two people in the government – President Sadyr Japarov and head of security service Kamchybek Tashiyev – were more equivocal in their comments on the violence. Since coming to power in late 2020, Japarov and his longtime friend Tashiyev have promoted nationalist policies. Their emphasis on respecting Kyrgyz traditions and customs has gained them significant popularity in Kyrgyzstan. They need such support in a country that has had three revolutions since 2005, including the October 2020 revolution that resulted in them occupying their current positions. Young Kyrgyz men, like the hundreds who gathered on the evening of May 17, are an important pillar of support for Japarov and Tashiyev. President Japarov vaguely blamed “forces interested in aggravating the situation,” and added, “The demands of our patriotic youth to stop the illegal migration of foreign citizens and take tough measures against those...

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Turkmenistan’s Gas and Türkiye’s Plans to Become a Gas Hub

By Robert M. Cutler A series of ongoing political consultations between Turkmenistan and Türkiye continued on 25–26 April, as a Turkmen delegation led by Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Gurbanov visited Ankara, hosted by Turkish counterpart Burak Akçapar. Beyond the regular bilateral agenda of political-diplomatic, trade-economic and cultural-humanitarian cooperation, the two sides emphasized the implementation of bilateral agreements reached at the third Antalya Diplomatic Forum in early March, particularly the prospects for cooperation in the energy sector. On 1 March 2024, Turkmenistan and Türkiye signed two documents — a memorandum of understanding (MoU) and a letter of intent — aimed at strengthening cooperation in the natural gas sector. In theory, this seems to be a positive development for the two countries as well as for Europe. The two possible routes for Turkmen gas to reach Türkiye and Europe are (1) via the Caspian Sea and Azerbaijan, and (2) through Iran's existing pipeline infrastructure via a gas swap agreement. Neither one is likely to happen soon. The project to export Turkmen gas to Europe through a shore-to-shore high volume pipeline, at 31 billion cubic meters per year (bcm/y) is no longer alive after various parties have failed to realize it over the past quarter-century. It was bruited when it was announced that Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov planned to visit Brussels in late 2023 (which ended up not happening) and definitively killed when the initiative by American company Trans-Caspian Resources (headed by a retired U.S. ambassador to Turkmenistan) failed to persuade Ashgabat to construct short low-volume (8–11 bcm/y) "Platform Option" pipeline in the Caspian Sea. Gas "swaps" and Türkiye’s ambitions The idea of a "Turkish gas hub" arose from Russia's search to depoliticize trade between Gazprom and European firms by facilitating a platform where Gazprom's origination of the gas would be obscured and anonymized. Buyers and sellers could meet through Turkish intermediation. Türkiye, however, seeks to draw advantage by imposing the condition of long-term contracts with Gazprom for gas sales at below-market prices. This would guarantee a role for the Turkish intermediaries and, moreover, ensure for them a profit margin through mandatory service fees. "Swap" operations mean an exchange of gas amongst Turkmenistan, Iran and Azerbaijan; however, this would involve only a few billion cubic meters. Even if all participants agree, several questions still remain: Will swap transactions be profitable, given the price of gas in Europe? Even if Iran agreed to a Turkmen gas swap, would Tehran execute the agreement in good faith? In fact, Tehran would prefer to offer its own gas to Turkish and European markets, rather than transit competitive Turkmen gas through his territory. In addition, the gas that Azerbaijan produces for export already has contracted buyers under long-term agreements. Azerbaijan would be interested in the Turkish gas hub only if it should in future produce surpluses of gas that cannot be sold under long-term contracts. Then, such surpluses could be sold at a gas hub under short-term contracts, assuming that transit and profitability are...

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How India is Becoming a Robust Soft Power in Central Asia

The middle-income trap, a pressing issue that has led to the stagnation of many successful developing economies, demands immediate attention. This trap, which occurs when a middle-income country can no longer compete internationally in standardized, labor-intensive goods due to relatively high wages, is a result of various factors, including countries most successful demographic characteristics. For instance, access to education has reduced birth rates due to an almost 100% literacy rate defined by 12 years of education. In the process, importing cheap manufacturing products has made local products uncompetitive. In such a situation, the country should have planned to upgrade current skill-based education to high-tech skills such as ICT, pharmaceuticals, etc. This shift to high-tech education holds immense potential for developing countries, offering a pathway out of the middle-income trap. Unfortunately, poor investment in developing high-tech education has led to an inadequate supply of a high-skilled workforce. Developed economies, such as the U.S. and a few European countries, are in an advantageous position to overcome such a trap due to their highly effective immigration policy. Developing countries, such as Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, the Philippines, and almost all Central Asian Republics, meanwhile, suffer. This will be further aggravated if the issue is not addressed urgently. Due to its geographic location and natural resource endowments, Central Asia, a diverse region with a mix of upper-middle and low-income countries, holds significant importance in the global economic landscape. Let's look at a specific case, such as Uzbekistan, a country whose population is growing at 1.3% per annum. Regarding age structure, the 0-14 age group makes up 30.1% of the population, the 15-64 age group 64.6%, and the 65-plus group constitutes just 5.3%. The country has achieved a high literacy rate, with 100% of the population completing 12 years of primary and higher secondary education. However, the country’s GDP per capita is relatively low, at US$ 3,209 (nominal term) and US$ 11,316 (PPP). The country's economy is dominated by the services sector, which contributes 48.4% to the GDP, followed by industry at 33.7%, and agriculture at 17.9%. The poverty line is set at less than US$ 3.2 per day, affecting 10% of the population. The country's labor force is distributed across sectors, with 25.9% in agriculture, 13.2% in industry, and 60.9% in services. The unemployment rate is 5.3%, and underemployment is a significant issue, affecting 20% of the population. The low supply of highly skilled workers challenges further increasing per capita income. The country will likely fall into this middle-income trap because it reaches a certain average income and cannot progress beyond that level. It seems helpful to mention some insights from this perspective. During Soviet times, the growth model of states was determined by their available resources, and Central Asia is rich in abundant resources. However, in most cases, primary resources were taken to other non-resource wealthy states for further value addition. So, the workforce was created in the respective states based on the concerned state's requirements. Workforce migration from one state to another was...

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Islamic Extremism in Central Asia: A Threat to Liberal Progress

Afghanistan earned its reputation as the “graveyard of empires” due to the significant toll exacted on foreign powers in their efforts to achieve military success in the country. This challenge was evident in the experiences of the British Empire, the Soviet Union, and, most recently, the United States. The persistent and decentralized nature of the country's tribal insurgency made achieving a definitive victory a formidable task. Furthermore, the adherence of groups harbored by the Taliban, such as Al Qaeda, to an extremist religious ideology spread terrorism globally, including in the 9/11 attacks as well as other deadly acts of violence in various parts of the world. While the United States arguably played a constructive role in modernizing Afghanistan, the establishment of democracy and Western values in the country proved to be an insurmountable challenge, even with over $100 billion in foreign aid. With heightened tensions between the Islamic and Western populations reignited in the Levant after the deadly Hamas attack on Israel on 7 October 2023, the threat of Afghanistan-based extremists redirecting their focus towards the West has intensified. Often overlooked is the fact that Salafists jihadists and other radical groups also pose a challenge to the emerging democracies in Central Asia as these Muslim-majority secular republics are seen as areas to spread their undemocratic and potentially violent influence. In this context, policies that may even inadvertently help promote illiberal religious movements threaten the region’s secular identity and the security of its peoples. We should assess Central Asia’s unique position on religious freedoms but also on jihadist threats For the large part, Western countries come from a privileged position of being able to resist the widespread influence from Islamic extremist movements at home thanks mainly to generations of democratic institution building as well as decent geographic distance to areas that would fall under pan-jihadist aspirations. Consider that there is no apparent threat of jihadists entirely displacing Western democratic institutions or imposing a pan-Islamist state encompassing parts of Western nations; most Western lands do not fall on areas some of these groups want to conquer to create an Islamic Caliphate. On the other hand, many other places, including Central Asia, still risk misconstruing the line between defending individual freedoms and combatting religious extremism. Here, the coexistence of extremist Islamic ideologies and democracy remains somewhat precarious. Islamic radicalism continues to pose a serious challenge to the emerging democracies of the region, where the secular republics are trying to keep a lid on certain hostile ideologies. Militant groups spilling over from Afghanistan and infiltrating post-Soviet countries want to spread jihad to the region and create an Islamic Khaganate stretching from Egypt to China. Pan-Islamist Salafists, such as Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP) and Al Qaeda, have a clear goal to overthrow Central Asia’s secular regimes. Moreover, the determination of Salafists jihadists and other groups to spread their illiberal and violent struggle to Central Asia (including from neighboring Afghanistan) has become apparent through their growing presence in the region’s schools and other spheres of public...

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Central Asia’s Growing Economic and Strategic Importance Comes to Fore

The Central Asian region has experienced a tremendous economic transformation since the beginning of the century. Its aggregate gross domestic product (GDP) now totals $397 billion, growing 8.6-fold since the year 2000. Its share in global GDP in purchasing power parity (PPP) has also increased 1.8 times. The GDP per capita has tripled as the labor pool has grown to almost 80 million, representing a 1.4-fold increase since 2000. The region’s strategic importance, particularly thanks to its geographic position bridging major economies of Europe and Asia, makes it a key player in geopolitical dynamics. Central Asia’s dependence on commodity exports and remittances has so far limited its integration into global value-chains. The Central Asia Regional Economic Co-operation (CAREC) Program, established by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), plays an important role in fostering regional development and co-operation. CAREC includes the five Central Asia countries (namely Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan) plus Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China, Georgia, Mongolia and Pakistan. CAREC also partners with five multilateral international institutions in addition to the ADB (which serves as its Secretariat). These are the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), International Monetary Fund (IMF), Islamic Development Bank (IsDB), United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the World Bank (a.k.a. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development or IBRD). The Program has constructively helped the countries of Central Asia to address challenges in trade governance. Nevertheless, inefficiencies in cross-border transport and customs procedures continue to hinder their commercial exchanges with one another as well as with external partners. CAREC’s current policy-implementation priorities are integration of regional trade, digitization, climate change, regional co-operation, development of financial technologies and financing in the water sector. There is still significant potential for further development given that the region’s trade within itself has been growing faster than its foreign trade. Enhancing Central Asia’s role in the global economy will require the implementation of co-operative initiatives already identified, especially in infrastructure. Such construction of new physical plants, as well as the renovation and building-out of those that already exist, is crucial for enhancing economic growth and sustainability. This strategy will leverage the region’s strengths such as its strategic location and resource endowments. In 2023, Central Asia’s economic growth is projected to remain relatively steady at 3.9 percent, but this may still be affected by the global challenges of weak external demand, rising inflation and supply-chain disruptions. These global economic conditions, along with the uncertainties that they engender, reflect continuing burdens of the ongoing post-COVID recovery as well as the effects of the war in Ukraine, which significantly impacts the region. In addition to the ADB, the IBRD also focuses on various development initiatives in Central Asia that aim to support regional infrastructure development and the strengthening of cross-border co-operation. These are implemented through relatively low-profile initiatives such as the Central Asia Water and Energy Program (CAWEP) to enhance energy and water security and the Central Asia Hydrometeorology Modernization Project (CAHMP) to improve weather, climate and hydrological services. The IBRD thus aims to increase...