Uzbekistan - The Times Of Central Asia

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Opinion

Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan Show What Diplomacy Can Deliver as Vast Rail Project with China Advances

Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov and Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev met on July 30 on the shores of Kyrgyzstan’s Lake Issyk-Kul, in Cholpon Ata, to sign the Treaty on Allied Relations. It was much more than business as usual. In their press conference, the leaders largely set aside the diplomatic boilerplate and expressions of mutual approbation that usually attend such summits. Instead, the meeting focused on putting a decisive end to mutual Kyrgyz-Uzbek grievances and rivalry, opting for dialogue over confrontation, stability over tension, and partnership over the quest for primacy in their bilateral relationship. Without ceding any of their sovereignty, they stressed that teamwork and shared responsibility—not the pursuit of great-power patronage or one-upmanship—are the surest way to advance common interests. Japarov, like Mirziyoyev, made clear that strategic-level collaboration always trumps short-term transactional gains. One of the biggest takeaways from the Japarov–Mirziyoyev summit was the confident demeanor and optimism with which they spoke about the future of Kyrgyz-Uzbek relations. Veering from his scripted notes and speaking in Russian to the press, Mirziyoyev said: “What an atmosphere we have today [here in Kyrgyzstan]. Look at what we're doing today— we're making history. This alliance — all of this will remain in history forever and ever.” Friendship, mutual respect, and hard work will produce “dynamic development” and “steady economic growth,” leading to “the well-being of peoples.” Business Development and Ahead of Schedule Once dismissed as an engineer's pipedream or a financier's nightmare, Japarov and Mirziyoyev said they’re staying the course on building strategic connectivity, energy, and water infrastructure, singling out the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway and the Kambarata-1 Hydropower Plant (HPP), projects that some considered unrealistic. The leaders made it plain that this railway will deliver huge benefits. As Mirziyoyev put it: "We will work together non-stop to develop trade and logistics infrastructure along this railway route." Beyond offering transit times faster than the northern routes, the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway will boost tourism and bring Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan hundreds of millions of dollars in transit revenue. Most importantly, it will unlock untapped economic resources, fueling new jobs, businesses, and logistics hubs along the corridor. After the Japarov-Mirziyoyev meetings, The Times of Central Asia spoke with Akramjon Nematov, First Deputy Director of Uzbekistan's Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies. Having been on site, he noted that the numbers and progress on the ground speak louder than any words or communiqués: "Construction is active at 83 of 107 planned sites on the Kyrgyz line, with over 10,000 workers and 7,000 units of heavy machinery deployed. Crews are drilling 26 tunnels through the Tian Shan, with over 13.5 kilometers of the main tunnel already cut, while 38 of 50 bridges are underway. The pace is staggering. I've watched this railway move Kyrgyz-Uzbek relations from friction to cooperation – and I measure progress not in words, but in cubic meters of earth moved." China has committed to supplying most of the capital and engineering capacity. The project carries a total capitalization of roughly $4.7 billion, structured as a $2.3...

Jewelry

Bukharan Jewelry: How an Uzbek Jeweler Is Preserving a Traditional Craft

In 2024, Uzbek jeweler Zokir Negmatov published a handbook of Bukharan jewelry making. Traditional Bukharan jewelry making left little technical documentation. Instead, its skills were transmitted largely through observation. "In jewelry making, much knowledge has traditionally been passed directly from master to apprentice," he explains. "For me it was important to preserve the tradition for future generations." A man in his mid-forties, Negmatov was born and trained in Bukhara and has nearly three decades of experience as a jeweler. His native city has been a center of gold and silver work for well over a millennium, and craftsmanship helped shape the city itself: as many as two hundred crafts are believed to have flourished here, with each neighborhood, or mahalla, tied to a particular one. At the center of the old town stands Toqi Zargaron, the Jewelers' Dome, a covered bazaar built in 1569–70 that once housed thirty-six jewelers' workshops and shops, where gold, precious stones, and coral were traded. It still stands, the largest of the surviving domes, and now sells spices and souvenirs. Across Uzbekistan, silver was the dominant metal, but Bukhara's jewelers were unusual in their preference for gold. The city lies in the Zarafshan oasis, named after the river whose Persian name means 'spreader of gold' and refers to gold-bearing sands in its upper reaches. By the nineteenth century, Bukhara ranked with Khiva, Samarkand, Karshi, and Kokand among Central Asia's principal jewelry centers, each with a recognizable style. A jeweler was a zargar, a Persian word that survives in the name of the dome. The trade was organized, with hierarchies, patron saints, and its own written texts: the risola, a pamphlet setting out the legend of how the craft's patron founded it and the prayers required of a craftsman. What those texts did not contain were the technical aspects of the craft: how to do the work. That knowledge was carried largely through the usta-shogird relationship. Usta, from the Persian ustad, means master and functions as a title; a man is addressed as Usta before his name. The shogird attaches himself to one master for years, works for little at the outset, and learns by being present at the bench. Negmatov's handbook is a different kind of text. Where the risola preserved the craft's spiritual charter, his book sets down the methodology. It arrives at a moment when Bukhara and the traditions of Uzbekistan are drawing interest not only from tourists but also from the broader world of art and culture. [caption id="attachment_54454" align="aligncenter" width="932"] Image courtesy of Zokir Negmatov[/caption] Family Traditions Zokir Negmatov grew up in a family where culture and tradition were central. His father was an educator. His mother, Gauhar Negmatova, was a master of zardozi, the gold embroidery for which Bukhara is equally known, creating figurative patterns and traditional ornament by hand in gold thread. "There were no professional jewelers in my family, but craftsmanship and traditional art were always highly valued," recounts Negmatov. "From childhood, I was surrounded by traditional ornament...

Nuclear Energy

Uzbekistan Plans Second Nuclear Power Plant Before First Is Ready

Uzbekistan will soon begin preparations for the construction of a second nuclear power plant (NPP), President Shavkat Mirziyoyev announced during an August 17 visit to Khorezm region. The announcement came a little more than two months after construction officially began on the country’s first NPP. The authorities have not yet disclosed where the new plant will be located or how much capacity it will have. They have also not named a technology partner. Discussing energy in connection with new industrial projects, Mirziyoyev said investors need an acceptable electricity price and a guarantee of uninterrupted supply. Uzbekistan is building its first NPP with the participation of Russia’s state nuclear corporation Rosatom. On June 4, first concrete was poured for the foundation of the first unit of the integrated NPP in Farish district, Jizzakh region, officially marking the start of construction. Mirziyoyev and Russian President Vladimir Putin launched the project by video link. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi also participated in the ceremony. The project itself has changed considerably over the past two years. In 2024, Uzbekistan and Russia agreed to build a small nuclear power plant with six RITM-200N reactors, each with a capacity of 55 MW. Tashkent later decided to combine small modular and large-scale nuclear generation at a single site. Under the current configuration, the Jizzakh project will have two large VVER-1000 units and two small RITM-200N units. The complex will have a total capacity of 2.11 GW and is expected to generate about 15.4 billion kWh of electricity annually. The first small reactor is expected to come online in 2029. The first large unit could begin operating in 2033, with the entire complex expected to be commissioned by 2035. Plans for a second NPP come as electricity demand is rising rapidly. Uzbekistan’s 2020–2030 electricity plan aimed to raise annual generation from 63.6 billion kWh to 120.8 billion kWh by 2030. A more recent government forecast puts electricity consumption at 121 billion kWh by 2035. Some of the growing demand is expected to be met by solar and wind power. Nuclear energy is intended to provide baseload generation, including for industry. Mirziyoyev specifically linked preparations for the second plant to investors’ need for a stable electricity supply. Uzbekistan is therefore expanding its nuclear program before its first reactor has entered operation. The country is continuing to develop the infrastructure and expertise needed for the new industry. Following a June review, the IAEA said Uzbekistan had made significant progress but needed to complete work on its nuclear regulatory body and finalize feasibility studies. So far, Mirziyoyev has said only that preparations for the second NPP will begin. Its cost, timetable, capacity, and technology have not been announced, nor has a potential contractor been named. The first NPP involves long-term cooperation with Russia’s nuclear industry. Rosatom is participating in the project, which will use its reactor technology. Mirziyoyev said in June that Uzbekistan planned further nuclear power projects with Russia, but whether the same model will be used for the second plant or Tashkent will consider...

Language Policy

Uzbekistan’s Alphabet Reform Revives a 33-Year-Old Debate

Uzbekistan began switching from Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet in 1993 and initially planned to complete the transition by 2000. Nearly 33 years later, both scripts are still widely used, and the country is preparing to revise its Latin alphabet again. On July 7, the lower house of Uzbekistan’s parliament approved a bill introducing a new version of the alphabet, with 28 letters and one apostrophe instead of the current 26 letters and three letter combinations, and sent it to the Senate. Literary scholar Dilbar Khaydarova told The Times of Central Asia that a reform originally intended to take seven years has stretched across a generation. She attributes the delay mainly to an inconsistent transition, with schools moving faster than publishers and much of the government. “After 30 or 31 years, these small corrections have prompted another reform,” she said. A Reform That Stretched Across Decades Uzbekistan adopted the law introducing a Latin-based alphabet in 1993. Schools were to use the new script first, while adults were expected to have opportunities to study it at workplaces and institutions. The transition was initially due to be completed by 2000. In 1995, the deadline was extended to 2005 and later postponed to 2010. The original alphabet was revised in 1995, when sh and ch were adopted and ng was listed separately. That revision also introduced the forms o‘ and g‘, establishing an alphabet of 26 letters and three letter combinations. Two Alphabets for One Country Schools switched to Latin, while Cyrillic remained common in government and the publishing industry. The media also continued using the script for years, and the Soviet-educated generation remained active in public institutions after 1993. As a result, children learned to write in Latin but continued to encounter Cyrillic in publications and official documents. The same script remained in use when they entered the workplace. “Even if we became literate in Latin, we also developed the ability to read and write in Cyrillic,” Khaydarova said. “Because the situation required it.” She describes this as the coexistence of “two policies or practices that did not correspond to each other.” This mismatch, she believes, largely explains why the transition has lasted for decades. That pattern persists, with some major publications using Latin while others continue publishing in Cyrillic. Khaydarova says the difference does not necessarily reflect opposition to the reform because publishers must consider their audiences’ habits. The Cost of the New Alphabet Implementing the revised alphabet will involve costs beyond school textbooks. Since 1993, Uzbekistan has accumulated a vast body of material in both Cyrillic and the current version of Latin. For publishers, this raises questions about whether existing publications should be converted to the revised script and who will pay for the work. “If they lose a significant share of their audience, there will be serious financial risks in the future,” Khaydarova said. Khaydarova believes the state will have to bear some of the cost by supporting publishers that convert existing materials to the revised script. “The more sources of...

Middle East Crisis

Trump’s New Threat Against Iran Collides With Central Asia’s Economic Interests

U.S. President Donald Trump has threatened economic consequences for any country that continues to provide support to Iran, promising Tehran “Economic Warfare and Isolation on an unprecedented scale.” Washington has not yet announced specific new measures. For Central Asia, the warning comes as economic and transport links with Iran are developing. Kazakhstan is building its own terminal at Iran’s largest port, Tajikistan is discussing fuel purchases and new transport routes, Uzbekistan is trying to protect trade that passes through Iran, and Turkmenistan is expanding transport and energy cooperation with Tehran. Each country has its own reasons for developing these ties, but they share one concern: for landlocked Central Asia, Iran provides one of the few overland routes to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Washington’s attempt to tighten Iran’s economic isolation therefore affects not only the region’s relations with Tehran, but also its own plans to diversify trade and transit. None of this means that Central Asian governments are prepared to disregard U.S. sanctions or enter into a political confrontation with Washington on Tehran’s behalf. The threat of secondary restrictions could cause banks, carriers, and private companies to withdraw from individual transactions even without formal decisions by their governments. Trump has not yet explained exactly what instruments he intends to use to enforce the isolation he announced. Kazakhstan Looks to the Persian Gulf Iran intensified its work with Central Asia well before Trump’s latest threat. In mid-June, the Iranian Minister of Roads and Urban Development Farzaneh Sadegh visited Astana. In talks with Kazakhstan’s Deputy Prime Minister Serik Zhumangarin, the two sides noted that bilateral trade had increased by 26.4% in 2025 to $430.2 million. Astana and Tehran now want to raise it to $3 billion, using, among other things, the free trade agreement between Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union, of which Kazakhstan is a member. The plans go beyond trade. Freight traffic along the International North-South Transport Corridor, which links Russia and Central Asia with Iran and Persian Gulf ports, rose by 12% in 2025 to 3.5 million metric tons. Rail freight between Kazakhstan and Iran also increased by 69%. Astana’s main interest lies even farther south. Iran has allowed Kazakhstan to establish its own transport and logistics terminal at Shahid Rajaee in Bandar Abbas, the country’s largest commercial port. On June 28, the two sides signed a Build-Operate-Transfer agreement. It runs for 27 years, with two years allocated for construction and another 25 for operation. Commercial operations are scheduled to begin in the project’s third year. For Kazakhstan, this is more than simply an overseas terminal. Its Foreign Ministry explicitly links the project to opening access for Kazakh cargo to markets in the Persian Gulf, South and Southeast Asia, and East Africa. In July, Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev again reaffirmed Astana’s interest in the project during a visit to Iran. The ministry also cited a 26.4% increase in bilateral trade in 2025 to $430.2 million. Astana is also considering another Iranian port, Chabahar, on the Indian Ocean....

Environmental Safeguards

Pasture Gives Way to Solar Power in Uzbekistan as Audit Remains Unpublished

Each spring, nine households grazed livestock on a stretch of desert pasture in Uzbekistan’s Bukhara Region. The land is now the site of the Nur Bukhara solar and battery plant, but an audit intended to show whether promised livelihood protections worked remains unpublished. Seven of the households came from the nearby settlement of Kirilishon and used the state-owned pasture without permits or formal agreements. A herder and his partner, identified publicly only as H1 and H2, grazed animals there through a short-term agreement with Alat Qorakolchilik LLC, a local livestock company holding a sublease on the land. The nine households included 43 people. The plant began operating in September 2025 and was inaugurated that December. The Uzbek government awarded the project to Masdar, an Abu Dhabi-based renewable energy developer that built the facility and now operates it. Nur Bukhara combines a 250-megawatt solar plant with a 63-megawatt battery system capable of storing 126 megawatt-hours of electricity. Masdar says it can supply more than 55,000 homes, while the World Bank described it as Central Asia’s first utility-scale renewable energy project to combine solar generation with battery storage. During a consultation on May 7, 2023, Kirilishon residents asked for the solar plant to be moved. If construction went ahead, they wanted replacement grazing land near the village and priority consideration for project jobs. H1 and H2 had a documented right to use the pasture, while the seven Kirilishon households did not. However, the safeguards required by Nur Bukhara’s international lenders covered both formal and informal users whose livelihoods would be disrupted by the project. Masdar commissioned a livelihood restoration plan setting out the assistance the households were to receive before construction cut off access to the site. It identified about 260 hectares of replacement pasture, equivalent to one square mile, for H1 and H2. Alat Qorakolchilik also identified approximately 1,000 hectares, or 3.9 square miles, of additional land available to herders. The seven informal households were to be allowed to use replacement pasture without obtaining formal agreements. The larger tract was not described as land reserved exclusively for those households. The published map did not record which final area each household would receive. The livelihood measures also included priority access to project employment and additional support for households considered vulnerable. In an official statement to The Times of Central Asia, a Masdar spokesperson said replacement grazing arrangements were provided before access to the project site was restricted, “maintaining equivalent grazing conditions,” and that “several members of affected households obtained project-related employment opportunities.” The statement cited monitoring by international lenders and an independent third-party review, with the completion audit finalized in September 2025. It reported no related complaints from affected households through the project’s grievance mechanism. The completion audit was not included with Masdar’s response. As of August 20, 2026, it was also absent from Masdar’s Nur Bukhara page and the International Finance Corporation’s project disclosure. Simonyan Consulting, which says it was engaged by the project company to conduct the audit, lists the assignment as “2025–ongoing.” Without the audit,...