Uzbekistan - The Times Of Central Asia

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Art and Literature

Memoirs of East Turkestan Republic’s First Leader Published in France

A French edition of Turkiston Qayg‘usi (The Sorrow of Turkestan), written by Alihan Tora Saghuni, an Uzbek religious leader who headed the East Turkestan Republic established in 1944 in what is now China's Xinjiang region, has been published in France under the title Amer Turkestan (Bitter Turkestan). The 448-page volume, published by Bleu Autour on October 23, brings the memoirs of a leading figure in the region's independence movement to French readers. The book examines the political upheavals of the 20th century through Saghuni's experiences of persecution by Soviet and Chinese authorities and his involvement in the East Turkestan independence movement. Combining history and memoir, the work reflects the author's personal experiences and political views. The French edition also includes writings in which Saghuni recounts his leadership of the East Turkestan Republic between 1944 and 1946. The translation was prepared by French historian and Orientalist Stéphane A. Dudoignon, a senior researcher at France's National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS). From 2024 to 2026, he worked on the book with Saghuni's son, Qutlughkhan. The edition includes scholarly commentary to help readers understand the historical events and political context of the narrative. Alihan Tora Saghuni was born in 1885 in Tokmok, in present-day Kyrgyzstan, to a family of Uzbek origin. His pen name is associated with the ancient city of Balasagun, one of the centers of the medieval Karakhanid state. After receiving a religious education, he became involved in the social and political life of Turkestan and later moved to China's Xinjiang region. In November 1944, amid an uprising against Chinese authorities, the East Turkestan Republic was proclaimed in the city of Ghulja, also known as Yining. Saghuni became head of its provisional government. The republic existed amid a complex struggle involving local nationalist movements, Chinese authorities, and the Soviet Union, which exercised considerable influence over events in the region. The name East Turkestan remains politically sensitive in China, where authorities associate it with separatist movements seeking independence for Xinjiang. Beijing rejects the term as a designation for the region, which has been under Chinese Communist rule since 1949. In a 2019 government white paper, Beijing declared that "there has never been any state known as 'East Turkistan,'" despite the establishment of short-lived republics of that name in 1933 and 1944. In 1946, Saghuni was forcibly taken to the Soviet Union. He spent the remainder of his life in Tashkent, where he worked on historical and religious writings. He died in 1976. The Sorrow of Turkestan became one of his best-known works on the region's history and fate. Dudoignon presented the book at the Rendez-Vous de l'Histoire festival near Blois, France, on October 9. According to Uzbekistan's UzA news agency, an English translation is planned as the next step. The work has previously appeared in other languages, including Turkish. According to Dudoignon's research institute, the French edition is the first translation of Saghuni's writings into a Western European language.

Cotton Harvest

Uzbekistan Cotton Harvest Reaches 4.63 Million Tons as Water Losses Persist

Uzbekistan's Ministry of Agriculture says the country had harvested 4.63 million metric tons of raw cotton as of October 22, exceeding its target by 3%. About 76% of the cotton harvested so far was harvested mechanically, reflecting the industry's shift away from manual labor. A new study, however, highlights another challenge: extensive water losses in the country's irrigation system. According to the Ministry of Agriculture, nearly 3,000 harvesting machines collected 3.52 million metric tons of cotton. Mechanized harvesting accounted for 98.5% of the crop in the Jizzakh region, 94.2% in the Syrdarya region, and 81.2% in the Tashkent region. In other regions, the figure was as low as 61%. Although the national target has been exceeded, the first picking is continuing on more than 49,000 hectares. Machines have reduced the need for seasonal workers in an industry that depended on large-scale manual labor for decades. Nevertheless, approximately 1.1 million metric tons of cotton was still picked by hand. At an international seminar on October 19–20, the government-linked Center for Economic Research and Reforms presented a study reporting that cotton yields had increased by 71% and grain yields by 48% between 2017 and 2025, while water withdrawals had declined by 22%. Water-saving technologies now cover 2.6 million hectares of agricultural land, according to the study. The same study, however, estimates that approximately 37% of irrigation water is lost during transportation through canals, while nearly half of irrigated farmland is affected by soil salinization. A 2021 World Bank report estimated that agriculture accounts for nearly 90% of the country's freshwater withdrawals, with cotton the largest user of irrigation water. These losses are particularly significant for Uzbekistan, whose agricultural sector depends on water from the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers. Decades of river water diversion for irrigation have been among the main causes of the Aral Sea's decline. The study also assesses the climate impact of agricultural production, finding that agriculture accounts for 17.5% of the country's greenhouse gas emissions. Methane, primarily associated with livestock farming, makes up nearly two-thirds of the sector's emissions. Proposed measures include reducing water losses, restoring pastures, and improving fertilizer efficiency. The pressure on Uzbekistan's water resources is also expected to increase. In July, the OECD warned that shrinking glaciers, rising temperatures, and growing demand threaten to reduce the country's water availability in the coming decades.

Russia's War in Ukraine

Ukraine Says More Than 20,400 Central Asians Signed Russian Army Contracts

More than 20,400 Central Asian citizens have signed contracts with Russia’s armed forces since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine began, according to the Ukrainian government’s “I Want to Live” project. The new figures come as families in Kazakhstan secure the return of young men who say they went to Russia for civilian work and were forced into military service. The project’s October figures identify 8,207 Uzbek citizens and 5,308 Tajiks, together accounting for about two-thirds of the regional total. Kazakhstan accounts for 3,819. A further 2,219 are from Kyrgyzstan, and 884 from Turkmenistan. The count covers identified contract signers as of October 1, rather than the number currently fighting, and excludes ethnic Central Asians with Russian citizenship. The figures have not been independently verified. “I Want to Live” is a Ukrainian state project that helps Russian servicemen surrender. For some Kazakh families, the immediate struggle has been to get their sons out of the Russian army. Twenty-year-old Ainabek Keldibek went to Russia expecting to work as a security guard. As TCA reported, he and other young Kazakh men later appeared in appeals for help, with some wearing Russian uniforms in or near the combat zone. On October 7, relatives went to Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry in Astana to demand help bringing the men home. Lawyer Meirman Shekeyev, who accompanied them, said he knew of at least 21 cases. Families said their relatives had accepted civilian jobs before being pressured to sign military contracts. Keldibek has now returned to Kazakhstan. His sister told RFE/RL’s Kazakh service that he arrived in Shymkent on the evening of October 21. She said others were still waiting to return. Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry had earlier asked Moscow to help repatriate the men and opened a hotline for their families. Their accounts fit a pattern documented by the International Federation for Human Rights. Its April study found that migrants in Russia had been offered military contracts as an alternative to detention or deportation. Others were recruited abroad with promises of civilian work, only to find themselves sent to the front. “Many of these men knew in some capacity what they were signing up for. But some were also deceived or coerced,” FIDH President Alexis Deswaef said. The war has also drawn Central Asians to Ukraine’s defense. TCA’s earlier reporting on both sides described volunteers who regarded Ukraine as home and saw Russia’s invasion as a threat to their families. Kazakh national Zhasulan Duysembin joined Ukraine’s armed forces in 2021 after settling there. In a 2022 interview, he told Ukrainska Pravda: “I had two children in Ukraine, and for the first time I started to think that they might be in danger.” Uzbekistan’s Migration Agency has warned citizens that offers of work or help with immigration papers can lead to recruitment into armed conflicts. It has also reminded them that joining foreign armed forces can bring criminal liability at home. For other families, there has been no homecoming. Kiril Nysanbaev went to Russia for work after completing his military...

Regional Cooperation

Opinion: China’s Regional Strategy Meets Central Asia’s National Bargains

The China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway spent decades on the drawing board. Disagreements over its route and financing held it up long after the three governments endorsed the project. In 2024, a Kyrgyz parliamentarian asked railway officials a simple question: “Where will we find $1 billion?” A financing agreement signed in Bishkek on December 16, 2025, cleared a major obstacle. The railway is estimated to cost $4.7 billion. Chinese banks will lend about $2.3 billion to the joint project company over 35 years. China holds 51% of the company, while Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan each hold 24.5%. The partners will provide the remaining funding as equity. In June 2026, Kyrgyzstan’s parliament approved in the first reading a separate $304.5 million loan from China’s Export-Import Bank to help fund its own contribution. That loan has a 25-year term. The joint company’s debt and Kyrgyzstan’s borrowing for its stake are different obligations, but both affect how much value the country will need to earn from the line. Kyrgyzstan wants business around the railway, including terminals and freight services; Uzbekistan gains a direct rail link toward China, while Beijing gains another route west. The governments agreed to build the line, but tariffs and terminal operations will help decide how the returns are shared. The same division between shared goals and separate deals runs through China’s C+C5 relationship with the five Central Asian states. At the second China-Central Asia summit in Astana in June 2025, the six countries signed a treaty on eternal good-neighborliness. The Chinese Foreign Ministry also published a list of 55 cooperation documents. The first 14 cover the regional China-Central Asia framework. The other 41 involve Chinese institutions and counterparts in individual Central Asian countries, including local authorities and companies. The count reflects how the agreements are organized rather than their financial weight. The regional documents cover road permits, customs procedures and green minerals. The country-specific agreements extend into particular industries and investment relationships. Customs cooperation shows how regional talks can lead to bilateral action. At a meeting on May 21–22, 2025, customs chiefs from China and Central Asia agreed to joint border inspections. The next day, Chinese and Kazakh officials conducted an inspection of Nur Zholy-Khorgos. They agreed to accept more trucks from Kazakhstan and recognize each other’s X-ray inspection images to reduce repeat checks. Kazakhstan’s customs authority explicitly linked the inspection to the regional meeting. The agreement illustrates how governments can address a shared concern through negotiations at an individual crossing. The Astana investment agreements reflected different national priorities. Kazakhstan pursued investment protection and applications for China’s BeiDou satellite navigation system, while Kyrgyzstan signed documents on an AI application center and processing industries. These were country-specific arrangements within the wider regional framework. The railway illustrates why some projects require only a few governments to agree. After recurring disagreements over its route and funding, China, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan reached a financing settlement in 2025. They did not need all five Central Asian governments to negotiate a single position. Kazakhstan already has direct rail links...

Children’s Health

International Network Launched to Support Childhood Cancer Care in Uzbekistan

An international network to support children with serious and life-threatening illnesses, including cancer, was announced in Samarkand on October 21. The new initiative will bring together first ladies and spouses of heads of state. The network's establishment was announced by Carlos Rodriguez-Galindo, executive vice president of St. Jude Children's Research Hospital in the United States and director of St. Jude Global, which works to improve childhood cancer care worldwide. Uzbekistan's First Lady Ziroat Mirziyoyeva was named chair for a two-year term. Participants in the initiative intend to share expertise and help expand children's access to diagnosis, treatment, and quality medical care. The announcement came during the second International Congress on Pediatric Oncology, held on October 21–22 alongside the World Summit on Children's Well-Being. The events brought together representatives from more than 100 countries, international organizations, and the medical community. Summit partners include UNICEF, the World Health Organization (WHO), and the World Bank. Mirziyoyeva also chairs the board of trustees of the Zamin Foundation, which co-hosted a UN event with St. Jude and the WHO in September 2025 aimed at improving survival rates among children with cancer and other serious illnesses. Uzbekistan is already participating in an international program to improve access to childhood cancer treatments. In February 2025, Uzbekistan and Mongolia became the first two countries to receive essential cancer medicines through a WHO–St. Jude initiative. The program aims to provide children in lower-income countries with a reliable supply of quality-assured cancer medicines free of charge. Uzbekistan is also preparing changes to its national cancer care system. As The Times of Central Asia previously reported, the country plans to reform its oncology services beginning in 2027, while a pediatric palliative care center is planned for the Samarkand region to support children with serious and incurable illnesses.

Migration

Russia Expels 32 Uzbek Migrants as Deportations Rise in Novosibirsk

Russian authorities expelled 32 Uzbek citizens from the Novosibirsk region on October 16 for violating migration regulations. Court bailiffs escorted a reported total of 47 foreign nationals out of the country that day, including citizens of Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Azerbaijan. Over the course of the week, 91 people were expelled from the region. The migrants were identified during police raids in two districts of Novosibirsk and the surrounding Novosibirsky district. Those expelled paid for their own tickets home. Violations of Russia's entry and residence regulations can result in fines ranging from 2,000 to 5,000 rubles (approximately $25–62), as well as administrative expulsion. Under Russian law, expulsion generally also means a five-year ban on re-entering the country. Expulsions from the region have risen sharply. By mid-September 2026, authorities had expelled 1,524 foreign nationals from the Novosibirsk region, compared with 958 during the same period a year earlier, an increase of approximately 59%. Uzbek citizens account for a substantial share of those expelled. By July, authorities had removed 618 Uzbeks out of a total of 1,314 foreign nationals, or approximately 47%. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan were the next most frequently represented countries. The increase in expulsions comes as fewer foreign workers are obtaining work permits in the region. According to figures presented to regional lawmakers, approximately 27,000 work patents were issued in the first eight months of 2026, down from 34,000 during the same period last year. Russia is also tightening national requirements for migrant workers and their families. In July, Russia enacted legislation requiring migrant workers to demonstrate that they can financially support themselves and dependent family members. The changes also require children covered by the provisions who turn 18 to obtain their own work patent or another legal basis to remain in Russia. The main provisions take effect on January 1, 2027. As The Times of Central Asia previously reported, work-related entries into Russia by citizens of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan fell by approximately 15% in the first half of 2026 compared with the same period a year earlier.