Uzbekistan - The Times Of Central Asia

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Podcast

Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Out Sunday

As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team is covering the Kurultai elections and what they mean for Kazakhstan. Special guest: Central Asia journalist Paul Bartlett.

Transplantation

Uzbekistan Performs First Simultaneous Liver-Kidney Transplant

Uzbekistan has performed its first simultaneous liver and kidney transplant on a single patient. The operation was carried out at the National Medical Center, the Zamon news program reported. The procedure marks a further expansion of transplant medicine in Uzbekistan, where hospitals have introduced increasingly complex liver and kidney procedures in recent years. The patient, a woman from Pakhtachi district in Samarkand region, had suffered from liver disease for eight years. After contracting hepatitis C, she developed cirrhosis and later kidney failure. For the past four years, she had regularly undergone hemodialysis, a procedure that filters the blood and partially replaces kidney function. She had previously been advised to seek transplantation abroad, including in India, but the procedure did not go ahead because no suitable donor was found and her family could not cover the cost. Uzbek doctors concluded that transplanting only one of the organs would not be sufficient and decided to perform both procedures during a single operation. Simultaneous liver-kidney transplantation is used in patients with severe disease affecting both organs and is significantly more complex than a single-organ transplant. Doctors must not only perform two transplants during the same operation but also closely monitor the function of both organs afterward. Transplant medicine in Uzbekistan has advanced markedly in recent years. The country now performs both liver and kidney transplants, including procedures that until recently would often have required treatment abroad. In April 2026, doctors at the Republican Specialized Scientific and Practical Medical Center for Nephrology and Kidney Transplantation carried out a kidney transplant between a donor and recipient with incompatible blood groups. Before the operation, antibodies that could cause rejection were removed from the recipient’s blood. Pediatric transplantation is also developing. In December 2025, Uzbekistan performed its first liver transplant on a seven-month-old infant at the National Children’s Medical Center. The child’s mother was the donor. Access to post-transplant treatment has also expanded. Transplant recipients under medical follow-up in Uzbekistan are entitled to free immunosuppressive medicines needed to prevent rejection of the transplanted organ. Regulations also set out procedures for preparing living donors and recipients for surgery, as well as rehabilitation and subsequent medical monitoring. The latest operation adds another highly complex transplant option to those now available domestically. For patients with simultaneous severe liver and kidney disease, treatment abroad is no longer the only option. Hepatitis C, which led to cirrhosis in this patient, can remain without noticeable symptoms for years. Chronic infection can cause cirrhosis and liver cancer. According to the World Health Organization, modern direct-acting antiviral medicines can cure more than 95% of people with hepatitis C.

SCO Summit

Kyrgyzstan Hosts SCO Summit as Bloc Marks 25 Years

Leaders of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's ten member states are due in Bishkek on September 1 for the final summit of Kyrgyzstan's 2025-2026 chairmanship. The meeting is expected to produce a Bishkek Declaration marking the SCO's 25th anniversary, alongside thematic statements and other decisions. For Kyrgyzstan, the gathering is more than a turn in the organization's rotating chairmanship. As many as 21 heads of state are expected in the country during the week, according to presidential spokesman Askat Alagozov. The summit coincides with Kyrgyzstan's Independence Day and the August 31 opening of the World Nomad Games. The member-state session will bring together Belarus, China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, with President Sadyr Japarov as host. Chinese President Xi Jinping will also make a state visit, giving the summit a substantial bilateral program alongside the formal meetings. Kyrgyzstan's Diplomatic Week The summit comes less than three months after Kyrgyzstan was elected to the UN Security Council for 2027-2028, its first term on the body. Hosting the SCO gives Japarov an opportunity to reinforce that diplomatic profile before the Security Council term begins in January. The SCO's foreign ministers reiterated in July that Central Asia is the organization's core and backed a larger role for it in the region's security and economic development. Their statement also praised Kyrgyzstan's chairmanship and confirmed that the Council of Heads of State and SCO Plus meetings would take place in Bishkek on August 31 and September 1. What Cholpon Ata Already Settled At their July 24 meeting in Cholpon Ata, SCO foreign ministers approved the draft declaration and accompanying documents as a basis for the summit. The language is therefore largely negotiated before the leaders arrive, although the final package can still change. The ministerial statement gives a clearer indication of the political agenda, supporting a multipolar world order and rejecting unilateral sanctions. It also calls for more intra-SCO trade. Terrorism, separatism, extremism, drug trafficking, and transnational organized crime remain its stated security priorities. The statement says the SCO is entering a period of institutional reform, including changes to its legal framework and cooperation procedures. A Development Bank Still Taking Shape Economic cooperation will occupy a significant part of the summit. In Tianjin last year, interested member states reached political consensus to establish an SCO Development Bank. The institution is not yet operational. At the fourth consultation meeting in Shenzhen in June, delegates discussed its key elements and the next stage of negotiations. A timetable or capital commitments announced in Bishkek would move the proposal beyond its current design stage. The bank could eventually provide another source of finance for infrastructure, but its structure and membership remain unsettled. Currency diversification will also remain part of the discussion. The 2024 Astana Declaration called for gradual growth in the use of national currencies for settlements among interested members. Sanctions on Russia and Iran have increased the political importance of that effort, although the SCO has not created a common payment system. SCO Plus, but Not...

Renewable Energy

Acwa and KOWEPO Explore Renewable Energy Projects in Uzbekistan

South Korea’s KOWEPO, which is wholly owned by state-controlled Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO), is moving into Uzbekistan’s rapidly expanding green energy market alongside Saudi Arabia’s Acwa, one of the market’s largest players. No specific projects have been announced yet, but the companies will explore opportunities in renewable generation and energy storage while considering the possibility of attracting South Korean financing. The memorandum was signed in Tashkent on August 25. For KOWEPO, the agreement offers an opportunity to bring to Central Asia the experience it has gained through projects in the Middle East totaling 3.5 GW of renewable capacity and 877 MW of gas-fired generation. For Acwa, Uzbekistan has already become its second-largest market after Saudi Arabia. The company has operated there since 2019 and is developing 19 projects with a combined capacity of more than 10 GW and potential investment estimated at $15 billion. Abid Malik, Acwa’s president for Central Asia, said the companies would also seek to “facilitate engagement with Korean financial institutions” as they assess potential projects. Acwa’s portfolio in Uzbekistan includes solar and wind power, conventional generation, green hydrogen, and energy storage. Storage is becoming increasingly important as the share of solar and wind grows because utility-scale batteries can store surplus electricity and return it to the grid when renewable generation falls. Uzbekistan aims to expand renewable energy capacity to around 25 GW by 2030, with renewables targeted to account for 54% of electricity generation. The rapid construction of solar and wind farms comes as electricity demand rises and Uzbekistan seeks to modernize a power system that has historically relied heavily on gas-fired generation. Acwa has already secured contractual priority to develop up to 2 GWh of new battery energy storage capacity in the country. KOWEPO could therefore provide additional expertise and capital. Uzbekistan’s energy transition has already attracted major investors from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, China, and elsewhere. For now, the agreement with KOWEPO remains a framework arrangement, with the capacity, cost, locations, and timelines of any joint projects yet to be announced. Its practical significance will become clearer if the companies move from exploring opportunities to concrete investment decisions.

Archaeology

Possible 2,200-Year-Old Greek Military Camp Found in Uzbekistan

Archaeologists in southern Uzbekistan may have identified an exceptionally rare Hellenistic military camp at a site previously thought to be a small rural settlement. Dating back around 2,200 years, Iskandar Tepa may have functioned as a temporary base for Greco-Bactrian troops and could be the first such camp identified in Central Asia. Alexander the Great conquered Bactria and Sogdiana in the late fourth century B.C., bringing Greek armies deep into Central Asia. After his empire fragmented, Greek-ruled states continued to control parts of the region for centuries. Iskandar Tepa is located in the Sherabad District of Surkhandarya Region, within the ancient borderlands between Bactria and Sogdiana. A Czech-Uzbek archaeological expedition identified the site in 2017. At first, it was interpreted as a Greco-Bactrian settlement, with later research suggesting it may have been a watch post. The mound had no known local name when archaeologists discovered it, so they gave it the working name Iskandar Tepa. Iskandar is the local form of Alexander, making the name equivalent to “Alexander’s Hill.” The latest research suggests the site had a different function altogether. Geophysical surveys and excavations indicate that Iskandar Tepa was probably occupied only briefly, perhaps as a temporary military camp. The findings were published in June 2026 in the Journal of Archaeological Science: Reports. The authors place the site in the Hellenistic period, while Archaeology Magazine dates the proposed military camp to the second century B.C. Iskandar Tepa’s layout supports the military interpretation. The site occupies a naturally protected hilltop. A perimeter ditch about 400 meters long enclosed an area of roughly 1.2 hectares and measured between 4 and 7 meters wide. However, researchers found little evidence of permanent buildings inside the enclosure. That combination is more consistent with a temporary fortified camp than with a permanent settlement. Coins associated with Hellenistic rulers help date the site. Considered alongside the site’s layout and other finds, the coins also support the interpretation that a military unit may once have occupied it. Supplying water to the people stationed there would have been a separate challenge. Archaeologists found large ceramic storage vessels, known as khums, buried in the ground. They also identified what appears to have been a canal, up to 1.1 meters wide, that carried water from several kilometers away. Researchers suggest that the vessels may have been used to store water for a temporary garrison. Geophysical surveys also revealed around 90 elongated pits. Many are interpreted as graves in a burial ground that developed after the main period of occupation at Iskandar Tepa or partly overlapped with it. Temporary military camps from the Hellenistic period are extremely difficult to identify archaeologically because, unlike cities and fortresses, they left relatively few permanent structures. Iskandar Tepa could therefore reveal another side of the Hellenistic presence in Central Asia by showing how relatively small military units stationed far from major urban centers secured water and monitored the surrounding territory. Southern Uzbekistan has also yielded evidence from a much earlier period. In 2025, researchers reported that...

Central Asia - Iran Relations

Opinion: Why Central Asia Cannot Afford to Abandon the Iranian Route

Kazakhstan had barely secured a foothold in Iran’s largest commercial port when renewed military escalation made the southern route risky again. The problem for Central Asia is that Iran is more than a trading partner. For a region without direct access to the open sea, it provides one of the few overland routes to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. On June 28, Kazakhstan and Iran signed a 27-year build-operate-transfer (BOT) agreement for a Kazakh transport and logistics terminal at Shahid Rajaee Port in Bandar Abbas. The agreement allocates two years for construction and the following 25 for operation. Astana expects the terminal to provide more direct access to markets in the Gulf, South and Southeast Asia, and East Africa. The project almost immediately found itself in a different reality. In July, U.S. strikes hit Iranian railway and coastal infrastructure. The Aq Taqeh Khan bridge on a rail route connecting Iran with Turkmenistan and, further north, with Kazakhstan, was damaged. There was no confirmed halt to Central Asian freight traffic, but military risk was no longer an abstract concern for carriers. That risk has now been compounded by a new U.S. sanctions campaign. On August 24, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent launched what Washington calls Operation Economic Outcast, combining direct sanctions with pressure on Iran’s foreign economic partners. The United States said it would set timelines for other countries to shut down economic activity with Iran, while the scope of secondary sanctions was expanded to cover five areas: digital assets, technology, gold, aviation, and shipping. Nearly 60 Iran-linked individuals, entities, and vessels were also sanctioned. The United States has not publicly identified which countries could face penalties first. War and sanctions can make the Iranian route more expensive, slower, and more dangerous. They cannot change geography. Iran gives Central Asia overland access to ports on the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman. From Bandar Abbas and Chabahar, cargo can move onward toward India, the Gulf states, and East Africa. Iran also provides a western overland route toward Turkey. This is one of the fundamental differences between the Iranian route and the Middle Corridor, which crosses the Caspian Sea before continuing through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. The Middle Corridor requires cargo to move between rail and maritime transport. Iran offers the possibility of a continuous overland chain while also providing access to ports connected to the Indian Ocean. For Kazakhstan, the southern route is already more than a plan. Trade with Iran increased by 26.4% in 2025 to $430.2 million. Freight traffic along the International North-South Transport Corridor reached 3.5 million tons, while rail traffic between Kazakhstan and Iran increased by 69%. It is this expanding transport network that is now exposed to greater military and sanctions risks. There is another factor. A free trade agreement between Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union, which includes Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, entered into force on May 15, 2025. It significantly reduced tariff barriers to trade in goods between the two sides. Uzbekistan offers...