Uzbekistan - The Times Of Central Asia

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Chess

Will Host Uzbekistan Be the “Most Dangerous Team” at the Chess Olympiad?

Some 400 teams have been confirmed for the FIDE Chess Olympiad in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, next month, an increase of 20 teams over the previous record number that competed at the Olympiad in Budapest, Hungary two years ago. In the open section, the United States is the top seed with Fabiano Caruana leading the five-player team, while India will aim to defend its 2024 title with Arjun Erigaisi at the head of its lineup, according to FIDE, the international governing body of chess. “The host nation might be the most dangerous team in Samarkand,” FIDE said this week. Uzbekistan’s Javokhir Sindarov, winner of the prestigious Candidates Tournament in April, leads the team, ahead of Nodirbek Abdusattorov, another of the world’s top players. Nodirbek Yakubboev, Shamsiddin Vokhidov, Madaminov will also play for Uzbekistan, which won the Chess Olympiad in Chennai, India in 2022 and took bronze in Budapest. China is also fielding a strong team in the open section, while Germany is seeded fifth. The gender-neutral category is called open because women have occasionally participated in male-dominated chess events. In the women’s competition in Samarkand, India is the top seed with Humpy Koneru at the head of the team, followed by Georgia, China, Kazakhstan and the U.S., according to FIDE. Kazakhstan’s female chess players have been progressing strongly in recent years, finishing fifth at the Chess Olympiad in Chennai, India in 2022, and second in Budapest in 2024. Bibisara Asaubayeva, who was second at the women’s Candidates tournament this year, leads her squad, followed by Alua Nurman, Meruert Kamalidenova, Elnaz Kaliakhmet and Zarina Nurgaliyeva. Host Uzbekistan is seeded 13th on the women’s side in Samarkand. The Chess Olympiad will feature 11 rounds of classical chess from September 16 to 27.

Succession

The Tradition of Power – Why Political Succession in Central Asia Follows Its Own Rules

In January 2027, Kyrgyzstan will hold a presidential election, an event that is anything but routine for the Central Asian republic. Over the past three decades, political crises, often surrounding disputed elections, have repeatedly ended in the removal of presidents. Kyrgyzstan remains an outlier in the region, although it, too, has gradually been moving towards a political model that has long become the norm across the rest of Central Asia. This year marks 35 years since the Soviet republics embarked on independent political lives following the collapse of the USSR. Yet many of the mechanisms governing the transfer of supreme power, shaped during the Soviet era, continue to define politics across the independent states. In Central Asia, three decades of independence have produced a distinctive model of political succession. The final years of the Soviet Union became known as the era of the so-called "gun-carriage race." As one ageing General Secretary after another passed away, an unwritten rule appeared to emerge: the official who chaired the state funeral commission for the deceased leader often became his successor. A remarkably similar pattern later emerged in Central Asia – first in Turkmenistan, then in Uzbekistan. Turkmenistan's first president, Saparmurat Niyazov, died in December 2006. The state funeral commission was chaired by Deputy Prime Minister and Health Minister Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, who simultaneously became acting president. It was during those funeral ceremonies that the wider public was introduced for the first time to the family of Turkmenbashi. Under the constitution, parliamentary speaker Ovezgeldy Atayev should have assumed the presidency. Instead, he was stripped of immunity and arrested, clearing the way for Berdimuhamedov to take the acting presidency. After assuming the presidency in 2007, Berdimuhamedov gradually abandoned the more eccentric elements of his predecessor's personality cult while building a political system centered on his own leadership. If Niyazov styled himself Turkmenbashi – Leader of All Turkmens – his successor adopted the title Arkadag, or Protector of the Nation. In February 2022, Berdimuhamedov unexpectedly announced that he would step down following an early presidential election scheduled for March 12. He explained the decision by saying it was time to "give the younger generation an opportunity to govern the country." Few doubted that he was referring to his son Serdar Berdimuhamedov, who by then had already occupied most of the key positions within the state hierarchy. That is precisely what happened. Serdar Berdimuhamedov became president, while his father moved to the chairmanship of the Halk Maslahaty, retaining the title of National Leader of the Turkmen People. Uzbekistan followed a similar pattern, although under different circumstances. Islam Karimov built a highly centralized presidential system that left virtually no room for political competition. This applied not only to political opponents, but also to those closest to the president. His eldest daughter, Gulnara Karimova, was placed under house arrest while her father was still alive. Following his death, she was convicted and remains imprisoned in Uzbekistan. When Karimov died in September 2016, reports of his death circulated for several days...

Russia's War in Ukraine

How the Russia–Ukraine War Is Reshaping Central Asia’s Geopolitical Balance

More than four years after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the conflict continues to alter political and economic relations across the former Soviet space. In an interview with The Times of Central Asia, Uzbek political scientist Mukhtor Nazirov examined Moscow’s evolving regional role, Central Asia’s search for wider external partnerships, and the areas in which Russia remains difficult to replace. “The war changed Russia,” Nazirov said. “It became more closed, more militarized, and its political logic increasingly became military. Central Asian countries suddenly found themselves dealing with a Russia that was no longer the same as it had been before the war.” Before 2022, Russia’s relations with Central Asia rested on long-established political, economic, and security ties. Since the invasion, international isolation and wartime pressures have complicated that relationship. “The war consumed everything,” Nazirov explained. “It influenced not only politics and the economy, but also public thinking, the country’s openness, its ideology, and the overall direction of the state. As Russia changed during the war, its dialogue with Central Asian countries became increasingly difficult.” “Central Asian states gained a moral justification to look for other options,” he said. “Russia is no longer the Russia it used to be.” Russia nevertheless remains deeply embedded in the region’s economy. Infrastructure, logistics networks, export routes, and labor migration still bind Central Asian states to the Russian market. Kazakhstan exports most of its oil through Russia’s Novorossiysk port, while trade from Uzbekistan and other countries continues to rely heavily on northern corridors. Millions of Central Asian citizens also work in Russia. “The economic foundation still exists,” Nazirov told TCA. “Much of Central Asia remains part of an economic structure that was formed during the Soviet period. Infrastructure is shared, and many export routes still pass through Russia.” However, the durability of Moscow’s influence is under closer scrutiny as other powers expand their regional presence. “Political closeness alone is not enough,” Nazirov said. “Any partnership eventually comes down to economics. If Russia wants to remain influential, it must have a strong economic foundation. If it cannot provide that, then others will naturally begin filling the gap.” China and the European Union have expanded their economic engagement as sanctions and wartime demands have constrained Russia. Interest has also grown in the Middle Corridor, or Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, which offers an alternative to routes through Russia. “The rhetoric surrounding the Middle Corridor became much stronger during the war,” he said. “The project already existed, but the war created momentum.” The EU’s Global Gateway initiative and new connectivity financing have given Central Asian governments additional channels for trade, investment, and transport. “This space is being filled partly by China and partly by the European Union,” he said. “They are proposing alternatives, and naturally Central Asian countries are turning toward those opportunities.” Russia remains the main destination for Central Asian labor migrants, although governments are pursuing employment opportunities in South Korea, Europe, and the Gulf states. “I would not say diversification has already taken place,” Nazirov...

Russia Migration Policy

Russia Migration Rules Tighten as Central Asian Work Entries Fall

Entries to Russia for work by citizens of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan fell by 15% in the first half of 2026 amid tighter migration rules and higher costs for workers. The Border Service of Russia’s Federal Security Service recorded about 1.9 million work-related entries by citizens of the three countries between January and June, down from more than 2.3 million in the same period of 2025, according to data published through Russia’s Unified Interdepartmental Information and Statistical System. The restrictions are also separating some migrant workers from their children. Since April 1, 2025, foreign children applying to Russian state schools have been required to prove that they are legally resident in the country and pass a Russian-language test. Those who fail cannot enroll and must wait at least three months before taking the test again. Rakhmat, a Tajik migrant worker preparing to bring his children, aged seven and nine, to Russia, told Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty that he might have to send them back to live with their grandparents if they fail. Tajikistan’s education minister has said that about 9,000 children have already returned from Russia after being denied school places. Russian Education Ministry figures cited by Asia-Plus show that the number of foreign children attending Russian schools fell by about 44,000 during the 2025–26 academic year. Enrollment among children from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan dropped by 27%, from 122,000 to 89,000. For adult migrants, tighter oversight increasingly comes through their phones. Since September 1, 2025, visa-free foreign nationals working in Moscow and the surrounding region have been required to register through the Amina mobile application. Its central function is to report a migrant’s place of residence while automatically transmitting the phone’s geolocation to the Russian Interior Ministry. Russian authorities present the system as a way to enforce migration rules and reduce corruption. Critics argue that continuous location tracking subjects foreign nationals to intrusive surveillance. Migrants who stop transmitting location data may be placed on Russia’s register of controlled persons, restricting their access to banking and other services and potentially leading to deportation. On September 1, 2026, the Amina requirement will be extended to adults from visa-free countries who remain in Moscow or the Moscow region for more than 90 days for purposes other than work, including foreign students. The experimental system remains limited to the capital region and does not yet apply across Russia. Kyrgyzstan’s Center for Employment of Citizens Abroad has published guidance explaining who must install Amina, what information it transmits, and how migrants can avoid breaching the new registration rules. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that Russia's tightening migration policy is prompting Central Asian countries to seek alternative labor markets while expanding employment opportunities at home.

Uzbekistan Football

Uzbekistan National Team Set for Youth Overhaul After World Cup, Says Cannavaro

Uzbekistan head coach Fabio Cannavaro has outlined plans to reshape the national team following its historic debut at the 2026 FIFA World Cup, saying the next phase will focus on refreshing the squad ahead of the AFC Asian Cup, promoting younger players and restoring the tactical approach he believes best suits the team. Speaking at a press briefing, the Italian coach dismissed reports that he had left the national team immediately after the World Cup, saying he remained with the squad until the last player departed. Cannavaro also rejected speculation about his salary and said he was prepared to take responsibility for the team's results, while defending his players against criticism, insisting they had "given everything" on the pitch. The central announcement of the briefing was confirmation that Uzbekistan is entering a new cycle. Cannavaro said several players had been included in the World Cup squad in recognition of their contribution to securing the country's first-ever qualification for the tournament, but added that the time had come to refresh the team. "I gave some players a kind of bonus for what they had done before. That bonus is over. Now we need to change some players," Cannavaro said. He added that younger footballers would be given greater opportunities during preparations for the Asian Cup. Cannavaro also acknowledged that not every decision made by the coaching staff had been successful. In particular, he admitted he may have made a mistake by changing the first-choice goalkeeper shortly before the World Cup began. At the same time, he stressed that he remained committed to rejuvenating the squad and creating stronger competition for places. Looking beyond the immediate future, Cannavaro argued that Uzbekistan's next step as a football nation depends on more players establishing themselves in Europe's top leagues. He pointed to Japan and Morocco as examples of national teams that have benefited from players gaining experience in elite European competitions before bringing that experience back to the international stage. As part of preparations for the AFC Asian Cup, Cannavaro said he wants Uzbekistan to arrange a series of friendlies against stronger opponents, including South Korea and Iran. He also plans to gradually return the team to a 4-3-3 formation and strengthen cooperation with the country's youth national teams. According to Cannavaro, the objective is not simply to build on Uzbekistan's first World Cup appearance, but to establish the national team as a regular participant at the world's biggest international tournaments.

Islam and National Identity

Dombra Dispute and Niqab Bans Fuel Religious Debate in Central Asia

Standing before a court in Aktobe in June, 35-year-old Azat Konys apologized to “the entire Kazakh people” for insulting one of the country’s most cherished cultural symbols. Two months earlier, during a TikTok livestream, he had declared the dombra forbidden under Islam, compared the two-stringed instrument to part of the devil’s anatomy and called clerics from Kazakhstan’s official Islamic authority “dogs of hell.” Konys asked the court not to imprison him. The judge instead sentenced him to three years and six months for inciting religious and national hatred. The controversy began when Konys cited the Hanafi school of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence, the dominant legal tradition among Muslims in Kazakhstan, to argue that the dombra and other stringed instruments, including the guitar and balalaika, were haram, meaning forbidden under Islamic law. The remarks caused particular anger because the dombra is more than a musical instrument in Kazakhstan: it has accompanied oral poetry and storytelling for generations and is officially celebrated as a symbol of cultural heritage and national identity. Police identified Konys after clips from the livestream circulated on social media and detained him in April. The case is an unusually stark example of how online religious disputes are spilling into legal and political life across Central Asia. Arguments that might once have remained within mosques or religious communities are now spreading through social media, forcing governments and official Islamic authorities alike to decide where religious expression ends and attacks on national culture begin. A more recent controversy arose in Kazakhstan’s Turkestan Region, where a 66-year-old guest at a toi, a traditional wedding feast, called for stricter adherence to Islamic law. He urged the organizers to separate men and women and remove music and alcohol from the celebration, while describing musicians as “heralds of Satan.” The video spread rapidly on social media, prompting nationwide debate. The man was detained and placed in a temporary detention facility for incitement of religious and social hatred. In a statement, the Ministry of Internal Affairs said that freedom of expression does not extend to statements that degrade the dignity of others or could provoke religious or social hostility. The Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kazakhstan (SAMK), the country’s main official Muslim body, later issued its own response. It stated that Islam does not prohibit music in itself and stressed that publicly insulting artists or women is inconsistent with Islamic ethics. Another controversy centered on Nauryz, the spring equinox holiday celebrated throughout Central Asia and across much of the Turkic and Iranian cultural world. In March, a blogger in the Almaty Region described the holiday as “non-Muslim” and argued that it should not be celebrated. Police opened a criminal case against him on suspicion of inciting religious hatred. Kazakhstan’s Prosecutor General’s Office subsequently warned of legal liability for statements attacking Nauryz and other national traditions. The SAMK, meanwhile, publicly celebrated Nauryz as a national holiday promoting social harmony and charitable acts. The debate soon spread beyond social media into politics and the entertainment industry. Producer and television presenter Bayan Alaguzova said...