• KZT/USD = 0.00218
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00218
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00218
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00218
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00218
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00218
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00218
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00218
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
01 September 2026

Viewing results 25 - 30 of 2233

Uzbekistan Plans Second Nuclear Power Plant Before First Is Ready

Uzbekistan will soon begin preparations for the construction of a second nuclear power plant (NPP), President Shavkat Mirziyoyev announced during an August 17 visit to Khorezm region. The announcement came a little more than two months after construction officially began on the country’s first NPP. The authorities have not yet disclosed where the new plant will be located or how much capacity it will have. They have also not named a technology partner. Discussing energy in connection with new industrial projects, Mirziyoyev said investors need an acceptable electricity price and a guarantee of uninterrupted supply. Uzbekistan is building its first NPP with the participation of Russia’s state nuclear corporation Rosatom. On June 4, first concrete was poured for the foundation of the first unit of the integrated NPP in Farish district, Jizzakh region, officially marking the start of construction. Mirziyoyev and Russian President Vladimir Putin launched the project by video link. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi also participated in the ceremony. The project itself has changed considerably over the past two years. In 2024, Uzbekistan and Russia agreed to build a small nuclear power plant with six RITM-200N reactors, each with a capacity of 55 MW. Tashkent later decided to combine small modular and large-scale nuclear generation at a single site. Under the current configuration, the Jizzakh project will have two large VVER-1000 units and two small RITM-200N units. The complex will have a total capacity of 2.11 GW and is expected to generate about 15.4 billion kWh of electricity annually. The first small reactor is expected to come online in 2029. The first large unit could begin operating in 2033, with the entire complex expected to be commissioned by 2035. Plans for a second NPP come as electricity demand is rising rapidly. Uzbekistan’s 2020–2030 electricity plan aimed to raise annual generation from 63.6 billion kWh to 120.8 billion kWh by 2030. A more recent government forecast puts electricity consumption at 121 billion kWh by 2035. Some of the growing demand is expected to be met by solar and wind power. Nuclear energy is intended to provide baseload generation, including for industry. Mirziyoyev specifically linked preparations for the second plant to investors’ need for a stable electricity supply. Uzbekistan is therefore expanding its nuclear program before its first reactor has entered operation. The country is continuing to develop the infrastructure and expertise needed for the new industry. Following a June review, the IAEA said Uzbekistan had made significant progress but needed to complete work on its nuclear regulatory body and finalize feasibility studies. So far, Mirziyoyev has said only that preparations for the second NPP will begin. Its cost, timetable, capacity, and technology have not been announced, nor has a potential contractor been named. The first NPP involves long-term cooperation with Russia’s nuclear industry. Rosatom is participating in the project, which will use its reactor technology. Mirziyoyev said in June that Uzbekistan planned further nuclear power projects with Russia, but whether the same model will be used for the second plant or Tashkent will consider...

Uzbekistan’s Alphabet Reform Revives a 33-Year-Old Debate

Uzbekistan began switching from Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet in 1993 and initially planned to complete the transition by 2000. Nearly 33 years later, both scripts are still widely used, and the country is preparing to revise its Latin alphabet again. On July 7, the lower house of Uzbekistan’s parliament approved a bill introducing a new version of the alphabet, with 28 letters and one apostrophe instead of the current 26 letters and three letter combinations, and sent it to the Senate. Literary scholar Dilbar Khaydarova told The Times of Central Asia that a reform originally intended to take seven years has stretched across a generation. She attributes the delay mainly to an inconsistent transition, with schools moving faster than publishers and much of the government. “After 30 or 31 years, these small corrections have prompted another reform,” she said. A Reform That Stretched Across Decades Uzbekistan adopted the law introducing a Latin-based alphabet in 1993. Schools were to use the new script first, while adults were expected to have opportunities to study it at workplaces and institutions. The transition was initially due to be completed by 2000. In 1995, the deadline was extended to 2005 and later postponed to 2010. The original alphabet was revised in 1995, when sh and ch were adopted and ng was listed separately. That revision also introduced the forms o‘ and g‘, establishing an alphabet of 26 letters and three letter combinations. Two Alphabets for One Country Schools switched to Latin, while Cyrillic remained common in government and the publishing industry. The media also continued using the script for years, and the Soviet-educated generation remained active in public institutions after 1993. As a result, children learned to write in Latin but continued to encounter Cyrillic in publications and official documents. The same script remained in use when they entered the workplace. “Even if we became literate in Latin, we also developed the ability to read and write in Cyrillic,” Khaydarova said. “Because the situation required it.” She describes this as the coexistence of “two policies or practices that did not correspond to each other.” This mismatch, she believes, largely explains why the transition has lasted for decades. That pattern persists, with some major publications using Latin while others continue publishing in Cyrillic. Khaydarova says the difference does not necessarily reflect opposition to the reform because publishers must consider their audiences’ habits. The Cost of the New Alphabet Implementing the revised alphabet will involve costs beyond school textbooks. Since 1993, Uzbekistan has accumulated a vast body of material in both Cyrillic and the current version of Latin. For publishers, this raises questions about whether existing publications should be converted to the revised script and who will pay for the work. “If they lose a significant share of their audience, there will be serious financial risks in the future,” Khaydarova said. Khaydarova believes the state will have to bear some of the cost by supporting publishers that convert existing materials to the revised script. “The more sources of...

Trump’s New Threat Against Iran Collides With Central Asia’s Economic Interests

U.S. President Donald Trump has threatened economic consequences for any country that continues to provide support to Iran, promising Tehran “Economic Warfare and Isolation on an unprecedented scale.” Washington has not yet announced specific new measures. For Central Asia, the warning comes as economic and transport links with Iran are developing. Kazakhstan is building its own terminal at Iran’s largest port, Tajikistan is discussing fuel purchases and new transport routes, Uzbekistan is trying to protect trade that passes through Iran, and Turkmenistan is expanding transport and energy cooperation with Tehran. Each country has its own reasons for developing these ties, but they share one concern: for landlocked Central Asia, Iran provides one of the few overland routes to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Washington’s attempt to tighten Iran’s economic isolation therefore affects not only the region’s relations with Tehran, but also its own plans to diversify trade and transit. None of this means that Central Asian governments are prepared to disregard U.S. sanctions or enter into a political confrontation with Washington on Tehran’s behalf. The threat of secondary restrictions could cause banks, carriers, and private companies to withdraw from individual transactions even without formal decisions by their governments. Trump has not yet explained exactly what instruments he intends to use to enforce the isolation he announced. Kazakhstan Looks to the Persian Gulf Iran intensified its work with Central Asia well before Trump’s latest threat. In mid-June, the Iranian Minister of Roads and Urban Development Farzaneh Sadegh visited Astana. In talks with Kazakhstan’s Deputy Prime Minister Serik Zhumangarin, the two sides noted that bilateral trade had increased by 26.4% in 2025 to $430.2 million. Astana and Tehran now want to raise it to $3 billion, using, among other things, the free trade agreement between Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union, of which Kazakhstan is a member. The plans go beyond trade. Freight traffic along the International North-South Transport Corridor, which links Russia and Central Asia with Iran and Persian Gulf ports, rose by 12% in 2025 to 3.5 million metric tons. Rail freight between Kazakhstan and Iran also increased by 69%. Astana’s main interest lies even farther south. Iran has allowed Kazakhstan to establish its own transport and logistics terminal at Shahid Rajaee in Bandar Abbas, the country’s largest commercial port. On June 28, the two sides signed a Build-Operate-Transfer agreement. It runs for 27 years, with two years allocated for construction and another 25 for operation. Commercial operations are scheduled to begin in the project’s third year. For Kazakhstan, this is more than simply an overseas terminal. Its Foreign Ministry explicitly links the project to opening access for Kazakh cargo to markets in the Persian Gulf, South and Southeast Asia, and East Africa. In July, Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev again reaffirmed Astana’s interest in the project during a visit to Iran. The ministry also cited a 26.4% increase in bilateral trade in 2025 to $430.2 million. Astana is also considering another Iranian port, Chabahar, on the Indian Ocean....

Pasture Gives Way to Solar Power in Uzbekistan as Audit Remains Unpublished

Each spring, nine households grazed livestock on a stretch of desert pasture in Uzbekistan’s Bukhara Region. The land is now the site of the Nur Bukhara solar and battery plant, but an audit intended to show whether promised livelihood protections worked remains unpublished. Seven of the households came from the nearby settlement of Kirilishon and used the state-owned pasture without permits or formal agreements. A herder and his partner, identified publicly only as H1 and H2, grazed animals there through a short-term agreement with Alat Qorakolchilik LLC, a local livestock company holding a sublease on the land. The nine households included 43 people. The plant began operating in September 2025 and was inaugurated that December. The Uzbek government awarded the project to Masdar, an Abu Dhabi-based renewable energy developer that built the facility and now operates it. Nur Bukhara combines a 250-megawatt solar plant with a 63-megawatt battery system capable of storing 126 megawatt-hours of electricity. Masdar says it can supply more than 55,000 homes, while the World Bank described it as Central Asia’s first utility-scale renewable energy project to combine solar generation with battery storage. During a consultation on May 7, 2023, Kirilishon residents asked for the solar plant to be moved. If construction went ahead, they wanted replacement grazing land near the village and priority consideration for project jobs. H1 and H2 had a documented right to use the pasture, while the seven Kirilishon households did not. However, the safeguards required by Nur Bukhara’s international lenders covered both formal and informal users whose livelihoods would be disrupted by the project. Masdar commissioned a livelihood restoration plan setting out the assistance the households were to receive before construction cut off access to the site. It identified about 260 hectares of replacement pasture, equivalent to one square mile, for H1 and H2. Alat Qorakolchilik also identified approximately 1,000 hectares, or 3.9 square miles, of additional land available to herders. The seven informal households were to be allowed to use replacement pasture without obtaining formal agreements. The larger tract was not described as land reserved exclusively for those households. The published map did not record which final area each household would receive. The livelihood measures also included priority access to project employment and additional support for households considered vulnerable. In an official statement to The Times of Central Asia, a Masdar spokesperson said replacement grazing arrangements were provided before access to the project site was restricted, “maintaining equivalent grazing conditions,” and that “several members of affected households obtained project-related employment opportunities.” The statement cited monitoring by international lenders and an independent third-party review, with the completion audit finalized in September 2025. It reported no related complaints from affected households through the project’s grievance mechanism. The completion audit was not included with Masdar’s response. As of August 20, 2026, it was also absent from Masdar’s Nur Bukhara page and the International Finance Corporation’s project disclosure. Simonyan Consulting, which says it was engaged by the project company to conduct the audit, lists the assignment as “2025–ongoing.” Without the audit,...

Tashkent to Host Uzbekistan’s First Swimming World Cup Event

Tashkent will host a World Aquatics Swimming World Cup event for the first time from October 8 to 10, as Uzbekistan prepares to join the international swimming circuit. The competition will be the second leg of the 2026 Swimming World Cup, which World Aquatics has branded the Silk Road Tour. The series begins in Baku on October 1 before moving to Tashkent and concluding in Astana from October 15 to 17. More than 750 swimmers representing over 50 national federations are expected to compete across the three events. The series has a total prize pool of $1.2 million, with additional bonuses available for world records and swimmers who win the same event at all three stops. The tour will also serve as preparation for the World Aquatics Swimming Championships (25m), which will be held in Beijing from December 1 to 6. Competition in Tashkent will take place at the Aquatic Palace in the capital’s new Olympic City. World Aquatics officials inspected the venue in January as preparations for the event continued. “Taking the Swimming World Cup to Uzbekistan for the first time ever is a very exciting milestone for World Aquatics,” World Aquatics President Husain Al Musallam said. Tashkent has previously hosted international competitions in other aquatic disciplines, including World Aquatics artistic swimming events in 2017 and 2018. The October competition will mark Uzbekistan’s first appearance as a host on the Swimming World Cup circuit.

Tashkent’s Rise Reshapes Central Asia’s Business Landscape

Tashkent is changing faster than it can adjust to its own growth. The city is already pressing against the limits of its existing airport; a vast new city designed for up to two million people is being built alongside it, and a separate financial jurisdiction drawing on English common law is being created. Uzbekistan is opening up further to foreign investment, and nearly two-thirds of the country’s foreign-invested enterprises are already concentrated in the capital. But being the leading business city in your own country and becoming a regional hub are not the same thing. Tashkent already has strong competitors in Central Asia. Given that competition, it is more useful to examine why companies are choosing Tashkent now and what the city still lacks than to declare it the region’s new business capital. As of July 1, 2026, Uzbekistan had 20,502 operating enterprises with foreign investment. Their number had increased about 1.4 times over five years. China accounted for the largest number, with 6,060 companies, followed by Russia with 3,454, Turkey with 2,293, and Kazakhstan with 1,307. As of June 1, 12,480 of the 19,921 enterprises with foreign investment then operating in Uzbekistan were located in Tashkent. That was almost 63%. Why Tashkent? Part of the answer is obvious: the institutions and services businesses rely on are concentrated there, from government and finance to professional services, technology firms, and skilled workers. That creates a network effect: companies come because partners, clients, and suppliers are already there. But the capital had roughly the same administrative advantages ten years ago without attracting business on anything like the current scale. What changed first was Uzbekistan’s economy itself. After 2016, the country began moving away from its previous closed economic model. One of the first major steps was currency liberalization in 2017. Changes followed in trade, taxation, privatization, and the treatment of foreign investors. The state still plays an enormous role in the economy, but it has become considerably easier for foreign private businesses to operate. Uzbekistan’s GDP grew by 7.7% in 2025. The IMF expects growth of about 6.8% in 2026, while pointing to a longstanding problem: the state’s large footprint in the economy, including major state-owned enterprises and banks, continues to constrain competition and private-sector development. The combination of rapid growth and a gradually more open economy has benefited Tashkent more than any other city in the country. Uzbekistan also has an advantage that cannot be created by government decree. With a population of about 38.5 million, it is Central Asia’s most populous country and has a large domestic consumer base. It is also the region’s only country that borders all four other Central Asian republics. For an international company, Tashkent can serve both as an office for the Uzbek market and as a gateway to neighboring countries. Now, Tashkent is entering territory long occupied by others. For decades, Almaty has concentrated banks, international representative offices, private companies, and professional talent. In 2018, the Astana International Financial Centre began operations, with a...