• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00209 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10523 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00209 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10523 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00209 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10523 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00209 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10523 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00209 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10523 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00209 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10523 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00209 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10523 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00209 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10523 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%

Viewing results 109 - 114 of 1163

Central Asia Watches as Venezuela Drama Unfolds  

Governments in Central Asia have not made any public comment, so far, on the U.S. military operation that captured Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, at a time when relations between Central Asian countries and the administration of President Donald Trump are growing closer. The operation on Saturday involved more than 150 American aircraft and extracted Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, from their compound in Caracas, prompting celebrations from many Venezuelan expatriates who viewed Maduro as a dictator, criticism from countries including Russia and China, and concerns that the complex attack violated international law. Additional questions about Venezuela’s sovereignty emerged after Trump said the United States will “run” the country ahead of a transition and that American oil companies will help to rebuild its oil infrastructure. The U.S. has argued that Maduro himself effectively hijacked Venezuelan sovereignty through electoral fraud, repression and by allegedly funneling illegal drugs to the U.S. Maduro, who has been indicted on narco-terrorism and other charges, denies the allegations. Countries in Central Asia are more than 10,000 kilometers away from Venezuela and their trade with the Latin American country is minimal, suggesting the uncertain and evolving situation there lies far outside their immediate area of interest. In May, Tokayev met Maduro in Moscow and invited him to visit Kazakhstan after describing Venezuela as an important partner. “However, he acknowledged that, due to objective reasons, significant achievements in bilateral cooperation have yet to be realized,” Tokayev’s office said at the time. Still, Tokayev and other Central Asian leaders have spoken in general terms of their adherence to United Nations principles of sovereignty, an issue that is being vigorously debated in some international circles after the U.S. military operation. U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres, who visited Central Asia in 2024 and 2025, has said that the U.S. military operation that extracted Maduro to New York constitutes a "dangerous precedent" and that he was concerned that the rules of international law had not been respected. The U.S. capture of the leader of oil-rich Venezuela has not had a major impact for now on global oil prices, indicating that Central Asia’s oil and natural gas producers will not see any big fallout. Even so, at a time of ongoing geopolitical tension, a major shock or event in one region could influence distant regions in ways that are difficult to discern. Russia and China, which are close trading partners with Central Asia and nurtured trade and political ties with Maduro’s government, condemned the U.S. military operation in Venezuela. But the Central Asian countries – Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan – have not joined in the criticism, much as they have refrained from publicly supporting any side over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Central Asia’s balancing act reflects efforts to maintain good ties with major powers even when they are in conflict, and comes during a period of increasing trade collaboration with the United States. The five leaders from Central Asia traveled to Washington in November for a summit with Trump, who later invited...

Kazakhstan’s MOST Ventures Invests in Uzbek Startup Bito, Valuing Company at $10 Million

Kazakhstan-based venture capital firm MOST Ventures has acquired a stake in Uzbekistan’s Bito, marking a significant cross-border investment in Central Asia’s growing tech ecosystem. The deal, completed in Tashkent on December 25 as part of a Bridge funding round, values the B2B software company at $10 million, a milestone that reflects rising investor confidence in Uzbekistan’s startup landscape. Bito is a business-to-business software-as-a-service (SaaS) company and a resident of Startup Garage, a leading Central Asian venture studio and accelerator. The company offers a digital ecosystem that integrates enterprise resource planning (ERP), financial technology, and artificial intelligence into a unified operating system tailored for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Its platform allows businesses to manage sales, finance, inventory, HR, payments, installment services, and analytics, all in one interface aimed at improving operational transparency and decision-making. The Bridge round represents a pivotal moment in Bito’s growth trajectory. The company reported that its valuation has tripled over the past ten months, though it has not disclosed the total amount raised. The investment will fund continued product development and regional expansion, with a primary focus on the Uzbek and Kazakh markets. As part of the transaction, Startup Garage partially exited its position in Bito. The accelerator played a crucial role in the company’s early-stage development, supporting product design, market entry, and initial scaling. Startup Garage founder Mukhammad Khalil said the deal highlights the increasing maturity of Central Asia’s startup ecosystem and its ability to attract institutional capital. “This transaction shows that companies in the region can secure funding based on strong fundamentals and sustainable growth,” he said. Bito founder Uchqun Tulavov called the investment a validation of the company’s strategic vision. “We are not simply building a product, we are setting a new standard for digital infrastructure for small and medium-sized businesses across the region,” he said. “The support of MOST Ventures confirms our direction as we integrate ERP, fintech, and AI into a unified operating platform.” Following the funding round, Bito plans to accelerate its regional footprint while consolidating its role as a leading B2B SaaS provider in Central Asia.

Beshbarmak, Pilaf, and Olivier Salad: What Will Be Served on New Year’s Eve Tables in Central Asia

New Year remains one of the most significant holidays in Central Asia. While its scale and prominence have gradually declined due to rising religiosity, many residents still regard it as the foremost secular and ideology-free celebration of the year. Across the region, households prepare their most beloved dishes to ring in the occasion. No New Year Without Olivier Salad For many families, traditional fare is an essential part of New Year’s Eve. Olivier salad has long been a staple of the holiday table. Originally created in the 1860s by a French chef in Russia, the dish once featured ingredients such as hazel grouse and seafood. Over time, particularly during the Soviet era of shortages, the recipe evolved. Today, Olivier salad typically includes beef, chicken (or boiled sausage), potatoes, green peas, pickled cucumbers, and mayonnaise. It is usually prepared in large batches to ensure there is enough for all guests. Other popular salads include herring under a fur coat, vinaigrette, and “Tenderness”, hearty dishes that can leave guests too full for main courses. Even in modest households, red caviar often finds its way to the table, adding a touch of festivity and indulgence. Kazakhstan: Beshbarmak with a Twist In Kazakhstan, beshbarmak remains the centerpiece of the New Year’s feast, as it is for most major celebrations. Traditionally, the dish combines three cuts of horse meat, kazy, karta, and zhay, served with flat noodles and onions. However, some families are adapting their menus in line with the Chinese zodiac. As the Year of the Red Horse approaches, online advice has suggested avoiding horse meat out of respect for the symbolic animal. A vegan version of beshbarmak, featuring mushrooms and pumpkin, is gaining traction. Baked koktal fish is another showpiece dish, while kuydak (lamb with potatoes and onions) and khan syrbaz (a rich stew of lamb, vegetables, barley, and broth) are popular additions. Desserts often include traditional fermented milk products such as zhent, katyk, and irimshik, and the table is rarely without kumys, a fermented mare’s milk beverage. Uzbekistan: Pilaf Reigns Supreme In Uzbekistan, New Year is celebrated with great enthusiasm. According to folklore, Korbobo, a local version of Santa Claus, arrives on a donkey with his granddaughter Korgyz to distribute gifts to well-behaved children. Pilaf, or plov, is the dominant holiday dish. Made with rice, carrots, onions, meat, and spices, regional variations might include raisins or quince for added sweetness. Each area boasts its own version of the national favorite. Samsas, meat-filled pastries baked in a tandoor, are also served, as are manti, large, steamed dumplings filled with lamb, beef, or pumpkin. Other popular dishes include kazan-kabob (fried meat and potatoes). For dessert, chak-chak (fried dough with honey) and halva (made from sesame, semolina, or nuts) are perennial favorites. Kyrgyzstan: Boorsoki and Beshbarmak In Kyrgyzstan, beshbarmak, prepared with either horse meat or lamb, is also a central dish. Families commonly serve manti, baked chicken, and boorsoki (known in Kazakhstan as baursaki), fried dough balls that are a holiday staple. Other meat-based specialties...

2025: The Year Central Asia Stepped Onto the Global Stage

For much of the post-Soviet era, Central Asia occupied a peripheral place in global affairs. It mattered to its immediate neighbors, but rarely shaped wider debates. In 2025, that changed in visible ways. The region became harder to ignore, largely not because of ideology or alignments, but because of assets that the world increasingly needs: energy, minerals, transit routes, and political access across Eurasia. One of the clearest signs came in April, when the European Union and the leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan met in Samarkand for their first summit at the head-of-state level. The meeting concluded with a joint declaration upgrading relations to a strategic partnership, with a focus on transport connectivity, energy security, and critical raw materials. The document marked a shift in how Brussels views Central Asia, moving beyond development assistance toward geopolitical cooperation, as outlined in the official EU–Central Asia summit joint declaration. European interest is rooted in necessity. Russia’s war in Ukraine has forced EU governments to rethink energy imports, supply chains, and overland trade routes. Central Asia sits astride the most viable alternatives that bypass Russian territory. It also holds resources essential to Europe’s green transition, including uranium and a range of industrial metals. The region’s leaders spent much of the year framing their diplomacy around these tangible advantages, rather than abstract political alignments. The United States followed a similar track. Through the C5+1 format, Washington deepened engagement with all five Central Asian states, with particular emphasis on economic cooperation and supply-chain resilience. A key element has been the Critical Minerals Dialogue, launched to connect Central Asian producers with Western markets. This initiative formed part of a broader U.S. effort to diversify access to strategic materials and reduce dependence on Russia and China. Russia remained a central but changing presence in Central Asia throughout 2025. Economic ties, labor migration, and shared infrastructure ensured that Moscow continued to matter across the region. At the same time, however, Russia’s war in Ukraine constrained its ability to act as the dominant external power it once was. Central Asian governments maintained pragmatic relations with Moscow, but they increasingly treated Russia as one partner among several rather than the default reference point. Trade continued, security cooperation persisted, and political dialogue remained active, yet the balance shifted toward hedging rather than dependence. Uranium sits at the center of this shift, with the United States having banned imports of certain Russian uranium products under federal law, with waivers set to expire no earlier than January 1, 2028. As Washington restructures its nuclear fuel supply chain, Central Asia’s role has grown sharply. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s 2024 Uranium Marketing Annual Report, Kazakhstan supplied 24% of uranium delivered to U.S. reactor operators, while Uzbekistan accounted for about 9%. Canada and Australia remain major suppliers, but the Central Asian share is now strategic rather than marginal. That economic weight translated into political visibility. In December, U.S. President Donald Trump said he would invite Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to attend...

Kazakhstan vs. Uzbekistan: A Footballing Derby with an Uncertain Outcome

The Uzbekistan national football team has qualified for the 2026 World Cup, which will take place across three North American countries: the U.S., Canada, and Mexico. Meanwhile, one of Kazakhstan’s leading clubs, FC Kairat Almaty, continues to gain experience competing in the UEFA Champions League. Football in Central Asia has become a mirror of the region’s growing economic and political ambitions, with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan at the forefront. Their rivalry, which dates back to the Soviet era, has adapted to this new chapter. Kazakhstan and the Road to Europe Matches between Almaty's Kairat and Tashkent's Pakhtakor were once marquee events during the Soviet era, filling stadiums and energizing fans across the republics. Following the collapse of the USSR, however, the footballing paths of these two historical rivals began to diverge. Initially, both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan joined the Asian Football Confederation (AFC), which includes countries from across Asia and parts of the Pacific, including former Oceania Football Confederation members such as Australia and Guam. Kazakhstan became a full member of the AFC in 1992, followed by Uzbekistan in 1994. However, Kazakhstan soon grew disillusioned with the level of competition within the AFC and began to explore other avenues. Its early attempts to join UEFA were rebuffed in the mid-1990s. Rakhat Aliyev, then head of the Football Union of Kazakhstan and son-in-law of former President Nursultan Nazarbayev, later described the process as being dismissed “without really getting to the heart of the matter.” Despite this, both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan quickly showed they were a cut above most AFC members at the time. Kazakhstan won the inaugural Central Asian Cup in 1992, while Uzbekistan claimed gold at the 1994 Asian Games in Hiroshima, defeating China 4-2 in the final. Eventually, Kazakhstan succeeded in joining UEFA. Spearheaded by Aliyev, the Football Union of Kazakhstan (FSC) lobbied hard for admission, culminating in meetings with FIFA and UEFA presidents Lennart Johansson and Joseph Blatter in Moscow in late 2000 and early 2001. The AFC issued a statement on May 10, 2001, allowing Kazakhstan to make its own decision, and five days later Johansson confirmed that UEFA would welcome Kazakhstan as its 52nd member. "Joining UEFA has given all of us who work in football a powerful boost," Aliyev said at the time. "We will strive to use this momentum to raise the level of our national football." Uzbekistan and the Central Asian Football Association Unlike Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan chose to remain in the AFC, where it has steadily risen in prominence. In 2014, it became a founding member of the Central Asian Football Association (CAFA), a regional sub-group within the AFC. Officially operational since 2015, CAFA also includes Afghanistan, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. The organization is currently chaired by Rustam Emomali, son of Tajik President Emomali Rahmon. Uzbekistan is ranked second in the CAFA, behind Iran, and has consistently reached the quarterfinals of the AFC Asian Cup in 2004, 2007, 2015, and 2023. Much of this success is due to sustained investment in youth development, training...

Trump’s G20 Invitations: Why Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan Matter

On December 23, President Donald Trump said he would invite Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to attend the United States–hosted 2026 G20 summit in Miami. The meeting is planned at Trump National Doral. The announcement followed separate telephone calls with Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, which Trump described as focused on peace and expanded trade, and cooperation. The G20 is a group of major economies, with membership based mainly on large nominal GDP and global economic importance, collectively representing about 85% of global GDP. Kazakhstan is ranked roughly 50th in the world by nominal GDP, at approximately $300 billion, while Uzbekistan is ranked around 62nd, with a nominal GDP of about $137–140 billion. According to Polish radio, the president of Poland stated that his country would also be on the guest list. Poland is the world’s 21st-largest economy. The G20 is a forum, not a treaty body. Leaders’ summits include member governments and a limited number of host-selected guest countries. Invitations to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan would place their leaders physically at the table with G20 heads of state, allowing them to be seen, heard, and recognized by other leaders, without conferring membership or a formal role in shaping the summit agenda. On average, the host invites six to seven guests. One official host-country explainer notes that guest invitations allow non-members to bring their own perspectives. For them, the significance of attending is access, not membership. What Washington Wants and What Can Be Transacted The host typically uses the guest invitations to signal which countries and regions they regard as priorities. U.S. interest in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan rests on an immediate material basis. The United States is rebuilding its nuclear-fuel supply chain away from Russian-origin material. Federal law now bans imports of certain Russian uranium products, with waivers terminating no later than January 1, 2028. U.S. agencies have been explicit that supply diversification is a policy objective. In 2024, Kazakhstan-origin material accounted for 24% of uranium delivered to U.S. owners and operators, while Uzbekistan-origin material accounted for about 9%. Kazakhstan’s structural advantage is scale and reliability. It remains the world’s leading uranium producer, with 2024 output around 23,270 metric tons of uranium and the largest share of global mine production. Astana has also signaled an interest in moving beyond extraction toward higher value-added fuel-cycle activity. Uzbekistan’s advantage is growth potential and its fit with Western joint-venture structures. Its uranium sector has attracted major external entrants, including Orano’s South Djengeldi joint venture Nurlikum Mining with the state partner Navoiyuran to develop a new mine alongside an Itochu (Japan) minority stake. The second instrument is the resource-focused diplomacy under the C5+1 umbrella. The State Department frames the C5+1 as organized around economy, energy, and security, within which framework it has elevated critical minerals to a dedicated track. The United States launched a C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue in early 2024, and subsequent U.S. statements have described it as a vehicle for geological exploration, mining, processing, and investment opportunities across the region. This...